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79c95130a5
886129 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Masahiro Yamada
|
79c95130a5 |
kbuild: update config_data.gz only when the content of .config is changed
commit 46b41d5dd8019b264717978c39c43313a524d033 upstream.
If the timestamp of the .config file is updated, config_data.gz is
regenerated, then vmlinux is re-linked. This occurs even if the content
of the .config has not changed at all.
This issue was mitigated by commit
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Sean Christopherson
|
19c8c34a8b |
x86/cpu: Initialize MSR_TSC_AUX if RDTSCP *or* RDPID is supported
commit b6b4fbd90b155a0025223df2c137af8a701d53b3 upstream.
Initialize MSR_TSC_AUX with CPU node information if RDTSCP or RDPID is
supported. This fixes a bug where vdso_read_cpunode() will read garbage
via RDPID if RDPID is supported but RDTSCP is not. While no known CPU
supports RDPID but not RDTSCP, both Intel's SDM and AMD's APM allow for
RDPID to exist without RDTSCP, e.g. it's technically a legal CPU model
for a virtual machine.
Note, technically MSR_TSC_AUX could be initialized if and only if RDPID
is supported since RDTSCP is currently not used to retrieve the CPU node.
But, the cost of the superfluous WRMSR is negigible, whereas leaving
MSR_TSC_AUX uninitialized is just asking for future breakage if someone
decides to utilize RDTSCP.
Fixes:
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Thomas Gleixner
|
8d2be04dbb |
Revert 337f13046f ("futex: Allow FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME with FUTEX_WAIT op")
commit 4fbf5d6837bf81fd7a27d771358f4ee6c4f243f8 upstream.
The FUTEX_WAIT operand has historically a relative timeout which means that
the clock id is irrelevant as relative timeouts on CLOCK_REALTIME are not
subject to wall clock changes and therefore are mapped by the kernel to
CLOCK_MONOTONIC for simplicity.
If a caller would set FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME for FUTEX_WAIT the timeout is
still treated relative vs. CLOCK_MONOTONIC and then the wait arms that
timeout based on CLOCK_REALTIME which is broken and obviously has never
been used or even tested.
Reject any attempt to use FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME with FUTEX_WAIT again.
The desired functionality can be achieved with FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET and a
FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY argument.
Fixes:
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Yang Yang
|
2b040d13b4 |
jffs2: check the validity of dstlen in jffs2_zlib_compress()
commit 90ada91f4610c5ef11bc52576516d96c496fc3f1 upstream. KASAN reports a BUG when download file in jffs2 filesystem.It is because when dstlen == 1, cpage_out will write array out of bounds. Actually, data will not be compressed in jffs2_zlib_compress() if data's length less than 4. [ 393.799778] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in jffs2_rtime_compress+0x214/0x2f0 at addr ffff800062e3b281 [ 393.809166] Write of size 1 by task tftp/2918 [ 393.813526] CPU: 3 PID: 2918 Comm: tftp Tainted: G B 4.9.115-rt93-EMBSYS-CGEL-6.1.R6-dirty #1 [ 393.823173] Hardware name: LS1043A RDB Board (DT) [ 393.827870] Call trace: [ 393.830322] [<ffff20000808c700>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x2f0 [ 393.835721] [<ffff20000808ca04>] show_stack+0x14/0x20 [ 393.840774] [<ffff2000086ef700>] dump_stack+0x90/0xb0 [ 393.845829] [<ffff20000827b19c>] kasan_object_err+0x24/0x80 [ 393.851402] [<ffff20000827b404>] kasan_report_error+0x1b4/0x4d8 [ 393.857323] [<ffff20000827bae8>] kasan_report+0x38/0x40 [ 393.862548] [<ffff200008279d44>] __asan_store1+0x4c/0x58 [ 393.867859] [<ffff2000084ce2ec>] jffs2_rtime_compress+0x214/0x2f0 [ 393.873955] [<ffff2000084bb3b0>] jffs2_selected_compress+0x178/0x2a0 [ 393.880308] [<ffff2000084bb530>] jffs2_compress+0x58/0x478 [ 393.885796] [<ffff2000084c5b34>] jffs2_write_inode_range+0x13c/0x450 [ 393.892150] [<ffff2000084be0b8>] jffs2_write_end+0x2a8/0x4a0 [ 393.897811] [<ffff2000081f3008>] generic_perform_write+0x1c0/0x280 [ 393.903990] [<ffff2000081f5074>] __generic_file_write_iter+0x1c4/0x228 [ 393.910517] [<ffff2000081f5210>] generic_file_write_iter+0x138/0x288 [ 393.916870] [<ffff20000829ec1c>] __vfs_write+0x1b4/0x238 [ 393.922181] [<ffff20000829ff00>] vfs_write+0xd0/0x238 [ 393.927232] [<ffff2000082a1ba8>] SyS_write+0xa0/0x110 [ 393.932283] [<ffff20000808429c>] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4 [ 393.937851] Object at ffff800062e3b280, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64 [ 393.944197] Allocated: [ 393.946552] PID = 2918 [ 393.948913] save_stack_trace_tsk+0x0/0x220 [ 393.953096] save_stack_trace+0x18/0x20 [ 393.956932] kasan_kmalloc+0xd8/0x188 [ 393.960594] __kmalloc+0x144/0x238 [ 393.963994] jffs2_selected_compress+0x48/0x2a0 [ 393.968524] jffs2_compress+0x58/0x478 [ 393.972273] jffs2_write_inode_range+0x13c/0x450 [ 393.976889] jffs2_write_end+0x2a8/0x4a0 [ 393.980810] generic_perform_write+0x1c0/0x280 [ 393.985251] __generic_file_write_iter+0x1c4/0x228 [ 393.990040] generic_file_write_iter+0x138/0x288 [ 393.994655] __vfs_write+0x1b4/0x238 [ 393.998228] vfs_write+0xd0/0x238 [ 394.001543] SyS_write+0xa0/0x110 [ 394.004856] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4 [ 394.008684] Freed: [ 394.010691] PID = 2918 [ 394.013051] save_stack_trace_tsk+0x0/0x220 [ 394.017233] save_stack_trace+0x18/0x20 [ 394.021069] kasan_slab_free+0x88/0x188 [ 394.024902] kfree+0x6c/0x1d8 [ 394.027868] jffs2_sum_write_sumnode+0x2c4/0x880 [ 394.032486] jffs2_do_reserve_space+0x198/0x598 [ 394.037016] jffs2_reserve_space+0x3f8/0x4d8 [ 394.041286] jffs2_write_inode_range+0xf0/0x450 [ 394.045816] jffs2_write_end+0x2a8/0x4a0 [ 394.049737] generic_perform_write+0x1c0/0x280 [ 394.054179] __generic_file_write_iter+0x1c4/0x228 [ 394.058968] generic_file_write_iter+0x138/0x288 [ 394.063583] __vfs_write+0x1b4/0x238 [ 394.067157] vfs_write+0xd0/0x238 [ 394.070470] SyS_write+0xa0/0x110 [ 394.073783] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4 [ 394.077612] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 394.082404] ffff800062e3b180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 394.089623] ffff800062e3b200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 394.096842] >ffff800062e3b280: 01 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 394.104056] ^ [ 394.107283] ffff800062e3b300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 394.114502] ffff800062e3b380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 394.121718] ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn> Cc: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Linus Torvalds
|
564b1868f2 |
Fix misc new gcc warnings
commit e7c6e405e171fb33990a12ecfd14e6500d9e5cf2 upstream. It seems like Fedora 34 ends up enabling a few new gcc warnings, notably "-Wstringop-overread" and "-Warray-parameter". Both of them cause what seem to be valid warnings in the kernel, where we have array size mismatches in function arguments (that are no longer just silently converted to a pointer to element, but actually checked). This fixes most of the trivial ones, by making the function declaration match the function definition, and in the case of intel_pm.c, removing the over-specified array size from the argument declaration. At least one 'stringop-overread' warning remains in the i915 driver, but that one doesn't have the same obvious trivial fix, and may or may not actually be indicative of a bug. [ It was a mistake to upgrade one of my machines to Fedora 34 while being busy with the merge window, but if this is the extent of the compiler upgrade problems, things are better than usual - Linus ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.z@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Arnd Bergmann
|
8aa7285682 |
security: commoncap: fix -Wstringop-overread warning
commit 82e5d8cc768b0c7b03c551a9ab1f8f3f68d5f83f upstream.
gcc-11 introdces a harmless warning for cap_inode_getsecurity:
security/commoncap.c: In function ‘cap_inode_getsecurity’:
security/commoncap.c:440:33: error: ‘memcpy’ reading 16 bytes from a region of size 0 [-Werror=stringop-overread]
440 | memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The problem here is that tmpbuf is initialized to NULL, so gcc assumes
it is not accessible unless it gets set by vfs_getxattr_alloc(). This is
a legitimate warning as far as I can tell, but the code is correct since
it correctly handles the error when that function fails.
Add a separate NULL check to tell gcc about it as well.
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Vivek Goyal
|
be8db260f4 |
fuse: fix write deadlock
commit 4f06dd92b5d0a6f8eec6a34b8d6ef3e1f4ac1e10 upstream.
There are two modes for write(2) and friends in fuse:
a) write through (update page cache, send sync WRITE request to userspace)
b) buffered write (update page cache, async writeout later)
The write through method kept all the page cache pages locked that were
used for the request. Keeping more than one page locked is deadlock prone
and Qian Cai demonstrated this with trinity fuzzing.
The reason for keeping the pages locked is that concurrent mapped reads
shouldn't try to pull possibly stale data into the page cache.
For full page writes, the easy way to fix this is to make the cached page
be the authoritative source by marking the page PG_uptodate immediately.
After this the page can be safely unlocked, since mapped/cached reads will
take the written data from the cache.
Concurrent mapped writes will now cause data in the original WRITE request
to be updated; this however doesn't cause any data inconsistency and this
scenario should be exceedingly rare anyway.
If the WRITE request returns with an error in the above case, currently the
page is not marked uptodate; this means that a concurrent read will always
read consistent data. After this patch the page is uptodate between
writing to the cache and receiving the error: there's window where a cached
read will read the wrong data. While theoretically this could be a
regression, it is unlikely to be one in practice, since this is normal for
buffered writes.
In case of a partial page write to an already uptodate page the locking is
also unnecessary, with the above caveats.
Partial write of a not uptodate page still needs to be handled. One way
would be to read the complete page before doing the write. This is not
possible, since it might break filesystems that don't expect any READ
requests when the file was opened O_WRONLY.
The other solution is to serialize the synchronous write with reads from
the partial pages. The easiest way to do this is to keep the partial pages
locked. The problem is that a write() may involve two such pages (one head
and one tail). This patch fixes it by only locking the partial tail page.
If there's a partial head page as well, then split that off as a separate
WRITE request.
Reported-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/4794a3fa3742a5e84fb0f934944204b55730829b.camel@lca.pw/
Fixes:
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Heinz Mauelshagen
|
dc21b42486 |
dm raid: fix inconclusive reshape layout on fast raid4/5/6 table reload sequences
commit f99a8e4373eeacb279bc9696937a55adbff7a28a upstream. If fast table reloads occur during an ongoing reshape of raid4/5/6 devices the target may race reading a superblock vs the the MD resync thread; causing an inconclusive reshape state to be read in its constructor. lvm2 test lvconvert-raid-reshape-stripes-load-reload.sh can cause BUG_ON() to trigger in md_run(), e.g.: "kernel BUG at drivers/md/raid5.c:7567!". Scenario triggering the bug: 1. the MD sync thread calls end_reshape() from raid5_sync_request() when done reshaping. However end_reshape() _only_ updates the reshape position to MaxSector keeping the changed layout configuration though (i.e. any delta disks, chunk sector or RAID algorithm changes). That inconclusive configuration is stored in the superblock. 2. dm-raid constructs a mapping, loading named inconsistent superblock as of step 1 before step 3 is able to finish resetting the reshape state completely, and calls md_run() which leads to mentioned bug in raid5.c. 3. the MD RAID personality's finish_reshape() is called; which resets the reshape information on chunk sectors, delta disks, etc. This explains why the bug is rarely seen on multi-core machines, as MD's finish_reshape() superblock update races with the dm-raid constructor's superblock load in step 2. Fix identifies inconclusive superblock content in the dm-raid constructor and resets it before calling md_run(), factoring out identifying checks into rs_is_layout_change() to share in existing rs_reshape_requested() and new rs_reset_inclonclusive_reshape(). Also enhance a comment and remove an empty line. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Heinz Mauelshagen <heinzm@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Paul Clements
|
6920cef604 |
md/raid1: properly indicate failure when ending a failed write request
commit 2417b9869b81882ab90fd5ed1081a1cb2d4db1dd upstream.
This patch addresses a data corruption bug in raid1 arrays using bitmaps.
Without this fix, the bitmap bits for the failed I/O end up being cleared.
Since we are in the failure leg of raid1_end_write_request, the request
either needs to be retried (R1BIO_WriteError) or failed (R1BIO_Degraded).
Fixes:
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Eric Biggers
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5f2d256875 |
crypto: rng - fix crypto_rng_reset() refcounting when !CRYPTO_STATS
commit 30d0f6a956fc74bb2e948398daf3278c6b08c7e9 upstream.
crypto_stats_get() is a no-op when the kernel is compiled without
CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS, so pairing it with crypto_alg_put() unconditionally
(as crypto_rng_reset() does) is wrong.
Fix this by moving the call to crypto_stats_get() to just before the
actual algorithm operation which might need it. This makes it always
paired with crypto_stats_rng_seed().
Fixes: eed74b3eba9e ("crypto: rng - Fix a refcounting bug in crypto_rng_reset()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Stefan Berger
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63a25b7156 |
tpm: vtpm_proxy: Avoid reading host log when using a virtual device
commit 9716ac65efc8f780549b03bddf41e60c445d4709 upstream.
Avoid allocating memory and reading the host log when a virtual device
is used since this log is of no use to that driver. A virtual
device can be identified through the flag TPM_CHIP_FLAG_VIRTUAL, which
is only set for the tpm_vtpm_proxy driver.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
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Stefan Berger
|
2f12258b52 |
tpm: efi: Use local variable for calculating final log size
commit 48cff270b037022e37835d93361646205ca25101 upstream.
When tpm_read_log_efi is called multiple times, which happens when
one loads and unloads a TPM2 driver multiple times, then the global
variable efi_tpm_final_log_size will at some point become a negative
number due to the subtraction of final_events_preboot_size occurring
each time. Use a local variable to avoid this integer underflow.
The following issue is now resolved:
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: Workqueue: tpm-vtpm vtpm_proxy_work [tpm_vtpm_proxy]
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: RIP: 0010:__memcpy+0x12/0x20
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: Code: 00 b8 01 00 00 00 85 d2 74 0a c7 05 44 7b ef 00 0f 00 00 00 c3 cc cc cc 66 66 90 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 48 c1 e9 03 83 e2 07 <f3> 48 a5 89 d1 f3 a4 c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 d1 f3 a4
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: RSP: 0018:ffff9ac4c0fcfde0 EFLAGS: 00010206
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: RAX: ffff88f878cefed5 RBX: ffff88f878ce9000 RCX: 1ffffffffffffe0f
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffff9ac4c003bff9 RDI: ffff88f878cf0e4d
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: RBP: ffff9ac4c003b000 R08: 0000000000001000 R09: 000000007e9d6073
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: R10: ffff9ac4c003b000 R11: ffff88f879ad3500 R12: 0000000000000ed5
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: R13: ffff88f878ce9760 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff88f77de7f018
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88f87bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: CR2: ffff9ac4c003c000 CR3: 00000001785a6004 CR4: 0000000000060ee0
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: Call Trace:
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: tpm_read_log_efi+0x152/0x1a7
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: tpm_bios_log_setup+0xc8/0x1c0
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: tpm_chip_register+0x8f/0x260
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: vtpm_proxy_work+0x16/0x60 [tpm_vtpm_proxy]
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: process_one_work+0x1b4/0x370
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: worker_thread+0x53/0x3e0
Mar 8 15:35:12 hibinst kernel: ? process_one_work+0x370/0x370
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
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Alexander Shishkin
|
2af501de8f |
intel_th: pci: Add Alder Lake-M support
commit 48cb17531b15967d9d3f34c770a25cc6c4ca6ad1 upstream. This adds support for the Trace Hub in Alder Lake-M PCH. Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210414171251.14672-8-alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Tony Ambardar
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ab5d5c9dfd |
powerpc: fix EDEADLOCK redefinition error in uapi/asm/errno.h
commit 7de21e679e6a789f3729e8402bc440b623a28eae upstream.
A few archs like powerpc have different errno.h values for macros
EDEADLOCK and EDEADLK. In code including both libc and linux versions of
errno.h, this can result in multiple definitions of EDEADLOCK in the
include chain. Definitions to the same value (e.g. seen with mips) do
not raise warnings, but on powerpc there are redefinitions changing the
value, which raise warnings and errors (if using "-Werror").
Guard against these redefinitions to avoid build errors like the following,
first seen cross-compiling libbpf v5.8.9 for powerpc using GCC 8.4.0 with
musl 1.1.24:
In file included from ../../arch/powerpc/include/uapi/asm/errno.h:5,
from ../../include/linux/err.h:8,
from libbpf.c:29:
../../include/uapi/asm-generic/errno.h:40: error: "EDEADLOCK" redefined [-Werror]
#define EDEADLOCK EDEADLK
In file included from toolchain-powerpc_8540_gcc-8.4.0_musl/include/errno.h:10,
from libbpf.c:26:
toolchain-powerpc_8540_gcc-8.4.0_musl/include/bits/errno.h:58: note: this is the location of the previous definition
#define EDEADLOCK 58
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Rosen Penev <rosenp@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Ambardar <Tony.Ambardar@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200917135437.1238787-1-Tony.Ambardar@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
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Mahesh Salgaonkar
|
abf3573ef4 |
powerpc/eeh: Fix EEH handling for hugepages in ioremap space.
commit 5ae5bc12d0728db60a0aa9b62160ffc038875f1a upstream. During the EEH MMIO error checking, the current implementation fails to map the (virtual) MMIO address back to the pci device on radix with hugepage mappings for I/O. This results into failure to dispatch EEH event with no recovery even when EEH capability has been enabled on the device. eeh_check_failure(token) # token = virtual MMIO address addr = eeh_token_to_phys(token); edev = eeh_addr_cache_get_dev(addr); if (!edev) return 0; eeh_dev_check_failure(edev); <= Dispatch the EEH event In case of hugepage mappings, eeh_token_to_phys() has a bug in virt -> phys translation that results in wrong physical address, which is then passed to eeh_addr_cache_get_dev() to match it against cached pci I/O address ranges to get to a PCI device. Hence, it fails to find a match and the EEH event never gets dispatched leaving the device in failed state. The commit |
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|
lizhe
|
077f526fe3 |
jffs2: Fix kasan slab-out-of-bounds problem
commit 960b9a8a7676b9054d8b46a2c7db52a0c8766b56 upstream.
KASAN report a slab-out-of-bounds problem. The logs are listed below.
It is because in function jffs2_scan_dirent_node, we alloc "checkedlen+1"
bytes for fd->name and we check crc with length rd->nsize. If checkedlen
is less than rd->nsize, it will cause the slab-out-of-bounds problem.
jffs2: Dirent at *** has zeroes in name. Truncating to %d char
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le+0x1ce/0x260 at addr ffff8800842cf2d1
Read of size 1 by task test_JFFS2/915
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-64 (Tainted: G B O ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in jffs2_alloc_full_dirent+0x2a/0x40 age=0 cpu=1 pid=915
___slab_alloc+0x580/0x5f0
__slab_alloc.isra.24+0x4e/0x64
__kmalloc+0x170/0x300
jffs2_alloc_full_dirent+0x2a/0x40
jffs2_scan_eraseblock+0x1ca4/0x3b64
jffs2_scan_medium+0x285/0xfe0
jffs2_do_mount_fs+0x5fb/0x1bbc
jffs2_do_fill_super+0x245/0x6f0
jffs2_fill_super+0x287/0x2e0
mount_mtd_aux.isra.0+0x9a/0x144
mount_mtd+0x222/0x2f0
jffs2_mount+0x41/0x60
mount_fs+0x63/0x230
vfs_kern_mount.part.6+0x6c/0x1f4
do_mount+0xae8/0x1940
SyS_mount+0x105/0x1d0
INFO: Freed in jffs2_free_full_dirent+0x22/0x40 age=27 cpu=1 pid=915
__slab_free+0x372/0x4e4
kfree+0x1d4/0x20c
jffs2_free_full_dirent+0x22/0x40
jffs2_build_remove_unlinked_inode+0x17a/0x1e4
jffs2_do_mount_fs+0x1646/0x1bbc
jffs2_do_fill_super+0x245/0x6f0
jffs2_fill_super+0x287/0x2e0
mount_mtd_aux.isra.0+0x9a/0x144
mount_mtd+0x222/0x2f0
jffs2_mount+0x41/0x60
mount_fs+0x63/0x230
vfs_kern_mount.part.6+0x6c/0x1f4
do_mount+0xae8/0x1940
SyS_mount+0x105/0x1d0
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x97
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff815befef>] dump_stack+0x59/0x7e
[<ffffffff812d1d65>] print_trailer+0x125/0x1b0
[<ffffffff812d82c8>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff812dadef>] kasan_report.part.1+0x21f/0x534
[<ffffffff81132401>] ? vprintk+0x2d/0x40
[<ffffffff815f1ee2>] ? crc32_le+0x1ce/0x260
[<ffffffff812db41a>] kasan_report+0x26/0x30
[<ffffffff812d9fc1>] __asan_load1+0x3d/0x50
[<ffffffff815f1ee2>] crc32_le+0x1ce/0x260
[<ffffffff814764ae>] ? jffs2_alloc_full_dirent+0x2a/0x40
[<ffffffff81485cec>] jffs2_scan_eraseblock+0x1d0c/0x3b64
[<ffffffff81488813>] ? jffs2_scan_medium+0xccf/0xfe0
[<ffffffff81483fe0>] ? jffs2_scan_make_ino_cache+0x14c/0x14c
[<ffffffff812da3e9>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
[<ffffffff812da3e9>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
[<ffffffff812da462>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0x5e/0x70
[<ffffffff812d5d90>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x10c/0x2cc
[<ffffffff818169fb>] ? mtd_point+0xf7/0x130
[<ffffffff81487dc9>] jffs2_scan_medium+0x285/0xfe0
[<ffffffff81487b44>] ? jffs2_scan_eraseblock+0x3b64/0x3b64
[<ffffffff812da3e9>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
[<ffffffff812da3e9>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50
[<ffffffff812da462>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0x5e/0x70
[<ffffffff812d57df>] ? __kmalloc+0x12b/0x300
[<ffffffff812da462>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0x5e/0x70
[<ffffffff814a2753>] ? jffs2_sum_init+0x9f/0x240
[<ffffffff8148b2ff>] jffs2_do_mount_fs+0x5fb/0x1bbc
[<ffffffff8148ad04>] ? jffs2_del_noinode_dirent+0x640/0x640
[<ffffffff812da462>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0x5e/0x70
[<ffffffff81127c5b>] ? __init_rwsem+0x97/0xac
[<ffffffff81492349>] jffs2_do_fill_super+0x245/0x6f0
[<ffffffff81493c5b>] jffs2_fill_super+0x287/0x2e0
[<ffffffff814939d4>] ? jffs2_parse_options+0x594/0x594
[<ffffffff81819bea>] mount_mtd_aux.isra.0+0x9a/0x144
[<ffffffff81819eb6>] mount_mtd+0x222/0x2f0
[<ffffffff814939d4>] ? jffs2_parse_options+0x594/0x594
[<ffffffff81819c94>] ? mount_mtd_aux.isra.0+0x144/0x144
[<ffffffff81258757>] ? free_pages+0x13/0x1c
[<ffffffff814fa0ac>] ? selinux_sb_copy_data+0x278/0x2e0
[<ffffffff81492b35>] jffs2_mount+0x41/0x60
[<ffffffff81302fb7>] mount_fs+0x63/0x230
[<ffffffff8133755f>] ? alloc_vfsmnt+0x32f/0x3b0
[<ffffffff81337f2c>] vfs_kern_mount.part.6+0x6c/0x1f4
[<ffffffff8133ceec>] do_mount+0xae8/0x1940
[<ffffffff811b94e0>] ? audit_filter_rules.constprop.6+0x1d10/0x1d10
[<ffffffff8133c404>] ? copy_mount_string+0x40/0x40
[<ffffffff812cbf78>] ? alloc_pages_current+0xa4/0x1bc
[<ffffffff81253a89>] ? __get_free_pages+0x25/0x50
[<ffffffff81338993>] ? copy_mount_options.part.17+0x183/0x264
[<ffffffff8133e3a9>] SyS_mount+0x105/0x1d0
[<ffffffff8133e2a4>] ? copy_mnt_ns+0x560/0x560
[<ffffffff810e8391>] ? msa_space_switch_handler+0x13d/0x190
[<ffffffff81be184a>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0x97
[<ffffffff810e9274>] ? msa_space_switch+0xb0/0xe0
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8800842cf180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8800842cf200: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800842cf280: fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 01 fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff8800842cf300: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8800842cf380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Kunkun Xu <xukunkun1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: lizhe <lizhe67@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
Hansem Ro
|
ad3f360ef2 |
Input: ili210x - add missing negation for touch indication on ili210x
commit ac05a8a927e5a1027592d8f98510a511dadeed14 upstream.
This adds the negation needed for proper finger detection on Ilitek
ili2107/ili210x. This fixes polling issues (on Amazon Kindle Fire)
caused by returning false for the cooresponding finger on the touchscreen.
Signed-off-by: Hansem Ro <hansemro@outlook.com>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Trond Myklebust
|
6be0e4b593 |
NFSv4: Don't discard segments marked for return in _pnfs_return_layout()
commit de144ff4234f935bd2150108019b5d87a90a8a96 upstream.
If the pNFS layout segment is marked with the NFS_LSEG_LAYOUTRETURN
flag, then the assumption is that it has some reporting requirement
to perform through a layoutreturn (e.g. flexfiles layout stats or error
information).
Fixes:
|
||
|
Trond Myklebust
|
12ccd59941 |
NFS: Don't discard pNFS layout segments that are marked for return
commit 39fd01863616964f009599e50ca5c6ea9ebf88d6 upstream.
If the pNFS layout segment is marked with the NFS_LSEG_LAYOUTRETURN
flag, then the assumption is that it has some reporting requirement
to perform through a layoutreturn (e.g. flexfiles layout stats or error
information).
Fixes:
|
||
|
Marc Zyngier
|
504632a357 |
ACPI: GTDT: Don't corrupt interrupt mappings on watchdow probe failure
commit 1ecd5b129252249b9bc03d7645a7bda512747277 upstream.
When failing the driver probe because of invalid firmware properties,
the GTDT driver unmaps the interrupt that it mapped earlier.
However, it never checks whether the mapping of the interrupt actially
succeeded. Even more, should the firmware report an illegal interrupt
number that overlaps with the GIC SGI range, this can result in an
IPI being unmapped, and subsequent fireworks (as reported by Dann
Frazier).
Rework the driver to have a slightly saner behaviour and actually
check whether the interrupt has been mapped before unmapping things.
Reported-by: dann frazier <dann.frazier@canonical.com>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Davide Caratti
|
490ad0a239 |
openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets
commit 7c0ea5930c1c211931819d83cfb157bff1539a4c upstream.
running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the
following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367
CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x92/0xc1
print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150
kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111
ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60
ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch]
do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch]
ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch]
ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0
genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490
netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630
netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0
sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110
____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890
___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160
__sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07
Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48
RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019
RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7
flags: 0x17ffffc0000000()
raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame:
ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch]
this frame has 2 objects:
[32, 144) 'ovs_dst'
[192, 424) 'ovs_rt'
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
^
ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then,
in the following call graph:
ip_do_fragment()
ip_skb_dst_mtu()
ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward()
ip_mtu_locked()
the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this
turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in
the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets
in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Ido Schimmel
|
9508634b2b |
mlxsw: spectrum_mr: Update egress RIF list before route's action
commit cbaf3f6af9c268caf558c8e7ec52bcb35c5455dd upstream.
Each multicast route that is forwarding packets (as opposed to trapping
them) points to a list of egress router interfaces (RIFs) through which
packets are replicated.
A route's action can transition from trap to forward when a RIF is
created for one of the route's egress virtual interfaces (eVIF). When
this happens, the route's action is first updated and only later the
list of egress RIFs is committed to the device.
This results in the route pointing to an invalid list. In case the list
pointer is out of range (due to uninitialized memory), the device will
complain:
mlxsw_spectrum2 0000:06:00.0: EMAD reg access failed (tid=5733bf490000905c,reg_id=300f(pefa),type=write,status=7(bad parameter))
Fix this by first committing the list of egress RIFs to the device and
only later update the route's action.
Note that a fix is not needed in the reverse function (i.e.,
mlxsw_sp_mr_route_evif_unresolve()), as there the route's action is
first updated and only later the RIF is removed from the list.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes:
|
||
|
Chao Yu
|
27a1306384 |
f2fs: fix to avoid out-of-bounds memory access
commit b862676e371715456c9dade7990c8004996d0d9e upstream. butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com> reported a bug found by syzkaller fuzzer with custom modifications in 5.12.0-rc3+ [1]: dump_stack+0xfa/0x151 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x82/0x32c mm/kasan/report.c:232 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:399 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 mm/kasan/report.c:416 f2fs_test_bit fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2572 [inline] current_nat_addr fs/f2fs/node.h:213 [inline] get_next_nat_page fs/f2fs/node.c:123 [inline] __flush_nat_entry_set fs/f2fs/node.c:2888 [inline] f2fs_flush_nat_entries+0x258e/0x2960 fs/f2fs/node.c:2991 f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x1372/0x6a70 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1640 f2fs_issue_checkpoint+0x149/0x410 fs/f2fs/checkpoint.c:1807 f2fs_sync_fs+0x20f/0x420 fs/f2fs/super.c:1454 __sync_filesystem fs/sync.c:39 [inline] sync_filesystem fs/sync.c:67 [inline] sync_filesystem+0x1b5/0x260 fs/sync.c:48 generic_shutdown_super+0x70/0x370 fs/super.c:448 kill_block_super+0x97/0xf0 fs/super.c:1394 The root cause is, if nat entry in checkpoint journal area is corrupted, e.g. nid of journalled nat entry exceeds max nid value, during checkpoint, once it tries to flush nat journal to NAT area, get_next_nat_page() may access out-of-bounds memory on nat_bitmap due to it uses wrong nid value as bitmap offset. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAFcO6XOMWdr8pObek6eN6-fs58KG9doRFadgJj-FnF-1x43s2g@mail.gmail.com/T/#u Reported-and-tested-by: butt3rflyh4ck <butterflyhuangxx@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Guochun Mao
|
6c9b98a66d |
ubifs: Only check replay with inode type to judge if inode linked
commit 3e903315790baf4a966436e7f32e9c97864570ac upstream.
Conside the following case, it just write a big file into flash,
when complete writing, delete the file, and then power off promptly.
Next time power on, we'll get a replay list like:
...
LEB 1105:211344 len 4144 deletion 0 sqnum 428783 key type 1 inode 80
LEB 15:233544 len 160 deletion 1 sqnum 428785 key type 0 inode 80
LEB 1105:215488 len 4144 deletion 0 sqnum 428787 key type 1 inode 80
...
In the replay list, data nodes' deletion are 0, and the inode node's
deletion is 1. In current logic, the file's dentry will be removed,
but inode and the flash space it occupied will be reserved.
User will see that much free space been disappeared.
We only need to check the deletion value of the following inode type
node of the replay entry.
Fixes:
|
||
|
Luis Henriques
|
310efc95c7 |
virtiofs: fix memory leak in virtio_fs_probe()
commit c79c5e0178922a9e092ec8fed026750f39dcaef4 upstream.
When accidentally passing twice the same tag to qemu, kmemleak ended up
reporting a memory leak in virtiofs. Also, looking at the log I saw the
following error (that's when I realised the duplicated tag):
virtiofs: probe of virtio5 failed with error -17
Here's the kmemleak log for reference:
unreferenced object 0xffff888103d47800 (size 1024):
comm "systemd-udevd", pid 118, jiffies 4294893780 (age 18.340s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 .....N..........
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 80 90 02 a0 ff ff ff ff ................
backtrace:
[<000000000ebb87c1>] virtio_fs_probe+0x171/0x7ae [virtiofs]
[<00000000f8aca419>] virtio_dev_probe+0x15f/0x210
[<000000004d6baf3c>] really_probe+0xea/0x430
[<00000000a6ceeac8>] device_driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<00000000196f47a7>] __driver_attach+0x98/0x140
[<000000000b20601d>] bus_for_each_dev+0x7b/0xc0
[<00000000399c7b7f>] bus_add_driver+0x11b/0x1f0
[<0000000032b09ba7>] driver_register+0x8f/0xe0
[<00000000cdd55998>] 0xffffffffa002c013
[<000000000ea196a2>] do_one_initcall+0x64/0x2e0
[<0000000008f727ce>] do_init_module+0x5c/0x260
[<000000003cdedab6>] __do_sys_finit_module+0xb5/0x120
[<00000000ad2f48c6>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[<00000000809526b5>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
Fixes:
|
||
|
Nathan Chancellor
|
2b28e26bd7 |
Makefile: Move -Wno-unused-but-set-variable out of GCC only block
commit 885480b084696331bea61a4f7eba10652999a9c1 upstream. Currently, -Wunused-but-set-variable is only supported by GCC so it is disabled unconditionally in a GCC only block (it is enabled with W=1). clang currently has its implementation for this warning in review so preemptively move this statement out of the GCC only block and wrap it with cc-disable-warning so that both compilers function the same. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://reviews.llvm.org/D100581 Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Tested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Bill Wendling
|
13a474c013 |
arm64/vdso: Discard .note.gnu.property sections in vDSO
[ Upstream commit 388708028e6937f3fc5fc19aeeb847f8970f489c ]
The arm64 assembler in binutils 2.32 and above generates a program
property note in a note section, .note.gnu.property, to encode used x86
ISAs and features. But the kernel linker script only contains a single
NOTE segment:
PHDRS
{
text PT_LOAD FLAGS(5) FILEHDR PHDRS; /* PF_R|PF_X */
dynamic PT_DYNAMIC FLAGS(4); /* PF_R */
note PT_NOTE FLAGS(4); /* PF_R */
}
The NOTE segment generated by the vDSO linker script is aligned to 4 bytes.
But the .note.gnu.property section must be aligned to 8 bytes on arm64.
$ readelf -n vdso64.so
Displaying notes found in: .note
Owner Data size Description
Linux 0x00000004 Unknown note type: (0x00000000)
description data: 06 00 00 00
readelf: Warning: note with invalid namesz and/or descsz found at offset 0x20
readelf: Warning: type: 0x78, namesize: 0x00000100, descsize: 0x756e694c, alignment: 8
Since the note.gnu.property section in the vDSO is not checked by the
dynamic linker, discard the .note.gnu.property sections in the vDSO.
Similar to commit 4caffe6a28d31 ("x86/vdso: Discard .note.gnu.property
sections in vDSO"), but for arm64.
Signed-off-by: Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210423205159.830854-1-morbo@google.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Filipe Manana
|
f40bf82bf6 |
btrfs: fix race when picking most recent mod log operation for an old root
[ Upstream commit f9690f426b2134cc3e74bfc5d9dfd6a4b2ca5281 ]
Commit dbcc7d57bffc0c ("btrfs: fix race when cloning extent buffer during
rewind of an old root"), fixed a race when we need to rewind the extent
buffer of an old root. It was caused by picking a new mod log operation
for the extent buffer while getting a cloned extent buffer with an outdated
number of items (off by -1), because we cloned the extent buffer without
locking it first.
However there is still another similar race, but in the opposite direction.
The cloned extent buffer has a number of items that does not match the
number of tree mod log operations that are going to be replayed. This is
because right after we got the last (most recent) tree mod log operation to
replay and before locking and cloning the extent buffer, another task adds
a new pointer to the extent buffer, which results in adding a new tree mod
log operation and incrementing the number of items in the extent buffer.
So after cloning we have mismatch between the number of items in the extent
buffer and the number of mod log operations we are going to apply to it.
This results in hitting a BUG_ON() that produces the following stack trace:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/tree-mod-log.c:675!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 3 PID: 4811 Comm: crawl_1215 Tainted: G W 5.12.0-7d1efdf501f8-misc-next+ #99
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:tree_mod_log_rewind+0x3b1/0x3c0
Code: 05 48 8d 74 10 (...)
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001027090 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880a8514600 RCX: ffffffffaa9e59b6
RDX: 0000000000000007 RSI: dffffc0000000000 RDI: ffff8880a851462c
RBP: ffffc900010270e0 R08: 00000000000000c0 R09: ffffed1004333417
R10: ffff88802199a0b7 R11: ffffed1004333416 R12: 000000000000000e
R13: ffff888135af8748 R14: ffff88818766ff00 R15: ffff8880a851462c
FS: 00007f29acf62700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f0e6013f718 CR3: 000000010d42e003 CR4: 0000000000170ee0
Call Trace:
btrfs_get_old_root+0x16a/0x5c0
? lock_downgrade+0x400/0x400
btrfs_search_old_slot+0x192/0x520
? btrfs_search_slot+0x1090/0x1090
? free_extent_buffer.part.61+0xd7/0x140
? free_extent_buffer+0x13/0x20
resolve_indirect_refs+0x3e9/0xfc0
? lock_downgrade+0x400/0x400
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
? add_prelim_ref.part.11+0x150/0x150
? lock_downgrade+0x400/0x400
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
? lock_acquired+0xbb/0x620
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
? rb_insert_color+0x340/0x360
? prelim_ref_insert+0x12d/0x430
find_parent_nodes+0x5c3/0x1830
? stack_trace_save+0x87/0xb0
? resolve_indirect_refs+0xfc0/0xfc0
? fs_reclaim_acquire+0x67/0xf0
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x210/0x210
? fs_reclaim_acquire+0x67/0xf0
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
? ___might_sleep+0x10f/0x1e0
? __kasan_kmalloc+0x9d/0xd0
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x55/0x120
btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0x142/0x1e0
? find_parent_nodes+0x1830/0x1830
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x55/0x120
? ulist_free+0x1f/0x30
? btrfs_inode_flags_to_xflags+0x50/0x50
iterate_extent_inodes+0x20e/0x580
? tree_backref_for_extent+0x230/0x230
? release_extent_buffer+0x225/0x280
? read_extent_buffer+0xdd/0x110
? lock_downgrade+0x400/0x400
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
? lock_acquired+0xbb/0x620
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x22/0x30
? release_extent_buffer+0x225/0x280
iterate_inodes_from_logical+0x129/0x170
? iterate_inodes_from_logical+0x129/0x170
? btrfs_inode_flags_to_xflags+0x50/0x50
? iterate_extent_inodes+0x580/0x580
? __vmalloc_node+0x92/0xb0
? init_data_container+0x34/0xb0
? init_data_container+0x34/0xb0
? kvmalloc_node+0x60/0x80
btrfs_ioctl_logical_to_ino+0x158/0x230
btrfs_ioctl+0x2038/0x4360
? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20
? mmput+0x3b/0x220
? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
? lock_release+0xc8/0x650
? __might_fault+0x64/0xd0
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
? lock_downgrade+0x400/0x400
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x210/0x210
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x13/0x210
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x51/0x63
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
? do_vfs_ioctl+0xfc/0x9d0
? ioctl_file_clone+0xe0/0xe0
? lock_downgrade+0x400/0x400
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x210/0x210
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
? lock_release+0xc8/0x650
? __task_pid_nr_ns+0xd3/0x250
? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
? __fget_files+0x160/0x230
? __fget_light+0xf2/0x110
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xc3/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x37/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7f29ae85b427
Code: 00 00 90 48 8b (...)
RSP: 002b:00007f29acf5fcf8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f29acf5ff40 RCX: 00007f29ae85b427
RDX: 00007f29acf5ff48 RSI: 00000000c038943b RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000001000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f29acf60120
R10: 00005640d5fc7b00 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 00007f29acf5ff48 R14: 00007f29acf5ff40 R15: 00007f29acf5fef8
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 85e5fce078dfbe04 ]---
(gdb) l *(tree_mod_log_rewind+0x3b1)
0xffffffff819e5b21 is in tree_mod_log_rewind (fs/btrfs/tree-mod-log.c:675).
670 * the modification. As we're going backwards, we do the
671 * opposite of each operation here.
672 */
673 switch (tm->op) {
674 case BTRFS_MOD_LOG_KEY_REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING:
675 BUG_ON(tm->slot < n);
676 fallthrough;
677 case BTRFS_MOD_LOG_KEY_REMOVE_WHILE_MOVING:
678 case BTRFS_MOD_LOG_KEY_REMOVE:
679 btrfs_set_node_key(eb, &tm->key, tm->slot);
(gdb) quit
The following steps explain in more detail how it happens:
1) We have one tree mod log user (through fiemap or the logical ino ioctl),
with a sequence number of 1, so we have fs_info->tree_mod_seq == 1.
This is task A;
2) Another task is at ctree.c:balance_level() and we have eb X currently as
the root of the tree, and we promote its single child, eb Y, as the new
root.
Then, at ctree.c:balance_level(), we call:
ret = btrfs_tree_mod_log_insert_root(root->node, child, true);
3) At btrfs_tree_mod_log_insert_root() we create a tree mod log operation
of type BTRFS_MOD_LOG_KEY_REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING, with a ->logical field
pointing to ebX->start. We only have one item in eb X, so we create
only one tree mod log operation, and store in the "tm_list" array;
4) Then, still at btrfs_tree_mod_log_insert_root(), we create a tree mod
log element of operation type BTRFS_MOD_LOG_ROOT_REPLACE, ->logical set
to ebY->start, ->old_root.logical set to ebX->start, ->old_root.level
set to the level of eb X and ->generation set to the generation of eb X;
5) Then btrfs_tree_mod_log_insert_root() calls tree_mod_log_free_eb() with
"tm_list" as argument. After that, tree_mod_log_free_eb() calls
tree_mod_log_insert(). This inserts the mod log operation of type
BTRFS_MOD_LOG_KEY_REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING from step 3 into the rbtree
with a sequence number of 2 (and fs_info->tree_mod_seq set to 2);
6) Then, after inserting the "tm_list" single element into the tree mod
log rbtree, the BTRFS_MOD_LOG_ROOT_REPLACE element is inserted, which
gets the sequence number 3 (and fs_info->tree_mod_seq set to 3);
7) Back to ctree.c:balance_level(), we free eb X by calling
btrfs_free_tree_block() on it. Because eb X was created in the current
transaction, has no other references and writeback did not happen for
it, we add it back to the free space cache/tree;
8) Later some other task B allocates the metadata extent from eb X, since
it is marked as free space in the space cache/tree, and uses it as a
node for some other btree;
9) The tree mod log user task calls btrfs_search_old_slot(), which calls
btrfs_get_old_root(), and finally that calls tree_mod_log_oldest_root()
with time_seq == 1 and eb_root == eb Y;
10) The first iteration of the while loop finds the tree mod log element
with sequence number 3, for the logical address of eb Y and of type
BTRFS_MOD_LOG_ROOT_REPLACE;
11) Because the operation type is BTRFS_MOD_LOG_ROOT_REPLACE, we don't
break out of the loop, and set root_logical to point to
tm->old_root.logical, which corresponds to the logical address of
eb X;
12) On the next iteration of the while loop, the call to
tree_mod_log_search_oldest() returns the smallest tree mod log element
for the logical address of eb X, which has a sequence number of 2, an
operation type of BTRFS_MOD_LOG_KEY_REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING and
corresponds to the old slot 0 of eb X (eb X had only 1 item in it
before being freed at step 7);
13) We then break out of the while loop and return the tree mod log
operation of type BTRFS_MOD_LOG_ROOT_REPLACE (eb Y), and not the one
for slot 0 of eb X, to btrfs_get_old_root();
14) At btrfs_get_old_root(), we process the BTRFS_MOD_LOG_ROOT_REPLACE
operation and set "logical" to the logical address of eb X, which was
the old root. We then call tree_mod_log_search() passing it the logical
address of eb X and time_seq == 1;
15) But before calling tree_mod_log_search(), task B locks eb X, adds a
key to eb X, which results in adding a tree mod log operation of type
BTRFS_MOD_LOG_KEY_ADD, with a sequence number of 4, to the tree mod
log, and increments the number of items in eb X from 0 to 1.
Now fs_info->tree_mod_seq has a value of 4;
16) Task A then calls tree_mod_log_search(), which returns the most recent
tree mod log operation for eb X, which is the one just added by task B
at the previous step, with a sequence number of 4, a type of
BTRFS_MOD_LOG_KEY_ADD and for slot 0;
17) Before task A locks and clones eb X, task A adds another key to eb X,
which results in adding a new BTRFS_MOD_LOG_KEY_ADD mod log operation,
with a sequence number of 5, for slot 1 of eb X, increments the
number of items in eb X from 1 to 2, and unlocks eb X.
Now fs_info->tree_mod_seq has a value of 5;
18) Task A then locks eb X and clones it. The clone has a value of 2 for
the number of items and the pointer "tm" points to the tree mod log
operation with sequence number 4, not the most recent one with a
sequence number of 5, so there is mismatch between the number of
mod log operations that are going to be applied to the cloned version
of eb X and the number of items in the clone;
19) Task A then calls tree_mod_log_rewind() with the clone of eb X, the
tree mod log operation with sequence number 4 and a type of
BTRFS_MOD_LOG_KEY_ADD, and time_seq == 1;
20) At tree_mod_log_rewind(), we set the local variable "n" with a value
of 2, which is the number of items in the clone of eb X.
Then in the first iteration of the while loop, we process the mod log
operation with sequence number 4, which is targeted at slot 0 and has
a type of BTRFS_MOD_LOG_KEY_ADD. This results in decrementing "n" from
2 to 1.
Then we pick the next tree mod log operation for eb X, which is the
tree mod log operation with a sequence number of 2, a type of
BTRFS_MOD_LOG_KEY_REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING and for slot 0, it is the one
added in step 5 to the tree mod log tree.
We go back to the top of the loop to process this mod log operation,
and because its slot is 0 and "n" has a value of 1, we hit the BUG_ON:
(...)
switch (tm->op) {
case BTRFS_MOD_LOG_KEY_REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING:
BUG_ON(tm->slot < n);
fallthrough;
(...)
Fix this by checking for a more recent tree mod log operation after locking
and cloning the extent buffer of the old root node, and use it as the first
operation to apply to the cloned extent buffer when rewinding it.
Stable backport notes: due to moved code and renames, in =< 5.11 the
change should be applied to ctree.c:get_old_root.
Reported-by: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/20210404040732.GZ32440@hungrycats.org/
Fixes:
|
||
|
Eckhart Mohr
|
2bc0131d5b |
ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for Intel Clevo PCx0Dx
commit 970e3012c04c96351c413f193a9c909e6d871ce2 upstream. This applies a SND_PCI_QUIRK(...) to the Clevo PCx0Dx barebones. This fix enables audio output over the headset jack and ensures that a microphone connected via the headset combo jack is correctly recognized when pluged in. [ Rearranged the list entries in a sorted order -- tiwai ] Signed-off-by: Eckhart Mohr <e.mohr@tuxedocomputers.com> Co-developed-by: Werner Sembach <wse@tuxedocomputers.com> Signed-off-by: Werner Sembach <wse@tuxedocomputers.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210427153025.451118-1-wse@tuxedocomputers.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Sami Loone
|
45392da1bd |
ALSA: hda/realtek: fix static noise on ALC285 Lenovo laptops
commit 9bbb94e57df135ef61bef075d9c99b8d9e89e246 upstream.
Remove a duplicate vendor+subvendor pin fixup entry as one is masking
the other and making it unreachable. Consider the more specific newcomer
as a second chance instead.
The generic entry is made less strict to also match for laptops with
slightly different 0x12 pin configuration. Tested on Lenovo Yoga 6 (AMD)
where 0x12 is 0x40000000.
Fixes: 607184cb1635 ("ALSA: hda/realtek - Add supported for more Lenovo ALC285 Headset Button")
Signed-off-by: Sami Loone <sami@loone.fi>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YIXS+GT/dGI/LtK6@yoga
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
||
|
Phil Calvin
|
ee47a64149 |
ALSA: hda/realtek: fix mic boost on Intel NUC 8
commit d1ee66c5d3c5a0498dd5e3f2af5b8c219a98bba5 upstream. Fix two bugs with the Intel HDA Realtek ALC233 sound codec present in Intel NUC NUC8i7BEH and probably a few other similar NUC models. These codecs advertise a 4-level microphone input boost amplifier on pin 0x19, but the highest two boost settings do not work correctly, and produce only low analog noise that does not seem to contain any discernible signal. There is an existing fixup for this exact problem but for a different PCI subsystem ID, so we re-use that logic. Changing the boost level also triggers a DC spike in the input signal that bleeds off over about a second and overwhelms any input during that time. Thankfully, the existing fixup has the side effect of making the boost control show up in userspace as a mute/unmute switch, and this keeps (e.g.) PulseAudio from fiddling with it during normal input volume adjustments. Finally, the NUC hardware has built-in inverted stereo mics. This patch also enables the usual fixup for this so the two channels cancel noise instead of the actual signal. [ Re-ordered the quirk entry point by tiwai ] Signed-off-by: Phil Calvin <phil@philcalvin.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/80dc5663-7734-e7e5-25ef-15b5df24511a@philcalvin.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Luke D Jones
|
d143cd1f8f |
ALSA: hda/realtek: GA503 use same quirks as GA401
commit 76fae6185f5456865ff1bcb647709d44fd987eb6 upstream. The GA503 has almost exactly the same default setup as the GA401 model with the same issues. The GA401 quirks solve all the issues so we will use the full quirk chain. Signed-off-by: Luke D Jones <luke@ljones.dev> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210419030411.28304-1-luke@ljones.dev Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Timo Gurr
|
f2b75e3578 |
ALSA: usb-audio: Add dB range mapping for Sennheiser Communications Headset PC 8
commit ab2165e2e6ed17345ffa8ee88ca764e8788ebcd7 upstream. The decibel volume range contains a negative maximum value resulting in pipewire complaining about the device and effectivly having no sound output. The wrong values also resulted in the headset sounding muted already at a mixer level of about ~25%. PipeWire BugLink: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/pipewire/pipewire/-/issues/1049 BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=212897 Signed-off-by: Timo Gurr <timo.gurr@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210503110822.10222-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Takashi Iwai
|
2136ecfcf3 |
ALSA: usb-audio: More constifications
commit a01df925d1bbc97d6f7fe07b157aadb565315337 upstream. Apply const prefix to the remaining places: the static table for the unit information, the mixer maps, the validator tables, etc. Just for minor optimization and no functional changes. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200105144823.29547-12-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Takashi Iwai
|
adba683c57 |
ALSA: usb-audio: Explicitly set up the clock selector
commit d2e8f641257d0d3af6e45d6ac2d6f9d56b8ea964 upstream. In the current code, we have some assumption that the audio clock selector has been set up implicitly and don't want to touch it unless it's really needed for the fallback autoclock setup. This works for most devices but some seem having a problem. Partially this was covered for the devices with a single connector at the initialization phase (commit 086b957cc17f "ALSA: usb-audio: Skip the clock selector inquiry for single connections"), but also there are cases where the wrong clock set up is kept silently. The latter seems to be the cause of the noises on Behringer devices. In this patch, we explicitly set up the audio clock selector whenever the appropriate node is found. Reported-by: Geraldo Nascimento <geraldogabriel@gmail.com> BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199327 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAEsQvcvF7LnO8PxyyCxuRCx=7jNeSCvFAd-+dE0g_rd1rOxxdw@mail.gmail.com Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210413084152.32325-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Lv Yunlong
|
93588ea2fb |
ALSA: sb: Fix two use after free in snd_sb_qsound_build
commit 4fb44dd2c1dda18606348acdfdb97e8759dde9df upstream. In snd_sb_qsound_build, snd_ctl_add(..,p->qsound_switch...) and snd_ctl_add(..,p->qsound_space..) are called. But the second arguments of snd_ctl_add() could be freed via snd_ctl_add_replace() ->snd_ctl_free_one(). After the error code is returned, snd_sb_qsound_destroy(p) is called in __error branch. But in snd_sb_qsound_destroy(), the freed p->qsound_switch and p->qsound_space are still used by snd_ctl_remove(). My patch set p->qsound_switch and p->qsound_space to NULL if snd_ctl_add() failed to avoid the uaf bugs. But these codes need to further be improved with the code style. Signed-off-by: Lv Yunlong <lyl2019@mail.ustc.edu.cn> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210426145541.8070-1-lyl2019@mail.ustc.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Takashi Iwai
|
1666f1ac38 |
ALSA: hda/conexant: Re-order CX5066 quirk table entries
commit 2e6a731296be9d356fdccee9fb6ae345dad96438 upstream. Just re-order the cx5066_fixups[] entries for HP devices for avoiding the oversight of the duplicated or unapplied item in future. No functional changes. Also Cc-to-stable for the further patch applications. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210428112704.23967-14-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Lv Yunlong
|
b53b72ef83 |
ALSA: emu8000: Fix a use after free in snd_emu8000_create_mixer
commit 1c98f574403dbcf2eb832d5535a10d967333ef2d upstream. Our code analyzer reported a uaf. In snd_emu8000_create_mixer, the callee snd_ctl_add(..,emu->controls[i]) calls snd_ctl_add_replace(.., kcontrol,..). Inside snd_ctl_add_replace(), if error happens, kcontrol will be freed by snd_ctl_free_one(kcontrol). Then emu->controls[i] points to a freed memory, and the execution comes to __error branch of snd_emu8000_create_mixer. The freed emu->controls[i] is used in snd_ctl_remove(card, emu->controls[i]). My patch set emu->controls[i] to NULL if snd_ctl_add() failed to avoid the uaf. Signed-off-by: Lv Yunlong <lyl2019@mail.ustc.edu.cn> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210426131129.4796-1-lyl2019@mail.ustc.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
|
Harald Freudenberger
|
a65181cfd9 |
s390/archrandom: add parameter check for s390_arch_random_generate
[ Upstream commit 28096067686c5a5cbd4c35b079749bd805df5010 ] A review of the code showed, that this function which is exposed within the whole kernel should do a parameter check for the amount of bytes requested. If this requested bytes is too high an unsigned int overflow could happen causing this function to try to memcpy a really big memory chunk. This is not a security issue as there are only two invocations of this function from arch/s390/include/asm/archrandom.h and both are not exposed to userland. Reported-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
Bart Van Assche
|
ef00a39e2c |
scsi: libfc: Fix a format specifier
[ Upstream commit 90d6697810f06aceea9de71ad836a8c7669789cd ]
Since the 'mfs' member has been declared as 'u32' in include/scsi/libfc.h,
use the %u format specifier instead of %hu. This patch fixes the following
clang compiler warning:
warning: format specifies type
'unsigned short' but the argument has type 'u32' (aka 'unsigned int')
[-Wformat]
"lport->mfs:%hu\n", mfs, lport->mfs);
~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~
%u
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210415220826.29438-8-bvanassche@acm.org
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
|
||
|
Dinghao Liu
|
02c1390047 |
mfd: arizona: Fix rumtime PM imbalance on error
[ Upstream commit fe6df2b48043bbe1e852b2320501d3b169363c35 ] pm_runtime_get_sync() will increase the rumtime PM counter even it returns an error. Thus a pairing decrement is needed to prevent refcount leak. Fix this by replacing this API with pm_runtime_resume_and_get(), which will not change the runtime PM counter on error. Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn> Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.cirrus.com> Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
James Smart
|
0d0e6dbd5f |
scsi: lpfc: Remove unsupported mbox PORT_CAPABILITIES logic
[ Upstream commit b62232ba8caccaf1954e197058104a6478fac1af ] SLI-4 does not contain a PORT_CAPABILITIES mailbox command (only SLI-3 does, and SLI-3 doesn't use it), yet there are SLI-4 code paths that have code to issue the command. The command will always fail. Remove the code for the mailbox command and leave only the resulting "failure path" logic. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210412013127.2387-12-jsmart2021@gmail.com Co-developed-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: James Smart <jsmart2021@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
James Smart
|
0756818b4d |
scsi: lpfc: Fix error handling for mailboxes completed in MBX_POLL mode
[ Upstream commit 304ee43238fed517faa123e034b593905b8679f8 ] In SLI-4, when performing a mailbox command with MBX_POLL, the driver uses the BMBX register to send the command rather than the MQ. A flag is set indicating the BMBX register is active and saves the mailbox job struct (mboxq) in the mbox_active element of the adapter. The routine then waits for completion or timeout. The mailbox job struct is not freed by the routine. In cases of timeout, the adapter will be reset. The lpfc_sli_mbox_sys_flush() routine will clean up the mbox in preparation for the reset. It clears the BMBX active flag and marks the job structure as MBX_NOT_FINISHED. But, it never frees the mboxq job structure. Expectation in both normal completion and timeout cases is that the issuer of the mbx command will free the structure. Unfortunately, not all calling paths are freeing the memory in cases of error. All calling paths were looked at and updated, if missing, to free the mboxq memory regardless of completion status. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210412013127.2387-7-jsmart2021@gmail.com Co-developed-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: James Smart <jsmart2021@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
|
James Smart
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f67fc8095b |
scsi: lpfc: Fix crash when a REG_RPI mailbox fails triggering a LOGO response
[ Upstream commit fffd18ec6579c2d9c72b212169259062fe747888 ] Fix a crash caused by a double put on the node when the driver completed an ACC for an unsolicted abort on the same node. The second put was executed by lpfc_nlp_not_used() and is wrong because the completion routine executes the nlp_put when the iocbq was released. Additionally, the driver is issuing a LOGO then immediately calls lpfc_nlp_set_state to put the node into NPR. This call does nothing. Remove the lpfc_nlp_not_used call and additional set_state in the completion routine. Remove the lpfc_nlp_set_state post issue_logo. Isn't necessary. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210412013127.2387-3-jsmart2021@gmail.com Co-developed-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: Justin Tee <justin.tee@broadcom.com> Signed-off-by: James Smart <jsmart2021@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Guchun Chen
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82bc134b93 |
drm/amdgpu: fix NULL pointer dereference
[ Upstream commit 3c3dc654333f6389803cdcaf03912e94173ae510 ] ttm->sg needs to be checked before accessing its child member. Call Trace: amdgpu_ttm_backend_destroy+0x12/0x70 [amdgpu] ttm_bo_cleanup_memtype_use+0x3a/0x60 [ttm] ttm_bo_release+0x17d/0x300 [ttm] amdgpu_bo_unref+0x1a/0x30 [amdgpu] amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0x78b/0x8b0 [amdgpu] kfd_ioctl_alloc_memory_of_gpu+0x118/0x220 [amdgpu] kfd_ioctl+0x222/0x400 [amdgpu] ? kfd_dev_is_large_bar+0x90/0x90 [amdgpu] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8e/0xd0 ? __context_tracking_exit+0x52/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x7f97f264d317 Code: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 71 4b 2d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 41 4b 2d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffdb402c338 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f97f3cc63a0 RCX: 00007f97f264d317 RDX: 00007ffdb402c380 RSI: 00000000c0284b16 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007ffdb402c380 R08: 00007ffdb402c428 R09: 00000000c4000004 R10: 00000000c4000004 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000c0284b16 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00007f97f3cc63a0 R15: 00007f8836200000 Signed-off-by: Guchun Chen <guchun.chen@amd.com> Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Arnd Bergmann
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4b65414ea4 |
amdgpu: avoid incorrect %hu format string
[ Upstream commit 7d98d416c2cc1c1f7d9508e887de4630e521d797 ]
clang points out that the %hu format string does not match the type
of the variables here:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_uvd.c:263:7: warning: format specifies type 'unsigned short' but the argument has type 'unsigned int' [-Wformat]
version_major, version_minor);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/drm/drm_print.h:498:19: note: expanded from macro 'DRM_ERROR'
__drm_err(fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
~~~ ^~~~~~~~~~~
Change it to a regular %u, the same way a previous patch did for
another instance of the same warning.
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Qu Huang
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443fdd7b4b |
drm/amdkfd: Fix cat debugfs hang_hws file causes system crash bug
[ Upstream commit d73610211eec8aa027850982b1a48980aa1bc96e ] Here is the system crash log: [ 1272.884438] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) [ 1272.884444] IP: [< (null)>] (null) [ 1272.884447] PGD 825b09067 PUD 8267c8067 PMD 0 [ 1272.884452] Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP [ 1272.884509] CPU: 13 PID: 3485 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G [ 1272.884515] task: ffff9a38dbd4d140 ti: ffff9a37cd3b8000 task.ti: ffff9a37cd3b8000 [ 1272.884517] RIP: 0010:[<0000000000000000>] [< (null)>] (null) [ 1272.884520] RSP: 0018:ffff9a37cd3bbe68 EFLAGS: 00010203 [ 1272.884522] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000014d5f [ 1272.884524] RDX: fffffffffffffff4 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff9a38aca4d200 [ 1272.884526] RBP: ffff9a37cd3bbed0 R08: ffff9a38dcd5f1a0 R09: ffff9a31ffc07300 [ 1272.884527] R10: ffff9a31ffc07300 R11: ffffffffaddd5e9d R12: ffff9a38b4e0fb00 [ 1272.884529] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9a37cd3bbf18 R15: ffff9a38aca4d200 [ 1272.884532] FS: 00007feccaa67740(0000) GS:ffff9a38dcd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1272.884534] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1272.884536] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000008267c0000 CR4: 00000000003407e0 [ 1272.884537] Call Trace: [ 1272.884544] [<ffffffffade68940>] ? seq_read+0x130/0x440 [ 1272.884548] [<ffffffffade40f8f>] vfs_read+0x9f/0x170 [ 1272.884552] [<ffffffffade41e4f>] SyS_read+0x7f/0xf0 [ 1272.884557] [<ffffffffae374ddb>] system_call_fastpath+0x22/0x27 [ 1272.884558] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 1272.884562] RIP [< (null)>] (null) [ 1272.884564] RSP <ffff9a37cd3bbe68> [ 1272.884566] CR2: 0000000000000000 Signed-off-by: Qu Huang <jinsdb@126.com> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Marijn Suijten
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c499817594 |
drm/msm/mdp5: Do not multiply vclk line count by 100
[ Upstream commit 377569f82ea8228c421cef4da33e056a900b58ca ] Neither vtotal nor drm_mode_vrefresh contain a value that is premultiplied by 100 making the x100 variable name incorrect and resulting in vclks_line to become 100 times larger than it is supposed to be. The hardware counts 100 clockticks too many before tearcheck, leading to severe panel issues on at least the Sony Xperia lineup. This is likely an artifact from the original MDSS DSI panel driver where the calculation [1] corrected for a premultiplied reference framerate by 100 [2]. It does not appear that the above values were ever premultiplied in the history of the DRM MDP5 driver. With this change applied the value written to the SYNC_CONFIG_VSYNC register is now identical to downstream kernels. [1]: https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.18/tree/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdss_mdp_intf_cmd.c?h=LA.UM.8.6.c26-02400-89xx.0#n288 [2]: https://source.codeaurora.org/quic/la/kernel/msm-3.18/tree/drivers/video/msm/mdss/mdss_dsi_panel.c?h=LA.UM.8.6.c26-02400-89xx.0#n1648 Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@somainline.org> Signed-off-by: Marijn Suijten <marijn.suijten@somainline.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210406214726.131534-3-marijn.suijten@somainline.org Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Marijn Suijten
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336e7e7586 |
drm/msm/mdp5: Configure PP_SYNC_HEIGHT to double the vtotal
[ Upstream commit 2ad52bdb220de5ab348098e3482b01235d15a842 ] Leaving this at a close-to-maximum register value 0xFFF0 means it takes very long for the MDSS to generate a software vsync interrupt when the hardware TE interrupt doesn't arrive. Configuring this to double the vtotal (like some downstream kernels) leads to a frame to take at most twice before the vsync signal, until hardware TE comes up. In this case the hardware interrupt responsible for providing this signal - "disp-te" gpio - is not hooked up to the mdp5 vsync/pp logic at all. This solves severe panel update issues observed on at least the Xperia Loire and Tone series, until said gpio is properly hooked up to an irq. Suggested-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@somainline.org> Signed-off-by: Marijn Suijten <marijn.suijten@somainline.org> Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@somainline.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210406214726.131534-2-marijn.suijten@somainline.org Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Lingutla Chandrasekhar
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b56ad4febe |
sched/fair: Ignore percpu threads for imbalance pulls
[ Upstream commit 9bcb959d05eeb564dfc9cac13a59843a4fb2edf2 ]
During load balance, LBF_SOME_PINNED will be set if any candidate task
cannot be detached due to CPU affinity constraints. This can result in
setting env->sd->parent->sgc->group_imbalance, which can lead to a group
being classified as group_imbalanced (rather than any of the other, lower
group_type) when balancing at a higher level.
In workloads involving a single task per CPU, LBF_SOME_PINNED can often be
set due to per-CPU kthreads being the only other runnable tasks on any
given rq. This results in changing the group classification during
load-balance at higher levels when in reality there is nothing that can be
done for this affinity constraint: per-CPU kthreads, as the name implies,
don't get to move around (modulo hotplug shenanigans).
It's not as clear for userspace tasks - a task could be in an N-CPU cpuset
with N-1 offline CPUs, making it an "accidental" per-CPU task rather than
an intended one. KTHREAD_IS_PER_CPU gives us an indisputable signal which
we can leverage here to not set LBF_SOME_PINNED.
Note that the aforementioned classification to group_imbalance (when
nothing can be done) is especially problematic on big.LITTLE systems, which
have a topology the likes of:
DIE [ ]
MC [ ][ ]
0 1 2 3
L L B B
arch_scale_cpu_capacity(L) < arch_scale_cpu_capacity(B)
Here, setting LBF_SOME_PINNED due to a per-CPU kthread when balancing at MC
level on CPUs [0-1] will subsequently prevent CPUs [2-3] from classifying
the [0-1] group as group_misfit_task when balancing at DIE level. Thus, if
CPUs [0-1] are running CPU-bound (misfit) tasks, ill-timed per-CPU kthreads
can significantly delay the upgmigration of said misfit tasks. Systems
relying on ASYM_PACKING are likely to face similar issues.
Signed-off-by: Lingutla Chandrasekhar <clingutla@codeaurora.org>
[Use kthread_is_per_cpu() rather than p->nr_cpus_allowed]
[Reword changelog]
Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210407220628.3798191-2-valentin.schneider@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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