This reverts commit 7a25a0a94c which is
commit 39ff83f2f6cc5cc1458dfcea9697f96338210beb upstream.
Arnd reports that this needs more review before being merged into all of
the trees.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAK8P3a0z5jE=Z3Ps5bFTCFT7CHZR1JQ8VhdntDJAfsUxSPCcEw@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org>
Cc: Lukas Hannen <lukas.hannen@opensource.tttech-industrial.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit c322a963d5 which is
commit 406dd42bd1ba0c01babf9cde169bb319e52f6147 upstream.
It is reported to cause regressions. A proposed fix has been posted,
but it is not in a released kernel yet. So just revert this from the
stable release so that the bug is fixed. If it's really needed we can
add it back in in a future release.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87ilz1pwaq.fsf@wylie.me.uk
Reported-by: "Alan J. Wylie" <alan@wylie.me.uk>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit b3fa499d72 which is
commit b1a811633f7321cf1ae2bb76a66805b7720e44c9 upstream.
The backport of this is reported to be causing some problems, so revert
this for now until they are worked out.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CACPK8XfUWoOHr-0RwRoYoskia4fbAbZ7DYf5wWBnv6qUnGq18w@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This reverts commit abbcd61d09.
Botched backport, dropping to reword for next release.
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit aaedb9e00e5400220a8871180d23a83e67f29f63 upstream.
Since a few kernel releases the Pogoplug 4 has crashed like this
during boot:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000002
(...)
[<c04116ec>] (strlen) from [<c00ead80>] (kstrdup+0x1c/0x4c)
[<c00ead80>] (kstrdup) from [<c04591d8>] (__clk_register+0x44/0x37c)
[<c04591d8>] (__clk_register) from [<c04595ec>] (clk_hw_register+0x20/0x44)
[<c04595ec>] (clk_hw_register) from [<c045bfa8>] (__clk_hw_register_mux+0x198/0x1e4)
[<c045bfa8>] (__clk_hw_register_mux) from [<c045c050>] (clk_register_mux_table+0x5c/0x6c)
[<c045c050>] (clk_register_mux_table) from [<c0acf3e0>] (kirkwood_clk_muxing_setup.constprop.0+0x13c/0x1ac)
[<c0acf3e0>] (kirkwood_clk_muxing_setup.constprop.0) from [<c0aceae0>] (of_clk_init+0x12c/0x214)
[<c0aceae0>] (of_clk_init) from [<c0ab576c>] (time_init+0x20/0x2c)
[<c0ab576c>] (time_init) from [<c0ab3d18>] (start_kernel+0x3dc/0x56c)
[<c0ab3d18>] (start_kernel) from [<00000000>] (0x0)
Code: e3130020 1afffffb e12fff1e c08a1078 (e5d03000)
This is because the "powersave" mux clock 0 was provided in an unterminated
array, which is required by the loop in the driver:
/* Count, allocate, and register clock muxes */
for (n = 0; desc[n].name;)
n++;
Here n will go out of bounds and then call clk_register_mux() on random
memory contents after the mux clock.
Fix this by terminating the array with a blank entry.
Fixes: 105299381d ("cpufreq: kirkwood: use the powersave multiplexer")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Cc: Chris Packham <chris.packham@alliedtelesis.co.nz>
Cc: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@bootlin.com>
Cc: Sebastian Hesselbarth <sebastian.hesselbarth@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210814235514.403426-1-linus.walleij@linaro.org
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 79fad92f2e596f5a8dd085788a24f540263ef887 upstream.
Currently there are (at least) two problems in the way pwm_bl starts
managing the enable_gpio pin. Both occur when the backlight is initially
off and the driver finds the pin not already in output mode and, as a
result, unconditionally switches it to output-mode and asserts the signal.
Problem 1: This could cause the backlight to flicker since, at this stage
in driver initialisation, we have no idea what the PWM and regulator are
doing (an unconfigured PWM could easily "rest" at 100% duty cycle).
Problem 2: This will cause us not to correctly honour the
post_pwm_on_delay (which also risks flickers).
Fix this by moving the code to configure the GPIO output mode until after
we have examines the handover state. That allows us to initialize
enable_gpio to off if the backlight is currently off and on if the
backlight is on.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Tested-by: Marek Vasut <marex@denx.de>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8510505d55e194d3f6c9644c9f9d12c4f6b0395a upstream.
MD5 is a weak digest algorithm that shouldn't be used for cryptographic
operation. It hinders the efficiency of a patch set that aims to limit
the digests allowed for the extended file attribute namely security.ima.
MD5 is no longer a requirement for IMA, nor should it be used there.
The sole place where we still use the MD5 algorithm inside IMA is setting
the ima_hash algorithm to MD5, if the user supplies 'ima_hash=md5'
parameter on the command line. With commit ab60368ab6 ("ima: Fallback
to the builtin hash algorithm"), setting "ima_hash=md5" fails gracefully
when CRYPTO_MD5 is not set:
ima: Can not allocate md5 (reason: -2)
ima: Allocating md5 failed, going to use default hash algorithm sha256
Remove the CRYPTO_MD5 dependency for IMA.
Signed-off-by: THOBY Simon <Simon.THOBY@viveris.fr>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: include commit number in patch description for
stable.]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.17
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 59bda8ecee2ffc6a602b7bf2b9e43ca669cdbdcd upstream.
Callers of fuse_writeback_range() assume that the file is ready for
modification by the server in the supplied byte range after the call
returns.
If there's a write that extends the file beyond the end of the supplied
range, then the file needs to be extended to at least the end of the range,
but currently that's not done.
There are at least two cases where this can cause problems:
- copy_file_range() will return short count if the file is not extended
up to end of the source range.
- FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE | FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE will not extend the file,
hence the region may not be fully allocated.
Fix by flushing writes from the start of the range up to the end of the
file. This could be optimized if the writes are non-extending, etc, but
it's probably not worth the trouble.
Fixes: a2bc923629 ("fuse: fix copy_file_range() in the writeback case")
Fixes: 6b1bdb56b17c ("fuse: allow fallocate(FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE)")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.2
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 76224355db7570cbe6b6f75c8929a1558828dd55 upstream.
fuse_finish_open() will be called with FUSE_NOWRITE in case of atomic
O_TRUNC. This can deadlock with fuse_wait_on_page_writeback() in
fuse_launder_page() triggered by invalidate_inode_pages2().
Fix by replacing invalidate_inode_pages2() in fuse_finish_open() with a
truncate_pagecache() call. This makes sense regardless of FOPEN_KEEP_CACHE
or fc->writeback cache, so do it unconditionally.
Reported-by: Xie Yongji <xieyongji@bytedance.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+bea44a5189836d956894@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: e4648309b8 ("fuse: truncate pending writes on O_TRUNC")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f7782bb8d818d8f47c26b22079db10599922787a upstream.
Clear nested.pi_pending on nested VM-Enter even if L2 will run without
posted interrupts enabled. If nested.pi_pending is left set from a
previous L2, vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() will pick up the
stale flag and exit to userspace with an "internal emulation error" due
the new L2 not having a valid nested.pi_desc.
Arguably, vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() should first check for
posted interrupts being enabled, but it's also completely reasonable that
KVM wouldn't screw up a fundamental flag. Not to mention that the mere
existence of nested.pi_pending is a long-standing bug as KVM shouldn't
move the posted interrupt out of the IRR until it's actually processed,
e.g. KVM effectively drops an interrupt when it performs a nested VM-Exit
with a "pending" posted interrupt. Fixing the mess is a future problem.
Prior to vmx_complete_nested_posted_interrupt() interpreting a null PI
descriptor as an error, this was a benign bug as the null PI descriptor
effectively served as a check on PI not being enabled. Even then, the
new flow did not become problematic until KVM started checking the result
of kvm_check_nested_events().
Fixes: 705699a139 ("KVM: nVMX: Enable nested posted interrupt processing")
Fixes: 966eefb89657 ("KVM: nVMX: Disable vmcs02 posted interrupts if vmcs12 PID isn't mappable")
Fixes: 47d3530f86c0 ("KVM: x86: Exit to userspace when kvm_check_nested_events fails")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210810144526.2662272-1-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d9130a2dfdd4b21736c91b818f87dbc0ccd1e757 upstream.
When MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST is written by guest due to TSC ADJUST feature
especially there's a big tsc warp (like a new vCPU is hot-added into VM
which has been up for a long time), tsc_offset is added by a large value
then go back to guest. This causes system time jump as tsc_timestamp is
not adjusted in the meantime and pvclock monotonic character.
To fix this, just notify kvm to update vCPU's guest time before back to
guest.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zelin Deng <zelin.deng@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1619576521-81399-2-git-send-email-zelin.deng@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a3e03bc1368c1bc16e19b001fc96dc7430573cc8 upstream.
While in practice vcpu->vcpu_idx == vcpu->vcp_id is often true, it may
not always be, and we must not rely on this. Reason is that KVM decides
the vcpu_idx, userspace decides the vcpu_id, thus the two might not
match.
Currently kvm->arch.idle_mask is indexed by vcpu_id, which implies
that code like
for_each_set_bit(vcpu_id, kvm->arch.idle_mask, online_vcpus) {
vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, vcpu_id);
do_stuff(vcpu);
}
is not legit. Reason is that kvm_get_vcpu expects an vcpu_idx, not an
vcpu_id. The trouble is, we do actually use kvm->arch.idle_mask like
this. To fix this problem we have two options. Either use
kvm_get_vcpu_by_id(vcpu_id), which would loop to find the right vcpu_id,
or switch to indexing via vcpu_idx. The latter is preferable for obvious
reasons.
Let us make switch from indexing kvm->arch.idle_mask by vcpu_id to
indexing it by vcpu_idx. To keep gisa_int.kicked_mask indexed by the
same index as idle_mask lets make the same change for it as well.
Fixes: 1ee0bc559d ("KVM: s390: get rid of local_int array")
Signed-off-by: Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Bornträger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.15+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210827125429.1912577-1-pasic@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 527f721478bce3f49b513a733bacd19d6f34b08c upstream.
The recent commit
064855a69003 ("x86/resctrl: Fix default monitoring groups reporting")
caused a RHEL build failure with an uninitialized variable warning
treated as an error because it removed the default case snippet.
The RHEL Makefile uses '-Werror=maybe-uninitialized' to force possibly
uninitialized variable warnings to be treated as errors. This is also
reported by smatch via the 0day robot.
The error from the RHEL build is:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c: In function ‘__mon_event_count’:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c:261:12: error: ‘m’ may be used
uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
m->chunks += chunks;
^~
The upstream Makefile does not build using '-Werror=maybe-uninitialized'.
So, the problem is not seen there. Fix the problem by putting back the
default case snippet.
[ bp: note that there's nothing wrong with the code and other compilers
do not trigger this warning - this is being done just so the RHEL compiler
is happy. ]
Fixes: 064855a69003 ("x86/resctrl: Fix default monitoring groups reporting")
Reported-by: Terry Bowman <Terry.Bowman@amd.com>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/162949631908.23903.17090272726012848523.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit bb2853a6a421a052268eee00fd5d3f6b3504b2b1 upstream.
The ops->receive_buf() may be accessed concurrently from these two
functions. If the driver flushes data to the line discipline
receive_buf() method while tiocsti() is waiting for the
ops->receive_buf() to finish its work, the data race will happen.
For example:
tty_ioctl |tty_ldisc_receive_buf
->tioctsi | ->tty_port_default_receive_buf
| ->tty_ldisc_receive_buf
->hci_uart_tty_receive | ->hci_uart_tty_receive
->h4_recv | ->h4_recv
In this case, the h4 receive buffer will be overwritten by the
latecomer, and we will lost the data.
Hence, change tioctsi() function to use the exclusive lock interface
from tty_buffer to avoid the data race.
Reported-by: syzbot+97388eb9d31b997fe1d0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nguyen Dinh Phi <phind.uet@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210823000641.2082292-1-phind.uet@gmail.com
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 39ff83f2f6cc5cc1458dfcea9697f96338210beb upstream.
timespec64_ns() prevents multiplication overflows by comparing the seconds
value of the timespec to KTIME_SEC_MAX. If the value is greater or equal it
returns KTIME_MAX.
But that check casts the signed seconds value to unsigned which makes the
comparision true for all negative values and therefore return wrongly
KTIME_MAX.
Negative second values are perfectly valid and required in some places,
e.g. ptp_clock_adjtime().
Remove the cast and add a check for the negative boundary which is required
to prevent undefined behaviour due to multiplication underflow.
Fixes: cb47755725da ("time: Prevent undefined behaviour in timespec64_to_ns()")'
Signed-off-by: Lukas Hannen <lukas.hannen@opensource.tttech-industrial.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/AM6PR01MB541637BD6F336B8FFB72AF80EEC69@AM6PR01MB5416.eurprd01.prod.exchangelabs.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e042aa532c84d18ff13291d00620502ce7a38dda upstream.
In 7fedb63a8307 ("bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask") we
narrowed the offset mask for unprivileged pointer arithmetic in order to
mitigate a corner case where in the speculative domain it is possible to
advance, for example, the map value pointer by up to value_size-1 out-of-
bounds in order to leak kernel memory via side-channel to user space.
The verifier's state pruning for scalars leaves one corner case open
where in the first verification path R_x holds an unknown scalar with an
aux->alu_limit of e.g. 7, and in a second verification path that same
register R_x, here denoted as R_x', holds an unknown scalar which has
tighter bounds and would thus satisfy range_within(R_x, R_x') as well as
tnum_in(R_x, R_x') for state pruning, yielding an aux->alu_limit of 3:
Given the second path fits the register constraints for pruning, the final
generated mask from aux->alu_limit will remain at 7. While technically
not wrong for the non-speculative domain, it would however be possible
to craft similar cases where the mask would be too wide as in 7fedb63a8307.
One way to fix it is to detect the presence of unknown scalar map pointer
arithmetic and force a deeper search on unknown scalars to ensure that
we do not run into a masking mismatch.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[OP: adjusted context in include/linux/bpf_verifier.h for 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c9e73e3d2b1eb1ea7ff068e05007eec3bd8ef1c9 upstream.
func_states_equal makes a very short lived allocation for idmap,
probably because it's too large to fit on the stack. However the
function is called quite often, leading to a lot of alloc / free
churn. Replace the temporary allocation with dedicated scratch
space in struct bpf_verifier_env.
Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210429134656.122225-4-lmb@cloudflare.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[OP: adjusted context for 5.4]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 2039f26f3aca5b0e419b98f65dd36481337b86ee upstream.
Spectre v4 gadgets make use of memory disambiguation, which is a set of
techniques that execute memory access instructions, that is, loads and
stores, out of program order; Intel's optimization manual, section 2.4.4.5:
A load instruction micro-op may depend on a preceding store. Many
microarchitectures block loads until all preceding store addresses are
known. The memory disambiguator predicts which loads will not depend on
any previous stores. When the disambiguator predicts that a load does
not have such a dependency, the load takes its data from the L1 data
cache. Eventually, the prediction is verified. If an actual conflict is
detected, the load and all succeeding instructions are re-executed.
af86ca4e30 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack") tried to mitigate
this attack by sanitizing the memory locations through preemptive "fast"
(low latency) stores of zero prior to the actual "slow" (high latency) store
of a pointer value such that upon dependency misprediction the CPU then
speculatively executes the load of the pointer value and retrieves the zero
value instead of the attacker controlled scalar value previously stored at
that location, meaning, subsequent access in the speculative domain is then
redirected to the "zero page".
The sanitized preemptive store of zero prior to the actual "slow" store is
done through a simple ST instruction based on r10 (frame pointer) with
relative offset to the stack location that the verifier has been tracking
on the original used register for STX, which does not have to be r10. Thus,
there are no memory dependencies for this store, since it's only using r10
and immediate constant of zero; hence af86ca4e30 /assumed/ a low latency
operation.
However, a recent attack demonstrated that this mitigation is not sufficient
since the preemptive store of zero could also be turned into a "slow" store
and is thus bypassed as well:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
31: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// r9 will remain "fast" register, r10 will become "slow" register below
32: (bf) r9 = r10
// JIT maps BPF reg to x86 reg:
// r9 -> r15 (callee saved)
// r10 -> rbp
// train store forward prediction to break dependency link between both r9
// and r10 by evicting them from the predictor's LRU table.
33: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24576)
34: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
35: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24580)
36: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
37: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24584)
38: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
39: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +24588)
40: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
[...]
543: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
544: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// prepare call to bpf_ringbuf_output() helper. the latter will cause rbp
// to spill to stack memory while r13/r14/r15 (all callee saved regs) remain
// in hardware registers. rbp becomes slow due to push/pop latency. below is
// disasm of bpf_ringbuf_output() helper for better visual context:
//
// ffffffff8117ee20: 41 54 push r12
// ffffffff8117ee22: 55 push rbp
// ffffffff8117ee23: 53 push rbx
// ffffffff8117ee24: 48 f7 c1 fc ff ff ff test rcx,0xfffffffffffffffc
// ffffffff8117ee2b: 0f 85 af 00 00 00 jne ffffffff8117eee0 <-- jump taken
// [...]
// ffffffff8117eee0: 49 c7 c4 ea ff ff ff mov r12,0xffffffffffffffea
// ffffffff8117eee7: 5b pop rbx
// ffffffff8117eee8: 5d pop rbp
// ffffffff8117eee9: 4c 89 e0 mov rax,r12
// ffffffff8117eeec: 41 5c pop r12
// ffffffff8117eeee: c3 ret
545: (18) r1 = map[id:4]
547: (bf) r2 = r7
548: (b7) r3 = 0
549: (b7) r4 = 4
550: (85) call bpf_ringbuf_output#194288
// instruction 551 inserted by verifier \
551: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
// storing map value pointer r7 at fp-16 | since value of r10 is "slow".
552: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 /
// following "fast" read to the same memory location, but due to dependency
// misprediction it will speculatively execute before insn 551/552 completes.
553: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r9 -16)
// in speculative domain contains attacker controlled r2. in non-speculative
// domain this contains r7, and thus accesses r7 +0 below.
554: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
As can be seen, the current speculative store bypass mitigation which the
verifier inserts at line 551 is insufficient since /both/, the write of
the zero sanitation as well as the map value pointer are a high latency
instruction due to prior memory access via push/pop of r10 (rbp) in contrast
to the low latency read in line 553 as r9 (r15) which stays in hardware
registers. Thus, architecturally, fp-16 is r7, however, microarchitecturally,
fp-16 can still be r2.
Initial thoughts to address this issue was to track spilled pointer loads
from stack and enforce their load via LDX through r10 as well so that /both/
the preemptive store of zero /as well as/ the load use the /same/ register
such that a dependency is created between the store and load. However, this
option is not sufficient either since it can be bypassed as well under
speculation. An updated attack with pointer spill/fills now _all_ based on
r10 would look as follows:
[...]
// r2 = oob address (e.g. scalar)
// r7 = pointer to map value
[...]
// longer store forward prediction training sequence than before.
2062: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25588)
2063: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30708) = r0
2064: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25592)
2065: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30712) = r0
2066: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r7 +25596)
2067: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +30716) = r0
// store the speculative load address (scalar) this time after the store
// forward prediction training.
2068: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r2
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
2069: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29696) = r0
2070: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29700) = r0
2071: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29704) = r0
2072: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29708) = r0
2073: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29712) = r0
2074: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29716) = r0
2075: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29720) = r0
2076: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29724) = r0
2077: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29728) = r0
2078: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29732) = r0
2079: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29736) = r0
2080: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29740) = r0
2081: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29744) = r0
2082: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29748) = r0
2083: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29752) = r0
2084: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29756) = r0
2085: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29760) = r0
2086: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29764) = r0
2087: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29768) = r0
2088: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29772) = r0
2089: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29776) = r0
2090: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29780) = r0
2091: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29784) = r0
2092: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29788) = r0
2093: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29792) = r0
2094: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2095: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2096: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2097: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2098: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; same as before, also including the
// sanitation store with 0 from the current mitigation by the verifier.
2099: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 0 | /both/ are now slow stores here
2100: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r7 | since store unit is still busy.
// load from stack intended to bypass stores.
2101: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2102: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
// leak r3
[...]
Looking at the CPU microarchitecture, the scheduler might issue loads (such
as seen in line 2101) before stores (line 2099,2100) because the load execution
units become available while the store execution unit is still busy with the
sequence of dummy stores (line 2069-2098). And so the load may use the prior
stored scalar from r2 at address r10 -16 for speculation. The updated attack
may work less reliable on CPU microarchitectures where loads and stores share
execution resources.
This concludes that the sanitizing with zero stores from af86ca4e30 ("bpf:
Prevent memory disambiguation attack") is insufficient. Moreover, the detection
of stack reuse from af86ca4e30 where previously data (STACK_MISC) has been
written to a given stack slot where a pointer value is now to be stored does
not have sufficient coverage as precondition for the mitigation either; for
several reasons outlined as follows:
1) Stack content from prior program runs could still be preserved and is
therefore not "random", best example is to split a speculative store
bypass attack between tail calls, program A would prepare and store the
oob address at a given stack slot and then tail call into program B which
does the "slow" store of a pointer to the stack with subsequent "fast"
read. From program B PoV such stack slot type is STACK_INVALID, and
therefore also must be subject to mitigation.
2) The STACK_SPILL must not be coupled to register_is_const(&stack->spilled_ptr)
condition, for example, the previous content of that memory location could
also be a pointer to map or map value. Without the fix, a speculative
store bypass is not mitigated in such precondition and can then lead to
a type confusion in the speculative domain leaking kernel memory near
these pointer types.
While brainstorming on various alternative mitigation possibilities, we also
stumbled upon a retrospective from Chrome developers [0]:
[...] For variant 4, we implemented a mitigation to zero the unused memory
of the heap prior to allocation, which cost about 1% when done concurrently
and 4% for scavenging. Variant 4 defeats everything we could think of. We
explored more mitigations for variant 4 but the threat proved to be more
pervasive and dangerous than we anticipated. For example, stack slots used
by the register allocator in the optimizing compiler could be subject to
type confusion, leading to pointer crafting. Mitigating type confusion for
stack slots alone would have required a complete redesign of the backend of
the optimizing compiler, perhaps man years of work, without a guarantee of
completeness. [...]
>From BPF side, the problem space is reduced, however, options are rather
limited. One idea that has been explored was to xor-obfuscate pointer spills
to the BPF stack:
[...]
// preoccupy the CPU store port by running sequence of dummy stores.
[...]
2106: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29796) = r0
2107: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29800) = r0
2108: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29804) = r0
2109: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29808) = r0
2110: (63) *(u32 *)(r7 +29812) = r0
// overwrite scalar with dummy pointer; xored with random 'secret' value
// of 943576462 before store ...
2111: (b4) w11 = 943576462
2112: (af) r11 ^= r7
2113: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r11
2114: (79) r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)
2115: (b4) w2 = 943576462
2116: (af) r2 ^= r11
// ... and restored with the same 'secret' value with the help of AX reg.
2117: (71) r3 = *(u8 *)(r2 +0)
[...]
While the above would not prevent speculation, it would make data leakage
infeasible by directing it to random locations. In order to be effective
and prevent type confusion under speculation, such random secret would have
to be regenerated for each store. The additional complexity involved for a
tracking mechanism that prevents jumps such that restoring spilled pointers
would not get corrupted is not worth the gain for unprivileged. Hence, the
fix in here eventually opted for emitting a non-public BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
instruction which the x86 JIT translates into a lfence opcode. Inserting the
latter in between the store and load instruction is one of the mitigations
options [1]. The x86 instruction manual notes:
[...] An LFENCE that follows an instruction that stores to memory might
complete before the data being stored have become globally visible. [...]
The latter meaning that the preceding store instruction finished execution
and the store is at minimum guaranteed to be in the CPU's store queue, but
it's not guaranteed to be in that CPU's L1 cache at that point (globally
visible). The latter would only be guaranteed via sfence. So the load which
is guaranteed to execute after the lfence for that local CPU would have to
rely on store-to-load forwarding. [2], in section 2.3 on store buffers says:
[...] For every store operation that is added to the ROB, an entry is
allocated in the store buffer. This entry requires both the virtual and
physical address of the target. Only if there is no free entry in the store
buffer, the frontend stalls until there is an empty slot available in the
store buffer again. Otherwise, the CPU can immediately continue adding
subsequent instructions to the ROB and execute them out of order. On Intel
CPUs, the store buffer has up to 56 entries. [...]
One small upside on the fix is that it lifts constraints from af86ca4e30
where the sanitize_stack_off relative to r10 must be the same when coming
from different paths. The BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC gets emitted after a BPF_STX
or BPF_ST instruction. This happens either when we store a pointer or data
value to the BPF stack for the first time, or upon later pointer spills.
The former needs to be enforced since otherwise stale stack data could be
leaked under speculation as outlined earlier. For non-x86 JITs the BPF_ST |
BPF_NOSPEC mapping is currently optimized away, but others could emit a
speculation barrier as well if necessary. For real-world unprivileged
programs e.g. generated by LLVM, pointer spill/fill is only generated upon
register pressure and LLVM only tries to do that for pointers which are not
used often. The program main impact will be the initial BPF_ST | BPF_NOSPEC
sanitation for the STACK_INVALID case when the first write to a stack slot
occurs e.g. upon map lookup. In future we might refine ways to mitigate
the latter cost.
[0] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1902.05178.pdf
[1] https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2018/05/21/analysis-and-mitigation-of-speculative-store-bypass-cve-2018-3639/
[2] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1905.05725.pdf
Fixes: af86ca4e30 ("bpf: Prevent memory disambiguation attack")
Fixes: f7cf25b202 ("bpf: track spill/fill of constants")
Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[OP: - apply check_stack_write_fixed_off() changes in check_stack_write()
- replace env->bypass_spec_v4 -> env->allow_ptr_leaks]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f5e81d1117501546b7be050c5fbafa6efd2c722c upstream.
In case of JITs, each of the JIT backends compiles the BPF nospec instruction
/either/ to a machine instruction which emits a speculation barrier /or/ to
/no/ machine instruction in case the underlying architecture is not affected
by Speculative Store Bypass or has different mitigations in place already.
This covers both x86 and (implicitly) arm64: In case of x86, we use 'lfence'
instruction for mitigation. In case of arm64, we rely on the firmware mitigation
as controlled via the ssbd kernel parameter. Whenever the mitigation is enabled,
it works for all of the kernel code with no need to provide any additional
instructions here (hence only comment in arm64 JIT). Other archs can follow
as needed. The BPF nospec instruction is specifically targeting Spectre v4
since i) we don't use a serialization barrier for the Spectre v1 case, and
ii) mitigation instructions for v1 and v4 might be different on some archs.
The BPF nospec is required for a future commit, where the BPF verifier does
annotate intermediate BPF programs with speculation barriers.
Co-developed-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Piotr Krysiuk <piotras@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Benedict Schlueter <benedict.schlueter@rub.de>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[OP: - adjusted context for 5.4
- apply riscv changes to /arch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp.c]
Signed-off-by: Ovidiu Panait <ovidiu.panait@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 92548b0ee220e000d81c27ac9a80e0ede895a881 ]
The UDP length field should be in network order.
This removes the following sparse error:
net/ipv4/route.c:3173:27: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different base types)
net/ipv4/route.c:3173:27: expected restricted __be16 [usertype] len
net/ipv4/route.c:3173:27: got unsigned long
Fixes: 404eb77ea7 ("ipv4: support sport, dport and ip_proto in RTM_GETROUTE")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@nvidia.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6537e96d743b89294b397b4865c6c061abae31b0 ]
When the given counter does not belong to the entry
then code ends up in infinite loop because the loop
cursor, entry is not getting updated further. This
patch fixes that by updating entry for every iteration.
Fixes: a958dd59f9 ("octeontx2-af: Map or unmap NPC MCAM entry and counter")
Signed-off-by: Subbaraya Sundeep <sbhatta@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Sunil Goutham <sgoutham@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 429205da6c834447a57279af128bdd56ccd5225e ]
Based on tests the QCA7000 doesn't support checksum offloading. So assume
ip_summed is CHECKSUM_NONE and let the kernel take care of the checksum
handling. This fixes data transfer issues in noisy environments.
Reported-by: Michael Heimpold <michael.heimpold@in-tech.com>
Fixes: 291ab06ecf ("net: qualcomm: new Ethernet over SPI driver for QCA7000")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c66070125837900163b81a03063ddd657a7e9bfb ]
The reference counting issue happens in one exception handling path of
cbq_change_class(). When failing to get tcf_block, the function forgets
to decrease the refcount of "rtab" increased by qdisc_put_rtab(),
causing a refcount leak.
Fix this issue by jumping to "failure" label when get tcf_block failed.
Fixes: 6529eaba33 ("net: sched: introduce tcf block infractructure")
Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1630252681-71588-1-git-send-email-xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 67d6d681e15b578c1725bad8ad079e05d1c48a8e ]
Even after commit 6457378fe796 ("ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in
fnhe_hashfun()"), an attacker can still use brute force to learn
some secrets from a victim linux host.
One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash
table bucket a random value.
Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions
could contain 6 items under attack.
After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items,
between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets.
This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table,
by 50% in average, we do not expect this to be a problem.
This patch is more complex than the prior one (IPv6 equivalent),
because IPv4 was reusing the oldest entry.
Since we need to be able to evict more than one entry per
update_or_create_fnhe() call, I had to replace
fnhe_oldest() with fnhe_remove_oldest().
Also note that we will queue extra kfree_rcu() calls under stress,
which hopefully wont be a too big issue.
Fixes: 4895c771c7 ("ipv4: Add FIB nexthop exceptions.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Tested-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a00df2caffed3883c341d5685f830434312e4a43 ]
Even after commit 4785305c05b2 ("ipv6: use siphash in rt6_exception_hash()"),
an attacker can still use brute force to learn some secrets from a victim
linux host.
One way to defeat these attacks is to make the max depth of the hash
table bucket a random value.
Before this patch, each bucket of the hash table used to store exceptions
could contain 6 items under attack.
After the patch, each bucket would contains a random number of items,
between 6 and 10. The attacker can no longer infer secrets.
This is slightly increasing memory size used by the hash table,
we do not expect this to be a problem.
Following patch is dealing with the same issue in IPv4.
Fixes: 35732d01fe ("ipv6: introduce a hash table to store dst cache")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Keyu Man <kman001@ucr.edu>
Cc: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d745ca4f2c4ae9f1bd8cf7d8ac6e22d739bffd19 ]
When resuming from suspend, brcmf_pcie_pm_leave_D3 will first attempt a
hot resume and then fall back to removing the PCI device and then
reprobing. If this probe fails, the kernel will oops, because brcmf_err,
which is called to report the failure will dereference the stale bus
pointer. Open code and use the default bus-less brcmf_err to avoid this.
Fixes: 8602e62441 ("brcmfmac: pass bus to the __brcmf_err() in pcie.c")
Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210817063521.22450-1-a.fatoum@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit b63aed3ff195130fef12e0af590f4838cf0201d8 ]
kmemleak reported that dev_name() of internally-handled cores were leaked
on driver unbinding. Let's use device_initialize() to take refcounts for
them and put_device() to properly free the related stuff.
While looking at it, there's another potential issue for those which should
be *registered* into driver core. If device_register() failed, we put
device once and freed bcma_device structures. In bcma_unregister_cores(),
they're treated as unregistered and we hit both UAF and double-free. That
smells not good and has also been fixed now.
Fixes: ab54bc8460 ("bcma: fill core details for every device")
Signed-off-by: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210727025232.663-2-yuzenghui@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fd6729ec534cffbbeb3917761e6d1fe6a412d3fe ]
This error path is unlikely because of it checked for NULL and
returned -ENOMEM earlier in the function. But it should return
an error code here as well if we ever do hit it because of a
race condition or something.
Fixes: bdcd817079 ("Add ath6kl cleaned up driver")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210813113438.GB30697@kili
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d3efd26af2e044ff2b48d38bb871630282d77e60 ]
The probe calls 'wcd9335_setup_irqs()' to enable interrupts on all slave
ports.
This must be undone in the remove function.
Add a 'wcd9335_teardown_irqs()' function that undoes 'wcd9335_setup_irqs()'
function, and call it from the remove function.
Fixes: 20aedafdf4 ("ASoC: wcd9335: add support to wcd9335 codec")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Message-Id: <8f761244d79bd4c098af8a482be9121d3a486d1b.1629091028.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fc6fc81caa63900cef9ebb8b2e365c3ed5a9effb ]
If 'wcd9335_setup_irqs()' fails, me must release the memory allocated in
'wcd_clsh_ctrl_alloc()', as already done in the remove function.
Add an error handling path and the missing 'wcd_clsh_ctrl_free()' call.
Fixes: 20aedafdf4 ("ASoC: wcd9335: add support to wcd9335 codec")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Message-Id: <6dc12372f09fabb70bf05941dbe6a1382dc93e43.1629091028.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7a6a723e98aa45f393e6add18f7309dfffa1b0e2 ]
There is no point in calling 'free_irq()' explicitly for
'WCD9335_IRQ_SLIMBUS' in the remove function.
The irqs are requested in 'wcd9335_setup_irqs()' using a resource managed
function (i.e. 'devm_request_threaded_irq()').
'wcd9335_setup_irqs()' requests all what is defined in the 'wcd9335_irqs'
structure.
This structure has only one entry for 'WCD9335_IRQ_SLIMBUS'.
So 'devm_request...irq()' + explicit 'free_irq()' would lead to a double
free.
Remove the unneeded 'free_irq()' from the remove function.
Fixes: 20aedafdf4 ("ASoC: wcd9335: add support to wcd9335 codec")
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Message-Id: <0614d63bc00edd7e81dd367504128f3d84f72efa.1629091028.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d5c38948448abc2bb6b36dbf85a554bf4748885e ]
Register offset needs to be applied on mapbase also.
dma_tx/rx_request use the physical address of UARTDATA.
Register offset is currently only applied to membase (the
corresponding virtual addr) but not on mapbase.
Fixes: 24b1e5f0e8 ("tty: serial: lpuart: add imx7ulp support")
Reviewed-by: Leonard Crestez <leonard.crestez@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Adriana Reus <adriana.reus@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sherry Sun <sherry.sun@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210819021033.32606-1-sherry.sun@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d2f42e09393c774ab79088d8e3afcc62b3328fc9 ]
If no suitable DMA configuration is available, a previous 'bdc_phy_init()'
call must be undone by a corresponding 'bdc_phy_exit()' call.
Branch to the existing error handling path instead of returning
directly.
Fixes: cc29d4f677 ("usb: bdc: Add support for USB phy")
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/0c5910979f39225d5d8fe68c9ab1c147c68ddee1.1629314734.git.christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4720f1bf4ee4a784d9ece05420ba33c9222a3004 ]
ehci_orion_drv_probe() did not account for possible errors of
clk_prepare_enable() that in particular could cause invocation of
clk_disable_unprepare() on clocks that were not prepared/enabled yet,
e.g. in remove or on handling errors of usb_add_hcd() in probe. Though,
there were several patches fixing different issues with clocks in this
driver, they did not solve this problem.
Add handling of errors of clk_prepare_enable() in ehci_orion_drv_probe()
to avoid calls of clk_disable_unprepare() without previous successful
invocation of clk_prepare_enable().
Found by Linux Driver Verification project (linuxtesting.org).
Fixes: 8c869edaee ("ARM: Orion: EHCI: Add support for enabling clocks")
Co-developed-by: Kirill Shilimanov <kirill.shilimanov@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Evgeny Novikov <novikov@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Shilimanov <kirill.shilimanov@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210825170902.11234-1-novikov@ispras.ru
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f980d055a0f858d73d9467bb0b570721bbfcdfb8 ]
strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first. This read may exceed the
destination size limit. This is both inefficient and can lead to linear
read overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated.
Also, the strnlen() call does not avoid the read overflow in the strlcpy
function when a not NUL-terminated string is passed.
So, replace this block by a call to kstrndup() that avoids this type of
overflow and does the same.
Fixes: 066ce68994 ("cifs: rename cifs_strlcpy_to_host and make it use new functions")
Signed-off-by: Len Baker <len.baker@gmx.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d7af7e497f0308bc97809cc48b58e8e0f13887e1 ]
Fix a verifier bug found by smatch static checker in [0].
This problem has never been seen in prod to my best knowledge. Fixing it
still seems to be a good idea since it's hard to say for sure whether
it's possible or not to have a scenario where a combination of
convert_ctx_access() and a narrow load would lead to an out of bound
write.
When narrow load is handled, one or two new instructions are added to
insn_buf array, but before it was only checked that
cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf)
And it's safe to add a new instruction to insn_buf[cnt++] only once. The
second try will lead to out of bound write. And this is what can happen
if `shift` is set.
Fix it by making sure that if the BPF_RSH instruction has to be added in
addition to BPF_AND then there is enough space for two more instructions
in insn_buf.
The full report [0] is below:
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:12304 convert_ctx_accesses() warn: offset 'cnt' incremented past end of array
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:12311 convert_ctx_accesses() warn: offset 'cnt' incremented past end of array
kernel/bpf/verifier.c
12282
12283 insn->off = off & ~(size_default - 1);
12284 insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | size_code;
12285 }
12286
12287 target_size = 0;
12288 cnt = convert_ctx_access(type, insn, insn_buf, env->prog,
12289 &target_size);
12290 if (cnt == 0 || cnt >= ARRAY_SIZE(insn_buf) ||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Bounds check.
12291 (ctx_field_size && !target_size)) {
12292 verbose(env, "bpf verifier is misconfigured\n");
12293 return -EINVAL;
12294 }
12295
12296 if (is_narrower_load && size < target_size) {
12297 u8 shift = bpf_ctx_narrow_access_offset(
12298 off, size, size_default) * 8;
12299 if (ctx_field_size <= 4) {
12300 if (shift)
12301 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_RSH,
^^^^^
increment beyond end of array
12302 insn->dst_reg,
12303 shift);
--> 12304 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU32_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
^^^^^
out of bounds write
12305 (1 << size * 8) - 1);
12306 } else {
12307 if (shift)
12308 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_RSH,
12309 insn->dst_reg,
12310 shift);
12311 insn_buf[cnt++] = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, insn->dst_reg,
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Same.
12312 (1ULL << size * 8) - 1);
12313 }
12314 }
12315
12316 new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
12317 if (!new_prog)
12318 return -ENOMEM;
12319
12320 delta += cnt - 1;
12321
12322 /* keep walking new program and skip insns we just inserted */
12323 env->prog = new_prog;
12324 insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
12325 }
12326
12327 return 0;
12328 }
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210817050843.GA21456@kili/
v1->v2:
- clarify that problem was only seen by static checker but not in prod;
Fixes: 46f53a65d2 ("bpf: Allow narrow loads with offset > 0")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ignatov <rdna@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210820163935.1902398-1-rdna@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ee5165354d498e5bceb0b386e480ac84c5f8c28c ]
Depending on the DMA driver being used, the struct dma_slave_config may
need to be initialized to zero for the unused data.
For example, we have three DMA drivers using src_port_window_size and
dst_port_window_size. If these are left uninitialized, it can cause DMA
failures.
For moxart, this is probably not currently an issue but is still good to
fix though.
Fixes: 1b66e94e6b ("mmc: moxart: Add MOXA ART SD/MMC driver")
Cc: Jonas Jensen <jonas.jensen@gmail.com>
Cc: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210810081644.19353-3-tony@atomide.com
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c3ff0189d3bc9c03845fe37472c140f0fefd0c79 ]
Depending on the DMA driver being used, the struct dma_slave_config may
need to be initialized to zero for the unused data.
For example, we have three DMA drivers using src_port_window_size and
dst_port_window_size. If these are left uninitialized, it can cause DMA
failures.
For dw_mmc, this is probably not currently an issue but is still good to
fix though.
Fixes: 3fc7eaef44 ("mmc: dw_mmc: Add external dma interface support")
Cc: Shawn Lin <shawn.lin@rock-chips.com>
Cc: Jaehoon Chung <jh80.chung@samsung.com>
Cc: Peter Ujfalusi <peter.ujfalusi@gmail.com>
Cc: Vinod Koul <vkoul@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210810081644.19353-2-tony@atomide.com
Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e8b374b649afe756c2470e0e6668022e90bf8518 ]
Module configuration may differ between its instances depending on
resources required and input and output audio format. Available
parameters to select from are stored in module resource and interface
(format) lists. These come from topology, together with description of
each of pipe's modules.
Ignoring index value provided by topology and relying always on 0th
entry leads to unexpected module behavior due to under/overbudged
resources assigned or impropper format selection. Fix by taking entry at
index specified by topology.
Fixes: f6fa56e225 ("ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Parse and update module config structure")
Signed-off-by: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com>
Tested-by: Lukasz Majczak <lma@semihalf.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210818075742.1515155-5-cezary.rojewski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 126b3422adc80f29d2129db7f61e0113a8a526c6 ]
Advancing pointer initially fixed issue for some users but caused
regression for others. Leave data as it to make it easier for end users
to adjust their topology files if needed.
Fixes: a8cd7066f0 ("ASoC: Intel: Skylake: Strip T and L from TLV IPCs")
Signed-off-by: Cezary Rojewski <cezary.rojewski@intel.com>
Tested-by: Lukasz Majczak <lma@semihalf.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210818075742.1515155-3-cezary.rojewski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9adcdf6758d7c4c9bdaf22d78eb9fcae260ed113 ]
Return -ENODEV instead of success for unsupported devices.
Fixes: 54fdb318c1 ("rsi: add new device model for 9116")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210816183947.GA2119@kili
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d0f8430332a16c7baa80ce2886339182c5d85f37 ]
This code returns success if the kmemdup() fails, but obviously it
should return -ENOMEM instead.
Fixes: e5a1ecc97e ("rsi: add firmware loading for 9116 device")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210805103746.GA26417@kili
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Otavio Salvador