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8604 Commits
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Qu Wenruo
|
e0e51f4fc4 |
btrfs: avoid possible signal interruption of btrfs_drop_snapshot() on relocation tree
commit f3e3d9cc35252a70a2fd698762c9687718268ec6 upstream. [BUG] There is a bug report about bad signal timing could lead to read-only fs during balance: BTRFS info (device xvdb): balance: start -d -m -s BTRFS info (device xvdb): relocating block group 73001861120 flags metadata BTRFS info (device xvdb): found 12236 extents, stage: move data extents BTRFS info (device xvdb): relocating block group 71928119296 flags data BTRFS info (device xvdb): found 3 extents, stage: move data extents BTRFS info (device xvdb): found 3 extents, stage: update data pointers BTRFS info (device xvdb): relocating block group 60922265600 flags metadata BTRFS: error (device xvdb) in btrfs_drop_snapshot:5505: errno=-4 unknown BTRFS info (device xvdb): forced readonly BTRFS info (device xvdb): balance: ended with status: -4 [CAUSE] The direct cause is the -EINTR from the following call chain when a fatal signal is pending: relocate_block_group() |- clean_dirty_subvols() |- btrfs_drop_snapshot() |- btrfs_start_transaction() |- btrfs_delayed_refs_rsv_refill() |- btrfs_reserve_metadata_bytes() |- __reserve_metadata_bytes() |- wait_reserve_ticket() |- prepare_to_wait_event(); |- ticket->error = -EINTR; Normally this behavior is fine for most btrfs_start_transaction() callers, as they need to catch any other error, same for the signal, and exit ASAP. However for balance, especially for the clean_dirty_subvols() case, we're already doing cleanup works, getting -EINTR from btrfs_drop_snapshot() could cause a lot of unexpected problems. From the mentioned forced read-only report, to later balance error due to half dropped reloc trees. [FIX] Fix this problem by using btrfs_join_transaction() if btrfs_drop_snapshot() is called from relocation context. Since btrfs_join_transaction() won't get interrupted by signal, we can continue the cleanup. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>3 Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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David Sterba
|
2f29a31f39 |
btrfs: add missing check for nocow and compression inode flags
commit f37c563bab4297024c300b05c8f48430e323809d upstream. User Forza reported on IRC that some invalid combinations of file attributes are accepted by chattr. The NODATACOW and compression file flags/attributes are mutually exclusive, but they could be set by 'chattr +c +C' on an empty file. The nodatacow will be in effect because it's checked first in btrfs_run_delalloc_range. Extend the flag validation to catch the following cases: - input flags are conflicting - old and new flags are conflicting - initialize the local variable with inode flags after inode ls locked Inode attributes take precedence over mount options and are an independent setting. Nocompress would be a no-op with nodatacow, but we don't want to mix any compression-related options with nodatacow. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Qu Wenruo
|
38ab14b1e2 |
btrfs: relocation: review the call sites which can be interrupted by signal
commit 44d354abf33e92a5e73b965c84caf5a5d5e58a0b upstream. Since most metadata reservation calls can return -EINTR when get interrupted by fatal signal, we need to review the all the metadata reservation call sites. In relocation code, the metadata reservation happens in the following sites: - btrfs_block_rsv_refill() in merge_reloc_root() merge_reloc_root() is a pretty critical section, we don't want to be interrupted by signal, so change the flush status to BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_LIMIT, so it won't get interrupted by signal. Since such change can be ENPSPC-prone, also shrink the amount of metadata to reserve least amount avoid deadly ENOSPC there. - btrfs_block_rsv_refill() in reserve_metadata_space() It calls with BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_LIMIT, which won't get interrupted by signal. - btrfs_block_rsv_refill() in prepare_to_relocate() - btrfs_block_rsv_add() in prepare_to_relocate() - btrfs_block_rsv_refill() in relocate_block_group() - btrfs_delalloc_reserve_metadata() in relocate_file_extent_cluster() - btrfs_start_transaction() in relocate_block_group() - btrfs_start_transaction() in create_reloc_inode() Can be interrupted by fatal signal and we can handle it easily. For these call sites, just catch the -EINTR value in btrfs_balance() and count them as canceled. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Josef Bacik
|
ae3f93cafd |
btrfs: move the chunk_mutex in btrfs_read_chunk_tree
commit 01d01caf19ff7c537527d352d169c4368375c0a1 upstream. We are currently getting this lockdep splat in btrfs/161: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Tainted: G E ------------------------------------------------------ mount/678048 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9b769f15b6e0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff9b76abdb08d0 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x6a/0x800 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x8b/0x8f0 btrfs_init_new_device+0x2d2/0x1240 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x1de/0x2d20 [btrfs] ksys_ioctl+0x87/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 __mutex_lock+0x8b/0x8f0 clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x330/0x800 [btrfs] open_ctree+0xb7c/0x18ce [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xfa [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 do_mount+0x7de/0xb30 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex); lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); lock(&fs_info->chunk_mutex); lock(&fs_devs->device_list_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by mount/678048: #0: ffff9b75ff5fb0e0 (&type->s_umount_key#63/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb5/0x380 #1: ffffffffc0c2fbc8 (uuid_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x54/0x800 [btrfs] #2: ffff9b76abdb08d0 (&fs_info->chunk_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x6a/0x800 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 678048 Comm: mount Tainted: G E 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./890FX Deluxe5, BIOS P1.40 05/03/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x96/0xd0 check_noncircular+0x162/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 ? asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 ? clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] __mutex_lock+0x8b/0x8f0 ? clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x60 ? cpumask_next+0x16/0x20 ? module_assert_mutex_or_preempt+0x14/0x40 ? __module_address+0x28/0xf0 ? clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] ? static_obj+0x4f/0x60 ? lockdep_init_map_waits+0x43/0x200 ? clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] clone_fs_devices+0x4d/0x170 [btrfs] btrfs_read_chunk_tree+0x330/0x800 [btrfs] open_ctree+0xb7c/0x18ce [btrfs] ? super_setup_bdi_name+0x79/0xd0 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x13/0xfa [btrfs] ? vfs_parse_fs_string+0x84/0xb0 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x60 ? kfree+0x2b5/0x310 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 fc_mount+0xe/0x40 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0x90 btrfs_mount+0x13b/0x3e0 [btrfs] ? cred_has_capability+0x7c/0x120 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x52/0x60 ? legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 do_mount+0x7de/0xb30 ? memdup_user+0x4e/0x90 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This is because btrfs_read_chunk_tree() can come upon DEV_EXTENT's and then read the device, which takes the device_list_mutex. The device_list_mutex needs to be taken before the chunk_mutex, so this is a problem. We only really need the chunk mutex around adding the chunk, so move the mutex around read_one_chunk. An argument could be made that we don't even need the chunk_mutex here as it's during mount, and we are protected by various other locks. However we already have special rules for ->device_list_mutex, and I'd rather not have another special case for ->chunk_mutex. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Josef Bacik
|
98f55cd496 |
btrfs: open device without device_list_mutex
commit 18c850fdc5a801bad4977b0f1723761d42267e45 upstream. There's long existed a lockdep splat because we open our bdev's under the ->device_list_mutex at mount time, which acquires the bd_mutex. Usually this goes unnoticed, but if you do loopback devices at all suddenly the bd_mutex comes with a whole host of other dependencies, which results in the splat when you mount a btrfs file system. ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ systemd-journal/509 is trying to acquire lock: ffff970831f84db0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #6 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}: __sb_start_write+0x13e/0x220 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 -> #5 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}: __might_fault+0x60/0x80 _copy_from_user+0x20/0xb0 get_sg_io_hdr+0x9a/0xb0 scsi_cmd_ioctl+0x1ea/0x2f0 cdrom_ioctl+0x3c/0x12b4 sr_block_ioctl+0xa4/0xd0 block_ioctl+0x3f/0x50 ksys_ioctl+0x82/0xc0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #4 (&cd->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 sr_block_open+0xa2/0x180 __blkdev_get+0xdd/0x550 blkdev_get+0x38/0x150 do_dentry_open+0x16b/0x3e0 path_openat+0x3c9/0xa00 do_filp_open+0x75/0x100 do_sys_openat2+0x8a/0x140 __x64_sys_openat+0x46/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #3 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 __blkdev_get+0x6a/0x550 blkdev_get+0x85/0x150 blkdev_get_by_path+0x2c/0x70 btrfs_get_bdev_and_sb+0x1b/0xb0 [btrfs] open_fs_devices+0x88/0x240 [btrfs] btrfs_open_devices+0x92/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_mount_root+0x250/0x490 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0 btrfs_mount+0x119/0x380 [btrfs] legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0 do_mount+0x8c6/0xca0 __x64_sys_mount+0x8e/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&fs_devs->device_list_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_run_dev_stats+0x36/0x420 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x91/0x2d0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4e6/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&fs_info->tree_log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x48e/0x9f0 [btrfs] btrfs_sync_file+0x38a/0x480 [btrfs] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x47/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}: __lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0 lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs] file_update_time+0xc6/0x120 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs] do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &fs_info->reloc_mutex --> &mm->mmap_lock#2 --> sb_pagefaults Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sb_pagefaults); lock(&mm->mmap_lock#2); lock(sb_pagefaults); lock(&fs_info->reloc_mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by systemd-journal/509: #0: ffff97083bdec8b8 (&mm->mmap_lock#2){++++}-{3:3}, at: do_user_addr_fault+0x12e/0x4b0 #1: ffff97083144d598 (sb_pagefaults){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_page_mkwrite+0x59/0x560 [btrfs] #2: ffff97083144d6a8 (sb_internal){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x3f8/0x500 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 509 Comm: systemd-journal Not tainted 5.8.0-0.rc3.1.fc33.x86_64+debug #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x92/0xc8 check_noncircular+0x134/0x150 __lock_acquire+0x1241/0x20c0 lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] ? lock_acquire+0xb0/0x400 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] __mutex_lock+0x7b/0x820 ? btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x14/0x30 ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0 btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x44/0x70 [btrfs] start_transaction+0xd2/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_dirty_inode+0x44/0xd0 [btrfs] file_update_time+0xc6/0x120 btrfs_page_mkwrite+0xda/0x560 [btrfs] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 do_page_mkwrite+0x4f/0x130 do_wp_page+0x3b0/0x4f0 handle_mm_fault+0xf47/0x1850 do_user_addr_fault+0x1fc/0x4b0 exc_page_fault+0x88/0x300 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 RIP: 0033:0x7fa3972fdbfe Code: Bad RIP value. Fix this by not holding the ->device_list_mutex at this point. The device_list_mutex exists to protect us from modifying the device list while the file system is running. However it can also be modified by doing a scan on a device. But this action is specifically protected by the uuid_mutex, which we are holding here. We cannot race with opening at this point because we have the ->s_mount lock held during the mount. Not having the ->device_list_mutex here is perfectly safe as we're not going to change the devices at this point. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ add some comments ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Anand Jain
|
3d3452920c |
btrfs: don't traverse into the seed devices in show_devname
commit 4faf55b03823e96c44dc4e364520000ed3b12fdb upstream.
->show_devname currently shows the lowest devid in the list. As the seed
devices have the lowest devid in the sprouted filesystem, the userland
tool such as findmnt end up seeing seed device instead of the device from
the read-writable sprouted filesystem. As shown below.
mount /dev/sda /btrfs
mount: /btrfs: WARNING: device write-protected, mounted read-only.
findmnt --output SOURCE,TARGET,UUID /btrfs
SOURCE TARGET UUID
/dev/sda /btrfs 899f7027-3e46-4626-93e7-7d4c9ad19111
btrfs dev add -f /dev/sdb /btrfs
umount /btrfs
mount /dev/sdb /btrfs
findmnt --output SOURCE,TARGET,UUID /btrfs
SOURCE TARGET UUID
/dev/sda /btrfs 899f7027-3e46-4626-93e7-7d4c9ad19111
All sprouts from a single seed will show the same seed device and the
same fsid. That's confusing.
This is causing problems in our prototype as there isn't any reference
to the sprout file-system(s) which is being used for actual read and
write.
This was added in the patch which implemented the show_devname in btrfs
commit
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Filipe Manana
|
8bc3a5d8c2 |
btrfs: remove no longer needed use of log_writers for the log root tree
commit a93e01682e283f6de09d6ce8f805dc52a2e942fb upstream.
When syncing the log, we used to update the log root tree without holding
neither the log_mutex of the subvolume root nor the log_mutex of log root
tree.
We used to have two critical sections delimited by the log_mutex of the
log root tree, so in the first one we incremented the log_writers of the
log root tree and on the second one we decremented it and waited for the
log_writers counter to go down to zero. This was because the update of
the log root tree happened between the two critical sections.
The use of two critical sections allowed a little bit more of parallelism
and required the use of the log_writers counter, necessary to make sure
we didn't miss any log root tree update when we have multiple tasks trying
to sync the log in parallel.
However after commit
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Filipe Manana
|
9380514089 |
btrfs: stop incremening log_batch for the log root tree when syncing log
commit 28a9579561bcb9082715e720eac93012e708ab94 upstream.
We are incrementing the log_batch atomic counter of the root log tree but
we never use that counter, it's used only for the log trees of subvolume
roots. We started doing it when we moved the log_batch and log_write
counters from the global, per fs, btrfs_fs_info structure, into the
btrfs_root structure in commit
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Tom Rix
|
0ddf373adb |
btrfs: ref-verify: fix memory leak in add_block_entry
commit d60ba8de1164e1b42e296ff270c622a070ef8fe7 upstream.
clang static analysis flags this error
fs/btrfs/ref-verify.c:290:3: warning: Potential leak of memory pointed to by 're' [unix.Malloc]
kfree(be);
^~~~~
The problem is in this block of code:
if (root_objectid) {
struct root_entry *exist_re;
exist_re = insert_root_entry(&exist->roots, re);
if (exist_re)
kfree(re);
}
There is no 'else' block freeing when root_objectid is 0. Add the
missing kfree to the else branch.
Fixes:
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Qu Wenruo
|
c16ba06f52 |
btrfs: don't allocate anonymous block device for user invisible roots
commit 851fd730a743e072badaf67caf39883e32439431 upstream. [BUG] When a lot of subvolumes are created, there is a user report about transaction aborted: BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -24) WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 17041 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1576 create_pending_snapshot+0xbc4/0xd10 [btrfs] RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot+0xbc4/0xd10 [btrfs] Call Trace: create_pending_snapshots+0x82/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x275/0x8c0 [btrfs] btrfs_mksubvol+0x4b9/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x174/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x11c/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x11a4/0x2da0 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x640 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 ---[ end trace 33f2f83f3d5250e9 ]--- BTRFS: error (device sda1) in create_pending_snapshot:1576: errno=-24 unknown BTRFS info (device sda1): forced readonly BTRFS warning (device sda1): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. BTRFS: error (device sda1) in cleanup_transaction:1831: errno=-24 unknown [CAUSE] The error is EMFILE (Too many files open) and comes from the anonymous block device allocation. The ids are in a shared pool of size 1<<20. The ids are assigned to live subvolumes, ie. the root structure exists in memory (eg. after creation or after the root appears in some path). The pool could be exhausted if the numbers are not reclaimed fast enough, after subvolume deletion or if other system component uses the anon block devices. [WORKAROUND] Since it's not possible to completely solve the problem, we can only minimize the time the id is allocated to a subvolume root. Firstly, we can reduce the use of anon_dev by trees that are not subvolume roots, like data reloc tree. This patch will do extra check on root objectid, to skip roots that don't need anon_dev. Currently it's only data reloc tree and orphan roots. Reported-by: Greed Rong <greedrong@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CA+UqX+NTrZ6boGnWHhSeZmEY5J76CTqmYjO2S+=tHJX7nb9DPw@mail.gmail.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Qu Wenruo
|
d2731ac13c |
btrfs: free anon block device right after subvolume deletion
commit 082b6c970f02fefd278c7833880cda29691a5f34 upstream. [BUG] When a lot of subvolumes are created, there is a user report about transaction aborted caused by slow anonymous block device reclaim: BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -24) WARNING: CPU: 17 PID: 17041 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1576 create_pending_snapshot+0xbc4/0xd10 [btrfs] RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot+0xbc4/0xd10 [btrfs] Call Trace: create_pending_snapshots+0x82/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x275/0x8c0 [btrfs] btrfs_mksubvol+0x4b9/0x500 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x174/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x11c/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x11a4/0x2da0 [btrfs] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x640 ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 ---[ end trace 33f2f83f3d5250e9 ]--- BTRFS: error (device sda1) in create_pending_snapshot:1576: errno=-24 unknown BTRFS info (device sda1): forced readonly BTRFS warning (device sda1): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. BTRFS: error (device sda1) in cleanup_transaction:1831: errno=-24 unknown [CAUSE] The anonymous device pool is shared and its size is 1M. It's possible to hit that limit if the subvolume deletion is not fast enough and the subvolumes to be cleaned keep the ids allocated. [WORKAROUND] We can't avoid the anon device pool exhaustion but we can shorten the time the id is attached to the subvolume root once the subvolume becomes invisible to the user. Reported-by: Greed Rong <greedrong@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CA+UqX+NTrZ6boGnWHhSeZmEY5J76CTqmYjO2S+=tHJX7nb9DPw@mail.gmail.com/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
David Sterba
|
207659ef15 |
btrfs: allow use of global block reserve for balance item deletion
commit 3502a8c0dc1bd4b4970b59b06e348f22a1c05581 upstream. On a filesystem with exhausted metadata, but still enough to start balance, it's possible to hit this error: [324402.053842] BTRFS info (device loop0): 1 enospc errors during balance [324402.060769] BTRFS info (device loop0): balance: ended with status: -28 [324402.172295] BTRFS: error (device loop0) in reset_balance_state:3321: errno=-28 No space left It fails inside reset_balance_state and turns the filesystem to read-only, which is unnecessary and should be fixed too, but the problem is caused by lack for space when the balance item is deleted. This is a one-time operation and from the same rank as unlink that is allowed to use the global block reserve. So do the same for the balance item. Status of the filesystem (100GiB) just after the balance fails: $ btrfs fi df mnt Data, single: total=80.01GiB, used=38.58GiB System, single: total=4.00MiB, used=16.00KiB Metadata, single: total=19.99GiB, used=19.48GiB GlobalReserve, single: total=512.00MiB, used=50.11MiB CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
e633add66d |
btrfs: fix lockdep splat from btrfs_dump_space_info
[ Upstream commit ab0db043c35da3477e57d4d516492b2d51a5ca0f ] When running with -o enospc_debug you can get the following splat if one of the dump_space_info's trip ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Tainted: G OE ------------------------------------------------------ dd/563090 is trying to acquire lock: ffff9e7dbf4f1e18 (&ctl->tree_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff9e7e2284d428 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0xaa/0x120 [btrfs] which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #3 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_add_reserved_bytes+0x3c/0x3c0 [btrfs] find_free_extent+0x7ef/0x13b0 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x9b/0x180 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0xc1/0x340 [btrfs] alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0x4a/0x60 [btrfs] __btrfs_cow_block+0x122/0x530 [btrfs] btrfs_cow_block+0x106/0x210 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x55/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4ed/0xac0 [btrfs] sync_filesystem+0x74/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x22/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 task_work_run+0x5f/0x90 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bd/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5e/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #2 (&space_info->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_block_rsv_release+0x1a6/0x3f0 [btrfs] btrfs_inode_rsv_release+0x4f/0x170 [btrfs] btrfs_clear_delalloc_extent+0x155/0x480 [btrfs] clear_state_bit+0x81/0x1a0 [btrfs] __clear_extent_bit+0x25c/0x5d0 [btrfs] clear_extent_bit+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] btrfs_invalidatepage+0x2b7/0x3c0 [btrfs] truncate_cleanup_page+0x47/0xe0 truncate_inode_pages_range+0x238/0x840 truncate_pagecache+0x44/0x60 btrfs_setattr+0x202/0x5e0 [btrfs] notify_change+0x33b/0x490 do_truncate+0x76/0xd0 path_openat+0x687/0xa10 do_filp_open+0x91/0x100 do_sys_openat2+0x215/0x2d0 do_sys_open+0x44/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #1 (&tree->lock#2){+.+.}-{2:2}: _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 find_first_extent_bit+0x32/0x150 [btrfs] write_pinned_extent_entries.isra.0+0xc5/0x100 [btrfs] __btrfs_write_out_cache+0x172/0x480 [btrfs] btrfs_write_out_cache+0x7a/0xf0 [btrfs] btrfs_write_dirty_block_groups+0x286/0x3b0 [btrfs] commit_cowonly_roots+0x245/0x300 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4ed/0xac0 [btrfs] close_ctree+0xf9/0x2f5 [btrfs] generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x100 kill_anon_super+0x14/0x30 btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0x20 [btrfs] deactivate_locked_super+0x36/0x70 cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 task_work_run+0x5f/0x90 __prepare_exit_to_usermode+0x1bd/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x5e/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 -> #0 (&ctl->tree_lock){+.+.}-{2:2}: __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_space_info+0xf4/0x120 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x176/0x180 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x145/0x550 [btrfs] cache_save_setup+0x28d/0x3b0 [btrfs] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x1fc/0x4f0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc/0xac0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x162/0x4c0 [btrfs] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write.isra.0+0x19b/0x740 [btrfs] btrfs_file_write_iter+0x3cf/0x610 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0x11e/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x200 ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: &ctl->tree_lock --> &space_info->lock --> &cache->lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&cache->lock); lock(&space_info->lock); lock(&cache->lock); lock(&ctl->tree_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 6 locks held by dd/563090: #0: ffff9e7e21d18448 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: vfs_write+0x195/0x200 #1: ffff9e7dd0410ed8 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#19){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_file_write_iter+0x86/0x610 [btrfs] #2: ffff9e7e21d18638 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: start_transaction+0x40b/0x5b0 [btrfs] #3: ffff9e7e1f05d688 (&cur_trans->cache_write_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x158/0x4f0 [btrfs] #4: ffff9e7e2284ddb8 (&space_info->groups_sem){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0x69/0x120 [btrfs] #5: ffff9e7e2284d428 (&cache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: btrfs_dump_space_info+0xaa/0x120 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 3 PID: 563090 Comm: dd Tainted: G OE 5.8.0-rc5+ #20 Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./890FX Deluxe5, BIOS P1.40 05/03/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x96/0xd0 check_noncircular+0x162/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x1240/0x2460 ? wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x30/0x40 lock_acquire+0xab/0x360 ? btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] _raw_spin_lock+0x25/0x30 ? btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_free_space+0x2b/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_dump_space_info+0xf4/0x120 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x176/0x180 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x145/0x550 [btrfs] ? btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data+0x1d/0x60 [btrfs] cache_save_setup+0x28d/0x3b0 [btrfs] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x1fc/0x4f0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xcc/0xac0 [btrfs] ? start_transaction+0xe0/0x5b0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x162/0x4c0 [btrfs] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs] btrfs_buffered_write.isra.0+0x19b/0x740 [btrfs] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xa8/0xd0 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1c/0xe0 btrfs_file_write_iter+0x3cf/0x610 [btrfs] new_sync_write+0x11e/0x1b0 vfs_write+0x1c9/0x200 ksys_write+0x68/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x52/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This is because we're holding the block_group->lock while trying to dump the free space cache. However we don't need this lock, we just need it to read the values for the printk, so move the free space cache dumping outside of the block group lock. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
Paul E. McKenney
|
6402b23182 |
fs/btrfs: Add cond_resched() for try_release_extent_mapping() stalls
[ Upstream commit 9f47eb5461aaeb6cb8696f9d11503ae90e4d5cb0 ] Very large I/Os can cause the following RCU CPU stall warning: RIP: 0010:rb_prev+0x8/0x50 Code: 49 89 c0 49 89 d1 48 89 c2 48 89 f8 e9 e5 fd ff ff 4c 89 48 10 c3 4c = 89 06 c3 4c 89 40 10 c3 0f 1f 00 48 8b 0f 48 39 cf 74 38 <48> 8b 47 10 48 85 c0 74 22 48 8b 50 08 48 85 d2 74 0c 48 89 d0 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc9002212bab0 EFLAGS: 00000287 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13 RAX: ffff888821f93630 RBX: ffff888821f93630 RCX: ffff888821f937e0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000102000 RDI: ffff888821f93630 RBP: 0000000000103000 R08: 000000000006c000 R09: 0000000000000238 R10: 0000000000102fff R11: ffffc9002212bac8 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffffffffffff R14: 0000000000102000 R15: ffff888821f937e0 __lookup_extent_mapping+0xa0/0x110 try_release_extent_mapping+0xdc/0x220 btrfs_releasepage+0x45/0x70 shrink_page_list+0xa39/0xb30 shrink_inactive_list+0x18f/0x3b0 shrink_lruvec+0x38e/0x6b0 shrink_node+0x14d/0x690 do_try_to_free_pages+0xc6/0x3e0 try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages+0xe6/0x1e0 reclaim_high.constprop.73+0x87/0xc0 mem_cgroup_handle_over_high+0x66/0x150 exit_to_usermode_loop+0x82/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xd4/0x100 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 On a PREEMPT=n kernel, the try_release_extent_mapping() function's "while" loop might run for a very long time on a large I/O. This commit therefore adds a cond_resched() to this loop, providing RCU any needed quiescent states. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Robbie Ko
|
38a66f3cda |
btrfs: fix page leaks after failure to lock page for delalloc
commit 5909ca110b29aa16b23b52b8de8d3bb1035fd738 upstream. When locking pages for delalloc, we check if it's dirty and mapping still matches. If it does not match, we need to return -EAGAIN and release all pages. Only the current page was put though, iterate over all the remaining pages too. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Robbie Ko <robbieko@synology.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Boris Burkov
|
b04805a7e8 |
btrfs: fix mount failure caused by race with umount
commit 48cfa61b58a1fee0bc49eef04f8ccf31493b7cdd upstream. It is possible to cause a btrfs mount to fail by racing it with a slow umount. The crux of the sequence is generic_shutdown_super not yet calling sop->put_super before btrfs_mount_root calls btrfs_open_devices. If that occurs, btrfs_open_devices will decide the opened counter is non-zero, increment it, and skip resetting fs_devices->total_rw_bytes to 0. From here, mount will call sget which will result in grab_super trying to take the super block umount semaphore. That semaphore will be held by the slow umount, so mount will block. Before up-ing the semaphore, umount will delete the super block, resulting in mount's sget reliably allocating a new one, which causes the mount path to dutifully fill it out, and increment total_rw_bytes a second time, which causes the mount to fail, as we see double the expected bytes. Here is the sequence laid out in greater detail: CPU0 CPU1 down_write sb->s_umount btrfs_kill_super kill_anon_super(sb) generic_shutdown_super(sb); shrink_dcache_for_umount(sb); sync_filesystem(sb); evict_inodes(sb); // SLOW btrfs_mount_root btrfs_scan_one_device fs_devices = device->fs_devices fs_info->fs_devices = fs_devices // fs_devices-opened makes this a no-op btrfs_open_devices(fs_devices, mode, fs_type) s = sget(fs_type, test, set, flags, fs_info); find sb in s_instances grab_super(sb); down_write(&s->s_umount); // blocks sop->put_super(sb) // sb->fs_devices->opened == 2; no-op spin_lock(&sb_lock); hlist_del_init(&sb->s_instances); spin_unlock(&sb_lock); up_write(&sb->s_umount); return 0; retry lookup don't find sb in s_instances (deleted by CPU0) s = alloc_super return s; btrfs_fill_super(s, fs_devices, data) open_ctree // fs_devices total_rw_bytes improperly set! btrfs_read_chunk_tree read_one_dev // increment total_rw_bytes again!! super_total_bytes < fs_devices->total_rw_bytes // ERROR!!! To fix this, we clear total_rw_bytes from within btrfs_read_chunk_tree before the calls to read_one_dev, while holding the sb umount semaphore and the uuid mutex. To reproduce, it is sufficient to dirty a decent number of inodes, then quickly umount and mount. for i in $(seq 0 500) do dd if=/dev/zero of="/mnt/foo/$i" bs=1M count=1 done umount /mnt/foo& mount /mnt/foo does the trick for me. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Filipe Manana
|
e333df0e4a |
btrfs: fix double free on ulist after backref resolution failure
commit 580c079b5766ac706f56eec5c79aee4bf929fef6 upstream.
At btrfs_find_all_roots_safe() we allocate a ulist and set the **roots
argument to point to it. However if later we fail due to an error returned
by find_parent_nodes(), we free that ulist but leave a dangling pointer in
the **roots argument. Upon receiving the error, a caller of this function
can attempt to free the same ulist again, resulting in an invalid memory
access.
One such scenario is during qgroup accounting:
btrfs_qgroup_account_extents()
--> calls btrfs_find_all_roots() passes &new_roots (a stack allocated
pointer) to btrfs_find_all_roots()
--> btrfs_find_all_roots() just calls btrfs_find_all_roots_safe()
passing &new_roots to it
--> allocates ulist and assigns its address to **roots (which
points to new_roots from btrfs_qgroup_account_extents())
--> find_parent_nodes() returns an error, so we free the ulist
and leave **roots pointing to it after returning
--> btrfs_qgroup_account_extents() sees btrfs_find_all_roots() returned
an error and jumps to the label 'cleanup', which just tries to
free again the same ulist
Stack trace example:
------------[ cut here ]------------
BTRFS: tree first key check failed
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1763215 at fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:422 btrfs_verify_level_key+0xe0/0x180 [btrfs]
Modules linked in: dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...)
CPU: 1 PID: 1763215 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 5.8.0-rc3-btrfs-next-64 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:btrfs_verify_level_key+0xe0/0x180 [btrfs]
Code: 28 5b 5d (...)
RSP: 0018:ffffb89b473779a0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff90397759bf08 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000027 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffff9039a419c000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffb89b43301000 R12: 000000000000005e
R13: ffffb89b47377a2e R14: ffffb89b473779af R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007fc47e1e1000(0000) GS:ffff9039ac200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fc47e1df000 CR3: 00000003d9e4e001 CR4: 00000000003606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
read_block_for_search+0xf6/0x350 [btrfs]
btrfs_next_old_leaf+0x242/0x650 [btrfs]
resolve_indirect_refs+0x7cf/0x9e0 [btrfs]
find_parent_nodes+0x4ea/0x12c0 [btrfs]
btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0xbf/0x130 [btrfs]
btrfs_qgroup_account_extents+0x9d/0x390 [btrfs]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4f7/0xb20 [btrfs]
btrfs_sync_file+0x3d4/0x4d0 [btrfs]
do_fsync+0x38/0x70
__x64_sys_fdatasync+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xe0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fc47e2d72e3
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 002b:00007fffa32098c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fc47e2d72e3
RDX: 00007fffa3209830 RSI: 00007fffa3209830 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000000072e R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000003e8
R13: 0000000051eb851f R14: 00007fffa3209970 R15: 00005607c4ac8b50
irq event stamp: 0
hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffffb8eb5e85>] copy_process+0x755/0x1eb0
softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffb8eb5e85>] copy_process+0x755/0x1eb0
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
---[ end trace 8639237550317b48 ]---
BTRFS error (device sdc): tree first key mismatch detected, bytenr=62324736 parent_transid=94 key expected=(262,108,1351680) has=(259,108,1921024)
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
CPU: 2 PID: 1763215 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 5.8.0-rc3-btrfs-next-64 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ulist_release+0x14/0x60 [btrfs]
Code: c7 07 00 (...)
RSP: 0018:ffffb89b47377d60 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff903959b56b90 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000270024 RDI: ffff9036e2adc840
RBP: ffff9036e2adc848 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9036e2adc840
R13: 0000000000000015 R14: ffff9039a419ccf8 R15: ffff90395d605840
FS: 00007fc47e1e1000(0000) GS:ffff9039ac600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8c1c0a51c8 CR3: 00000003d9e4e004 CR4: 00000000003606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
ulist_free+0x13/0x20 [btrfs]
btrfs_qgroup_account_extents+0xf3/0x390 [btrfs]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x4f7/0xb20 [btrfs]
btrfs_sync_file+0x3d4/0x4d0 [btrfs]
do_fsync+0x38/0x70
__x64_sys_fdatasync+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0xe0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7fc47e2d72e3
Code: Bad RIP value.
RSP: 002b:00007fffa32098c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007fc47e2d72e3
RDX: 00007fffa3209830 RSI: 00007fffa3209830 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000000072e R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000003e8
R13: 0000000051eb851f R14: 00007fffa3209970 R15: 00005607c4ac8b50
Modules linked in: dm_snapshot dm_thin_pool (...)
---[ end trace 8639237550317b49 ]---
RIP: 0010:ulist_release+0x14/0x60 [btrfs]
Code: c7 07 00 (...)
RSP: 0018:ffffb89b47377d60 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff903959b56b90 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000270024 RDI: ffff9036e2adc840
RBP: ffff9036e2adc848 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9036e2adc840
R13: 0000000000000015 R14: ffff9039a419ccf8 R15: ffff90395d605840
FS: 00007fc47e1e1000(0000) GS:ffff9039ad200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f6a776f7d40 CR3: 00000003d9e4e002 CR4: 00000000003606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Fix this by making btrfs_find_all_roots_safe() set *roots to NULL after
it frees the ulist.
Fixes:
|
||
Qu Wenruo
|
ee08663380 |
btrfs: reloc: clear DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit for orphan roots to prevent runaway balance
commit 1dae7e0e58b484eaa43d530f211098fdeeb0f404 upstream. [BUG] There are several reported runaway balance, that balance is flooding the log with "found X extents" where the X never changes. [CAUSE] Commit |
||
Qu Wenruo
|
044ca91027 |
btrfs: reloc: fix reloc root leak and NULL pointer dereference
commit 51415b6c1b117e223bc083e30af675cb5c5498f3 upstream.
[BUG]
When balance is canceled, there is a pretty high chance that unmounting
the fs can lead to lead the NULL pointer dereference:
BTRFS warning (device dm-3): page private not zero on page 223158272
...
BTRFS warning (device dm-3): page private not zero on page 223162368
BTRFS error (device dm-3): leaked root 18446744073709551608-304 refcount 1
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000168
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 2 PID: 5793 Comm: umount Tainted: G O 5.7.0-rc5-custom+ #53
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x5dc/0x24c0
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xab/0x390
_raw_spin_lock+0x39/0x80
btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages+0xd7/0x200 [btrfs]
release_extent_buffer+0xb2/0x170 [btrfs]
free_extent_buffer+0x66/0xb0 [btrfs]
btrfs_put_root+0x8e/0x130 [btrfs]
btrfs_check_leaked_roots.cold+0x5/0x5d [btrfs]
btrfs_free_fs_info+0xe5/0x120 [btrfs]
btrfs_kill_super+0x1f/0x30 [btrfs]
deactivate_locked_super+0x3b/0x80
deactivate_super+0x3e/0x50
cleanup_mnt+0x109/0x160
__cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
task_work_run+0x67/0xa0
exit_to_usermode_loop+0xc5/0xd0
syscall_return_slowpath+0x205/0x360
do_syscall_64+0x6e/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xb3
RIP: 0033:0x7fd028ef740b
[CAUSE]
When balance is canceled, all reloc roots are marked as orphan, and
orphan reloc roots are going to be cleaned up.
However for orphan reloc roots and merged reloc roots, their lifespan
are quite different:
Merged reloc roots | Orphan reloc roots by cancel
--------------------------------------------------------------------
create_reloc_root() | create_reloc_root()
|- refs == 1 | |- refs == 1
|
btrfs_grab_root(reloc_root); | btrfs_grab_root(reloc_root);
|- refs == 2 | |- refs == 2
|
root->reloc_root = reloc_root; | root->reloc_root = reloc_root;
>>> No difference so far <<<
|
prepare_to_merge() | prepare_to_merge()
|- btrfs_set_root_refs(item, 1);| |- if (!err) (err == -EINTR)
|
merge_reloc_roots() | merge_reloc_roots()
|- merge_reloc_root() | |- Doing nothing to put reloc root
|- insert_dirty_subvol() | |- refs == 2
|- __del_reloc_root() |
|- btrfs_put_root() |
|- refs == 1 |
>>> Now orphan reloc roots still have refs 2 <<<
|
clean_dirty_subvols() | clean_dirty_subvols()
|- btrfs_drop_snapshot() | |- btrfS_drop_snapshot()
|- reloc_root get freed | |- reloc_root still has refs 2
| related ebs get freed, but
| reloc_root still recorded in
| allocated_roots
btrfs_check_leaked_roots() | btrfs_check_leaked_roots()
|- No leaked roots | |- Leaked reloc_roots detected
| |- btrfs_put_root()
| |- free_extent_buffer(root->node);
| |- eb already freed, caused NULL
| pointer dereference
[FIX]
The fix is to clear fs_root->reloc_root and put it at
merge_reloc_roots() time, so that we won't leak reloc roots.
Fixes:
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
026f830e0b |
btrfs: fix double put of block group with nocow
commit 230ed397435e85b54f055c524fcb267ae2ce3bc4 upstream.
While debugging a patch that I wrote I was hitting use-after-free panics
when accessing block groups on unmount. This turned out to be because
in the nocow case if we bail out of doing the nocow for whatever reason
we need to call btrfs_dec_nocow_writers() if we called the inc. This
puts our block group, but a few error cases does
if (nocow) {
btrfs_dec_nocow_writers();
goto error;
}
unfortunately, error is
error:
if (nocow)
btrfs_dec_nocow_writers();
so we get a double put on our block group. Fix this by dropping the
error cases calling of btrfs_dec_nocow_writers(), as it's handled at the
error label now.
Fixes:
|
||
Boris Burkov
|
808b2b3ea8 |
btrfs: fix fatal extent_buffer readahead vs releasepage race
commit 6bf9cd2eed9aee6d742bb9296c994a91f5316949 upstream. Under somewhat convoluted conditions, it is possible to attempt to release an extent_buffer that is under io, which triggers a BUG_ON in btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages. This relies on a few different factors. First, extent_buffer reads done as readahead for searching use WAIT_NONE, so they free the local extent buffer reference while the io is outstanding. However, they should still be protected by TREE_REF. However, if the system is doing signficant reclaim, and simultaneously heavily accessing the extent_buffers, it is possible for releasepage to race with two concurrent readahead attempts in a way that leaves TREE_REF unset when the readahead extent buffer is released. Essentially, if two tasks race to allocate a new extent_buffer, but the winner who attempts the first io is rebuffed by a page being locked (likely by the reclaim itself) then the loser will still go ahead with issuing the readahead. The loser's call to find_extent_buffer must also race with the reclaim task reading the extent_buffer's refcount as 1 in a way that allows the reclaim to re-clear the TREE_REF checked by find_extent_buffer. The following represents an example execution demonstrating the race: CPU0 CPU1 CPU2 reada_for_search reada_for_search readahead_tree_block readahead_tree_block find_create_tree_block find_create_tree_block alloc_extent_buffer alloc_extent_buffer find_extent_buffer // not found allocates eb lock pages associate pages to eb insert eb into radix tree set TREE_REF, refs == 2 unlock pages read_extent_buffer_pages // WAIT_NONE not uptodate (brand new eb) lock_page if !trylock_page goto unlock_exit // not an error free_extent_buffer release_extent_buffer atomic_dec_and_test refs to 1 find_extent_buffer // found try_release_extent_buffer take refs_lock reads refs == 1; no io atomic_inc_not_zero refs to 2 mark_buffer_accessed check_buffer_tree_ref // not STALE, won't take refs_lock refs == 2; TREE_REF set // no action read_extent_buffer_pages // WAIT_NONE clear TREE_REF release_extent_buffer atomic_dec_and_test refs to 1 unlock_page still not uptodate (CPU1 read failed on trylock_page) locks pages set io_pages > 0 submit io return free_extent_buffer release_extent_buffer dec refs to 0 delete from radix tree btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages BUG_ON(io_pages > 0)!!! We observe this at a very low rate in production and were also able to reproduce it in a test environment by introducing some spurious delays and by introducing probabilistic trylock_page failures. To fix it, we apply check_tree_ref at a point where it could not possibly be unset by a competing task: after io_pages has been incremented. All the codepaths that clear TREE_REF check for io, so they would not be able to clear it after this point until the io is done. Stack trace, for reference: [1417839.424739] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [1417839.435328] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4841! [1417839.447024] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP [1417839.502972] RIP: 0010:btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages+0x20/0x1f0 [1417839.517008] Code: ed e9 ... [1417839.558895] RSP: 0018:ffffc90020bcf798 EFLAGS: 00010202 [1417839.570816] RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff888102d6def0 RCX: 0000000000000028 [1417839.586962] RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffff8887f0296482 RDI: ffff888102d6def0 [1417839.603108] RBP: ffff88885664a000 R08: 0000000000000046 R09: 0000000000000238 [1417839.619255] R10: 0000000000000028 R11: ffff88885664af68 R12: 0000000000000000 [1417839.635402] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88875f573ad0 R15: ffff888797aafd90 [1417839.651549] FS: 00007f5a844fa700(0000) GS:ffff88885f680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [1417839.669810] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [1417839.682887] CR2: 00007f7884541fe0 CR3: 000000049f609002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [1417839.699037] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [1417839.715187] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [1417839.731320] Call Trace: [1417839.737103] release_extent_buffer+0x39/0x90 [1417839.746913] read_block_for_search.isra.38+0x2a3/0x370 [1417839.758645] btrfs_search_slot+0x260/0x9b0 [1417839.768054] btrfs_lookup_file_extent+0x4a/0x70 [1417839.778427] btrfs_get_extent+0x15f/0x830 [1417839.787665] ? submit_extent_page+0xc4/0x1c0 [1417839.797474] ? __do_readpage+0x299/0x7a0 [1417839.806515] __do_readpage+0x33b/0x7a0 [1417839.815171] ? btrfs_releasepage+0x70/0x70 [1417839.824597] extent_readpages+0x28f/0x400 [1417839.833836] read_pages+0x6a/0x1c0 [1417839.841729] ? startup_64+0x2/0x30 [1417839.849624] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x13c/0x1a0 [1417839.860590] filemap_fault+0x6c7/0x990 [1417839.869252] ? xas_load+0x8/0x80 [1417839.876756] ? xas_find+0x150/0x190 [1417839.884839] ? filemap_map_pages+0x295/0x3b0 [1417839.894652] __do_fault+0x32/0x110 [1417839.902540] __handle_mm_fault+0xacd/0x1000 [1417839.912156] handle_mm_fault+0xaa/0x1c0 [1417839.921004] __do_page_fault+0x242/0x4b0 [1417839.930044] ? page_fault+0x8/0x30 [1417839.937933] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [1417839.945631] RIP: 0033:0x33c4bae [1417839.952927] Code: Bad RIP value. [1417839.960411] RSP: 002b:00007f5a844f7350 EFLAGS: 00010206 [1417839.972331] RAX: 000000000000006e RBX: 1614b3ff6a50398a RCX: 0000000000000000 [1417839.988477] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000002 [1417840.004626] RBP: 00007f5a844f7420 R08: 000000000000006e R09: 00007f5a94aeccb8 [1417840.020784] R10: 00007f5a844f7350 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00007f5a94aecc79 [1417840.036932] R13: 00007f5a94aecc78 R14: 00007f5a94aecc90 R15: 00007f5a94aecc40 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Filipe Manana
|
a79c3a99ac |
btrfs: fix failure of RWF_NOWAIT write into prealloc extent beyond eof
commit 4b1946284dd6641afdb9457101056d9e6ee6204c upstream.
If we attempt to write to prealloc extent located after eof using a
RWF_NOWAIT write, we always fail with -EAGAIN.
We do actually check if we have an allocated extent for the write at
the start of btrfs_file_write_iter() through a call to check_can_nocow(),
but later when we go into the actual direct IO write path we simply
return -EAGAIN if the write starts at or beyond EOF.
Trivial to reproduce:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
$ touch /mnt/foo
$ chattr +C /mnt/foo
$ xfs_io -d -c "pwrite -S 0xab 0 64K" /mnt/foo
wrote 65536/65536 bytes at offset 0
64 KiB, 16 ops; 0.0004 sec (135.575 MiB/sec and 34707.1584 ops/sec)
$ xfs_io -c "falloc -k 64K 1M" /mnt/foo
$ xfs_io -d -c "pwrite -N -V 1 -S 0xfe -b 64K 64K 64K" /mnt/foo
pwrite: Resource temporarily unavailable
On xfs and ext4 the write succeeds, as expected.
Fix this by removing the wrong check at btrfs_direct_IO().
Fixes:
|
||
Filipe Manana
|
863a197f7f |
btrfs: check if a log root exists before locking the log_mutex on unlink
commit e7a79811d0db136dc2d336b56d54cf1b774ce972 upstream. This brings back an optimization that commit |
||
Filipe Manana
|
53a0816610 |
btrfs: fix data block group relocation failure due to concurrent scrub
commit 432cd2a10f1c10cead91fe706ff5dc52f06d642a upstream. When running relocation of a data block group while scrub is running in parallel, it is possible that the relocation will fail and abort the current transaction with an -EINVAL error: [134243.988595] BTRFS info (device sdc): found 14 extents, stage: move data extents [134243.999871] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [134244.000741] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -22) [134244.001692] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 26954 at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1071 __btrfs_cow_block+0x6a7/0x790 [btrfs] [134244.003380] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor raid6_pq (...) [134244.012577] CPU: 0 PID: 26954 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 5.6.0-rc7-btrfs-next-58 #5 [134244.014162] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [134244.016184] RIP: 0010:__btrfs_cow_block+0x6a7/0x790 [btrfs] [134244.017151] Code: 48 c7 c7 (...) [134244.020549] RSP: 0018:ffffa41607863888 EFLAGS: 00010286 [134244.021515] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9614bdfe09c8 RCX: 0000000000000000 [134244.022822] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffb3d63980 RDI: 0000000000000001 [134244.024124] RBP: ffff961589e8c000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 [134244.025424] R10: ffffffffc0ae5955 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9614bd530d08 [134244.026725] R13: ffff9614ced41b88 R14: ffff9614bdfe2a48 R15: 0000000000000000 [134244.028024] FS: 00007f29b63c08c0(0000) GS:ffff9615ba600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [134244.029491] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [134244.030560] CR2: 00007f4eb339b000 CR3: 0000000130d6e006 CR4: 00000000003606f0 [134244.031997] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [134244.033153] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [134244.034484] Call Trace: [134244.034984] btrfs_cow_block+0x12b/0x2b0 [btrfs] [134244.035859] do_relocation+0x30b/0x790 [btrfs] [134244.036681] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xc0 [134244.037460] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 [134244.038235] relocate_tree_blocks+0x37b/0x730 [btrfs] [134244.039245] relocate_block_group+0x388/0x770 [btrfs] [134244.040228] btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x161/0x2e0 [btrfs] [134244.041323] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x36/0x110 [btrfs] [134244.041345] btrfs_balance+0xc06/0x1860 [btrfs] [134244.043382] ? btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x27c/0x310 [btrfs] [134244.045586] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x1ed/0x310 [btrfs] [134244.045611] btrfs_ioctl+0x1880/0x3760 [btrfs] [134244.049043] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xc0 [134244.049838] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x29/0x40 [134244.050587] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x11b3/0x14b0 [134244.051417] ? ksys_ioctl+0x92/0xb0 [134244.052070] ksys_ioctl+0x92/0xb0 [134244.052701] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [134244.053511] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 [134244.054206] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x280 [134244.054891] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [134244.055819] RIP: 0033:0x7f29b51c9dd7 [134244.056491] Code: 00 00 00 (...) [134244.059767] RSP: 002b:00007ffcccc1dd08 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [134244.061168] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f29b51c9dd7 [134244.062474] RDX: 00007ffcccc1dda0 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003 [134244.063771] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 00005565cea4b000 R09: 0000000000000000 [134244.065032] R10: 0000000000000541 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007ffcccc2060a [134244.066327] R13: 00007ffcccc1dda0 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 00007ffcccc1dec0 [134244.067626] irq event stamp: 0 [134244.068202] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [134244.069351] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffffb2abdedf>] copy_process+0x74f/0x2020 [134244.070909] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffb2abdedf>] copy_process+0x74f/0x2020 [134244.072392] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [134244.073432] ---[ end trace bd7c03622e0b0a99 ]--- The -EINVAL error comes from the following chain of function calls: __btrfs_cow_block() <-- aborts the transaction btrfs_reloc_cow_block() replace_file_extents() get_new_location() <-- returns -EINVAL When relocating a data block group, for each allocated extent of the block group, we preallocate another extent (at prealloc_file_extent_cluster()), associated with the data relocation inode, and then dirty all its pages. These preallocated extents have, and must have, the same size that extents from the data block group being relocated have. Later before we start the relocation stage that updates pointers (bytenr field of file extent items) to point to the the new extents, we trigger writeback for the data relocation inode. The expectation is that writeback will write the pages to the previously preallocated extents, that it follows the NOCOW path. That is generally the case, however, if a scrub is running it may have turned the block group that contains those extents into RO mode, in which case writeback falls back to the COW path. However in the COW path instead of allocating exactly one extent with the expected size, the allocator may end up allocating several smaller extents due to free space fragmentation - because we tell it at cow_file_range() that the minimum allocation size can match the filesystem's sector size. This later breaks the relocation's expectation that an extent associated to a file extent item in the data relocation inode has the same size as the respective extent pointed by a file extent item in another tree - in this case the extent to which the relocation inode poins to is smaller, causing relocation.c:get_new_location() to return -EINVAL. For example, if we are relocating a data block group X that has a logical address of X and the block group has an extent allocated at the logical address X + 128KiB with a size of 64KiB: 1) At prealloc_file_extent_cluster() we allocate an extent for the data relocation inode with a size of 64KiB and associate it to the file offset 128KiB (X + 128KiB - X) of the data relocation inode. This preallocated extent was allocated at block group Z; 2) A scrub running in parallel turns block group Z into RO mode and starts scrubing its extents; 3) Relocation triggers writeback for the data relocation inode; 4) When running delalloc (btrfs_run_delalloc_range()), we try first the NOCOW path because the data relocation inode has BTRFS_INODE_PREALLOC set in its flags. However, because block group Z is in RO mode, the NOCOW path (run_delalloc_nocow()) falls back into the COW path, by calling cow_file_range(); 5) At cow_file_range(), in the first iteration of the while loop we call btrfs_reserve_extent() to allocate a 64KiB extent and pass it a minimum allocation size of 4KiB (fs_info->sectorsize). Due to free space fragmentation, btrfs_reserve_extent() ends up allocating two extents of 32KiB each, each one on a different iteration of that while loop; 6) Writeback of the data relocation inode completes; 7) Relocation proceeds and ends up at relocation.c:replace_file_extents(), with a leaf which has a file extent item that points to the data extent from block group X, that has a logical address (bytenr) of X + 128KiB and a size of 64KiB. Then it calls get_new_location(), which does a lookup in the data relocation tree for a file extent item starting at offset 128KiB (X + 128KiB - X) and belonging to the data relocation inode. It finds a corresponding file extent item, however that item points to an extent that has a size of 32KiB, which doesn't match the expected size of 64KiB, resuling in -EINVAL being returned from this function and propagated up to __btrfs_cow_block(), which aborts the current transaction. To fix this make sure that at cow_file_range() when we call the allocator we pass it a minimum allocation size corresponding the desired extent size if the inode belongs to the data relocation tree, otherwise pass it the filesystem's sector size as the minimum allocation size. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Filipe Manana
|
0a4dfc69ea |
btrfs: fix bytes_may_use underflow when running balance and scrub in parallel
commit 6bd335b469f945f75474c11e3f577f85409f39c3 upstream. When balance and scrub are running in parallel it is possible to end up with an underflow of the bytes_may_use counter of the data space_info object, which triggers a warning like the following: [134243.793196] BTRFS info (device sdc): relocating block group 1104150528 flags data [134243.806891] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [134243.807561] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 26884 at fs/btrfs/space-info.h:125 btrfs_add_reserved_bytes+0x1da/0x280 [btrfs] [134243.808819] Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor (...) [134243.815779] CPU: 1 PID: 26884 Comm: kworker/u8:8 Tainted: G W 5.6.0-rc7-btrfs-next-58 #5 [134243.816944] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [134243.818389] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-108483) [134243.819186] RIP: 0010:btrfs_add_reserved_bytes+0x1da/0x280 [btrfs] [134243.819963] Code: 0b f2 85 (...) [134243.822271] RSP: 0018:ffffa4160aae7510 EFLAGS: 00010287 [134243.822929] RAX: 000000000000c000 RBX: ffff96159a8c1000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [134243.823816] RDX: 0000000000008000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff96158067a810 [134243.824742] RBP: ffff96158067a800 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [134243.825636] R10: ffff961501432a40 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000c000 [134243.826532] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffffffffffff4000 R15: ffff96158067a810 [134243.827432] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9615baa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [134243.828451] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [134243.829184] CR2: 000055bd7e414000 CR3: 00000001077be004 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [134243.830083] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [134243.830975] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [134243.831867] Call Trace: [134243.832211] find_free_extent+0x4a0/0x16c0 [btrfs] [134243.832846] btrfs_reserve_extent+0x91/0x180 [btrfs] [134243.833487] cow_file_range+0x12d/0x490 [btrfs] [134243.834080] fallback_to_cow+0x82/0x1b0 [btrfs] [134243.834689] ? release_extent_buffer+0x121/0x170 [btrfs] [134243.835370] run_delalloc_nocow+0x33f/0xa30 [btrfs] [134243.836032] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x1ea/0x6d0 [btrfs] [134243.836725] ? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x221/0x250 [btrfs] [134243.837450] writepage_delalloc+0xe8/0x150 [btrfs] [134243.838059] __extent_writepage+0xe8/0x4c0 [btrfs] [134243.838674] extent_write_cache_pages+0x237/0x530 [btrfs] [134243.839364] extent_writepages+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs] [134243.839946] do_writepages+0x23/0x80 [134243.840401] __writeback_single_inode+0x59/0x700 [134243.841006] writeback_sb_inodes+0x267/0x5f0 [134243.841548] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x87/0xe0 [134243.842091] wb_writeback+0x382/0x590 [134243.842574] ? wb_workfn+0x4a2/0x6c0 [134243.843030] wb_workfn+0x4a2/0x6c0 [134243.843468] process_one_work+0x26d/0x6a0 [134243.843978] worker_thread+0x4f/0x3e0 [134243.844452] ? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0 [134243.844981] kthread+0x103/0x140 [134243.845400] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [134243.846030] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [134243.846494] irq event stamp: 0 [134243.846892] hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [134243.847682] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffffb2abdedf>] copy_process+0x74f/0x2020 [134243.848687] softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffb2abdedf>] copy_process+0x74f/0x2020 [134243.849913] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0 [134243.850698] ---[ end trace bd7c03622e0b0a96 ]--- [134243.851335] ------------[ cut here ]------------ When relocating a data block group, for each extent allocated in the block group we preallocate another extent with the same size for the data relocation inode (we do it at prealloc_file_extent_cluster()). We reserve space by calling btrfs_check_data_free_space(), which ends up incrementing the data space_info's bytes_may_use counter, and then call btrfs_prealloc_file_range() to allocate the extent, which always decrements the bytes_may_use counter by the same amount. The expectation is that writeback of the data relocation inode always follows a NOCOW path, by writing into the preallocated extents. However, when starting writeback we might end up falling back into the COW path, because the block group that contains the preallocated extent was turned into RO mode by a scrub running in parallel. The COW path then calls the extent allocator which ends up calling btrfs_add_reserved_bytes(), and this function decrements the bytes_may_use counter of the data space_info object by an amount corresponding to the size of the allocated extent, despite we haven't previously incremented it. When the counter currently has a value smaller then the allocated extent we reset the counter to 0 and emit a warning, otherwise we just decrement it and slowly mess up with this counter which is crucial for space reservation, the end result can be granting reserved space to tasks when there isn't really enough free space, and having the tasks fail later in critical places where error handling consists of a transaction abort or hitting a BUG_ON(). Fix this by making sure that if we fallback to the COW path for a data relocation inode, we increment the bytes_may_use counter of the data space_info object. The COW path will then decrement it at btrfs_add_reserved_bytes() on success or through its error handling part by a call to extent_clear_unlock_delalloc() (which ends up calling btrfs_clear_delalloc_extent() that does the decrement operation) in case of an error. Test case btrfs/061 from fstests could sporadically trigger this. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Sasha Levin
|
9d3d40ec7d |
btrfs: fix a block group ref counter leak after failure to remove block group
[ Upstream commit 9fecd13202f520f3f25d5b1c313adb740fe19773 ] When removing a block group, if we fail to delete the block group's item from the extent tree, we jump to the 'out' label and end up decrementing the block group's reference count once only (by 1), resulting in a counter leak because the block group at that point was already removed from the block group cache rbtree - so we have to decrement the reference count twice, once for the rbtree and once for our lookup at the start of the function. There is a second bug where if removing the free space tree entries (the call to remove_block_group_free_space()) fails we end up jumping to the 'out_put_group' label but end up decrementing the reference count only once, when we should have done it twice, since we have already removed the block group from the block group cache rbtree. This happens because the reference count decrement for the rbtree reference happens after attempting to remove the free space tree entries, which is far away from the place where we remove the block group from the rbtree. To make things less error prone, decrement the reference count for the rbtree immediately after removing the block group from it. This also eleminates the need for two different exit labels on error, renaming 'out_put_label' to just 'out' and removing the old 'out'. Fixes: f6033c5e333238 ("btrfs: fix block group leak when removing fails") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
Filipe Manana
|
0ccfd7a531 |
btrfs: fix space_info bytes_may_use underflow during space cache writeout
commit 2166e5edce9ac1edf3b113d6091ef72fcac2d6c4 upstream.
We always preallocate a data extent for writing a free space cache, which
causes writeback to always try the nocow path first, since the free space
inode has the prealloc bit set in its flags.
However if the block group that contains the data extent for the space
cache has been turned to RO mode due to a running scrub or balance for
example, we have to fallback to the cow path. In that case once a new data
extent is allocated we end up calling btrfs_add_reserved_bytes(), which
decrements the counter named bytes_may_use from the data space_info object
with the expection that this counter was previously incremented with the
same amount (the size of the data extent).
However when we started writeout of the space cache at cache_save_setup(),
we incremented the value of the bytes_may_use counter through a call to
btrfs_check_data_free_space() and then decremented it through a call to
btrfs_prealloc_file_range_trans() immediately after. So when starting the
writeback if we fallback to cow mode we have to increment the counter
bytes_may_use of the data space_info again to compensate for the extent
allocation done by the cow path.
When this issue happens we are incorrectly decrementing the bytes_may_use
counter and when its current value is smaller then the amount we try to
subtract we end up with the following warning:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 657 at fs/btrfs/space-info.h:115 btrfs_add_reserved_bytes+0x3d6/0x4e0 [btrfs]
Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor raid6_pq libcrc32c (...)
CPU: 3 PID: 657 Comm: kworker/u8:7 Tainted: G W 5.6.0-rc7-btrfs-next-58 #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-1591)
RIP: 0010:btrfs_add_reserved_bytes+0x3d6/0x4e0 [btrfs]
Code: ff ff 48 (...)
RSP: 0000:ffffa41608f13660 EFLAGS: 00010287
RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: ffff9615b93ae400 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9615b96ab410
RBP: fffffffffffee000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff961585e62a40 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9615b96ab400
R13: ffff9615a1a2a000 R14: 0000000000012000 R15: ffff9615b93ae400
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9615bb200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055cbbc2ae178 CR3: 0000000115794006 CR4: 00000000003606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
find_free_extent+0x4a0/0x16c0 [btrfs]
btrfs_reserve_extent+0x91/0x180 [btrfs]
cow_file_range+0x12d/0x490 [btrfs]
btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x9f/0x6d0 [btrfs]
? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x221/0x250 [btrfs]
writepage_delalloc+0xe8/0x150 [btrfs]
__extent_writepage+0xe8/0x4c0 [btrfs]
extent_write_cache_pages+0x237/0x530 [btrfs]
extent_writepages+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs]
do_writepages+0x23/0x80
__writeback_single_inode+0x59/0x700
writeback_sb_inodes+0x267/0x5f0
__writeback_inodes_wb+0x87/0xe0
wb_writeback+0x382/0x590
? wb_workfn+0x4a2/0x6c0
wb_workfn+0x4a2/0x6c0
process_one_work+0x26d/0x6a0
worker_thread+0x4f/0x3e0
? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0
kthread+0x103/0x140
? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
irq event stamp: 0
hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffffb2abdedf>] copy_process+0x74f/0x2020
softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffb2abdedf>] copy_process+0x74f/0x2020
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
---[ end trace bd7c03622e0b0a52 ]---
------------[ cut here ]------------
So fix this by incrementing the bytes_may_use counter of the data
space_info when we fallback to the cow path. If the cow path is successful
the counter is decremented after extent allocation (by
btrfs_add_reserved_bytes()), if it fails it ends up being decremented as
well when clearing the delalloc range (extent_clear_unlock_delalloc()).
This could be triggered sporadically by the test case btrfs/061 from
fstests.
Fixes:
|
||
Filipe Manana
|
248cdf7288 |
btrfs: fix space_info bytes_may_use underflow after nocow buffered write
commit 467dc47ea99c56e966e99d09dae54869850abeeb upstream.
When doing a buffered write we always try to reserve data space for it,
even when the file has the NOCOW bit set or the write falls into a file
range covered by a prealloc extent. This is done both because it is
expensive to check if we can do a nocow write (checking if an extent is
shared through reflinks or if there's a hole in the range for example),
and because when writeback starts we might actually need to fallback to
COW mode (for example the block group containing the target extents was
turned into RO mode due to a scrub or balance).
When we are unable to reserve data space we check if we can do a nocow
write, and if we can, we proceed with dirtying the pages and setting up
the range for delalloc. In this case the bytes_may_use counter of the
data space_info object is not incremented, unlike in the case where we
are able to reserve data space (done through btrfs_check_data_free_space()
which calls btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand()).
Later when running delalloc we attempt to start writeback in nocow mode
but we might revert back to cow mode, for example because in the meanwhile
a block group was turned into RO mode by a scrub or relocation. The cow
path after successfully allocating an extent ends up calling
btrfs_add_reserved_bytes(), which expects the bytes_may_use counter of
the data space_info object to have been incremented before - but we did
not do it when the buffered write started, since there was not enough
available data space. So btrfs_add_reserved_bytes() ends up decrementing
the bytes_may_use counter anyway, and when the counter's current value
is smaller then the size of the allocated extent we get a stack trace
like the following:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 20138 at fs/btrfs/space-info.h:115 btrfs_add_reserved_bytes+0x3d6/0x4e0 [btrfs]
Modules linked in: btrfs blake2b_generic xor raid6_pq libcrc32c (...)
CPU: 0 PID: 20138 Comm: kworker/u8:15 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc7-btrfs-next-58 #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-btrfs-1754)
RIP: 0010:btrfs_add_reserved_bytes+0x3d6/0x4e0 [btrfs]
Code: ff ff 48 (...)
RSP: 0018:ffffbda18a4b3568 EFLAGS: 00010287
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9ca076f5d800 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9ca068470410
RBP: fffffffffffff000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff9ca079d58040 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ca068470400
R13: ffff9ca0408b2000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: ffff9ca076f5d800
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9ca07a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005605dbfe7048 CR3: 0000000138570006 CR4: 00000000003606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
find_free_extent+0x4a0/0x16c0 [btrfs]
btrfs_reserve_extent+0x91/0x180 [btrfs]
cow_file_range+0x12d/0x490 [btrfs]
run_delalloc_nocow+0x341/0xa40 [btrfs]
btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x1ea/0x6d0 [btrfs]
? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x221/0x250 [btrfs]
writepage_delalloc+0xe8/0x150 [btrfs]
__extent_writepage+0xe8/0x4c0 [btrfs]
extent_write_cache_pages+0x237/0x530 [btrfs]
? btrfs_wq_submit_bio+0x9f/0xc0 [btrfs]
extent_writepages+0x44/0xa0 [btrfs]
do_writepages+0x23/0x80
__writeback_single_inode+0x59/0x700
writeback_sb_inodes+0x267/0x5f0
__writeback_inodes_wb+0x87/0xe0
wb_writeback+0x382/0x590
? wb_workfn+0x4a2/0x6c0
wb_workfn+0x4a2/0x6c0
process_one_work+0x26d/0x6a0
worker_thread+0x4f/0x3e0
? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0
kthread+0x103/0x140
? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
irq event stamp: 0
hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffff94ebdedf>] copy_process+0x74f/0x2020
softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffff94ebdedf>] copy_process+0x74f/0x2020
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
---[ end trace f9f6ef8ec4cd8ec9 ]---
So to fix this, when falling back into cow mode check if space was not
reserved, by testing for the bit EXTENT_NORESERVE in the respective file
range, and if not, increment the bytes_may_use counter for the data
space_info object. Also clear the EXTENT_NORESERVE bit from the range, so
that if the cow path fails it decrements the bytes_may_use counter when
clearing the delalloc range (through the btrfs_clear_delalloc_extent()
callback).
Fixes:
|
||
Filipe Manana
|
8076bdd4fe |
btrfs: fix wrong file range cleanup after an error filling dealloc range
commit e2c8e92d1140754073ad3799eb6620c76bab2078 upstream.
If an error happens while running dellaloc in COW mode for a range, we can
end up calling extent_clear_unlock_delalloc() for a range that goes beyond
our range's end offset by 1 byte, which affects 1 extra page. This results
in clearing bits and doing page operations (such as a page unlock) outside
our target range.
Fix that by calling extent_clear_unlock_delalloc() with an inclusive end
offset, instead of an exclusive end offset, at cow_file_range().
Fixes:
|
||
Omar Sandoval
|
c2c69ecb60 |
btrfs: fix error handling when submitting direct I/O bio
commit 6d3113a193e3385c72240096fe397618ecab6e43 upstream.
In btrfs_submit_direct_hook(), if a direct I/O write doesn't span a RAID
stripe or chunk, we submit orig_bio without cloning it. In this case, we
don't increment pending_bios. Then, if btrfs_submit_dio_bio() fails, we
decrement pending_bios to -1, and we never complete orig_bio. Fix it by
initializing pending_bios to 1 instead of incrementing later.
Fixing this exposes another bug: we put orig_bio prematurely and then
put it again from end_io. Fix it by not putting orig_bio.
After this change, pending_bios is really more of a reference count, but
I'll leave that cleanup separate to keep the fix small.
Fixes:
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
05c5e98bf4 |
btrfs: force chunk allocation if our global rsv is larger than metadata
commit 9c343784c4328781129bcf9e671645f69fe4b38a upstream.
Nikolay noticed a bunch of test failures with my global rsv steal
patches. At first he thought they were introduced by them, but they've
been failing for a while with 64k nodes.
The problem is with 64k nodes we have a global reserve that calculates
out to 13MiB on a freshly made file system, which only has 8MiB of
metadata space. Because of changes I previously made we no longer
account for the global reserve in the overcommit logic, which means we
correctly allow overcommit to happen even though we are already
overcommitted.
However in some corner cases, for example btrfs/170, we will allocate
the entire file system up with data chunks before we have enough space
pressure to allocate a metadata chunk. Then once the fs is full we
ENOSPC out because we cannot overcommit and the global reserve is taking
up all of the available space.
The most ideal way to deal with this is to change our space reservation
stuff to take into account the height of the tree's that we're
modifying, so that our global reserve calculation does not end up so
obscenely large.
However that is a huge undertaking. Instead fix this by forcing a chunk
allocation if the global reserve is larger than the total metadata
space. This gives us essentially the same behavior that happened
before, we get a chunk allocated and these tests can pass.
This is meant to be a stop-gap measure until we can tackle the "tree
height only" project.
Fixes:
|
||
Marcos Paulo de Souza
|
f63545770f |
btrfs: send: emit file capabilities after chown
commit 89efda52e6b6930f80f5adda9c3c9edfb1397191 upstream. Whenever a chown is executed, all capabilities of the file being touched are lost. When doing incremental send with a file with capabilities, there is a situation where the capability can be lost on the receiving side. The sequence of actions bellow shows the problem: $ mount /dev/sda fs1 $ mount /dev/sdb fs2 $ touch fs1/foo.bar $ setcap cap_sys_nice+ep fs1/foo.bar $ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r fs1 fs1/snap_init $ btrfs send fs1/snap_init | btrfs receive fs2 $ chgrp adm fs1/foo.bar $ setcap cap_sys_nice+ep fs1/foo.bar $ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r fs1 fs1/snap_complete $ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r fs1 fs1/snap_incremental $ btrfs send fs1/snap_complete | btrfs receive fs2 $ btrfs send -p fs1/snap_init fs1/snap_incremental | btrfs receive fs2 At this point, only a chown was emitted by "btrfs send" since only the group was changed. This makes the cap_sys_nice capability to be dropped from fs2/snap_incremental/foo.bar To fix that, only emit capabilities after chown is emitted. The current code first checks for xattrs that are new/changed, emits them, and later emit the chown. Now, __process_new_xattr skips capabilities, letting only finish_inode_if_needed to emit them, if they exist, for the inode being processed. This behavior was being worked around in "btrfs receive" side by caching the capability and only applying it after chown. Now, xattrs are only emmited _after_ chown, making that workaround not needed anymore. Link: https://github.com/kdave/btrfs-progs/issues/202 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Suggested-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Marcos Paulo de Souza <mpdesouza@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Anand Jain
|
20f260ed53 |
btrfs: include non-missing as a qualifier for the latest_bdev
commit 998a0671961f66e9fad4990ed75f80ba3088c2f1 upstream. btrfs_free_extra_devids() updates fs_devices::latest_bdev to point to the bdev with greatest device::generation number. For a typical-missing device the generation number is zero so fs_devices::latest_bdev will never point to it. But if the missing device is due to alienation [1], then device::generation is not zero and if it is greater or equal to the rest of device generations in the list, then fs_devices::latest_bdev ends up pointing to the missing device and reports the error like [2]. [1] We maintain devices of a fsid (as in fs_device::fsid) in the fs_devices::devices list, a device is considered as an alien device if its fsid does not match with the fs_device::fsid Consider a working filesystem with raid1: $ mkfs.btrfs -f -d raid1 -m raid1 /dev/sda /dev/sdb $ mount /dev/sda /mnt-raid1 $ umount /mnt-raid1 While mnt-raid1 was unmounted the user force-adds one of its devices to another btrfs filesystem: $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc $ mount /dev/sdc /mnt-single $ btrfs dev add -f /dev/sda /mnt-single Now the original mnt-raid1 fails to mount in degraded mode, because fs_devices::latest_bdev is pointing to the alien device. $ mount -o degraded /dev/sdb /mnt-raid1 [2] mount: wrong fs type, bad option, bad superblock on /dev/sdb, missing codepage or helper program, or other error In some cases useful info is found in syslog - try dmesg | tail or so. kernel: BTRFS warning (device sdb): devid 1 uuid 072a0192-675b-4d5a-8640-a5cf2b2c704d is missing kernel: BTRFS error (device sdb): failed to read devices kernel: BTRFS error (device sdb): open_ctree failed Fix the root cause by checking if the device is not missing before it can be considered for the fs_devices::latest_bdev. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Anand Jain
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fd9720b8e9 |
btrfs: free alien device after device add
commit 7f551d969037cc128eca60688d9c5a300d84e665 upstream. When an old device has new fsid through 'btrfs device add -f <dev>' our fs_devices list has an alien device in one of the fs_devices lists. By having an alien device in fs_devices, we have two issues so far 1. missing device does not not show as missing in the userland 2. degraded mount will fail Both issues are caused by the fact that there's an alien device in the fs_devices list. (Alien means that it does not belong to the filesystem, identified by fsid, or does not contain btrfs filesystem at all, eg. due to overwrite). A device can be scanned/added through the control device ioctls SCAN_DEV, DEVICES_READY or by ADD_DEV. And device coming through the control device is checked against the all other devices in the lists, but this was not the case for ADD_DEV. This patch fixes both issues above by removing the alien device. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Qu Wenruo
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c6f1f12a8c |
btrfs: qgroup: mark qgroup inconsistent if we're inherting snapshot to a new qgroup
[ Upstream commit cbab8ade585a18c4334b085564d9d046e01a3f70 ] [BUG] For the following operation, qgroup is guaranteed to be screwed up due to snapshot adding to a new qgroup: # mkfs.btrfs -f $dev # mount $dev $mnt # btrfs qgroup en $mnt # btrfs subv create $mnt/src # xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 1m" $mnt/src/file # sync # btrfs qgroup create 1/0 $mnt/src # btrfs subv snapshot -i 1/0 $mnt/src $mnt/snapshot # btrfs qgroup show -prce $mnt/src qgroupid rfer excl max_rfer max_excl parent child -------- ---- ---- -------- -------- ------ ----- 0/5 16.00KiB 16.00KiB none none --- --- 0/257 1.02MiB 16.00KiB none none --- --- 0/258 1.02MiB 16.00KiB none none 1/0 --- 1/0 0.00B 0.00B none none --- 0/258 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ [CAUSE] The problem is in btrfs_qgroup_inherit(), we don't have good enough check to determine if the new relation would break the existing accounting. Unlike btrfs_add_qgroup_relation(), which has proper check to determine if we can do quick update without a rescan, in btrfs_qgroup_inherit() we can even assign a snapshot to multiple qgroups. [FIX] Fix it by manually marking qgroup inconsistent for snapshot inheritance. For subvolume creation, since all its extents are exclusively owned, we don't need to rescan. In theory, we should call relation check like quick_update_accounting() when doing qgroup inheritance and inform user about qgroup accounting inconsistency. But we don't have good mechanism to relay that back to the user in the snapshot creation context, thus we can only silently mark the qgroup inconsistent. Anyway, user shouldn't use qgroup inheritance during snapshot creation, and should add qgroup relationship after snapshot creation by 'btrfs qgroup assign', which has a much better UI to inform user about qgroup inconsistent and kick in rescan automatically. Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Josef Bacik
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1e42a1857b |
btrfs: improve global reserve stealing logic
[ Upstream commit 7f9fe614407692f670601a634621138233ac00d7 ] For unlink transactions and block group removal btrfs_start_transaction_fallback_global_rsv will first try to start an ordinary transaction and if it fails it will fall back to reserving the required amount by stealing from the global reserve. This is problematic because of all the same reasons we had with previous iterations of the ENOSPC handling, thundering herd. We get a bunch of failures all at once, everybody tries to allocate from the global reserve, some win and some lose, we get an ENSOPC. Fix this behavior by introducing BTRFS_RESERVE_FLUSH_ALL_STEAL. It's used to mark unlink reservation. To fix this we need to integrate this logic into the normal ENOSPC infrastructure. We still go through all of the normal flushing work, and at the moment we begin to fail all the tickets we try to satisfy any tickets that are allowed to steal by stealing from the global reserve. If this works we start the flushing system over again just like we would with a normal ticket satisfaction. This serializes our global reserve stealing, so we don't have the thundering herd problem. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Tested-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Filipe Manana
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2a00502610 |
btrfs: do not ignore error from btrfs_next_leaf() when inserting checksums
[ Upstream commit 7e4a3f7ed5d54926ec671bbb13e171cfe179cc50 ] We are currently treating any non-zero return value from btrfs_next_leaf() the same way, by going to the code that inserts a new checksum item in the tree. However if btrfs_next_leaf() returns an error (a value < 0), we should just stop and return the error, and not behave as if nothing has happened, since in that case we do not have a way to know if there is a next leaf or we are currently at the last leaf already. So fix that by returning the error from btrfs_next_leaf(). Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Josef Bacik
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3bb51c966b |
btrfs: account for trans_block_rsv in may_commit_transaction
[ Upstream commit bb4f58a747f0421b10645fbf75a6acc88da0de50 ] On ppc64le with 64k page size (respectively 64k block size) generic/320 was failing and debug output showed we were getting a premature ENOSPC with a bunch of space in btrfs_fs_info::trans_block_rsv. This meant there were still open transaction handles holding space, yet the flusher didn't commit the transaction because it deemed the freed space won't be enough to satisfy the current reserve ticket. Fix this by accounting for space in trans_block_rsv when deciding whether the current transaction should be committed or not. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Tested-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Qu Wenruo
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2b925c4600 |
btrfs: transaction: Avoid deadlock due to bad initialization timing of fs_info::journal_info
commit fcc99734d1d4ced30167eb02e17f656735cb9928 upstream. [BUG] One run of btrfs/063 triggered the following lockdep warning: ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- kworker/u24:0/7 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs] but task is already holding lock: ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs] other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(sb_internal#2); lock(sb_internal#2); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 4 locks held by kworker/u24:0/7: #0: ffff88817b495948 ((wq_completion)btrfs-endio-write){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80 #1: ffff888189ea7db8 ((work_completion)(&work->normal_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80 #2: ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs] #3: ffff888174ca4da8 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x83/0xd0 [btrfs] stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u24:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] Call Trace: dump_stack+0xc2/0x11a __lock_acquire.cold+0xce/0x214 lock_acquire+0xe6/0x210 __sb_start_write+0x14e/0x290 start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs] btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs] find_free_extent+0x1504/0x1a50 [btrfs] btrfs_reserve_extent+0xd5/0x1f0 [btrfs] btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1ac/0x570 [btrfs] btrfs_copy_root+0x213/0x580 [btrfs] create_reloc_root+0x3bd/0x470 [btrfs] btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2d2/0x310 [btrfs] record_root_in_trans+0x191/0x1d0 [btrfs] btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x90/0xd0 [btrfs] start_transaction+0x16e/0x890 [btrfs] btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs] btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x55d/0xcd0 [btrfs] finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20 [btrfs] btrfs_work_helper+0x116/0x9a0 [btrfs] process_one_work+0x632/0xb80 worker_thread+0x80/0x690 kthread+0x1a3/0x1f0 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50 It's pretty hard to reproduce, only one hit so far. [CAUSE] This is because we're calling btrfs_join_transaction() without re-using the current running one: btrfs_finish_ordered_io() |- btrfs_join_transaction() <<< Call #1 |- btrfs_record_root_in_trans() |- btrfs_reserve_extent() |- btrfs_join_transaction() <<< Call #2 Normally such btrfs_join_transaction() call should re-use the existing one, without trying to re-start a transaction. But the problem is, in btrfs_join_transaction() call #1, we call btrfs_record_root_in_trans() before initializing current::journal_info. And in btrfs_join_transaction() call #2, we're relying on current::journal_info to avoid such deadlock. [FIX] Call btrfs_record_root_in_trans() after we have initialized current::journal_info. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Filipe Manana
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67bc5f667a |
btrfs: fix partial loss of prealloc extent past i_size after fsync
commit f135cea30de5f74d5bfb5116682073841fb4af8f upstream.
When we have an inode with a prealloc extent that starts at an offset
lower than the i_size and there is another prealloc extent that starts at
an offset beyond i_size, we can end up losing part of the first prealloc
extent (the part that starts at i_size) and have an implicit hole if we
fsync the file and then have a power failure.
Consider the following example with comments explaining how and why it
happens.
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
# Create our test file with 2 consecutive prealloc extents, each with a
# size of 128Kb, and covering the range from 0 to 256Kb, with a file
# size of 0.
$ xfs_io -f -c "falloc -k 0 128K" /mnt/foo
$ xfs_io -c "falloc -k 128K 128K" /mnt/foo
# Fsync the file to record both extents in the log tree.
$ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/foo
# Now do a redudant extent allocation for the range from 0 to 64Kb.
# This will merely increase the file size from 0 to 64Kb. Instead we
# could also do a truncate to set the file size to 64Kb.
$ xfs_io -c "falloc 0 64K" /mnt/foo
# Fsync the file, so we update the inode item in the log tree with the
# new file size (64Kb). This also ends up setting the number of bytes
# for the first prealloc extent to 64Kb. This is done by the truncation
# at btrfs_log_prealloc_extents().
# This means that if a power failure happens after this, a write into
# the file range 64Kb to 128Kb will not use the prealloc extent and
# will result in allocation of a new extent.
$ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/foo
# Now set the file size to 256K with a truncate and then fsync the file.
# Since no changes happened to the extents, the fsync only updates the
# i_size in the inode item at the log tree. This results in an implicit
# hole for the file range from 64Kb to 128Kb, something which fsck will
# complain when not using the NO_HOLES feature if we replay the log
# after a power failure.
$ xfs_io -c "truncate 256K" -c "fsync" /mnt/foo
So instead of always truncating the log to the inode's current i_size at
btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(), check first if there's a prealloc extent
that starts at an offset lower than the i_size and with a length that
crosses the i_size - if there is one, just make sure we truncate to a
size that corresponds to the end offset of that prealloc extent, so
that we don't lose the part of that extent that starts at i_size if a
power failure happens.
A test case for fstests follows soon.
Fixes:
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Xiyu Yang
|
636987650f |
btrfs: fix block group leak when removing fails
commit f6033c5e333238f299c3ae03fac8cc1365b23b77 upstream. btrfs_remove_block_group() invokes btrfs_lookup_block_group(), which returns a local reference of the block group that contains the given bytenr to "block_group" with increased refcount. When btrfs_remove_block_group() returns, "block_group" becomes invalid, so the refcount should be decreased to keep refcount balanced. The reference counting issue happens in several exception handling paths of btrfs_remove_block_group(). When those error scenarios occur such as btrfs_alloc_path() returns NULL, the function forgets to decrease its refcnt increased by btrfs_lookup_block_group() and will cause a refcnt leak. Fix this issue by jumping to "out_put_group" label and calling btrfs_put_block_group() when those error scenarios occur. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Xiyu Yang <xiyuyang19@fudan.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Xin Tan <tanxin.ctf@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Xiyu Yang
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a378abbb8e |
btrfs: fix transaction leak in btrfs_recover_relocation
commit 1402d17dfd9657be0da8458b2079d03c2d61c86a upstream.
btrfs_recover_relocation() invokes btrfs_join_transaction(), which joins
a btrfs_trans_handle object into transactions and returns a reference of
it with increased refcount to "trans".
When btrfs_recover_relocation() returns, "trans" becomes invalid, so the
refcount should be decreased to keep refcount balanced.
The reference counting issue happens in one exception handling path of
btrfs_recover_relocation(). When read_fs_root() failed, the refcnt
increased by btrfs_join_transaction() is not decreased, causing a refcnt
leak.
Fix this issue by calling btrfs_end_transaction() on this error path
when read_fs_root() failed.
Fixes:
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Madhuparna Bhowmik
|
7650522178 |
btrfs: add RCU locks around block group initialization
[ Upstream commit 29566c9c773456467933ee22bbca1c2b72a3506c ] The space_info list is normally RCU protected and should be traversed with rcu_read_lock held. There's a warning [29.104756] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage [29.105046] 5.6.0-rc4-next-20200305 #1 Not tainted [29.105231] ----------------------------- [29.105401] fs/btrfs/block-group.c:2011 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!! pointing out that the locking is missing in btrfs_read_block_groups. However this is not necessary as the list traversal happens at mount time when there's no other thread potentially accessing the list. To fix the warning and for consistency let's add the RCU lock/unlock, the code won't be affected much as it's doing some lightweight operations. Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Madhuparna Bhowmik <madhuparnabhowmik10@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Josef Bacik
|
aa5b11bb33 |
btrfs: check commit root generation in should_ignore_root
commit 4d4225fc228e46948486d8b8207955f0c031b92e upstream.
Previously we would set the reloc root's last snapshot to transid - 1.
However there was a problem with doing this, and we changed it to
setting the last snapshot to the generation of the commit node of the fs
root.
This however broke should_ignore_root(). The assumption is that if we
are in a generation newer than when the reloc root was created, then we
would find the reloc root through normal backref lookups, and thus can
ignore any fs roots we find with an old enough reloc root.
Now that the last snapshot could be considerably further in the past
than before, we'd end up incorrectly ignoring an fs root. Thus we'd
find no nodes for the bytenr we were searching for, and we'd fail to
relocate anything. We'd loop through the relocate code again and see
that there were still used space in that block group, attempt to
relocate those bytenr's again, fail in the same way, and just loop like
this forever. This is tricky in that we have to not modify the fs root
at all during this time, so we need to have a block group that has data
in this fs root that is not shared by any other root, which is why this
has been difficult to reproduce.
Fixes:
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Josef Bacik
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87a9058d55 |
btrfs: use nofs allocations for running delayed items
commit 351cbf6e4410e7ece05e35d0a07320538f2418b4 upstream. Zygo reported the following lockdep splat while testing the balance patches ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 5.6.0-c6f0579d496a+ #53 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ kswapd0/1133 is trying to acquire lock: ffff888092f622c0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x7c/0x5b0 but task is already holding lock: ffffffff8fc5f860 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}: fs_reclaim_acquire.part.91+0x29/0x30 fs_reclaim_acquire+0x19/0x20 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x32/0x740 add_block_entry+0x45/0x260 btrfs_ref_tree_mod+0x6e2/0x8b0 btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x789/0x880 alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0xc6/0xf0 __btrfs_cow_block+0x270/0x940 btrfs_cow_block+0x1ba/0x3a0 btrfs_search_slot+0x999/0x1030 btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x81/0xe0 btrfs_insert_delayed_items+0x128/0x7d0 __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0xf4/0x2a0 btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x13/0x20 btrfs_commit_transaction+0x5cc/0x1390 insert_balance_item.isra.39+0x6b2/0x6e0 btrfs_balance+0x72d/0x18d0 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x3de/0x4c0 btrfs_ioctl+0x30ab/0x44a0 ksys_ioctl+0xa1/0xe0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x43/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x77/0x2c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}: __lock_acquire+0x197e/0x2550 lock_acquire+0x103/0x220 __mutex_lock+0x13d/0xce0 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x7c/0x5b0 btrfs_remove_delayed_node+0x49/0x50 btrfs_evict_inode+0x6fc/0x900 evict+0x19a/0x2c0 dispose_list+0xa0/0xe0 prune_icache_sb+0xbd/0xf0 super_cache_scan+0x1b5/0x250 do_shrink_slab+0x1f6/0x530 shrink_slab+0x32e/0x410 shrink_node+0x2a5/0xba0 balance_pgdat+0x4bd/0x8a0 kswapd+0x35a/0x800 kthread+0x1e9/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(fs_reclaim); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); lock(fs_reclaim); lock(&delayed_node->mutex); *** DEADLOCK *** 3 locks held by kswapd0/1133: #0: ffffffff8fc5f860 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30 #1: ffffffff8fc380d8 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}, at: shrink_slab+0x1e8/0x410 #2: ffff8881e0e6c0e8 (&type->s_umount_key#42){++++}, at: trylock_super+0x1b/0x70 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 PID: 1133 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.6.0-c6f0579d496a+ #53 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xc1/0x11a print_circular_bug.isra.38.cold.57+0x145/0x14a check_noncircular+0x2a9/0x2f0 ? print_circular_bug.isra.38+0x130/0x130 ? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x90/0x90 ? save_trace+0x3cc/0x420 __lock_acquire+0x197e/0x2550 ? btrfs_inode_clear_file_extent_range+0x9b/0xb0 ? register_lock_class+0x960/0x960 lock_acquire+0x103/0x220 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x7c/0x5b0 __mutex_lock+0x13d/0xce0 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x7c/0x5b0 ? __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20 ? pvclock_clocksource_read+0xeb/0x190 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x7c/0x5b0 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0xc20/0xc20 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 ? check_chain_key+0x1e6/0x2e0 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x7c/0x5b0 btrfs_remove_delayed_node+0x49/0x50 btrfs_evict_inode+0x6fc/0x900 ? btrfs_setattr+0x840/0x840 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140 evict+0x19a/0x2c0 dispose_list+0xa0/0xe0 prune_icache_sb+0xbd/0xf0 ? invalidate_inodes+0x310/0x310 super_cache_scan+0x1b5/0x250 do_shrink_slab+0x1f6/0x530 shrink_slab+0x32e/0x410 ? do_shrink_slab+0x530/0x530 ? do_shrink_slab+0x530/0x530 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 ? mem_cgroup_protected+0x13d/0x260 shrink_node+0x2a5/0xba0 balance_pgdat+0x4bd/0x8a0 ? mem_cgroup_shrink_node+0x490/0x490 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x27/0x40 ? finish_task_switch+0xce/0x390 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0 kswapd+0x35a/0x800 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4c/0x60 ? balance_pgdat+0x8a0/0x8a0 ? finish_wait+0x110/0x110 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 ? __kthread_parkme+0xc6/0xe0 ? balance_pgdat+0x8a0/0x8a0 kthread+0x1e9/0x210 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 This is because we hold that delayed node's mutex while doing tree operations. Fix this by just wrapping the searches in nofs. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Robbie Ko
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0425813c22 |
btrfs: fix missing semaphore unlock in btrfs_sync_file
commit 6ff06729c22ec0b7498d900d79cc88cfb8aceaeb upstream.
Ordered ops are started twice in sync file, once outside of inode mutex
and once inside, taking the dio semaphore. There was one error path
missing the semaphore unlock.
Fixes:
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Josef Bacik
|
08e69ab983 |
btrfs: unset reloc control if we fail to recover
commit fb2d83eefef4e1c717205bac71cb1941edf8ae11 upstream. If we fail to load an fs root, or fail to start a transaction we can bail without unsetting the reloc control, which leads to problems later when we free the reloc control but still have it attached to the file system. In the normal path we'll end up calling unset_reloc_control() twice, but all it does is set fs_info->reloc_control = NULL, and we can only have one balance at a time so it's not racey. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Filipe Manana
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098d3da1ad |
btrfs: fix missing file extent item for hole after ranged fsync
commit 95418ed1d10774cd9a49af6f39e216c1256f1eeb upstream. When doing a fast fsync for a range that starts at an offset greater than zero, we can end up with a log that when replayed causes the respective inode miss a file extent item representing a hole if we are not using the NO_HOLES feature. This is because for fast fsyncs we don't log any extents that cover a range different from the one requested in the fsync. Example scenario to trigger it: $ mkfs.btrfs -O ^no-holes -f /dev/sdd $ mount /dev/sdd /mnt # Create a file with a single 256K and fsync it to clear to full sync # bit in the inode - we want the msync below to trigger a fast fsync. $ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xab 0 256K" -c "fsync" /mnt/foo # Force a transaction commit and wipe out the log tree. $ sync # Dirty 768K of data, increasing the file size to 1Mb, and flush only # the range from 256K to 512K without updating the log tree # (sync_file_range() does not trigger fsync, it only starts writeback # and waits for it to finish). $ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xcd 256K 768K" /mnt/foo $ xfs_io -c "sync_range -abw 256K 256K" /mnt/foo # Now dirty the range from 768K to 1M again and sync that range. $ xfs_io -c "mmap -w 768K 256K" \ -c "mwrite -S 0xef 768K 256K" \ -c "msync -s 768K 256K" \ -c "munmap" \ /mnt/foo <power fail> # Mount to replay the log. $ mount /dev/sdd /mnt $ umount /mnt $ btrfs check /dev/sdd Opening filesystem to check... Checking filesystem on /dev/sdd UUID: 482fb574-b288-478e-a190-a9c44a78fca6 [1/7] checking root items [2/7] checking extents [3/7] checking free space cache [4/7] checking fs roots root 5 inode 257 errors 100, file extent discount Found file extent holes: start: 262144, len: 524288 ERROR: errors found in fs roots found 720896 bytes used, error(s) found total csum bytes: 512 total tree bytes: 131072 total fs tree bytes: 32768 total extent tree bytes: 16384 btree space waste bytes: 123514 file data blocks allocated: 589824 referenced 589824 Fix this issue by setting the range to full (0 to LLONG_MAX) when the NO_HOLES feature is not enabled. This results in extra work being done but it gives the guarantee we don't end up with missing holes after replaying the log. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Josef Bacik
|
b436fbff6f |
btrfs: drop block from cache on error in relocation
commit 8e19c9732ad1d127b5575a10f4fbcacf740500ff upstream. If we have an error while building the backref tree in relocation we'll process all the pending edges and then free the node. However if we integrated some edges into the cache we'll lose our link to those edges by simply freeing this node, which means we'll leak memory and references to any roots that we've found. Instead we need to use remove_backref_node(), which walks through all of the edges that are still linked to this node and free's them up and drops any root references we may be holding. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Josef Bacik
|
dd68ba0d73 |
btrfs: set update the uuid generation as soon as possible
commit 75ec1db8717a8f0a9d9c8d033e542fdaa7b73898 upstream.
In my EIO stress testing I noticed I was getting forced to rescan the
uuid tree pretty often, which was weird. This is because my error
injection stuff would sometimes inject an error after log replay but
before we loaded the UUID tree. If log replay committed the transaction
it wouldn't have updated the uuid tree generation, but the tree was
valid and didn't change, so there's no reason to not update the
generation here.
Fix this by setting the BTRFS_FS_UPDATE_UUID_TREE_GEN bit immediately
after reading all the fs roots if the uuid tree generation matches the
fs generation. Then any transaction commits that happen during mount
won't screw up our uuid tree state, forcing us to do needless uuid
rescans.
Fixes:
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Josef Bacik
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441b83a842 |
btrfs: reloc: clean dirty subvols if we fail to start a transaction
commit 6217b0fadd4473a16fabc6aecd7527a9f71af534 upstream. If we do merge_reloc_roots() we could insert a few roots onto the dirty subvol roots list, where we hold a ref on them. If we fail to start the transaction we need to run clean_dirty_subvols() in order to cleanup the refs. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Filipe Manana
|
1bd44cada4 |
Btrfs: fix crash during unmount due to race with delayed inode workers
commit f0cc2cd70164efe8f75c5d99560f0f69969c72e4 upstream. During unmount we can have a job from the delayed inode items work queue still running, that can lead to at least two bad things: 1) A crash, because the worker can try to create a transaction just after the fs roots were freed; 2) A transaction leak, because the worker can create a transaction before the fs roots are freed and just after we committed the last transaction and after we stopped the transaction kthread. A stack trace example of the crash: [79011.691214] kernel BUG at lib/radix-tree.c:982! [79011.692056] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI [79011.693180] CPU: 3 PID: 1394 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Tainted: G W 5.6.0-rc2-btrfs-next-54 #2 (...) [79011.696789] Workqueue: btrfs-delayed-meta btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [79011.697904] RIP: 0010:radix_tree_tag_set+0xe7/0x170 (...) [79011.702014] RSP: 0018:ffffb3c84a317ca0 EFLAGS: 00010293 [79011.702949] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [79011.704202] RDX: ffffb3c84a317cb0 RSI: ffffb3c84a317ca8 RDI: ffff8db3931340a0 [79011.705463] RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: ffffffff974629d0 [79011.706756] R10: ffffb3c84a317bc0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8db393134000 [79011.708010] R13: ffff8db3931340a0 R14: ffff8db393134068 R15: 0000000000000001 [79011.709270] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8db3b6a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [79011.710699] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [79011.711710] CR2: 00007f22c2a0a000 CR3: 0000000232ad4005 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [79011.712958] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [79011.714205] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [79011.715448] Call Trace: [79011.715925] record_root_in_trans+0x72/0xf0 [btrfs] [79011.716819] btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x4b/0x70 [btrfs] [79011.717925] start_transaction+0xdd/0x5c0 [btrfs] [79011.718829] btrfs_async_run_delayed_root+0x17e/0x2b0 [btrfs] [79011.719915] btrfs_work_helper+0xaa/0x720 [btrfs] [79011.720773] process_one_work+0x26d/0x6a0 [79011.721497] worker_thread+0x4f/0x3e0 [79011.722153] ? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0 [79011.722901] kthread+0x103/0x140 [79011.723481] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [79011.724379] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 (...) The following diagram shows a sequence of steps that lead to the crash during ummount of the filesystem: CPU 1 CPU 2 CPU 3 btrfs_punch_hole() btrfs_btree_balance_dirty() btrfs_balance_delayed_items() --> sees fs_info->delayed_root->items with value 200, which is greater than BTRFS_DELAYED_BACKGROUND (128) and smaller than BTRFS_DELAYED_WRITEBACK (512) btrfs_wq_run_delayed_node() --> queues a job for fs_info->delayed_workers to run btrfs_async_run_delayed_root() btrfs_async_run_delayed_root() --> job queued by CPU 1 --> starts picking and running delayed nodes from the prepare_list list close_ctree() btrfs_delete_unused_bgs() btrfs_commit_super() btrfs_join_transaction() --> gets transaction N btrfs_commit_transaction(N) --> set transaction state to TRANTS_STATE_COMMIT_START btrfs_first_prepared_delayed_node() --> picks delayed node X through the prepared_list list btrfs_run_delayed_items() btrfs_first_delayed_node() --> also picks delayed node X but through the node_list list __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items() --> runs all delayed items from this node and drops the node's item count to 0 through call to btrfs_release_delayed_inode() --> finishes running any remaining delayed nodes --> finishes transaction commit --> stops cleaner and transaction threads btrfs_free_fs_roots() --> frees all roots and removes them from the radix tree fs_info->fs_roots_radix btrfs_join_transaction() start_transaction() btrfs_record_root_in_trans() record_root_in_trans() radix_tree_tag_set() --> crashes because the root is not in the radix tree anymore If the worker is able to call btrfs_join_transaction() before the unmount task frees the fs roots, we end up leaking a transaction and all its resources, since after the call to btrfs_commit_super() and stopping the transaction kthread, we don't expect to have any transaction open anymore. When this situation happens the worker has a delayed node that has no more items to run, since the task calling btrfs_run_delayed_items(), which is doing a transaction commit, picks the same node and runs all its items first. We can not wait for the worker to complete when running delayed items through btrfs_run_delayed_items(), because we call that function in several phases of a transaction commit, and that could cause a deadlock because the worker calls btrfs_join_transaction() and the task doing the transaction commit may have already set the transaction state to TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING. Also it's not possible to get into a situation where only some of the items of a delayed node are added to the fs/subvolume tree in the current transaction and the remaining ones in the next transaction, because when running the items of a delayed inode we lock its mutex, effectively waiting for the worker if the worker is running the items of the delayed node already. Since this can only cause issues when unmounting a filesystem, fix it in a simple way by waiting for any jobs on the delayed workers queue before calling btrfs_commit_supper() at close_ctree(). This works because at this point no one can call btrfs_btree_balance_dirty() or btrfs_balance_delayed_items(), and if we end up waiting for any worker to complete, btrfs_commit_super() will commit the transaction created by the worker. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Qu Wenruo
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941dabde6c |
btrfs: Don't submit any btree write bio if the fs has errors
commit b3ff8f1d380e65dddd772542aa9bff6c86bf715a upstream.
[BUG]
There is a fuzzed image which could cause KASAN report at unmount time.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in btrfs_queue_work+0x2c1/0x390
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888067cf6848 by task umount/1922
CPU: 0 PID: 1922 Comm: umount Tainted: G W 5.0.21 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x5b/0x8b
print_address_description+0x70/0x280
kasan_report+0x13a/0x19b
btrfs_queue_work+0x2c1/0x390
btrfs_wq_submit_bio+0x1cd/0x240
btree_submit_bio_hook+0x18c/0x2a0
submit_one_bio+0x1be/0x320
flush_write_bio.isra.41+0x2c/0x70
btree_write_cache_pages+0x3bb/0x7f0
do_writepages+0x5c/0x130
__writeback_single_inode+0xa3/0x9a0
writeback_single_inode+0x23d/0x390
write_inode_now+0x1b5/0x280
iput+0x2ef/0x600
close_ctree+0x341/0x750
generic_shutdown_super+0x126/0x370
kill_anon_super+0x31/0x50
btrfs_kill_super+0x36/0x2b0
deactivate_locked_super+0x80/0xc0
deactivate_super+0x13c/0x150
cleanup_mnt+0x9a/0x130
task_work_run+0x11a/0x1b0
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x107/0x130
do_syscall_64+0x1e5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[CAUSE]
The fuzzed image has a completely screwd up extent tree:
leaf 29421568 gen 8 total ptrs 6 free space 3587 owner EXTENT_TREE
refs 2 lock (w:0 r:0 bw:0 br:0 sw:0 sr:0) lock_owner 0 current 5938
item 0 key (12587008 168 4096) itemoff 3942 itemsize 53
extent refs 1 gen 9 flags 1
ref#0: extent data backref root 5 objectid 259 offset 0 count 1
item 1 key (12591104 168 8192) itemoff 3889 itemsize 53
extent refs 1 gen 9 flags 1
ref#0: extent data backref root 5 objectid 271 offset 0 count 1
item 2 key (
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Josef Bacik
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acec0e9a91 |
btrfs: track reloc roots based on their commit root bytenr
[ Upstream commit ea287ab157c2816bf12aad4cece41372f9d146b4 ] We always search the commit root of the extent tree for looking up back references, however we track the reloc roots based on their current bytenr. This is wrong, if we commit the transaction between relocating tree blocks we could end up in this code in build_backref_tree if (key.objectid == key.offset) { /* * Only root blocks of reloc trees use backref * pointing to itself. */ root = find_reloc_root(rc, cur->bytenr); ASSERT(root); cur->root = root; break; } find_reloc_root() is looking based on the bytenr we had in the commit root, but if we've COWed this reloc root we will not find that bytenr, and we will trip over the ASSERT(root). Fix this by using the commit_root->start bytenr for indexing the commit root. Then we change the __update_reloc_root() caller to be used when we switch the commit root for the reloc root during commit. This fixes the panic I was seeing when we started throttling relocation for delayed refs. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Josef Bacik
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9632851a53 |
btrfs: restart relocate_tree_blocks properly
[ Upstream commit 50dbbb71c79df89532ec41d118d59386e5a877e3 ] There are two bugs here, but fixing them independently would just result in pain if you happened to bisect between the two patches. First is how we handle the -EAGAIN from relocate_tree_block(). We don't set error, unless we happen to be the first node, which makes no sense, I have no idea what the code was trying to accomplish here. We in fact _do_ want err set here so that we know we need to restart in relocate_block_group(). Also we need finish_pending_nodes() to not actually call link_to_upper(), because we didn't actually relocate the block. And then if we do get -EAGAIN we do not want to set our backref cache last_trans to the one before ours. This would force us to update our backref cache if we didn't cross transaction ids, which would mean we'd have some nodes updated to their new_bytenr, but still able to find their old bytenr because we're searching the same commit root as the last time we went through relocate_tree_blocks. Fixing these two things keeps us from panicing when we start breaking out of relocate_tree_blocks() either for delayed ref flushing or enospc. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Josef Bacik
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ddc25a38ab |
btrfs: remove a BUG_ON() from merge_reloc_roots()
[ Upstream commit 7b7b74315b24dc064bc1c683659061c3d48f8668 ] This was pretty subtle, we default to reloc roots having 0 root refs, so if we crash in the middle of the relocation they can just be deleted. If we successfully complete the relocation operations we'll set our root refs to 1 in prepare_to_merge() and then go on to merge_reloc_roots(). At prepare_to_merge() time if any of the reloc roots have a 0 reference still, we will remove that reloc root from our reloc root rb tree, and then clean it up later. However this only happens if we successfully start a transaction. If we've aborted previously we will skip this step completely, and only have reloc roots with a reference count of 0, but were never properly removed from the reloc control's rb tree. This isn't a problem per-se, our references are held by the list the reloc roots are on, and by the original root the reloc root belongs to. If we end up in this situation all the reloc roots will be added to the dirty_reloc_list, and then properly dropped at that point. The reloc control will be free'd and the rb tree is no longer used. There were two options when fixing this, one was to remove the BUG_ON(), the other was to make prepare_to_merge() handle the case where we couldn't start a trans handle. IMO this is the cleaner solution. I started with handling the error in prepare_to_merge(), but it turned out super ugly. And in the end this BUG_ON() simply doesn't matter, the cleanup was happening properly, we were just panicing because this BUG_ON() only matters in the success case. So I've opted to just remove it and add a comment where it was. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
Qu Wenruo
|
679885143c |
btrfs: qgroup: ensure qgroup_rescan_running is only set when the worker is at least queued
[ Upstream commit d61acbbf54c612ea9bf67eed609494cda0857b3a ]
[BUG]
There are some reports about btrfs wait forever to unmount itself, with
the following call trace:
INFO: task umount:4631 blocked for more than 491 seconds.
Tainted: G X 5.3.8-2-default #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
umount D 0 4631 3337 0x00000000
Call Trace:
([<00000000174adf7a>] __schedule+0x342/0x748)
[<00000000174ae3ca>] schedule+0x4a/0xd8
[<00000000174b1f08>] schedule_timeout+0x218/0x420
[<00000000174af10c>] wait_for_common+0x104/0x1d8
[<000003ff804d6994>] btrfs_qgroup_wait_for_completion+0x84/0xb0 [btrfs]
[<000003ff8044a616>] close_ctree+0x4e/0x380 [btrfs]
[<0000000016fa3136>] generic_shutdown_super+0x8e/0x158
[<0000000016fa34d6>] kill_anon_super+0x26/0x40
[<000003ff8041ba88>] btrfs_kill_super+0x28/0xc8 [btrfs]
[<0000000016fa39f8>] deactivate_locked_super+0x68/0x98
[<0000000016fcb198>] cleanup_mnt+0xc0/0x140
[<0000000016d6a846>] task_work_run+0xc6/0x110
[<0000000016d04f76>] do_notify_resume+0xae/0xb8
[<00000000174b30ae>] system_call+0xe2/0x2c8
[CAUSE]
The problem happens when we have called qgroup_rescan_init(), but
not queued the worker. It can be caused mostly by error handling.
Qgroup ioctl thread | Unmount thread
----------------------------------------+-----------------------------------
|
btrfs_qgroup_rescan() |
|- qgroup_rescan_init() |
| |- qgroup_rescan_running = true; |
| |
|- trans = btrfs_join_transaction() |
| Some error happened |
| |
|- btrfs_qgroup_rescan() returns error |
But qgroup_rescan_running == true; |
| close_ctree()
| |- btrfs_qgroup_wait_for_completion()
| |- running == true;
| |- wait_for_completion();
btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker is never queued, thus no one is going to wake
up close_ctree() and we get a deadlock.
All involved qgroup_rescan_init() callers are:
- btrfs_qgroup_rescan()
The example above. It's possible to trigger the deadlock when error
happened.
- btrfs_quota_enable()
Not possible. Just after qgroup_rescan_init() we queue the work.
- btrfs_read_qgroup_config()
It's possible to trigger the deadlock. It only init the work, the
work queueing happens in btrfs_qgroup_rescan_resume().
Thus if error happened in between, deadlock is possible.
We shouldn't set fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running just in
qgroup_rescan_init(), as at that stage we haven't yet queued qgroup
rescan worker to run.
[FIX]
Set qgroup_rescan_running before queueing the work, so that we ensure
the rescan work is queued when we wait for it.
Fixes:
|
||
Filipe Manana
|
eaa7fe2023 |
btrfs: fix log context list corruption after rename whiteout error
commit 236ebc20d9afc5e9ff52f3cf3f365a91583aac10 upstream. During a rename whiteout, if btrfs_whiteout_for_rename() returns an error we can end up returning from btrfs_rename() with the log context object still in the root's log context list - this happens if 'sync_log' was set to true before we called btrfs_whiteout_for_rename() and it is dangerous because we end up with a corrupt linked list (root->log_ctxs) as the log context object was allocated on the stack. After btrfs_rename() returns, any task that is running btrfs_sync_log() concurrently can end up crashing because that linked list is traversed by btrfs_sync_log() (through btrfs_remove_all_log_ctxs()). That results in the same issue that commit |
||
Omar Sandoval
|
0c8eccc28e |
btrfs: fix RAID direct I/O reads with alternate csums
commit e7a04894c766daa4248cb736efee93550f2d5872 upstream.
btrfs_lookup_and_bind_dio_csum() does pointer arithmetic which assumes
32-bit checksums. If using a larger checksum, this leads to spurious
failures when a direct I/O read crosses a stripe. This is easy
to reproduce:
# mkfs.btrfs -f --checksum blake2 -d raid0 /dev/vdc /dev/vdd
...
# mount /dev/vdc /mnt
# cd /mnt
# dd if=/dev/urandom of=foo bs=1M count=1 status=none
# dd if=foo of=/dev/null bs=1M iflag=direct status=none
dd: error reading 'foo': Input/output error
# dmesg | tail -1
[ 135.821568] BTRFS warning (device vdc): csum failed root 5 ino 257 off 421888 ...
Fix it by using the actual checksum size.
Fixes:
|
||
Filipe Manana
|
9ad7f8df34 |
Btrfs: fix deadlock during fast fsync when logging prealloc extents beyond eof
commit a5ae50dea9111db63d30d700766dd5509602f7ad upstream. While logging the prealloc extents of an inode during a fast fsync we call btrfs_truncate_inode_items(), through btrfs_log_prealloc_extents(), while holding a read lock on a leaf of the inode's root (not the log root, the fs/subvol root), and then that function locks the file range in the inode's iotree. This can lead to a deadlock when: * the fsync is ranged * the file has prealloc extents beyond eof * writeback for a range different from the fsync range starts during the fsync * the size of the file is not sector size aligned Because when finishing an ordered extent we lock first a file range and then try to COW the fs/subvol tree to insert an extent item. The following diagram shows how the deadlock can happen. CPU 1 CPU 2 btrfs_sync_file() --> for range [0, 1MiB) --> inode has a size of 1MiB and has 1 prealloc extent beyond the i_size, starting at offset 4MiB flushes all delalloc for the range [0MiB, 1MiB) and waits for the respective ordered extents to complete --> before task at CPU 1 locks the inode, a write into file range [1MiB, 2MiB + 1KiB) is made --> i_size is updated to 2MiB + 1KiB --> writeback is started for that range, [1MiB, 2MiB + 4KiB) --> end offset rounded up to be sector size aligned btrfs_log_dentry_safe() btrfs_log_inode_parent() btrfs_log_inode() btrfs_log_changed_extents() btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() --> does a search on the inode's root --> holds a read lock on leaf X btrfs_finish_ordered_io() --> locks range [1MiB, 2MiB + 4KiB) --> end offset rounded up to be sector size aligned --> tries to cow leaf X, through insert_reserved_file_extent() --> already locked by the task at CPU 1 btrfs_truncate_inode_items() --> gets an i_size of 2MiB + 1KiB, which is not sector size aligned --> tries to lock file range [2MiB, (u64)-1) --> the start range is rounded down from 2MiB + 1K to 2MiB to be sector size aligned --> but the subrange [2MiB, 2MiB + 4KiB) is already locked by task at CPU 2 which is waiting to get a write lock on leaf X for which we are holding a read lock *** deadlock *** This results in a stack trace like the following, triggered by test case generic/561 from fstests: [ 2779.973608] INFO: task kworker/u8:6:247 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 2779.979536] Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-btrfs-next-53 #1 [ 2779.984503] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 2779.990136] kworker/u8:6 D 0 247 2 0x80004000 [ 2779.990457] Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] [ 2779.990466] Call Trace: [ 2779.990491] ? __schedule+0x384/0xa30 [ 2779.990521] schedule+0x33/0xe0 [ 2779.990616] btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x19e/0x2e0 [btrfs] [ 2779.990632] ? remove_wait_queue+0x60/0x60 [ 2779.990730] btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x2f/0x40 [btrfs] [ 2779.990782] btrfs_search_slot+0x510/0x1000 [btrfs] [ 2779.990869] btrfs_lookup_file_extent+0x4a/0x70 [btrfs] [ 2779.990944] __btrfs_drop_extents+0x161/0x1060 [btrfs] [ 2779.990987] ? mark_held_locks+0x6d/0xc0 [ 2779.990994] ? __slab_alloc.isra.49+0x99/0x100 [ 2779.991060] ? insert_reserved_file_extent.constprop.19+0x64/0x300 [btrfs] [ 2779.991145] insert_reserved_file_extent.constprop.19+0x97/0x300 [btrfs] [ 2779.991222] ? start_transaction+0xdd/0x5c0 [btrfs] [ 2779.991291] btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x4f4/0x840 [btrfs] [ 2779.991405] btrfs_work_helper+0xaa/0x720 [btrfs] [ 2779.991432] process_one_work+0x26d/0x6a0 [ 2779.991460] worker_thread+0x4f/0x3e0 [ 2779.991481] ? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0 [ 2779.991489] kthread+0x103/0x140 [ 2779.991499] ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 [ 2779.991515] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 (...) [ 2780.026211] INFO: task fsstress:17375 blocked for more than 120 seconds. [ 2780.027480] Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-btrfs-next-53 #1 [ 2780.028482] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [ 2780.030035] fsstress D 0 17375 17373 0x00004000 [ 2780.030038] Call Trace: [ 2780.030044] ? __schedule+0x384/0xa30 [ 2780.030052] schedule+0x33/0xe0 [ 2780.030075] lock_extent_bits+0x20c/0x320 [btrfs] [ 2780.030094] ? btrfs_truncate_inode_items+0xf4/0x1150 [btrfs] [ 2780.030098] ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x59/0xa0 [ 2780.030102] ? remove_wait_queue+0x60/0x60 [ 2780.030122] btrfs_truncate_inode_items+0x133/0x1150 [btrfs] [ 2780.030151] ? btrfs_set_path_blocking+0xb2/0x160 [btrfs] [ 2780.030165] ? btrfs_search_slot+0x379/0x1000 [btrfs] [ 2780.030195] btrfs_log_changed_extents.isra.8+0x841/0x93e [btrfs] [ 2780.030202] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x49/0xc0 [ 2780.030215] ? btrfs_get_num_csums+0x10/0x10 [btrfs] [ 2780.030239] btrfs_log_inode+0xf83/0x1124 [btrfs] [ 2780.030251] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x45/0x2a0 [ 2780.030275] btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x2a0/0xe40 [btrfs] [ 2780.030282] ? dget_parent+0xa1/0x370 [ 2780.030309] btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x4a/0x70 [btrfs] [ 2780.030329] btrfs_sync_file+0x3f3/0x490 [btrfs] [ 2780.030339] do_fsync+0x38/0x60 [ 2780.030343] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x13/0x20 [ 2780.030345] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x280 [ 2780.030348] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 2780.030356] RIP: 0033:0x7f2d80f6d5f0 [ 2780.030361] Code: Bad RIP value. [ 2780.030362] RSP: 002b:00007ffdba3c8548 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b [ 2780.030364] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f2d80f6d5f0 [ 2780.030365] RDX: 00007ffdba3c84b0 RSI: 00007ffdba3c84b0 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 2780.030367] RBP: 000000000000004a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffdba3c855c [ 2780.030368] R10: 0000000000000078 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000001f4 [ 2780.030369] R13: 0000000051eb851f R14: 00007ffdba3c85f0 R15: 0000557a49220d90 So fix this by making btrfs_truncate_inode_items() not lock the range in the inode's iotree when the target root is a log root, since it's not needed to lock the range for log roots as the protection from the inode's lock and log_mutex are all that's needed. Fixes: 28553fa992cb28 ("Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
73e1f26632 |
btrfs: don't set path->leave_spinning for truncate
commit 52e29e331070cd7d52a64cbf1b0958212a340e28 upstream. The only time we actually leave the path spinning is if we're truncating a small amount and don't actually free an extent, which is not a common occurrence. We have to set the path blocking in order to add the delayed ref anyway, so the first extent we find we set the path to blocking and stay blocking for the duration of the operation. With the upcoming file extent map stuff there will be another case that we have to have the path blocking, so just swap to blocking always. Note: this patch also fixes a warning after 28553fa992cb ("Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap") got merged that inserts extent locks around truncation so the path must not leave spinning locks after btrfs_search_slot. [70.794783] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/slab.h:565 [70.794834] in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1141, name: rsync [70.794863] 5 locks held by rsync/1141: [70.794876] #0: ffff888417b9c408 (sb_writers#17){.+.+}, at: mnt_want_write+0x20/0x50 [70.795030] #1: ffff888428de28e8 (&type->i_mutex_dir_key#13/1){+.+.}, at: lock_rename+0xf1/0x100 [70.795051] #2: ffff888417b9c608 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x394/0x560 [70.795124] #3: ffff888403081768 (btrfs-fs-01){++++}, at: btrfs_try_tree_write_lock+0x2f/0x160 [70.795203] #4: ffff888403086568 (btrfs-fs-00){++++}, at: btrfs_try_tree_write_lock+0x2f/0x160 [70.795222] CPU: 5 PID: 1141 Comm: rsync Not tainted 5.6.0-rc2-backup+ #2 [70.795362] Call Trace: [70.795374] dump_stack+0x71/0xa0 [70.795445] ___might_sleep.part.96.cold.106+0xa6/0xb6 [70.795459] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1d3/0x290 [70.795471] alloc_extent_state+0x22/0x1c0 [70.795544] __clear_extent_bit+0x3ba/0x580 [70.795557] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x30 [70.795569] btrfs_truncate_inode_items+0x339/0xe50 [70.795647] btrfs_evict_inode+0x269/0x540 [70.795659] ? dput.part.38+0x29/0x460 [70.795671] evict+0xcd/0x190 [70.795682] __dentry_kill+0xd6/0x180 [70.795754] dput.part.38+0x2ad/0x460 [70.795765] do_renameat2+0x3cb/0x540 [70.795777] __x64_sys_rename+0x1c/0x20 Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Fixes: 28553fa992cb ("Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap") CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ add note ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Filipe Manana
|
d3d0fb9d42 |
Btrfs: fix race between shrinking truncate and fiemap
commit 28553fa992cb28be6a65566681aac6cafabb4f2d upstream. When there is a fiemap executing in parallel with a shrinking truncate we can end up in a situation where we have extent maps for which we no longer have corresponding file extent items. This is generally harmless and at the moment the only consequences are missing file extent items representing holes after we expand the file size again after the truncate operation removed the prealloc extent items, and stale information for future fiemap calls (reporting extents that no longer exist or may have been reallocated to other files for example). Consider the following example: 1) Our inode has a size of 128KiB, one 128KiB extent at file offset 0 and a 1MiB prealloc extent at file offset 128KiB; 2) Task A starts doing a shrinking truncate of our inode to reduce it to a size of 64KiB. Before it searches the subvolume tree for file extent items to delete, it drops all the extent maps in the range from 64KiB to (u64)-1 by calling btrfs_drop_extent_cache(); 3) Task B starts doing a fiemap against our inode. When looking up for the inode's extent maps in the range from 128KiB to (u64)-1, it doesn't find any in the inode's extent map tree, since they were removed by task A. Because it didn't find any in the extent map tree, it scans the inode's subvolume tree for file extent items, and it finds the 1MiB prealloc extent at file offset 128KiB, then it creates an extent map based on that file extent item and adds it to inode's extent map tree (this ends up being done by btrfs_get_extent() <- btrfs_get_extent_fiemap() <- get_extent_skip_holes()); 4) Task A then drops the prealloc extent at file offset 128KiB and shrinks the 128KiB extent file offset 0 to a length of 64KiB. The truncation operation finishes and we end up with an extent map representing a 1MiB prealloc extent at file offset 128KiB, despite we don't have any more that extent; After this the two types of problems we have are: 1) Future calls to fiemap always report that a 1MiB prealloc extent exists at file offset 128KiB. This is stale information, no longer correct; 2) If the size of the file is increased, by a truncate operation that increases the file size or by a write into a file offset > 64KiB for example, we end up not inserting file extent items to represent holes for any range between 128KiB and 128KiB + 1MiB, since the hole expansion function, btrfs_cont_expand() will skip hole insertion for any range for which an extent map exists that represents a prealloc extent. This causes fsck to complain about missing file extent items when not using the NO_HOLES feature. The second issue could be often triggered by test case generic/561 from fstests, which runs fsstress and duperemove in parallel, and duperemove does frequent fiemap calls. Essentially the problems happens because fiemap does not acquire the inode's lock while truncate does, and fiemap locks the file range in the inode's iotree while truncate does not. So fix the issue by making btrfs_truncate_inode_items() lock the file range from the new file size to (u64)-1, so that it serializes with fiemap. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Filipe Manana
|
c383f8ad2a |
Btrfs: fix btrfs_wait_ordered_range() so that it waits for all ordered extents
commit e75fd33b3f744f644061a4f9662bd63f5434f806 upstream. In btrfs_wait_ordered_range() once we find an ordered extent that has finished with an error we exit the loop and don't wait for any other ordered extents that might be still in progress. All the users of btrfs_wait_ordered_range() expect that there are no more ordered extents in progress after that function returns. So past fixes such like the ones from the two following commits: |
||
Josef Bacik
|
9af8e25889 |
btrfs: do not check delayed items are empty for single transaction cleanup
commit 1e90315149f3fe148e114a5de86f0196d1c21fa5 upstream. btrfs_assert_delayed_root_empty() will check if the delayed root is completely empty, but this is a filesystem-wide check. On cleanup we may have allowed other transactions to begin, for whatever reason, and thus the delayed root is not empty. So remove this check from cleanup_one_transation(). This however can stay in btrfs_cleanup_transaction(), because it checks only after all of the transactions have been properly cleaned up, and thus is valid. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Josef Bacik
|
6065ca5d01 |
btrfs: reset fs_root to NULL on error in open_ctree
commit 315bf8ef914f31d51d084af950703aa1e09a728c upstream. While running my error injection script I hit a panic when we tried to clean up the fs_root when freeing the fs_root. This is because fs_info->fs_root == PTR_ERR(-EIO), which isn't great. Fix this by setting fs_info->fs_root = NULL; if we fail to read the root. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Josef Bacik
|
37a2e70480 |
btrfs: fix bytes_may_use underflow in prealloc error condtition
commit b778cf962d71a0e737923d55d0432f3bd287258e upstream. I hit the following warning while running my error injection stress testing: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1453 at fs/btrfs/space-info.h:108 btrfs_free_reserved_data_space_noquota+0xfd/0x160 [btrfs] RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_reserved_data_space_noquota+0xfd/0x160 [btrfs] Call Trace: btrfs_free_reserved_data_space+0x4f/0x70 [btrfs] __btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x378/0x470 [btrfs] elfcorehdr_read+0x40/0x40 ? elfcorehdr_read+0x40/0x40 ? btrfs_commit_transaction+0xca/0xa50 [btrfs] ? dput+0xb4/0x2a0 ? btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x55/0x70 [btrfs] ? btrfs_sync_file+0x30e/0x420 [btrfs] ? do_fsync+0x38/0x70 ? __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x13/0x20 ? do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x1b0 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This happens if we fail to insert our reserved file extent. At this point we've already converted our reservation from ->bytes_may_use to ->bytes_reserved. However once we break we will attempt to free everything from [cur_offset, end] from ->bytes_may_use, but our extent reservation will overlap part of this. Fix this problem by adding ins.offset (our extent allocation size) to cur_offset so we remove the actual remaining part from ->bytes_may_use. I validated this fix using my inject-error.py script python inject-error.py -o should_fail_bio -t cache_save_setup -t \ __btrfs_prealloc_file_range \ -t insert_reserved_file_extent.constprop.0 \ -r "-5" ./run-fsstress.sh where run-fsstress.sh simply mounts and runs fsstress on a disk. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Jeff Mahoney
|
40ea30638d |
btrfs: destroy qgroup extent records on transaction abort
commit 81f7eb00ff5bb8326e82503a32809421d14abb8a upstream.
We clean up the delayed references when we abort a transaction but we
leave the pending qgroup extent records behind, leaking memory.
This patch destroys the extent records when we destroy the delayed refs
and makes sure ensure they're gone before releasing the transaction.
Fixes:
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
802a8369d2 |
btrfs: handle logged extent failure properly
commit bd727173e4432fe6cb70ba108dc1f3602c5409d7 upstream. If we're allocating a logged extent we attempt to insert an extent record for the file extent directly. We increase space_info->bytes_reserved, because the extent entry addition will call btrfs_update_block_group(), which will convert the ->bytes_reserved to ->bytes_used. However if we fail at any point while inserting the extent entry we will bail and leave space on ->bytes_reserved, which will trigger a WARN_ON() on umount. Fix this by pinning the space if we fail to insert, which is what happens in every other failure case that involves adding the extent entry. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Josef Bacik
|
7a97311de4 |
btrfs: do not do delalloc reservation under page lock
[ Upstream commit f4b1363cae43fef7c86c993b7ca7fe7d546b3c68 ]
We ran into a deadlock in production with the fixup worker. The stack
traces were as follows:
Thread responsible for the writeout, waiting on the page lock
[<0>] io_schedule+0x12/0x40
[<0>] __lock_page+0x109/0x1e0
[<0>] extent_write_cache_pages+0x206/0x360
[<0>] extent_writepages+0x40/0x60
[<0>] do_writepages+0x31/0xb0
[<0>] __writeback_single_inode+0x3d/0x350
[<0>] writeback_sb_inodes+0x19d/0x3c0
[<0>] __writeback_inodes_wb+0x5d/0xb0
[<0>] wb_writeback+0x231/0x2c0
[<0>] wb_workfn+0x308/0x3c0
[<0>] process_one_work+0x1e0/0x390
[<0>] worker_thread+0x2b/0x3c0
[<0>] kthread+0x113/0x130
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[<0>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Thread of the fixup worker who is holding the page lock
[<0>] start_delalloc_inodes+0x241/0x2d0
[<0>] btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x179/0x230
[<0>] btrfs_alloc_data_chunk_ondemand+0x11b/0x2e0
[<0>] btrfs_check_data_free_space+0x53/0xa0
[<0>] btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space+0x20/0x70
[<0>] btrfs_writepage_fixup_worker+0x1fc/0x2a0
[<0>] normal_work_helper+0x11c/0x360
[<0>] process_one_work+0x1e0/0x390
[<0>] worker_thread+0x2b/0x3c0
[<0>] kthread+0x113/0x130
[<0>] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[<0>] 0xffffffffffffffff
Thankfully the stars have to align just right to hit this. First you
have to end up in the fixup worker, which is tricky by itself (my
reproducer does DIO reads into a MMAP'ed region, so not a common
operation). Then you have to have less than a page size of free data
space and 0 unallocated space so you go down the "commit the transaction
to free up pinned space" path. This was accomplished by a random
balance that was running on the host. Then you get this deadlock.
I'm still in the process of trying to force the deadlock to happen on
demand, but I've hit other issues. I can still trigger the fixup worker
path itself so this patch has been tested in that regard, so the normal
case is fine.
Fixes:
|
||
Nikolay Borisov
|
714cd4a512 |
btrfs: Fix split-brain handling when changing FSID to metadata uuid
[ Upstream commit 1362089d2ad7e20d16371b39d3c11990d4ec23e4 ] Current code doesn't correctly handle the situation which arises when a file system that has METADATA_UUID_INCOMPAT flag set and has its FSID changed to the one in metadata uuid. This causes the incompat flag to disappear. In case of a power failure we could end up in a situation where part of the disks in a multi-disk filesystem are correctly reverted to METADATA_UUID_INCOMPAT flag unset state, while others have METADATA_UUID_INCOMPAT set and CHANGING_FSID_V2_IN_PROGRESS. This patch corrects the behavior required to handle the case where a disk of the second type is scanned first, creating the necessary btrfs_fs_devices. Subsequently, when a disk which has already completed the transition is scanned it should overwrite the data in btrfs_fs_devices. Reported-by: Su Yue <Damenly_Su@gmx.com> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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David Sterba
|
dc22bc8a86 |
btrfs: separate definition of assertion failure handlers
[ Upstream commit 68c467cbb2f389b6c933e235bce0d1756fc8cc34 ] There's a report where objtool detects unreachable instructions, eg.: fs/btrfs/ctree.o: warning: objtool: btrfs_search_slot()+0x2d4: unreachable instruction This seems to be a false positive due to compiler version. The cause is in the ASSERT macro implementation that does the conditional check as IS_DEFINED(CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT) and not an #ifdef. To avoid that, use the ifdefs directly. There are still 2 reports that aren't fixed: fs/btrfs/extent_io.o: warning: objtool: __set_extent_bit()+0x71f: unreachable instruction fs/btrfs/relocation.o: warning: objtool: find_data_references()+0x4e0: unreachable instruction Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Anand Jain
|
7303a0b0a5 |
btrfs: device stats, log when stats are zeroed
[ Upstream commit a69976bc69308aa475d0ba3b8b3efd1d013c0460 ] We had a report indicating that some read errors aren't reported by the device stats in the userland. It is important to have the errors reported in the device stat as user land scripts might depend on it to take the reasonable corrective actions. But to debug these issue we need to be really sure that request to reset the device stat did not come from the userland itself. So log an info message when device error reset happens. For example: BTRFS info (device sdc): device stats zeroed by btrfs(9223) Reported-by: philip@philip-seeger.de Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-btrfs/msg96528.html Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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David Sterba
|
f9ab58f9a2 |
btrfs: safely advance counter when looking up bio csums
[ Upstream commit 4babad10198fa73fe73239d02c2e99e3333f5f5c ] Dan's smatch tool reports fs/btrfs/file-item.c:295 btrfs_lookup_bio_sums() warn: should this be 'count == -1' which points to the while (count--) loop. With count == 0 the check itself could decrement it to -1. There's a WARN_ON a few lines below that has never been seen in practice though. It turns out that the value of page_bytes_left matches the count (by sectorsize multiples). The loop never reaches the state where count would go to -1, because page_bytes_left == 0 is found first and this breaks out. For clarity, use only plain check on count (and only for positive value), decrement safely inside the loop. Any other discrepancy after the whole bio list processing should be reported by the exising WARN_ON_ONCE as well. Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Johannes Thumshirn
|
ebf8e54118 |
btrfs: fix possible NULL-pointer dereference in integrity checks
[ Upstream commit 3dbd351df42109902fbcebf27104149226a4fcd9 ] A user reports a possible NULL-pointer dereference in btrfsic_process_superblock(). We are assigning state->fs_info to a local fs_info variable and afterwards checking for the presence of state. While we would BUG_ON() a NULL state anyways, we can also just remove the local fs_info copy, as fs_info is only used once as the first argument for btrfs_num_copies(). There we can just pass in state->fs_info as well. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=205003 Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jth@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Chris Mason
|
53aaa9f1a6 |
Btrfs: keep pages dirty when using btrfs_writepage_fixup_worker
[ Upstream commit 25f3c5021985e885292980d04a1423fd83c967bb ]
For COW, btrfs expects pages dirty pages to have been through a few setup
steps. This includes reserving space for the new block allocations and marking
the range in the state tree for delayed allocation.
A few places outside btrfs will dirty pages directly, especially when unmapping
mmap'd pages. In order for these to properly go through COW, we run them
through a fixup worker to wait for stable pages, and do the delalloc prep.
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David Sterba
|
cafaf6bcce |
btrfs: log message when rw remount is attempted with unclean tree-log
commit 10a3a3edc5b89a8cd095bc63495fb1e0f42047d9 upstream. A remount to a read-write filesystem is not safe when there's tree-log to be replayed. Files that could be opened until now might be affected by the changes in the tree-log. A regular mount is needed to replay the log so the filesystem presents the consistent view with the pending changes included. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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David Sterba
|
2655c88c03 |
btrfs: print message when tree-log replay starts
commit e8294f2f6aa6208ed0923aa6d70cea3be178309a upstream. There's no logged information about tree-log replay although this is something that points to previous unclean unmount. Other filesystems report that as well. Suggested-by: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com> CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Wenwen Wang
|
f3cdf024ed |
btrfs: ref-verify: fix memory leaks
commit f311ade3a7adf31658ed882aaab9f9879fdccef7 upstream. In btrfs_ref_tree_mod(), 'ref' and 'ra' are allocated through kzalloc() and kmalloc(), respectively. In the following code, if an error occurs, the execution will be redirected to 'out' or 'out_unlock' and the function will be exited. However, on some of the paths, 'ref' and 'ra' are not deallocated, leading to memory leaks. For example, if 'action' is BTRFS_ADD_DELAYED_EXTENT, add_block_entry() will be invoked. If the return value indicates an error, the execution will be redirected to 'out'. But, 'ref' is not deallocated on this path, causing a memory leak. To fix the above issues, deallocate both 'ref' and 'ra' before exiting from the function when an error is encountered. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.15+ Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Filipe Manana
|
bf4a9715a9 |
Btrfs: fix race between using extent maps and merging them
commit ac05ca913e9f3871126d61da275bfe8516ff01ca upstream. We have a few cases where we allow an extent map that is in an extent map tree to be merged with other extents in the tree. Such cases include the unpinning of an extent after the respective ordered extent completed or after logging an extent during a fast fsync. This can lead to subtle and dangerous problems because when doing the merge some other task might be using the same extent map and as consequence see an inconsistent state of the extent map - for example sees the new length but has seen the old start offset. With luck this triggers a BUG_ON(), and not some silent bug, such as the following one in __do_readpage(): $ cat -n fs/btrfs/extent_io.c 3061 static int __do_readpage(struct extent_io_tree *tree, 3062 struct page *page, (...) 3127 em = __get_extent_map(inode, page, pg_offset, cur, 3128 end - cur + 1, get_extent, em_cached); 3129 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(em)) { 3130 SetPageError(page); 3131 unlock_extent(tree, cur, end); 3132 break; 3133 } 3134 extent_offset = cur - em->start; 3135 BUG_ON(extent_map_end(em) <= cur); (...) Consider the following example scenario, where we end up hitting the BUG_ON() in __do_readpage(). We have an inode with a size of 8KiB and 2 extent maps: extent A: file offset 0, length 4KiB, disk_bytenr = X, persisted on disk by a previous transaction extent B: file offset 4KiB, length 4KiB, disk_bytenr = X + 4KiB, not yet persisted but writeback started for it already. The extent map is pinned since there's writeback and an ordered extent in progress, so it can not be merged with extent map A yet The following sequence of steps leads to the BUG_ON(): 1) The ordered extent for extent B completes, the respective page gets its writeback bit cleared and the extent map is unpinned, at that point it is not yet merged with extent map A because it's in the list of modified extents; 2) Due to memory pressure, or some other reason, the MM subsystem releases the page corresponding to extent B - btrfs_releasepage() is called and returns 1, meaning the page can be released as it's not dirty, not under writeback anymore and the extent range is not locked in the inode's iotree. However the extent map is not released, either because we are not in a context that allows memory allocations to block or because the inode's size is smaller than 16MiB - in this case our inode has a size of 8KiB; 3) Task B needs to read extent B and ends up __do_readpage() through the btrfs_readpage() callback. At __do_readpage() it gets a reference to extent map B; 4) Task A, doing a fast fsync, calls clear_em_loggin() against extent map B while holding the write lock on the inode's extent map tree - this results in try_merge_map() being called and since it's possible to merge extent map B with extent map A now (the extent map B was removed from the list of modified extents), the merging begins - it sets extent map B's start offset to 0 (was 4KiB), but before it increments the map's length to 8KiB (4kb + 4KiB), task A is at: BUG_ON(extent_map_end(em) <= cur); The call to extent_map_end() sees the extent map has a start of 0 and a length still at 4KiB, so it returns 4KiB and 'cur' is 4KiB, so the BUG_ON() is triggered. So it's dangerous to modify an extent map that is in the tree, because some other task might have got a reference to it before and still using it, and needs to see a consistent map while using it. Generally this is very rare since most paths that lookup and use extent maps also have the file range locked in the inode's iotree. The fsync path is pretty much the only exception where we don't do it to avoid serialization with concurrent reads. Fix this by not allowing an extent map do be merged if if it's being used by tasks other then the one attempting to merge the extent map (when the reference count of the extent map is greater than 2). Reported-by: ryusuke1925 <st13s20@gm.ibaraki-ct.ac.jp> Reported-by: Koki Mitani <koki.mitani.xg@hco.ntt.co.jp> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206211 CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Josef Bacik
|
4987426257 |
btrfs: free block groups after free'ing fs trees
[ Upstream commit 4e19443da1941050b346f8fc4c368aa68413bc88 ] Sometimes when running generic/475 we would trip the WARN_ON(cache->reserved) check when free'ing the block groups on umount. This is because sometimes we don't commit the transaction because of IO errors and thus do not cleanup the tree logs until at umount time. These blocks are still reserved until they are cleaned up, but they aren't cleaned up until _after_ we do the free block groups work. Fix this by moving the free after free'ing the fs roots, that way all of the tree logs are cleaned up and we have a properly cleaned fs. A bunch of loops of generic/475 confirmed this fixes the problem. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Anand Jain
|
26ca39ac55 |
btrfs: use bool argument in free_root_pointers()
[ Upstream commit 4273eaff9b8d5e141113a5bdf9628c02acf3afe5 ] We don't need int argument bool shall do in free_root_pointers(). And rename the argument as it confused two people. Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
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Nikolay Borisov
|
9e78c0e742 |
btrfs: Correctly handle empty trees in find_first_clear_extent_bit
commit 5750c37523a2c8cbb450b9ef31e21c2ba876b05e upstream.
Raviu reported that running his regular fs_trim segfaulted with the
following backtrace:
[ 237.525947] assertion failed: prev, in ../fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1595
[ 237.525984] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 237.525985] kernel BUG at ../fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3117!
[ 237.525992] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 237.525998] CPU: 4 PID: 4423 Comm: fstrim Tainted: G U OE 5.4.14-8-vanilla #1
[ 237.526001] Hardware name: ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC.
[ 237.526044] RIP: 0010:assfail.constprop.58+0x18/0x1a [btrfs]
[ 237.526079] Call Trace:
[ 237.526120] find_first_clear_extent_bit+0x13d/0x150 [btrfs]
[ 237.526148] btrfs_trim_fs+0x211/0x3f0 [btrfs]
[ 237.526184] btrfs_ioctl_fitrim+0x103/0x170 [btrfs]
[ 237.526219] btrfs_ioctl+0x129a/0x2ed0 [btrfs]
[ 237.526227] ? filemap_map_pages+0x190/0x3d0
[ 237.526232] ? do_filp_open+0xaf/0x110
[ 237.526238] ? _copy_to_user+0x22/0x30
[ 237.526242] ? cp_new_stat+0x150/0x180
[ 237.526247] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x640
[ 237.526278] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 [btrfs]
[ 237.526283] do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x640
[ 237.526288] ? __do_sys_newfstat+0x3c/0x60
[ 237.526292] ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80
[ 237.526297] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[ 237.526303] do_syscall_64+0x5a/0x1c0
[ 237.526310] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
That was due to btrfs_fs_device::aloc_tree being empty. Initially I
thought this wasn't possible and as a percaution have put the assert in
find_first_clear_extent_bit. Turns out this is indeed possible and could
happen when a file system with SINGLE data/metadata profile has a 2nd
device added. Until balance is run or a new chunk is allocated on this
device it will be completely empty.
In this case find_first_clear_extent_bit should return the full range
[0, -1ULL] and let the caller handle this i.e for trim the end will be
capped at the size of actual device.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/izW2WNyvy1dEDweBICizKnd2KDwDiDyY2EYQr4YCwk7pkuIpthx-JRn65MPBde00ND6V0_Lh8mW0kZwzDiLDv25pUYWxkskWNJnVP0kgdMA=@protonmail.com/
Fixes:
|
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Josef Bacik
|
d82ff2d640 |
btrfs: flush write bio if we loop in extent_write_cache_pages
commit 42ffb0bf584ae5b6b38f72259af1e0ee417ac77f upstream.
There exists a deadlock with range_cyclic that has existed forever. If
we loop around with a bio already built we could deadlock with a writer
who has the page locked that we're attempting to write but is waiting on
a page in our bio to be written out. The task traces are as follows
PID: 1329874 TASK: ffff889ebcdf3800 CPU: 33 COMMAND: "kworker/u113:5"
#0 [ffffc900297bb658] __schedule at ffffffff81a4c33f
#1 [ffffc900297bb6e0] schedule at ffffffff81a4c6e3
#2 [ffffc900297bb6f8] io_schedule at ffffffff81a4ca42
#3 [ffffc900297bb708] __lock_page at ffffffff811f145b
#4 [ffffc900297bb798] __process_pages_contig at ffffffff814bc502
#5 [ffffc900297bb8c8] lock_delalloc_pages at ffffffff814bc684
#6 [ffffc900297bb900] find_lock_delalloc_range at ffffffff814be9ff
#7 [ffffc900297bb9a0] writepage_delalloc at ffffffff814bebd0
#8 [ffffc900297bba18] __extent_writepage at ffffffff814bfbf2
#9 [ffffc900297bba98] extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffff814bffbd
PID: 2167901 TASK: ffff889dc6a59c00 CPU: 14 COMMAND:
"aio-dio-invalid"
#0 [ffffc9003b50bb18] __schedule at ffffffff81a4c33f
#1 [ffffc9003b50bba0] schedule at ffffffff81a4c6e3
#2 [ffffc9003b50bbb8] io_schedule at ffffffff81a4ca42
#3 [ffffc9003b50bbc8] wait_on_page_bit at ffffffff811f24d6
#4 [ffffc9003b50bc60] prepare_pages at ffffffff814b05a7
#5 [ffffc9003b50bcd8] btrfs_buffered_write at ffffffff814b1359
#6 [ffffc9003b50bdb0] btrfs_file_write_iter at ffffffff814b5933
#7 [ffffc9003b50be38] new_sync_write at ffffffff8128f6a8
#8 [ffffc9003b50bec8] vfs_write at ffffffff81292b9d
#9 [ffffc9003b50bf00] ksys_pwrite64 at ffffffff81293032
I used drgn to find the respective pages we were stuck on
page_entry.page 0xffffea00fbfc7500 index 8148 bit 15 pid 2167901
page_entry.page 0xffffea00f9bb7400 index 7680 bit 0 pid 1329874
As you can see the kworker is waiting for bit 0 (PG_locked) on index
7680, and aio-dio-invalid is waiting for bit 15 (PG_writeback) on index
8148. aio-dio-invalid has 7680, and the kworker epd looks like the
following
crash> struct extent_page_data ffffc900297bbbb0
struct extent_page_data {
bio = 0xffff889f747ed830,
tree = 0xffff889eed6ba448,
extent_locked = 0,
sync_io = 0
}
Probably worth mentioning as well that it waits for writeback of the
page to complete while holding a lock on it (at prepare_pages()).
Using drgn I walked the bio pages looking for page
0xffffea00fbfc7500 which is the one we're waiting for writeback on
bio = Object(prog, 'struct bio', address=0xffff889f747ed830)
for i in range(0, bio.bi_vcnt.value_()):
bv = bio.bi_io_vec[i]
if bv.bv_page.value_() == 0xffffea00fbfc7500:
print("FOUND IT")
which validated what I suspected.
The fix for this is simple, flush the epd before we loop back around to
the beginning of the file during writeout.
Fixes:
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Filipe Manana
|
5e7a9ad78d |
Btrfs: fix race between adding and putting tree mod seq elements and nodes
commit 7227ff4de55d931bbdc156c8ef0ce4f100c78a5b upstream. There is a race between adding and removing elements to the tree mod log list and rbtree that can lead to use-after-free problems. Consider the following example that explains how/why the problems happens: 1) Task A has mod log element with sequence number 200. It currently is the only element in the mod log list; 2) Task A calls btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq() because it no longer needs to access the tree mod log. When it enters the function, it initializes 'min_seq' to (u64)-1. Then it acquires the lock 'tree_mod_seq_lock' before checking if there are other elements in the mod seq list. Since the list it empty, 'min_seq' remains set to (u64)-1. Then it unlocks the lock 'tree_mod_seq_lock'; 3) Before task A acquires the lock 'tree_mod_log_lock', task B adds itself to the mod seq list through btrfs_get_tree_mod_seq() and gets a sequence number of 201; 4) Some other task, name it task C, modifies a btree and because there elements in the mod seq list, it adds a tree mod elem to the tree mod log rbtree. That node added to the mod log rbtree is assigned a sequence number of 202; 5) Task B, which is doing fiemap and resolving indirect back references, calls btrfs get_old_root(), with 'time_seq' == 201, which in turn calls tree_mod_log_search() - the search returns the mod log node from the rbtree with sequence number 202, created by task C; 6) Task A now acquires the lock 'tree_mod_log_lock', starts iterating the mod log rbtree and finds the node with sequence number 202. Since 202 is less than the previously computed 'min_seq', (u64)-1, it removes the node and frees it; 7) Task B still has a pointer to the node with sequence number 202, and it dereferences the pointer itself and through the call to __tree_mod_log_rewind(), resulting in a use-after-free problem. This issue can be triggered sporadically with the test case generic/561 from fstests, and it happens more frequently with a higher number of duperemove processes. When it happens to me, it either freezes the VM or it produces a trace like the following before crashing: [ 1245.321140] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI [ 1245.321200] CPU: 1 PID: 26997 Comm: pool Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-btrfs-next-52 #1 [ 1245.321235] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 1245.321287] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x16/0x50 [ 1245.321307] Code: .... [ 1245.321372] RSP: 0018:ffffa151c4d039b0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 1245.321388] RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff8ae221363c80 RCX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b [ 1245.321409] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8ae221363c80 [ 1245.321439] RBP: ffff8ae20fcc4688 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1245.321475] R10: ffff8ae20b120910 R11: 00000000243f8bb1 R12: 0000000000000038 [ 1245.321506] R13: ffff8ae221363c80 R14: 000000000000075f R15: ffff8ae223f762b8 [ 1245.321539] FS: 00007fdee1ec7700(0000) GS:ffff8ae236c80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1245.321591] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1245.321614] CR2: 00007fded4030c48 CR3: 000000021da16003 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [ 1245.321642] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 1245.321668] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 1245.321706] Call Trace: [ 1245.321798] __tree_mod_log_rewind+0xbf/0x280 [btrfs] [ 1245.321841] btrfs_search_old_slot+0x105/0xd00 [btrfs] [ 1245.321877] resolve_indirect_refs+0x1eb/0xc60 [btrfs] [ 1245.321912] find_parent_nodes+0x3dc/0x11b0 [btrfs] [ 1245.321947] btrfs_check_shared+0x115/0x1c0 [btrfs] [ 1245.321980] ? extent_fiemap+0x59d/0x6d0 [btrfs] [ 1245.322029] extent_fiemap+0x59d/0x6d0 [btrfs] [ 1245.322066] do_vfs_ioctl+0x45a/0x750 [ 1245.322081] ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80 [ 1245.322092] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c [ 1245.322113] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 [ 1245.322126] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x280 [ 1245.322139] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 1245.322155] RIP: 0033:0x7fdee3942dd7 [ 1245.322177] Code: .... [ 1245.322258] RSP: 002b:00007fdee1ec6c88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 1245.322294] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fded40210d8 RCX: 00007fdee3942dd7 [ 1245.322314] RDX: 00007fded40210d8 RSI: 00000000c020660b RDI: 0000000000000004 [ 1245.322337] RBP: 0000562aa89e7510 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fdee1ec6d44 [ 1245.322369] R10: 0000000000000073 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fdee1ec6d48 [ 1245.322390] R13: 00007fdee1ec6d40 R14: 00007fded40210d0 R15: 00007fdee1ec6d50 [ 1245.322423] Modules linked in: .... [ 1245.323443] ---[ end trace 01de1e9ec5dff3cd ]--- Fix this by ensuring that btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq() computes the minimum sequence number and iterates the rbtree while holding the lock 'tree_mod_log_lock' in write mode. Also get rid of the 'tree_mod_seq_lock' lock, since it is now redundant. Fixes: |
||
Josef Bacik
|
ce06684558 |
btrfs: drop log root for dropped roots
commit 889bfa39086e86b52fcfaa04d72c95eaeb12f9a5 upstream. If we fsync on a subvolume and create a log root for that volume, and then later delete that subvolume we'll never clean up its log root. Fix this by making switch_commit_roots free the log for any dropped roots we encounter. The extra churn is because we need a btrfs_trans_handle, not the btrfs_transaction. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
7baf8f665b |
btrfs: set trans->drity in btrfs_commit_transaction
commit d62b23c94952e78211a383b7d90ef0afbd9a3717 upstream. If we abort a transaction we have the following sequence if (!trans->dirty && list_empty(&trans->new_bgs)) return; WRITE_ONCE(trans->transaction->aborted, err); The idea being if we didn't modify anything with our trans handle then we don't really need to abort the whole transaction, maybe the other trans handles are fine and we can carry on. However in the case of create_snapshot we add a pending_snapshot object to our transaction and then commit the transaction. We don't actually modify anything. sync() behaves the same way, attach to an existing transaction and commit it. This means that if we have an IO error in the right places we could abort the committing transaction with our trans->dirty being not set and thus not set transaction->aborted. This is a problem because in the create_snapshot() case we depend on pending->error being set to something, or btrfs_commit_transaction returning an error. If we are not the trans handle that gets to commit the transaction, and we're waiting on the commit to happen we get our return value from cur_trans->aborted. If this was not set to anything because sync() hit an error in the transaction commit before it could modify anything then cur_trans->aborted would be 0. Thus we'd return 0 from btrfs_commit_transaction() in create_snapshot. This is a problem because we then try to do things with pending_snapshot->snap, which will be NULL because we didn't create the snapshot, and then we'll get a NULL pointer dereference like the following "BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000001f0" RIP: 0010:btrfs_orphan_cleanup+0x2d/0x330 Call Trace: ? btrfs_mksubvol.isra.31+0x3f2/0x510 btrfs_mksubvol.isra.31+0x4bc/0x510 ? __sb_start_write+0xfa/0x200 ? mnt_want_write_file+0x24/0x50 btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x16c/0x1a0 btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x11e/0x1a0 btrfs_ioctl+0x1534/0x2c10 ? free_debug_processing+0x262/0x2a3 do_vfs_ioctl+0xa6/0x6b0 ? do_sys_open+0x188/0x220 ? syscall_trace_enter+0x1f8/0x330 ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x1b0 In order to fix this we need to make sure anybody who calls commit_transaction has trans->dirty set so that they properly set the trans->transaction->aborted value properly so any waiters know bad things happened. This was found while I was running generic/475 with my modified fsstress, it reproduced within a few runs. I ran with this patch all night and didn't see the problem again. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Filipe Manana
|
78748f2491 |
Btrfs: fix infinite loop during fsync after rename operations
commit b5e4ff9d465da1233a2d9a47ebce487c70d8f4ab upstream.
Recently fsstress (from fstests) sporadically started to trigger an
infinite loop during fsync operations. This turned out to be because
support for the rename exchange and whiteout operations was added to
fsstress in fstests. These operations, unlike any others in fsstress,
cause file names to be reused, whence triggering this issue. However
it's not necessary to use rename exchange and rename whiteout operations
trigger this issue, simple rename operations and file creations are
enough to trigger the issue.
The issue boils down to when we are logging inodes that conflict (that
had the name of any inode we need to log during the fsync operation), we
keep logging them even if they were already logged before, and after
that we check if there's any other inode that conflicts with them and
then add it again to the list of inodes to log. Skipping already logged
inodes fixes the issue.
Consider the following example:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
$ mkdir /mnt/testdir # inode 257
$ touch /mnt/testdir/zz # inode 258
$ ln /mnt/testdir/zz /mnt/testdir/zz_link
$ touch /mnt/testdir/a # inode 259
$ sync
# The following 3 renames achieve the same result as a rename exchange
# operation (<rename_exchange> /mnt/testdir/zz_link to /mnt/testdir/a).
$ mv /mnt/testdir/a /mnt/testdir/a/tmp
$ mv /mnt/testdir/zz_link /mnt/testdir/a
$ mv /mnt/testdir/a/tmp /mnt/testdir/zz_link
# The following rename and file creation give the same result as a
# rename whiteout operation (<rename_whiteout> zz to a2).
$ mv /mnt/testdir/zz /mnt/testdir/a2
$ touch /mnt/testdir/zz # inode 260
$ xfs_io -c fsync /mnt/testdir/zz
--> results in the infinite loop
The following steps happen:
1) When logging inode 260, we find that its reference named "zz" was
used by inode 258 in the previous transaction (through the commit
root), so inode 258 is added to the list of conflicting indoes that
need to be logged;
2) After logging inode 258, we find that its reference named "a" was
used by inode 259 in the previous transaction, and therefore we add
inode 259 to the list of conflicting inodes to be logged;
3) After logging inode 259, we find that its reference named "zz_link"
was used by inode 258 in the previous transaction - we add inode 258
to the list of conflicting inodes to log, again - we had already
logged it before at step 3. After logging it again, we find again
that inode 259 conflicts with him, and we add again 259 to the list,
etc - we end up repeating all the previous steps.
So fix this by skipping logging of conflicting inodes that were already
logged.
Fixes:
|
||
Filipe Manana
|
79a29dee90 |
Btrfs: make deduplication with range including the last block work
commit 831d2fa25ab8e27592b1b0268dae6f2dfaf7cc43 upstream. Since btrfs was migrated to use the generic VFS helpers for clone and deduplication, it stopped allowing for the last block of a file to be deduplicated when the source file size is not sector size aligned (when eof is somewhere in the middle of the last block). There are two reasons for that: 1) The generic code always rounds down, to a multiple of the block size, the range's length for deduplications. This means we end up never deduplicating the last block when the eof is not block size aligned, even for the safe case where the destination range's end offset matches the destination file's size. That rounding down operation is done at generic_remap_check_len(); 2) Because of that, the btrfs specific code does not expect anymore any non-aligned range length's for deduplication and therefore does not work if such nona-aligned length is given. This patch addresses that second part, and it depends on a patch that fixes generic_remap_check_len(), in the VFS, which was submitted ealier and has the following subject: "fs: allow deduplication of eof block into the end of the destination file" These two patches address reports from users that started seeing lower deduplication rates due to the last block never being deduplicated when the file size is not aligned to the filesystem's block size. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/2019-1576167349.500456@svIo.N5dq.dFFD/ CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.1+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Filipe Manana
|
ddb36ab79b |
Btrfs: fix missing hole after hole punching and fsync when using NO_HOLES
commit 0e56315ca147b3e60c7bf240233a301d3c7fb508 upstream.
When using the NO_HOLES feature, if we punch a hole into a file and then
fsync it, there are cases where a subsequent fsync will miss the fact that
a hole was punched, resulting in the holes not existing after replaying
the log tree.
Essentially these cases all imply that, tree-log.c:copy_items(), is not
invoked for the leafs that delimit holes, because nothing changed those
leafs in the current transaction. And it's precisely copy_items() where
we currenly detect and log holes, which works as long as the holes are
between file extent items in the input leaf or between the beginning of
input leaf and the previous leaf or between the last item in the leaf
and the next leaf.
First example where we miss a hole:
*) The extent items of the inode span multiple leafs;
*) The punched hole covers a range that affects only the extent items of
the first leaf;
*) The fsync operation is done in full mode (BTRFS_INODE_NEEDS_FULL_SYNC
is set in the inode's runtime flags).
That results in the hole not existing after replaying the log tree.
For example, if the fs/subvolume tree has the following layout for a
particular inode:
Leaf N, generation 10:
[ ... INODE_ITEM INODE_REF EXTENT_ITEM (0 64K) EXTENT_ITEM (64K 128K) ]
Leaf N + 1, generation 10:
[ EXTENT_ITEM (128K 64K) ... ]
If at transaction 11 we punch a hole coverting the range [0, 128K[, we end
up dropping the two extent items from leaf N, but we don't touch the other
leaf, so we end up in the following state:
Leaf N, generation 11:
[ ... INODE_ITEM INODE_REF ]
Leaf N + 1, generation 10:
[ EXTENT_ITEM (128K 64K) ... ]
A full fsync after punching the hole will only process leaf N because it
was modified in the current transaction, but not leaf N + 1, since it
was not modified in the current transaction (generation 10 and not 11).
As a result the fsync will not log any holes, because it didn't process
any leaf with extent items.
Second example where we will miss a hole:
*) An inode as its items spanning 5 (or more) leafs;
*) A hole is punched and it covers only the extents items of the 3rd
leaf. This resulsts in deleting the entire leaf and not touching any
of the other leafs.
So the only leaf that is modified in the current transaction, when
punching the hole, is the first leaf, which contains the inode item.
During the full fsync, the only leaf that is passed to copy_items()
is that first leaf, and that's not enough for the hole detection
code in copy_items() to determine there's a hole between the last
file extent item in the 2nd leaf and the first file extent item in
the 3rd leaf (which was the 4th leaf before punching the hole).
Fix this by scanning all leafs and punch holes as necessary when doing a
full fsync (less common than a non-full fsync) when the NO_HOLES feature
is enabled. The lack of explicit file extent items to mark holes makes it
necessary to scan existing extents to determine if holes exist.
A test case for fstests follows soon.
Fixes:
|
||
Nikolay Borisov
|
f3107a3c9b |
btrfs: Handle another split brain scenario with metadata uuid feature
commit 05840710149c7d1a78ea85a2db5723f706e97d8f upstream.
There is one more cases which isn't handled by the original metadata
uuid work. Namely, when a filesystem has METADATA_UUID incompat bit and
the user decides to change the FSID to the original one e.g. have
metadata_uuid and fsid match. In case of power failure while this
operation is in progress we could end up in a situation where some of
the disks have the incompat bit removed and the other half have both
METADATA_UUID_INCOMPAT and FSID_CHANGING_IN_PROGRESS flags.
This patch handles the case where a disk that has successfully changed
its FSID such that it equals METADATA_UUID is scanned first.
Subsequently when a disk with both
METADATA_UUID_INCOMPAT/FSID_CHANGING_IN_PROGRESS flags is scanned
find_fsid_changed won't be able to find an appropriate btrfs_fs_devices.
This is done by extending find_fsid_changed to correctly find
btrfs_fs_devices whose metadata_uuid/fsid are the same and they match
the metadata_uuid of the currently scanned device.
Fixes:
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
dd9837259d |
btrfs: fix improper setting of scanned for range cyclic write cache pages
commit 556755a8a99be8ca3cd9fbe36aaf9b3b0339a00d upstream.
We noticed that we were having regular CG OOM kills in cases where there
was still enough dirty pages to avoid OOM'ing. It turned out there's
this corner case in btrfs's handling of range_cyclic where files that
were being redirtied were not getting fully written out because of how
we do range_cyclic writeback.
We unconditionally were setting scanned = 1; the first time we found any
pages in the inode. This isn't actually what we want, we want it to be
set if we've scanned the entire file. For range_cyclic we could be
starting in the middle or towards the end of the file, so we could write
one page and then not write any of the other dirty pages in the file
because we set scanned = 1.
Fix this by not setting scanned = 1 if we find pages. The rules for
setting scanned should be
1) !range_cyclic. In this case we have a specified range to write out.
2) range_cyclic && index == 0. In this case we've started at the
beginning and there is no need to loop around a second time.
3) range_cyclic && we started at index > 0 and we've reached the end of
the file without satisfying our nr_to_write.
This patch fixes both of our writepages implementations to make sure
these rules hold true. This fixed our over zealous CG OOMs in
production.
Fixes:
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
c5e3c887df |
btrfs: do not zero f_bavail if we have available space
commit d55966c4279bfc6a0cf0b32bf13f5df228a1eeb6 upstream. There was some logic added a while ago to clear out f_bavail in statfs() if we did not have enough free metadata space to satisfy our global reserve. This was incorrect at the time, however didn't really pose a problem for normal file systems because we would often allocate chunks if we got this low on free metadata space, and thus wouldn't really hit this case unless we were actually full. Fast forward to today and now we are much better about not allocating metadata chunks all of the time. Couple this with |
||
Filipe Manana
|
cef6f2aeda |
Btrfs: always copy scrub arguments back to user space
commit 5afe6ce748c1ea99e0d648153c05075e1ab93afb upstream.
If scrub returns an error we are not copying back the scrub arguments
structure to user space. This prevents user space to know how much
progress scrub has done if an error happened - this includes -ECANCELED
which is returned when users ask for scrub to stop. A particular use
case, which is used in btrfs-progs, is to resume scrub after it is
canceled, in that case it relies on checking the progress from the scrub
arguments structure and then use that progress in a call to resume
scrub.
So fix this by always copying the scrub arguments structure to user
space, overwriting the value returned to user space with -EFAULT only if
copying the structure failed to let user space know that either that
copying did not happen, and therefore the structure is stale, or it
happened partially and the structure is probably not valid and corrupt
due to the partial copy.
Reported-by: Graham Cobb <g.btrfs@cobb.uk.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/d0a97688-78be-08de-ca7d-bcb4c7fb397e@cobb.uk.net/
Fixes:
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
2f7050c2b2 |
btrfs: check rw_devices, not num_devices for balance
commit b35cf1f0bf1f2b0b193093338414b9bd63b29015 upstream.
The fstest btrfs/154 reports
[ 8675.381709] BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -28)
[ 8675.383302] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 31900 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:2038 btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x1e0/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 8675.390925] CPU: 1 PID: 31900 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-default+ #935
[ 8675.392780] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba527-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[ 8675.395452] RIP: 0010:btrfs_create_pending_block_groups+0x1e0/0x1f0 [btrfs]
[ 8675.402672] RSP: 0018:ffffb2090888fb00 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 8675.404413] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff92026dfa91c8 RCX: 0000000000000001
[ 8675.406609] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8e100899 RDI: ffffffff8e100971
[ 8675.408775] RBP: ffff920247c61660 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 8675.410978] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000ffffffe4
[ 8675.412647] R13: ffff92026db74000 R14: ffff920247c616b8 R15: ffff92026dfbc000
[ 8675.413994] FS: 00007fd5e57248c0(0000) GS:ffff92027d800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 8675.416146] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8675.417833] CR2: 0000564aa51682d8 CR3: 000000006dcbc004 CR4: 0000000000160ee0
[ 8675.419801] Call Trace:
[ 8675.420742] btrfs_start_dirty_block_groups+0x355/0x480 [btrfs]
[ 8675.422600] btrfs_commit_transaction+0xc8/0xaf0 [btrfs]
[ 8675.424335] reset_balance_state+0x14a/0x190 [btrfs]
[ 8675.425824] btrfs_balance.cold+0xe7/0x154 [btrfs]
[ 8675.427313] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x235/0x2c0
[ 8675.428663] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x298/0x350 [btrfs]
[ 8675.430285] btrfs_ioctl+0x466/0x2550 [btrfs]
[ 8675.431788] ? mem_cgroup_charge_statistics+0x51/0xf0
[ 8675.433487] ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x56/0x400
[ 8675.435122] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4b/0xc0
[ 8675.436618] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30
[ 8675.438093] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x499/0x740
[ 8675.439619] ? do_vfs_ioctl+0x56e/0x770
[ 8675.441034] do_vfs_ioctl+0x56e/0x770
[ 8675.442411] ksys_ioctl+0x3a/0x70
[ 8675.443718] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[ 8675.445333] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[ 8675.446705] do_syscall_64+0x50/0x210
[ 8675.448059] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 8675.479187] BTRFS: error (device vdb) in btrfs_create_pending_block_groups:2038: errno=-28 No space left
We now use btrfs_can_overcommit() to see if we can flip a block group
read only. Before this would fail because we weren't taking into
account the usable un-allocated space for allocating chunks. With my
patches we were allowed to do the balance, which is technically correct.
The test is trying to start balance on degraded mount. So now we're
trying to allocate a chunk and cannot because we want to allocate a
RAID1 chunk, but there's only 1 device that's available for usage. This
results in an ENOSPC.
But we shouldn't even be making it this far, we don't have enough
devices to restripe. The problem is we're using btrfs_num_devices(),
that also includes missing devices. That's not actually what we want, we
need to use rw_devices.
The chunk_mutex is not needed here, rw_devices changes only in device
add, remove or replace, all are excluded by EXCL_OP mechanism.
Fixes:
|
||
Johannes Thumshirn
|
b25e68dd5a |
btrfs: fix memory leak in qgroup accounting
commit 26ef8493e1ab771cb01d27defca2fa1315dc3980 upstream. When running xfstests on the current btrfs I get the following splat from kmemleak: unreferenced object 0xffff88821b2404e0 (size 32): comm "kworker/u4:7", pid 26663, jiffies 4295283698 (age 8.776s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff ...........&.... 10 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff 20 ff fd 26 82 88 ff ff ...&.... ..&.... backtrace: [<00000000f94fd43f>] ulist_alloc+0x25/0x60 [btrfs] [<00000000fd023d99>] btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0x41/0x100 [btrfs] [<000000008f17bd32>] btrfs_find_all_roots+0x52/0x70 [btrfs] [<00000000b7660afb>] btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker+0x343/0x680 [btrfs] [<0000000058e66778>] btrfs_work_helper+0xac/0x1e0 [btrfs] [<00000000f0188930>] process_one_work+0x1cf/0x350 [<00000000af5f2f8e>] worker_thread+0x28/0x3c0 [<00000000b55a1add>] kthread+0x109/0x120 [<00000000f88cbd17>] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 This corresponds to: (gdb) l *(btrfs_find_all_roots_safe+0x41) 0x8d7e1 is in btrfs_find_all_roots_safe (fs/btrfs/backref.c:1413). 1408 1409 tmp = ulist_alloc(GFP_NOFS); 1410 if (!tmp) 1411 return -ENOMEM; 1412 *roots = ulist_alloc(GFP_NOFS); 1413 if (!*roots) { 1414 ulist_free(tmp); 1415 return -ENOMEM; 1416 } 1417 Following the lifetime of the allocated 'roots' ulist, it gets freed again in btrfs_qgroup_account_extent(). But this does not happen if the function is called with the 'BTRFS_FS_QUOTA_ENABLED' flag cleared, then btrfs_qgroup_account_extent() does a short leave and directly returns. Instead of directly returning we should jump to the 'out_free' in order to free all resources as expected. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com> [ add comment ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Qu Wenruo
|
707de9c080 |
btrfs: relocation: fix reloc_root lifespan and access
commit 6282675e6708ec78518cc0e9ad1f1f73d7c5c53d upstream.
[BUG]
There are several different KASAN reports for balance + snapshot
workloads. Involved call paths include:
should_ignore_root+0x54/0xb0 [btrfs]
build_backref_tree+0x11af/0x2280 [btrfs]
relocate_tree_blocks+0x391/0xb80 [btrfs]
relocate_block_group+0x3e5/0xa00 [btrfs]
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x240/0x4d0 [btrfs]
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x53/0xf0 [btrfs]
btrfs_balance+0xc91/0x1840 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x416/0x4e0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x8af/0x3e60 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10
create_reloc_root+0x9f/0x460 [btrfs]
btrfs_reloc_post_snapshot+0xff/0x6c0 [btrfs]
create_pending_snapshot+0xa9b/0x15f0 [btrfs]
create_pending_snapshots+0x111/0x140 [btrfs]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x7a6/0x1360 [btrfs]
btrfs_mksubvol+0x915/0x960 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x1d5/0x1e0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1d3/0x270 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x241b/0x3e60 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10
btrfs_reloc_pre_snapshot+0x85/0xc0 [btrfs]
create_pending_snapshot+0x209/0x15f0 [btrfs]
create_pending_snapshots+0x111/0x140 [btrfs]
btrfs_commit_transaction+0x7a6/0x1360 [btrfs]
btrfs_mksubvol+0x915/0x960 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_transid+0x1d5/0x1e0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1d3/0x270 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x241b/0x3e60 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x831/0xb10
[CAUSE]
All these call sites are only relying on root->reloc_root, which can
undergo btrfs_drop_snapshot(), and since we don't have real refcount
based protection to reloc roots, we can reach already dropped reloc
root, triggering KASAN.
[FIX]
To avoid such access to unstable root->reloc_root, we should check
BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit first.
This patch introduces wrappers that provide the correct way to check the
bit with memory barriers protection.
Most callers don't distinguish merged reloc tree and no reloc tree. The
only exception is should_ignore_root(), as merged reloc tree can be
ignored, while no reloc tree shouldn't.
[CRITICAL SECTION ANALYSIS]
Although test_bit()/set_bit()/clear_bit() doesn't imply a barrier, the
DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit has extra help from transaction as a higher level
barrier, the lifespan of root::reloc_root and DEAD_RELOC_TREE bit are:
NULL: reloc_root is NULL PTR: reloc_root is not NULL
0: DEAD_RELOC_ROOT bit not set DEAD: DEAD_RELOC_ROOT bit set
(NULL, 0) Initial state __
| /\ Section A
btrfs_init_reloc_root() \/
| __
(PTR, 0) reloc_root initialized /\
| |
btrfs_update_reloc_root() | Section B
| |
(PTR, DEAD) reloc_root has been merged \/
| __
=== btrfs_commit_transaction() ====================
| /\
clean_dirty_subvols() |
| | Section C
(NULL, DEAD) reloc_root cleanup starts \/
| __
btrfs_drop_snapshot() /\
| | Section D
(NULL, 0) Back to initial state \/
Every have_reloc_root() or test_bit(DEAD_RELOC_ROOT) caller holds
transaction handle, so none of such caller can cross transaction boundary.
In Section A, every caller just found no DEAD bit, and grab reloc_root.
In the cross section A-B, caller may get no DEAD bit, but since reloc_root
is still completely valid thus accessing reloc_root is completely safe.
No test_bit() caller can cross the boundary of Section B and Section C.
In Section C, every caller found the DEAD bit, so no one will access
reloc_root.
In the cross section C-D, either caller gets the DEAD bit set, avoiding
access reloc_root no matter if it's safe or not. Or caller get the DEAD
bit cleared, then access reloc_root, which is already NULL, nothing will
be wrong.
The memory write barriers are between the reloc_root updates and bit
set/clear, the pairing read side is before test_bit.
Reported-by: Zygo Blaxell <ce3g8jdj@umail.furryterror.org>
Fixes:
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
4c281ce51c |
btrfs: do not delete mismatched root refs
commit 423a716cd7be16fb08690760691befe3be97d3fc upstream. btrfs_del_root_ref() will simply WARN_ON() if the ref doesn't match in any way, and then continue to delete the reference. This shouldn't happen, we have these values because there's more to the reference than the original root and the sub root. If any of these checks fail, return -ENOENT. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
d5e34783c8 |
btrfs: fix invalid removal of root ref
commit d49d3287e74ffe55ae7430d1e795e5f9bf7359ea upstream. If we have the following sequence of events btrfs sub create A btrfs sub create A/B btrfs sub snap A C mkdir C/foo mv A/B C/foo rm -rf * We will end up with a transaction abort. The reason for this is because we create a root ref for B pointing to A. When we create a snapshot of C we still have B in our tree, but because the root ref points to A and not C we will make it appear to be empty. The problem happens when we move B into C. This removes the root ref for B pointing to A and adds a ref of B pointing to C. When we rmdir C we'll see that we have a ref to our root and remove the root ref, despite not actually matching our reference name. Now btrfs_del_root_ref() allowing this to work is a bug as well, however we know that this inode does not actually point to a root ref in the first place, so we shouldn't be calling btrfs_del_root_ref() in the first place and instead simply look up our dir index for this item and do the rest of the removal. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
a8ac2da72f |
btrfs: rework arguments of btrfs_unlink_subvol
[ Upstream commit 045d3967b6920b663fc010ad414ade1b24143bd1 ] btrfs_unlink_subvol takes the name of the dentry and the root objectid based on what kind of inode this is, either a real subvolume link or a empty one that we inherited as a snapshot. We need to fix how we unlink in the case for BTRFS_EMPTY_SUBVOL_DIR_OBJECTID in the future, so rework btrfs_unlink_subvol to just take the dentry and handle getting the right objectid given the type of inode this is. There is no functional change here, simply pushing the work into btrfs_unlink_subvol() proper. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
Goldwyn Rodrigues
|
3eb81bbf4e |
btrfs: simplify inode locking for RWF_NOWAIT
commit 9cf35f673583ccc9f3e2507498b3079d56614ad3 upstream. This is similar to |
||
Filipe Manana
|
989f4be351 |
Btrfs: fix hole extent items with a zero size after range cloning
[ Upstream commit 147271e35ba267506dde6550f58ccf8d287db3ef ] Normally when cloning a file range if we find an implicit hole at the end of the range we assume it is because the NO_HOLES feature is enabled. However that is not always the case. One well known case [1] is when we have a power failure after mixing buffered and direct IO writes against the same file. In such cases we need to punch a hole in the destination file, and if the NO_HOLES feature is not enabled, we need to insert explicit file extent items to represent the hole. After commit |
||
Josef Bacik
|
dfa25a8dc1 |
btrfs: handle error in btrfs_cache_block_group
[ Upstream commit db8fe64f9ce61d1d89d3c3c34d111a43afb9f053 ] We have a BUG_ON(ret < 0) in find_free_extent from btrfs_cache_block_group. If we fail to allocate our ctl we'll just panic, which is not good. Instead just go on to another block group. If we fail to find a block group we don't want to return ENOSPC, because really we got a ENOMEM and that's the root of the problem. Save our return from btrfs_cache_block_group(), and then if we still fail to make our allocation return that ret so we get the right error back. Tested with inject-error.py from bcc. Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
Filipe Manana
|
e167468cc4 |
Btrfs: fix cloning range with a hole when using the NO_HOLES feature
[ Upstream commit fcb970581dd900675c4371c2b688a57924a8368c ]
When using the NO_HOLES feature if we clone a range that contains a hole
and a temporary ENOSPC happens while dropping extents from the target
inode's range, we can end up failing and aborting the transaction with
-EEXIST or with a corrupt file extent item, that has a length greater
than it should and overlaps with other extents. For example when cloning
the following range from inode A to inode B:
Inode A:
extent A1 extent A2
[ ----------- ] [ hole, implicit, 4MB length ] [ ------------- ]
0 1MB 5MB 6MB
Range to clone: [1MB, 6MB)
Inode B:
extent B1 extent B2 extent B3 extent B4
[ ---------- ] [ --------- ] [ ---------- ] [ ---------- ]
0 1MB 1MB 2MB 2MB 5MB 5MB 6MB
Target range: [1MB, 6MB) (same as source, to make it easier to explain)
The following can happen:
1) btrfs_punch_hole_range() gets -ENOSPC from __btrfs_drop_extents();
2) At that point, 'cur_offset' is set to 1MB and __btrfs_drop_extents()
set 'drop_end' to 2MB, meaning it was able to drop only extent B2;
3) We then compute 'clone_len' as 'drop_end' - 'cur_offset' = 2MB - 1MB =
1MB;
4) We then attempt to insert a file extent item at inode B with a file
offset of 5MB, which is the value of clone_info->file_offset. This
fails with error -EEXIST because there's already an extent at that
offset (extent B4);
5) We abort the current transaction with -EEXIST and return that error
to user space as well.
Another example, for extent corruption:
Inode A:
extent A1 extent A2
[ ----------- ] [ hole, implicit, 10MB length ] [ ------------- ]
0 1MB 11MB 12MB
Inode B:
extent B1 extent B2
[ ----------- ] [ --------- ] [ ----------------------------- ]
0 1MB 1MB 5MB 5MB 12MB
Target range: [1MB, 12MB) (same as source, to make it easier to explain)
1) btrfs_punch_hole_range() gets -ENOSPC from __btrfs_drop_extents();
2) At that point, 'cur_offset' is set to 1MB and __btrfs_drop_extents()
set 'drop_end' to 5MB, meaning it was able to drop only extent B2;
3) We then compute 'clone_len' as 'drop_end' - 'cur_offset' = 5MB - 1MB =
4MB;
4) We then insert a file extent item at inode B with a file offset of 11MB
which is the value of clone_info->file_offset, and a length of 4MB (the
value of 'clone_len'). So we get 2 extents items with ranges that
overlap and an extent length of 4MB, larger then the extent A2 from
inode A (1MB length);
5) After that we end the transaction, balance the btree dirty pages and
then start another or join the previous transaction. It might happen
that the transaction which inserted the incorrect extent was committed
by another task so we end up with extent corruption if a power failure
happens.
So fix this by making sure we attempt to insert the extent to clone at
the destination inode only if we are past dropping the sub-range that
corresponds to a hole.
Fixes:
|
||
Nikolay Borisov
|
7312543371 |
btrfs: Fix error messages in qgroup_rescan_init
[ Upstream commit 37d02592f11bb76e4ab1dcaa5b8a2a0715403207 ] The branch of qgroup_rescan_init which is executed from the mount path prints wrong errors messages. The textual print out in case BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN/BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_ON are not set are transposed. Fix it by exchanging their place. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
Chris Mason
|
4e1269e147 |
Btrfs: only associate the locked page with one async_chunk struct
[ Upstream commit 1d53c9e6723022b12e4a5ed4b141f67c834b7f6f ]
The btrfs writepages function collects a large range of pages flagged
for delayed allocation, and then sends them down through the COW code
for processing. When compression is on, we allocate one async_chunk
structure for every 512K, and then run those pages through the
compression code for IO submission.
writepages starts all of this off with a single page, locked by the
original call to extent_write_cache_pages(), and it's important to keep
track of this page because it has already been through
clear_page_dirty_for_io().
The btrfs async_chunk struct has a pointer to the locked_page, and when
we're redirtying the page because compression had to fallback to
uncompressed IO, we use page->index to decide if a given async_chunk
struct really owns that page.
But, this is racey. If a given delalloc range is broken up into two
async_chunks (chunkA and chunkB), we can end up with something like
this:
compress_file_range(chunkA)
submit_compress_extents(chunkA)
submit compressed bios(chunkA)
put_page(locked_page)
compress_file_range(chunkB)
...
Or:
async_cow_submit
submit_compressed_extents <--- falls back to buffered writeout
cow_file_range
extent_clear_unlock_delalloc
__process_pages_contig
put_page(locked_pages)
async_cow_submit
The end result is that chunkA is completed and cleaned up before chunkB
even starts processing. This means we can free locked_page() and reuse
it elsewhere. If we get really lucky, it'll have the same page->index
in its new home as it did before.
While we're processing chunkB, we might decide we need to fall back to
uncompressed IO, and so compress_file_range() will call
__set_page_dirty_nobufers() on chunkB->locked_page.
Without cgroups in use, this creates as a phantom dirty page, which
isn't great but isn't the end of the world. What can happen, it can go
through the fixup worker and the whole COW machinery again:
in submit_compressed_extents():
while (async extents) {
...
cow_file_range
if (!page_started ...)
extent_write_locked_range
else if (...)
unlock_page
continue;
This hasn't been observed in practice but is still possible.
With cgroups in use, we might crash in the accounting code because
page->mapping->i_wb isn't set.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000d0
IP: percpu_counter_add_batch+0x11/0x70
PGD 66534e067 P4D 66534e067 PUD 66534f067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
CPU: 16 PID: 2172 Comm: rm Not tainted
RIP: 0010:percpu_counter_add_batch+0x11/0x70
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000a97bbe0 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000005 RBX: 0000000000000090 RCX: 0000000000026115
RDX: 0000000000000030 RSI: ffffffffffffffff RDI: 0000000000000090
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: fffffffffffffff5 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000260c0 R11: ffff881037fc26c0 R12: ffffffffffffffff
R13: ffff880fe4111548 R14: ffffc9000a97bc90 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f5503ced480(0000) GS:ffff880ff7200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000000000d0 CR3: 00000001e0459005 CR4: 0000000000360ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
account_page_cleaned+0x15b/0x1f0
__cancel_dirty_page+0x146/0x200
truncate_cleanup_page+0x92/0xb0
truncate_inode_pages_range+0x202/0x7d0
btrfs_evict_inode+0x92/0x5a0
evict+0xc1/0x190
do_unlinkat+0x176/0x280
do_syscall_64+0x63/0x1a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
The fix here is to make asyc_chunk->locked_page NULL everywhere but the
one async_chunk struct that's allowed to do things to the locked page.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/c2419d01-5c84-3fb4-189e-4db519d08796@suse.com/
Fixes:
|
||
Omar Sandoval
|
2bae3ee327 |
btrfs: get rid of unique workqueue helper functions
[ Upstream commit a0cac0ec961f0d42828eeef196ac2246a2f07659 ]
Commit
|
||
Filipe Manana
|
842c4cd688 |
Btrfs: fix infinite loop during nocow writeback due to race
commit de7999afedff02c6631feab3ea726a0e8f8c3d40 upstream.
When starting writeback for a range that covers part of a preallocated
extent, due to a race with writeback for another range that also covers
another part of the same preallocated extent, we can end up in an infinite
loop.
Consider the following example where for inode 280 we have two dirty
ranges:
range A, from 294912 to 303103, 8192 bytes
range B, from 348160 to 438271, 90112 bytes
and we have the following file extent item layout for our inode:
leaf 38895616 gen 24544 total ptrs 29 free space 13820 owner 5
(...)
item 27 key (280 108 200704) itemoff 14598 itemsize 53
extent data disk bytenr 0 nr 0 type 1 (regular)
extent data offset 0 nr 94208 ram 94208
item 28 key (280 108 294912) itemoff 14545 itemsize 53
extent data disk bytenr 10433052672 nr 81920 type 2 (prealloc)
extent data offset 0 nr 81920 ram 81920
Then the following happens:
1) Writeback starts for range B (from 348160 to 438271), execution of
run_delalloc_nocow() starts;
2) The first iteration of run_delalloc_nocow()'s whil loop leaves us at
the extent item at slot 28, pointing to the prealloc extent item
covering the range from 294912 to 376831. This extent covers part of
our range;
3) An ordered extent is created against that extent, covering the file
range from 348160 to 376831 (28672 bytes);
4) We adjust 'cur_offset' to 376832 and move on to the next iteration of
the while loop;
5) The call to btrfs_lookup_file_extent() leaves us at the same leaf,
pointing to slot 29, 1 slot after the last item (the extent item
we processed in the previous iteration);
6) Because we are a slot beyond the last item, we call btrfs_next_leaf(),
which releases the search path before doing a another search for the
last key of the leaf (280 108 294912);
7) Right after btrfs_next_leaf() released the path, and before it did
another search for the last key of the leaf, writeback for the range
A (from 294912 to 303103) completes (it was previously started at
some point);
8) Upon completion of the ordered extent for range A, the prealloc extent
we previously found got split into two extent items, one covering the
range from 294912 to 303103 (8192 bytes), with a type of regular extent
(and no longer prealloc) and another covering the range from 303104 to
376831 (73728 bytes), with a type of prealloc and an offset of 8192
bytes. So our leaf now has the following layout:
leaf 38895616 gen 24544 total ptrs 31 free space 13664 owner 5
(...)
item 27 key (280 108 200704) itemoff 14598 itemsize 53
extent data disk bytenr 0 nr 0 type 1
extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 94208
item 28 key (280 108 208896) itemoff 14545 itemsize 53
extent data disk bytenr 10433142784 nr 86016 type 1
extent data offset 0 nr 86016 ram 86016
item 29 key (280 108 294912) itemoff 14492 itemsize 53
extent data disk bytenr 10433052672 nr 81920 type 1
extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 81920
item 30 key (280 108 303104) itemoff 14439 itemsize 53
extent data disk bytenr 10433052672 nr 81920 type 2
extent data offset 8192 nr 73728 ram 81920
9) After btrfs_next_leaf() returns, we have our path pointing to that same
leaf and at slot 30, since it has a key we didn't have before and it's
the first key greater then the key that was previously the last key of
the leaf (key (280 108 294912));
10) The extent item at slot 30 covers the range from 303104 to 376831
which is in our target range, so we process it, despite having already
created an ordered extent against this extent for the file range from
348160 to 376831. This is because we skip to the next extent item only
if its end is less than or equals to the start of our delalloc range,
and not less than or equals to the current offset ('cur_offset');
11) As a result we compute 'num_bytes' as:
num_bytes = min(end + 1, extent_end) - cur_offset;
= min(438271 + 1, 376832) - 376832 = 0
12) We then call create_io_em() for a 0 bytes range starting at offset
376832;
13) Then create_io_em() enters an infinite loop because its calls to
btrfs_drop_extent_cache() do nothing due to the 0 length range
passed to it. So no existing extent maps that cover the offset
376832 get removed, and therefore calls to add_extent_mapping()
return -EEXIST, resulting in an infinite loop. This loop from
create_io_em() is the following:
do {
btrfs_drop_extent_cache(BTRFS_I(inode), em->start,
em->start + em->len - 1, 0);
write_lock(&em_tree->lock);
ret = add_extent_mapping(em_tree, em, 1);
write_unlock(&em_tree->lock);
/*
* The caller has taken lock_extent(), who could race with us
* to add em?
*/
} while (ret == -EEXIST);
Also, each call to btrfs_drop_extent_cache() triggers a warning because
the start offset passed to it (376832) is smaller then the end offset
(376832 - 1) passed to it by -1, due to the 0 length:
[258532.052621] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[258532.052643] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9987 at fs/btrfs/file.c:602 btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x3f4/0x590 [btrfs]
(...)
[258532.052672] CPU: 0 PID: 9987 Comm: fsx Tainted: G W 5.4.0-rc7-btrfs-next-64 #1
[258532.052673] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[258532.052691] RIP: 0010:btrfs_drop_extent_cache+0x3f4/0x590 [btrfs]
(...)
[258532.052695] RSP: 0018:ffffb4be0153f860 EFLAGS: 00010287
[258532.052700] RAX: ffff975b445ee360 RBX: ffff975b44eb3e08 RCX: 0000000000000000
[258532.052700] RDX: 0000000000038fff RSI: 0000000000039000 RDI: ffff975b445ee308
[258532.052700] RBP: 0000000000038fff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[258532.052701] R10: ffff975b513c5c10 R11: 00000000e3c0cfa9 R12: 0000000000039000
[258532.052703] R13: ffff975b445ee360 R14: 00000000ffffffef R15: ffff975b445ee308
[258532.052705] FS: 00007f86a821de80(0000) GS:ffff975b76a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[258532.052707] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[258532.052708] CR2: 00007fdacf0f3ab4 CR3: 00000001f9d26002 CR4: 00000000003606f0
[258532.052712] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[258532.052717] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[258532.052717] Call Trace:
[258532.052718] ? preempt_schedule_common+0x32/0x70
[258532.052722] ? ___preempt_schedule+0x16/0x20
[258532.052741] create_io_em+0xff/0x180 [btrfs]
[258532.052767] run_delalloc_nocow+0x942/0xb10 [btrfs]
[258532.052791] btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0x30b/0x520 [btrfs]
[258532.052812] ? find_lock_delalloc_range+0x221/0x250 [btrfs]
[258532.052834] writepage_delalloc+0xe4/0x140 [btrfs]
[258532.052855] __extent_writepage+0x110/0x4e0 [btrfs]
[258532.052876] extent_write_cache_pages+0x21c/0x480 [btrfs]
[258532.052906] extent_writepages+0x52/0xb0 [btrfs]
[258532.052911] do_writepages+0x23/0x80
[258532.052915] __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xd2/0x110
[258532.052938] btrfs_fdatawrite_range+0x1b/0x50 [btrfs]
[258532.052954] start_ordered_ops+0x57/0xa0 [btrfs]
[258532.052973] ? btrfs_sync_file+0x225/0x490 [btrfs]
[258532.052988] btrfs_sync_file+0x225/0x490 [btrfs]
[258532.052997] __x64_sys_msync+0x199/0x200
[258532.053004] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x250
[258532.053007] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[258532.053010] RIP: 0033:0x7f86a7dfd760
(...)
[258532.053014] RSP: 002b:00007ffd99af0368 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000001a
[258532.053016] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000ec9 RCX: 00007f86a7dfd760
[258532.053017] RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 000000000000836c RDI: 00007f86a8221000
[258532.053019] RBP: 0000000000021ec9 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 00007f86a812037c
[258532.053020] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000074a3
[258532.053021] R13: 00007f86a8221000 R14: 000000000000836c R15: 0000000000000001
[258532.053032] irq event stamp: 1653450494
[258532.053035] hardirqs last enabled at (1653450493): [<ffffffff9dec69f9>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x29/0x50
[258532.053037] hardirqs last disabled at (1653450494): [<ffffffff9d4048ea>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x20
[258532.053039] softirqs last enabled at (1653449852): [<ffffffff9e200466>] __do_softirq+0x466/0x6bd
[258532.053042] softirqs last disabled at (1653449845): [<ffffffff9d4c8a0c>] irq_exit+0xec/0x120
[258532.053043] ---[ end trace 8476fce13d9ce20a ]---
Which results in flooding dmesg/syslog since btrfs_drop_extent_cache()
uses WARN_ON() and not WARN_ON_ONCE().
So fix this issue by changing run_delalloc_nocow()'s loop to move to the
next extent item when the current extent item ends at at offset less than
or equals to the current offset instead of the start offset.
Fixes:
|
||
Omar Sandoval
|
60c7663ac6 |
btrfs: don't prematurely free work in scrub_missing_raid56_worker()
[ Upstream commit 57d4f0b863272ba04ba85f86bfdc0f976f0af91c ] Currently, scrub_missing_raid56_worker() puts and potentially frees sblock (which embeds the work item) and then submits a bio through scrub_wr_submit(). This is another potential instance of the bug in "btrfs: don't prematurely free work in run_ordered_work()". Fix it by dropping the reference after we submit the bio. Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
Omar Sandoval
|
736d28c704 |
btrfs: don't prematurely free work in reada_start_machine_worker()
[ Upstream commit e732fe95e4cad35fc1df278c23a32903341b08b3 ] Currently, reada_start_machine_worker() frees the reada_machine_work and then calls __reada_start_machine() to do readahead. This is another potential instance of the bug in "btrfs: don't prematurely free work in run_ordered_work()". There _might_ already be a deadlock here: reada_start_machine_worker() can depend on itself through stacked filesystems (__read_start_machine() -> reada_start_machine_dev() -> reada_tree_block_flagged() -> read_extent_buffer_pages() -> submit_one_bio() -> btree_submit_bio_hook() -> btrfs_map_bio() -> submit_stripe_bio() -> submit_bio() onto a loop device can trigger readahead on the lower filesystem). Either way, let's fix it by freeing the work at the end. Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
Omar Sandoval
|
545bd24924 |
btrfs: don't prematurely free work in run_ordered_work()
[ Upstream commit c495dcd6fbe1dce51811a76bb85b4675f6494938 ] We hit the following very strange deadlock on a system with Btrfs on a loop device backed by another Btrfs filesystem: 1. The top (loop device) filesystem queues an async_cow work item from cow_file_range_async(). We'll call this work X. 2. Worker thread A starts work X (normal_work_helper()). 3. Worker thread A executes the ordered work for the top filesystem (run_ordered_work()). 4. Worker thread A finishes the ordered work for work X and frees X (work->ordered_free()). 5. Worker thread A executes another ordered work and gets blocked on I/O to the bottom filesystem (still in run_ordered_work()). 6. Meanwhile, the bottom filesystem allocates and queues an async_cow work item which happens to be the recently-freed X. 7. The workqueue code sees that X is already being executed by worker thread A, so it schedules X to be executed _after_ worker thread A finishes (see the find_worker_executing_work() call in process_one_work()). Now, the top filesystem is waiting for I/O on the bottom filesystem, but the bottom filesystem is waiting for the top filesystem to finish, so we deadlock. This happens because we are breaking the workqueue assumption that a work item cannot be recycled while it still depends on other work. Fix it by waiting to free the work item until we are done with all of the related ordered work. P.S.: One might ask why the workqueue code doesn't try to detect a recycled work item. It actually does try by checking whether the work item has the same work function (find_worker_executing_work()), but in our case the function is the same. This is the only key that the workqueue code has available to compare, short of adding an additional, layer-violating "custom key". Considering that we're the only ones that have ever hit this, we should just play by the rules. Unfortunately, we haven't been able to create a minimal reproducer other than our full container setup using a compress-force=zstd filesystem on top of another compress-force=zstd filesystem. Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
Omar Sandoval
|
4b3bd1615e |
btrfs: don't prematurely free work in end_workqueue_fn()
[ Upstream commit 9be490f1e15c34193b1aae17da58e14dd9f55a95 ] Currently, end_workqueue_fn() frees the end_io_wq entry (which embeds the work item) and then calls bio_endio(). This is another potential instance of the bug in "btrfs: don't prematurely free work in run_ordered_work()". In particular, the endio call may depend on other work items. For example, btrfs_end_dio_bio() can call btrfs_subio_endio_read() -> __btrfs_correct_data_nocsum() -> dio_read_error() -> submit_dio_repair_bio(), which submits a bio that is also completed through a end_workqueue_fn() work item. However, __btrfs_correct_data_nocsum() waits for the newly submitted bio to complete, thus it depends on another work item. This example currently usually works because we use different workqueue helper functions for BTRFS_WQ_ENDIO_DATA and BTRFS_WQ_ENDIO_DIO_REPAIR. However, it may deadlock with stacked filesystems and is fragile overall. The proper fix is to free the work item at the very end of the work function, so let's do that. Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> |
||
Filipe Manana
|
7062bab77a |
Btrfs: fix removal logic of the tree mod log that leads to use-after-free issues
commit 6609fee8897ac475378388238456c84298bff802 upstream.
When a tree mod log user no longer needs to use the tree it calls
btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq() to remove itself from the list of users and
delete all no longer used elements of the tree's red black tree, which
should be all elements with a sequence number less then our equals to
the caller's sequence number. However the logic is broken because it
can delete and free elements from the red black tree that have a
sequence number greater then the caller's sequence number:
1) At a point in time we have sequence numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 in the
tree mod log;
2) The task which got assigned the sequence number 1 calls
btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq();
3) Sequence number 1 is deleted from the list of sequence numbers;
4) The current minimum sequence number is computed to be the sequence
number 2;
5) A task using sequence number 2 is at tree_mod_log_rewind() and gets
a pointer to one of its elements from the red black tree through
a call to tree_mod_log_search();
6) The task with sequence number 1 iterates the red black tree of tree
modification elements and deletes (and frees) all elements with a
sequence number less then or equals to 2 (the computed minimum sequence
number) - it ends up only leaving elements with sequence numbers of 3
and 4;
7) The task with sequence number 2 now uses the pointer to its element,
already freed by the other task, at __tree_mod_log_rewind(), resulting
in a use-after-free issue. When CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y it produces
a trace like the following:
[16804.546854] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
[16804.547451] CPU: 0 PID: 28257 Comm: pool Tainted: G W 5.4.0-rc8-btrfs-next-51 #1
[16804.548059] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[16804.548666] RIP: 0010:rb_next+0x16/0x50
(...)
[16804.550581] RSP: 0018:ffffb948418ef9b0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[16804.551227] RAX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff90e0247f6600 RCX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b
[16804.551873] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff90e0247f6600
[16804.552504] RBP: ffff90dffe0d4688 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[16804.553136] R10: ffff90dffa4a0040 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000002e
[16804.553768] R13: ffff90e0247f6600 R14: 0000000000001663 R15: ffff90dff77862b8
[16804.554399] FS: 00007f4b197ae700(0000) GS:ffff90e036a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[16804.555039] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[16804.555683] CR2: 00007f4b10022000 CR3: 00000002060e2004 CR4: 00000000003606f0
[16804.556336] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[16804.556968] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[16804.557583] Call Trace:
[16804.558207] __tree_mod_log_rewind+0xbf/0x280 [btrfs]
[16804.558835] btrfs_search_old_slot+0x105/0xd00 [btrfs]
[16804.559468] resolve_indirect_refs+0x1eb/0xc70 [btrfs]
[16804.560087] ? free_extent_buffer.part.19+0x5a/0xc0 [btrfs]
[16804.560700] find_parent_nodes+0x388/0x1120 [btrfs]
[16804.561310] btrfs_check_shared+0x115/0x1c0 [btrfs]
[16804.561916] ? extent_fiemap+0x59d/0x6d0 [btrfs]
[16804.562518] extent_fiemap+0x59d/0x6d0 [btrfs]
[16804.563112] ? __might_fault+0x11/0x90
[16804.563706] do_vfs_ioctl+0x45a/0x700
[16804.564299] ksys_ioctl+0x70/0x80
[16804.564885] ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x20
[16804.565461] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
[16804.566020] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x250
[16804.566580] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[16804.567153] RIP: 0033:0x7f4b1ba2add7
(...)
[16804.568907] RSP: 002b:00007f4b197adc88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[16804.569513] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4b100210d8 RCX: 00007f4b1ba2add7
[16804.570133] RDX: 00007f4b100210d8 RSI: 00000000c020660b RDI: 0000000000000003
[16804.570726] RBP: 000055de05a6cfe0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f4b197add44
[16804.571314] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4b197add48
[16804.571905] R13: 00007f4b197add40 R14: 00007f4b100210d0 R15: 00007f4b197add50
(...)
[16804.575623] ---[ end trace 87317359aad4ba50 ]---
Fix this by making btrfs_put_tree_mod_seq() skip deletion of elements that
have a sequence number equals to the computed minimum sequence number, and
not just elements with a sequence number greater then that minimum.
Fixes:
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
785c7ecae1 |
btrfs: handle ENOENT in btrfs_uuid_tree_iterate
commit 714cd3e8cba6841220dce9063a7388a81de03825 upstream. If we get an -ENOENT back from btrfs_uuid_iter_rem when iterating the uuid tree we'll just continue and do btrfs_next_item(). However we've done a btrfs_release_path() at this point and no longer have a valid path. So increment the key and go back and do a normal search. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
15b1de9197 |
btrfs: do not leak reloc root if we fail to read the fs root
commit ca1aa2818a53875cfdd175fb5e9a2984e997cce9 upstream. If we fail to read the fs root corresponding with a reloc root we'll just break out and free the reloc roots. But we remove our current reloc_root from this list higher up, which means we'll leak this reloc_root. Fix this by adding ourselves back to the reloc_roots list so we are properly cleaned up. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
f597f873ae |
btrfs: skip log replay on orphaned roots
commit 9bc574de590510eff899c3ca8dbaf013566b5efe upstream. My fsstress modifications coupled with generic/475 uncovered a failure to mount and replay the log if we hit a orphaned root. We do not want to replay the log for an orphan root, but it's completely legitimate to have an orphaned root with a log attached. Fix this by simply skipping replaying the log. We still need to pin it's root node so that we do not overwrite it while replaying other logs, as we re-read the log root at every stage of the replay. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
c1db18e292 |
btrfs: abort transaction after failed inode updates in create_subvol
commit c7e54b5102bf3614cadb9ca32d7be73bad6cecf0 upstream. We can just abort the transaction here, and in fact do that for every other failure in this function except these two cases. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Anand Jain
|
f7e039d108 |
btrfs: send: remove WARN_ON for readonly mount
commit fbd542971aa1e9ec33212afe1d9b4f1106cd85a1 upstream. We log warning if root::orphan_cleanup_state is not set to ORPHAN_CLEANUP_DONE in btrfs_ioctl_send(). However if the filesystem is mounted as readonly we skip the orphan item cleanup during the lookup and root::orphan_cleanup_state remains at the init state 0 instead of ORPHAN_CLEANUP_DONE (2). So during send in btrfs_ioctl_send() we hit the warning as below. WARN_ON(send_root->orphan_cleanup_state != ORPHAN_CLEANUP_DONE); WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 2616 at /Volumes/ws/btrfs-devel/fs/btrfs/send.c:7090 btrfs_ioctl_send+0xb2f/0x18c0 [btrfs] :: RIP: 0010:btrfs_ioctl_send+0xb2f/0x18c0 [btrfs] :: Call Trace: :: _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x7b/0x110 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x150a/0x2b00 [btrfs] :: do_vfs_ioctl+0xa9/0x620 ? __fget+0xac/0xe0 ksys_ioctl+0x60/0x90 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x49/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Reproducer: mkfs.btrfs -fq /dev/sdb mount /dev/sdb /btrfs btrfs subvolume create /btrfs/sv1 btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /btrfs/sv1 /btrfs/ss1 umount /btrfs mount -o ro /dev/sdb /btrfs btrfs send /btrfs/ss1 -f /tmp/f The warning exists because having orphan inodes could confuse send and cause it to fail or produce incorrect streams. The two cases that would cause such send failures, which are already fixed are: 1) Inodes that were unlinked - these are orphanized and remain with a link count of 0. These caused send operations to fail because it expected to always find at least one path for an inode. However this is no longer a problem since send is now able to deal with such inodes since commit |
||
Filipe Manana
|
ee98e130b4 |
Btrfs: fix missing data checksums after replaying a log tree
commit 40e046acbd2f369cfbf93c3413639c66514cec2d upstream. When logging a file that has shared extents (reflinked with other files or with itself), we can end up logging multiple checksum items that cover overlapping ranges. This confuses the search for checksums at log replay time causing some checksums to never be added to the fs/subvolume tree. Consider the following example of a file that shares the same extent at offsets 0 and 256Kb: [ bytenr 13893632, offset 64Kb, len 64Kb ] 0 64Kb [ bytenr 13631488, offset 64Kb, len 192Kb ] 64Kb 256Kb [ bytenr 13893632, offset 0, len 256Kb ] 256Kb 512Kb When logging the inode, at tree-log.c:copy_items(), when processing the file extent item at offset 0, we log a checksum item covering the range 13959168 to 14024704, which corresponds to 13893632 + 64Kb and 13893632 + 64Kb + 64Kb, respectively. Later when processing the extent item at offset 256K, we log the checksums for the range from 13893632 to 14155776 (which corresponds to 13893632 + 256Kb). These checksums get merged with the checksum item for the range from 13631488 to 13893632 (13631488 + 256Kb), logged by a previous fsync. So after this we get the two following checksum items in the log tree: (...) item 6 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 13631488) itemoff 3095 itemsize 512 range start 13631488 end 14155776 length 524288 item 7 key (EXTENT_CSUM EXTENT_CSUM 13959168) itemoff 3031 itemsize 64 range start 13959168 end 14024704 length 65536 The first one covers the range from the second one, they overlap. So far this does not cause a problem after replaying the log, because when replaying the file extent item for offset 256K, we copy all the checksums for the extent 13893632 from the log tree to the fs/subvolume tree, since searching for an checksum item for bytenr 13893632 leaves us at the first checksum item, which covers the whole range of the extent. However if we write 64Kb to file offset 256Kb for example, we will not be able to find and copy the checksums for the last 128Kb of the extent at bytenr 13893632, referenced by the file range 384Kb to 512Kb. After writing 64Kb into file offset 256Kb we get the following extent layout for our file: [ bytenr 13893632, offset 64K, len 64Kb ] 0 64Kb [ bytenr 13631488, offset 64Kb, len 192Kb ] 64Kb 256Kb [ bytenr 14155776, offset 0, len 64Kb ] 256Kb 320Kb [ bytenr 13893632, offset 64Kb, len 192Kb ] 320Kb 512Kb After fsync'ing the file, if we have a power failure and then mount the filesystem to replay the log, the following happens: 1) When replaying the file extent item for file offset 320Kb, we lookup for the checksums for the extent range from 13959168 (13893632 + 64Kb) to 14155776 (13893632 + 256Kb), through a call to btrfs_lookup_csums_range(); 2) btrfs_lookup_csums_range() finds the checksum item that starts precisely at offset 13959168 (item 7 in the log tree, shown before); 3) However that checksum item only covers 64Kb of data, and not 192Kb of data; 4) As a result only the checksums for the first 64Kb of data referenced by the file extent item are found and copied to the fs/subvolume tree. The remaining 128Kb of data, file range 384Kb to 512Kb, doesn't get the corresponding data checksums found and copied to the fs/subvolume tree. 5) After replaying the log userspace will not be able to read the file range from 384Kb to 512Kb, because the checksums are missing and resulting in an -EIO error. The following steps reproduce this scenario: $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc $ mount /dev/sdc /mnt/sdc $ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xa3 0 256K" /mnt/sdc/foobar $ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/sdc/foobar $ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xc7 256K 256K" /mnt/sdc/foobar $ xfs_io -c "reflink /mnt/sdc/foobar 320K 0 64K" /mnt/sdc/foobar $ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/sdc/foobar $ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xe5 256K 64K" /mnt/sdc/foobar $ xfs_io -c "fsync" /mnt/sdc/foobar <power failure> $ mount /dev/sdc /mnt/sdc $ md5sum /mnt/sdc/foobar md5sum: /mnt/sdc/foobar: Input/output error $ dmesg | tail [165305.003464] BTRFS info (device sdc): no csum found for inode 257 start 401408 [165305.004014] BTRFS info (device sdc): no csum found for inode 257 start 405504 [165305.004559] BTRFS info (device sdc): no csum found for inode 257 start 409600 [165305.005101] BTRFS info (device sdc): no csum found for inode 257 start 413696 [165305.005627] BTRFS info (device sdc): no csum found for inode 257 start 417792 [165305.006134] BTRFS info (device sdc): no csum found for inode 257 start 421888 [165305.006625] BTRFS info (device sdc): no csum found for inode 257 start 425984 [165305.007278] BTRFS info (device sdc): no csum found for inode 257 start 430080 [165305.008248] BTRFS warning (device sdc): csum failed root 5 ino 257 off 393216 csum 0x1337385e expected csum 0x00000000 mirror 1 [165305.009550] BTRFS warning (device sdc): csum failed root 5 ino 257 off 393216 csum 0x1337385e expected csum 0x00000000 mirror 1 Fix this simply by deleting first any checksums, from the log tree, for the range of the extent we are logging at copy_items(). This ensures we do not get checksum items in the log tree that have overlapping ranges. This is a long time issue that has been present since we have the clone (and deduplication) ioctl, and can happen both when an extent is shared between different files and within the same file. A test case for fstests follows soon. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Dan Carpenter
|
aed46bbd42 |
btrfs: return error pointer from alloc_test_extent_buffer
commit b6293c821ea8fa2a631a2112cd86cd435effeb8b upstream.
Callers of alloc_test_extent_buffer have not correctly interpreted the
return value as error pointer, as alloc_test_extent_buffer should behave
as alloc_extent_buffer. The self-tests were unaffected but
btrfs_find_create_tree_block could call both functions and that would
cause problems up in the call chain.
Fixes:
|
||
Filipe Manana
|
2bfffc24da |
Btrfs: make tree checker detect checksum items with overlapping ranges
commit ad1d8c439978ede77cbf73cbdd11bafe810421a5 upstream.
Having checksum items, either on the checksums tree or in a log tree, that
represent ranges that overlap each other is a sign of a corruption. Such
case confuses the checksum lookup code and can result in not being able to
find checksums or find stale checksums.
So add a check for such case.
This is motivated by a recent fix for a case where a log tree had checksum
items covering ranges that overlap each other due to extent cloning, and
resulted in missing checksums after replaying the log tree. It also helps
detect past issues such as stale and outdated checksums due to overlapping,
commit
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
e3fb5bb7eb |
btrfs: do not call synchronize_srcu() in inode_tree_del
commit f72ff01df9cf5db25c76674cac16605992d15467 upstream.
Testing with the new fsstress uncovered a pretty nasty deadlock with
lookup and snapshot deletion.
Process A
unlink
-> final iput
-> inode_tree_del
-> synchronize_srcu(subvol_srcu)
Process B
btrfs_lookup <- srcu_read_lock() acquired here
-> btrfs_iget
-> find inode that has I_FREEING set
-> __wait_on_freeing_inode()
We're holding the srcu_read_lock() while doing the iget in order to make
sure our fs root doesn't go away, and then we are waiting for the inode
to finish freeing. However because the free'ing process is doing a
synchronize_srcu() we deadlock.
Fix this by dropping the synchronize_srcu() in inode_tree_del(). We
don't need people to stop accessing the fs root at this point, we're
only adding our empty root to the dead roots list.
A larger much more invasive fix is forthcoming to address how we deal
with fs roots, but this fixes the immediate problem.
Fixes:
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
831140602a |
btrfs: don't double lock the subvol_sem for rename exchange
commit 943eb3bf25f4a7b745dd799e031be276aa104d82 upstream.
If we're rename exchanging two subvols we'll try to lock this lock
twice, which is bad. Just lock once if either of the ino's are subvols.
Fixes:
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
cab5f4c6fd |
btrfs: record all roots for rename exchange on a subvol
commit 3e1740993e43116b3bc71b0aad1e6872f6ccf341 upstream.
Testing with the new fsstress support for subvolumes uncovered a pretty
bad problem with rename exchange on subvolumes. We're modifying two
different subvolumes, but we only start the transaction on one of them,
so the other one is not added to the dirty root list. This is caught by
btrfs_cow_block() with a warning because the root has not been updated,
however if we do not modify this root again we'll end up pointing at an
invalid root because the root item is never updated.
Fix this by making sure we add the destination root to the trans list,
the same as we do with normal renames. This fixes the corruption.
Fixes:
|
||
Filipe Manana
|
cb7c10c675 |
Btrfs: send, skip backreference walking for extents with many references
commit fd0ddbe2509568b00df364156f47561e9f469f15 upstream. Backreference walking, which is used by send to figure if it can issue clone operations instead of write operations, can be very slow and use too much memory when extents have many references. This change simply skips backreference walking when an extent has more than 64 references, in which case we fallback to a write operation instead of a clone operation. This limit is conservative and in practice I observed no signicant slowdown with up to 100 references and still low memory usage up to that limit. This is a temporary workaround until there are speedups in the backref walking code, and as such it does not attempt to add extra interfaces or knobs to tweak the threshold. Reported-by: Atemu <atemu.main@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/CAE4GHgkvqVADtS4AzcQJxo0Q1jKQgKaW3JGp3SGdoinVo=C9eQ@mail.gmail.com/T/#me55dc0987f9cc2acaa54372ce0492c65782be3fa CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Qu Wenruo
|
6951a31e55 |
btrfs: Remove btrfs_bio::flags member
commit 34b127aecd4fe8e6a3903e10f204a7b7ffddca22 upstream.
The last user of btrfs_bio::flags was removed in commit
|
||
Tejun Heo
|
6c2fb7a5aa |
btrfs: Avoid getting stuck during cyclic writebacks
commit f7bddf1e27d18fbc7d3e3056ba449cfbe4e20b0a upstream. During a cyclic writeback, extent_write_cache_pages() uses done_index to update the writeback_index after the current run is over. However, instead of current index + 1, it gets to to the current index itself. Unfortunately, this, combined with returning on EOF instead of looping back, can lead to the following pathlogical behavior. 1. There is a single file which has accumulated enough dirty pages to trigger balance_dirty_pages() and the writer appending to the file with a series of short writes. 2. balance_dirty_pages kicks in, wakes up background writeback and sleeps. 3. Writeback kicks in and the cursor is on the last page of the dirty file. Writeback is started or skipped if already in progress. As it's EOF, extent_write_cache_pages() returns and the cursor is set to done_index which is pointing to the last page. 4. Writeback is done. Nothing happens till balance_dirty_pages finishes, at which point we go back to #1. This can almost completely stall out writing back of the file and keep the system over dirty threshold for a long time which can mess up the whole system. We encountered this issue in production with a package handling application which can reliably reproduce the issue when running under tight memory limits. Reading the comment in the error handling section, this seems to be to avoid accidentally skipping a page in case the write attempt on the page doesn't succeed. However, this concern seems bogus. On each page, the code either: * Skips and moves onto the next page. * Fails issue and sets done_index to index + 1. * Successfully issues and continue to the next page if budget allows and not EOF. IOW, as long as it's not EOF and there's budget, the code never retries writing back the same page. Only when a page happens to be the last page of a particular run, we end up retrying the page, which can't possibly guarantee anything data integrity related. Besides, cyclic writes are only used for non-syncing writebacks meaning that there's no data integrity implication to begin with. Fix it by always setting done_index past the current page being processed. Note that this problem exists in other writepages too. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Filipe Manana
|
b24ec1e6b6 |
Btrfs: fix negative subv_writers counter and data space leak after buffered write
commit a0e248bb502d5165b3314ac3819e888fdcdf7d9f upstream. When doing a buffered write it's possible to leave the subv_writers counter of the root, used for synchronization between buffered nocow writers and snapshotting. This happens in an exceptional case like the following: 1) We fail to allocate data space for the write, since there's not enough available data space nor enough unallocated space for allocating a new data block group; 2) Because of that failure, we try to go to NOCOW mode, which succeeds and therefore we set the local variable 'only_release_metadata' to true and set the root's sub_writers counter to 1 through the call to btrfs_start_write_no_snapshotting() made by check_can_nocow(); 3) The call to btrfs_copy_from_user() returns zero, which is very unlikely to happen but not impossible; 4) No pages are copied because btrfs_copy_from_user() returned zero; 5) We call btrfs_end_write_no_snapshotting() which decrements the root's subv_writers counter to 0; 6) We don't set 'only_release_metadata' back to 'false' because we do it only if 'copied', the value returned by btrfs_copy_from_user(), is greater than zero; 7) On the next iteration of the while loop, which processes the same page range, we are now able to allocate data space for the write (we got enough data space released in the meanwhile); 8) After this if we fail at btrfs_delalloc_reserve_metadata(), because now there isn't enough free metadata space, or in some other place further below (prepare_pages(), lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need(), btrfs_dirty_pages()), we break out of the while loop with 'only_release_metadata' having a value of 'true'; 9) Because 'only_release_metadata' is 'true' we end up decrementing the root's subv_writers counter to -1 (through a call to btrfs_end_write_no_snapshotting()), and we also end up not releasing the data space previously reserved through btrfs_check_data_free_space(). As a consequence the mechanism for synchronizing NOCOW buffered writes with snapshotting gets broken. Fix this by always setting 'only_release_metadata' to false at the start of each iteration. Fixes: |
||
Filipe Manana
|
17b22f8594 |
Btrfs: fix metadata space leak on fixup worker failure to set range as delalloc
commit 536870071dbc4278264f59c9a2f5f447e584d139 upstream.
In the fixup worker, if we fail to mark the range as delalloc in the io
tree, we must release the previously reserved metadata, as well as update
the outstanding extents counter for the inode, otherwise we leak metadata
space.
In pratice we can't return an error from btrfs_set_extent_delalloc(),
which is just a wrapper around __set_extent_bit(), as for most errors
__set_extent_bit() does a BUG_ON() (or panics which hits a BUG_ON() as
well) and returning an -EEXIST error doesn't happen in this case since
the exclusive bits parameter always has a value of 0 through this code
path. Nevertheless, just fix the error handling in the fixup worker,
in case one day __set_extent_bit() can return an error to this code
path.
Fixes:
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
1e8308fb3d |
btrfs: use refcount_inc_not_zero in kill_all_nodes
commit baf320b9d531f1cfbf64c60dd155ff80a58b3796 upstream. We hit the following warning while running down a different problem [ 6197.175850] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 6197.185082] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free. [ 6197.194704] WARNING: CPU: 47 PID: 966 at lib/refcount.c:190 refcount_sub_and_test_checked+0x53/0x60 [ 6197.521792] Call Trace: [ 6197.526687] __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x76/0x1c0 [ 6197.536615] btrfs_kill_all_delayed_nodes+0xec/0x130 [ 6197.546532] ? __btrfs_btree_balance_dirty+0x60/0x60 [ 6197.556482] btrfs_clean_one_deleted_snapshot+0x71/0xd0 [ 6197.566910] cleaner_kthread+0xfa/0x120 [ 6197.574573] kthread+0x111/0x130 [ 6197.581022] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x60/0x60 [ 6197.590086] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 6197.597228] ---[ end trace 424bb7ae00509f56 ]--- This is because the free side drops the ref without the lock, and then takes the lock if our refcount is 0. So you can have nodes on the tree that have a refcount of 0. Fix this by zero'ing out that element in our temporary array so we don't try to kill it again. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+ Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ add comment ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
d92f03395a |
btrfs: use btrfs_block_group_cache_done in update_block_group
commit a60adce85f4bb5c1ef8ffcebadd702cafa2f3696 upstream. When free'ing extents in a block group we check to see if the block group is not cached, and then cache it if we need to. However we'll just carry on as long as we're loading the cache. This is problematic because we are dirtying the block group here. If we are fast enough we could do a transaction commit and clear the free space cache while we're still loading the space cache in another thread. This truncates the free space inode, which will keep it from loading the space cache. Fix this by using the btrfs_block_group_cache_done helper so that we try to load the space cache unconditionally here, which will result in the caller waiting for the fast caching to complete and keep us from truncating the free space inode. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
3c821cc5ed |
btrfs: check page->mapping when loading free space cache
commit 3797136b626ad4b6582223660c041efdea8f26b2 upstream. While testing 5.2 we ran into the following panic [52238.017028] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000001 [52238.105608] RIP: 0010:drop_buffers+0x3d/0x150 [52238.304051] Call Trace: [52238.308958] try_to_free_buffers+0x15b/0x1b0 [52238.317503] shrink_page_list+0x1164/0x1780 [52238.325877] shrink_inactive_list+0x18f/0x3b0 [52238.334596] shrink_node_memcg+0x23e/0x7d0 [52238.342790] ? do_shrink_slab+0x4f/0x290 [52238.350648] shrink_node+0xce/0x4a0 [52238.357628] balance_pgdat+0x2c7/0x510 [52238.365135] kswapd+0x216/0x3e0 [52238.371425] ? wait_woken+0x80/0x80 [52238.378412] ? balance_pgdat+0x510/0x510 [52238.386265] kthread+0x111/0x130 [52238.392727] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x60/0x60 [52238.401782] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 The page we were trying to drop had a page->private, but had no page->mapping and so called drop_buffers, assuming that we had a buffer_head on the page, and then panic'ed trying to deref 1, which is our page->private for data pages. This is happening because we're truncating the free space cache while we're trying to load the free space cache. This isn't supposed to happen, and I'll fix that in a followup patch. However we still shouldn't allow those sort of mistakes to result in messing with pages that do not belong to us. So add the page->mapping check to verify that we still own this page after dropping and re-acquiring the page lock. This page being unlocked as: btrfs_readpage extent_read_full_page __extent_read_full_page __do_readpage if (!nr) unlock_page <-- nr can be 0 only if submit_extent_page returns an error CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> [ add callchain ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
||
Linus Torvalds
|
afd7a71872 |
for-5.4-rc7-tag
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE8rQSAMVO+zA4DBdWxWXV+ddtWDsFAl3MUkoACgkQxWXV+ddt WDvAEQ//fEHZ51NbIMwJNltqF4mr6Oao0M5u0wejEgiXzmR9E1IuHUgVK+KDQmSu wZl/y+RTlQC0TiURyStaVFBreXEqiuB79my9u4iDeNv/4UJQB42qpmYB4EuviDgB mxb9bFpWTLkO6Oc+vMrGF3BOmVsQKlq2nOua25g8VFtApQ6uiEfbwBOslCcC8kQB ZpNBl6x74xz/VWNWZnRStBfwYjRitKNDVU6dyIyRuLj8cktqfGBxGtx7/w0wDiZT kPR1bNtdpy3Ndke6H/0G6plRWi9kENqcN43hvrz54IKh2l+Jd2/as51j4Qq2tJU9 KaAnJzRaSePxc2m0SqtgZTvc2BYSOg7dqaCyHxBB0CUBdTdJdz2TVZ2KM9MiLns4 1haHBLo4l8o8zeYZpW05ac6OXKY4f8qsjWPEGshn4FDbq0TrHQzYxAF3c0X3hPag SnuvilgYUuYal+n87qinePg/ZmVrrBXPRycpQnn7FxqezJbf/2WUEojUVQnreU05 mdp8mulxQxyFhgEvO7K1uDtlP8bqW69IO9M//6IWzGNKTDK2SRI08ULplghqgyna 8SG0+y9w26r8UIWDhuvPbdfUMSG3kEH8yLFK84AFDMVJJxOnfznE3sC8sGOiP5q9 OUkl8l7bhDkyAdWZY57gGUobebdPfnLxRV9A+LZQ2El1kSOEK18= =xzXs -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-5.4-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fix from David Sterba: "A fix for an older bug that has started to show up during testing (because of an updated test for rename exchange). It's an in-memory corruption caused by local variable leaking out of the function scope" * tag 'for-5.4-rc7-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: Btrfs: fix log context list corruption after rename exchange operation |
||
Filipe Manana
|
e6c617102c |
Btrfs: fix log context list corruption after rename exchange operation
During rename exchange we might have successfully log the new name in the
source root's log tree, in which case we leave our log context (allocated
on stack) in the root's list of log contextes. However we might fail to
log the new name in the destination root, in which case we fallback to
a transaction commit later and never sync the log of the source root,
which causes the source root log context to remain in the list of log
contextes. This later causes invalid memory accesses because the context
was allocated on stack and after rename exchange finishes the stack gets
reused and overwritten for other purposes.
The kernel's linked list corruption detector (CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y) can
detect this and report something like the following:
[ 691.489929] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 691.489947] list_add corruption. prev->next should be next (ffff88819c944530), but was ffff8881c23f7be4. (prev=ffff8881c23f7a38).
[ 691.489967] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 28933 at lib/list_debug.c:28 __list_add_valid+0x95/0xe0
(...)
[ 691.489998] CPU: 2 PID: 28933 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 5.4.0-rc6-btrfs-next-62 #1
[ 691.490001] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 691.490003] RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid+0x95/0xe0
(...)
[ 691.490007] RSP: 0018:ffff8881f0b3faf8 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 691.490010] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88819c944530 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 691.490011] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffffa2c497e0
[ 691.490013] RBP: ffff8881f0b3fe68 R08: ffffed103eaa4115 R09: ffffed103eaa4114
[ 691.490015] R10: ffff88819c944000 R11: ffffed103eaa4115 R12: 7fffffffffffffff
[ 691.490016] R13: ffff8881b4035610 R14: ffff8881e7b84728 R15: 1ffff1103e167f7b
[ 691.490019] FS: 00007f4b25ea2e80(0000) GS:ffff8881f5500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 691.490021] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 691.490022] CR2: 00007fffbb2d4eec CR3: 00000001f2a4a004 CR4: 00000000003606e0
[ 691.490025] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 691.490027] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 691.490029] Call Trace:
[ 691.490058] btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x667/0x2730 [btrfs]
[ 691.490083] ? join_transaction+0x24a/0xce0 [btrfs]
[ 691.490107] ? btrfs_end_log_trans+0x80/0x80 [btrfs]
[ 691.490111] ? dget_parent+0xb8/0x460
[ 691.490116] ? lock_downgrade+0x6b0/0x6b0
[ 691.490121] ? rwlock_bug.part.0+0x90/0x90
[ 691.490127] ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x142/0x220
[ 691.490151] btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x65/0x90 [btrfs]
[ 691.490172] btrfs_sync_file+0x9f1/0xc00 [btrfs]
[ 691.490195] ? btrfs_file_write_iter+0x1800/0x1800 [btrfs]
[ 691.490198] ? rcu_read_lock_any_held.part.11+0x20/0x20
[ 691.490204] ? __do_sys_newstat+0x88/0xd0
[ 691.490207] ? cp_new_stat+0x5d0/0x5d0
[ 691.490218] ? do_fsync+0x38/0x60
[ 691.490220] do_fsync+0x38/0x60
[ 691.490224] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x32/0x40
[ 691.490228] do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x540
[ 691.490233] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[ 691.490235] RIP: 0033:0x7f4b253ad5f0
(...)
[ 691.490239] RSP: 002b:00007fffbb2d6078 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004b
[ 691.490242] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f4b253ad5f0
[ 691.490244] RDX: 00007fffbb2d5fe0 RSI: 00007fffbb2d5fe0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 691.490245] RBP: 000000000000000d R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007fffbb2d608c
[ 691.490247] R10: 00000000000002e8 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000001f4
[ 691.490248] R13: 0000000051eb851f R14: 00007fffbb2d6120 R15: 00005635a498bda0
This started happening recently when running some test cases from fstests
like btrfs/004 for example, because support for rename exchange was added
last week to fsstress from fstests.
So fix this by deleting the log context for the source root from the list
if we have logged the new name in the source root.
Reported-by: Su Yue <Damenly_Su@gmx.com>
Fixes:
|
||
Linus Torvalds
|
00aff68362 |
for-5.4-rc6-tag
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE8rQSAMVO+zA4DBdWxWXV+ddtWDsFAl3GwvEACgkQxWXV+ddt WDvsfQ//UQ/TND1roMW3EmN+PLTRTUQS75Hb737r5Q66j0j94gFnBxB03R+tU8lP bH5XVpateb1wDmmdscqVQ1WM9O82bQdDNiYeLDr86+kzpLgy61rZHswZfNlDtl5M wDwyaxsrd7HndDeUZnIuaakYI9MXz9WIaNXkt0o8hSHctt0N18y23DSBFTVSh/4q T3cn4odkoBKtQ4mIn2OSmQvkl69nWRBVpjPJZIvsNszKjOo9aZTuGHrOWUV5RPiE Ho9UBkr+IjEDo8OH88vXAsHeYFIoYhEeUltjLHyF6Agwk1/Ajwp5sxXSubbfHUMQ l1YdmrTZf+l1Dxdj0sCdyK1npcgGI5IuZmIICpNUEAny9AbTtpSE3GNwtnIHAEAr cpki+1Z3lfaVSwNMYUz9Esbsb72C+f08WJHGHBMaOhjrBIwQUeWeYzTx6N7uDwNg GjaDRxjqFV2o7373isQaz7WOTatUMNtL1xvhkeceONI9NBXQRjW5rq5zECmr1ix7 lSTKDzn7yAd6eGBW0T6iYdRl4Bta/zxPiDEF5KDNPugvv23yx17LAOdS4qAiHzbx oglra/kz9D4xmKVqH7hpFaaHrzL38G4mz6aMdwBu0M7dkn9AwsXiXWSDb0n7jnK0 o96gkUBZjUSFBseUFD2s34MikFtrDynEJzPq96JHuWLguaByMcc= =CZxY -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-5.4-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba: "A few regressions and fixes for stable. Regressions: - fix a race leading to metadata space leak after task received a signal - un-deprecate 2 ioctls, marked as deprecated by mistake Fixes: - fix limit check for number of devices during chunk allocation - fix a race due to double evaluation of i_size_read inside max() macro, can cause a crash - remove wrong device id check in tree-checker" * tag 'for-5.4-rc6-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: un-deprecate ioctls START_SYNC and WAIT_SYNC btrfs: save i_size to avoid double evaluation of i_size_read in compress_file_range Btrfs: fix race leading to metadata space leak after task received signal btrfs: tree-checker: Fix wrong check on max devid btrfs: Consider system chunk array size for new SYSTEM chunks |
||
David Sterba
|
a5009d3a31 |
btrfs: un-deprecate ioctls START_SYNC and WAIT_SYNC
The two ioctls START_SYNC and WAIT_SYNC were mistakenly marked as deprecated and scheduled for removal but we actualy do use them for 'btrfs subvolume delete -C/-c'. The deprecated thing in |
||
Josef Bacik
|
d98da49977 |
btrfs: save i_size to avoid double evaluation of i_size_read in compress_file_range
We hit a regression while rolling out 5.2 internally where we were hitting the following panic kernel BUG at mm/page-writeback.c:2659! RIP: 0010:clear_page_dirty_for_io+0xe6/0x1f0 Call Trace: __process_pages_contig+0x25a/0x350 ? extent_clear_unlock_delalloc+0x43/0x70 submit_compressed_extents+0x359/0x4d0 normal_work_helper+0x15a/0x330 process_one_work+0x1f5/0x3f0 worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0 ? rescuer_thread+0x340/0x340 kthread+0x111/0x130 ? kthread_create_on_node+0x60/0x60 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This is happening because the page is not locked when doing clear_page_dirty_for_io. Looking at the core dump it was because our async_extent had a ram_size of 24576 but our async_chunk range only spanned 20480, so we had a whole extra page in our ram_size for our async_extent. This happened because we try not to compress pages outside of our i_size, however a cleanup patch changed us to do actual_end = min_t(u64, i_size_read(inode), end + 1); which is problematic because i_size_read() can evaluate to different values in between checking and assigning. So either an expanding truncate or a fallocate could increase our i_size while we're doing writeout and actual_end would end up being past the range we have locked. I confirmed this was what was happening by installing a debug kernel that had actual_end = min_t(u64, i_size_read(inode), end + 1); if (actual_end > end + 1) { printk(KERN_ERR "KABOOM\n"); actual_end = end + 1; } and installing it onto 500 boxes of the tier that had been seeing the problem regularly. Last night I got my debug message and no panic, confirming what I expected. [ dsterba: the assembly confirms a tiny race window: mov 0x20(%rsp),%rax cmp %rax,0x48(%r15) # read movl $0x0,0x18(%rsp) mov %rax,%r12 mov %r14,%rax cmovbe 0x48(%r15),%r12 # eval Where r15 is inode and 0x48 is offset of i_size. The original fix was to revert |
||
Filipe Manana
|
0cab7acc4a |
Btrfs: fix race leading to metadata space leak after task received signal
When a task that is allocating metadata needs to wait for the async
reclaim job to process its ticket and gets a signal (because it was killed
for example) before doing the wait, the task ends up erroring out but
with space reserved for its ticket, which never gets released, resulting
in a metadata space leak (more specifically a leak in the bytes_may_use
counter of the metadata space_info object).
Here's the sequence of steps leading to the space leak:
1) A task tries to create a file for example, so it ends up trying to
start a transaction at btrfs_create();
2) The filesystem is currently in a state where there is not enough
metadata free space to satisfy the transaction's needs. So at
space-info.c:__reserve_metadata_bytes() we create a ticket and
add it to the list of tickets of the space info object. Also,
because the metadata async reclaim job is not running, we queue
a job ro run metadata reclaim;
3) In the meanwhile the task receives a signal (like SIGTERM from
a kill command for example);
4) After queing the async reclaim job, at __reserve_metadata_bytes(),
we unlock the metadata space info and call handle_reserve_ticket();
5) That last function calls wait_reserve_ticket(), which acquires the
lock from the metadata space info. Then in the first iteration of
its while loop, it calls prepare_to_wait_event(), which returns
-ERESTARTSYS because the task has a pending signal. As a result,
we set the error field of the ticket to -EINTR and exit the while
loop without deleting the ticket from the list of tickets (in the
space info object). After exiting the loop we unlock the space info;
6) The async reclaim job is able to release enough metadata, acquires
the metadata space info's lock and then reserves space for the ticket,
since the ticket is still in the list of (non-priority) tickets. The
space reservation happens at btrfs_try_granting_tickets(), called from
maybe_fail_all_tickets(). This increments the bytes_may_use counter
from the metadata space info object, sets the ticket's bytes field to
zero (meaning success, that space was reserved) and removes it from
the list of tickets;
7) wait_reserve_ticket() returns, with the error field of the ticket
set to -EINTR. Then handle_reserve_ticket() just propagates that error
to the caller. Because an error was returned, the caller does not
release the reserved space, since the expectation is that any error
means no space was reserved.
Fix this by removing the ticket from the list, while holding the space
info lock, at wait_reserve_ticket() when prepare_to_wait_event() returns
an error.
Also add some comments and an assertion to guarantee we never end up with
a ticket that has an error set and a bytes counter field set to zero, to
more easily detect regressions in the future.
This issue could be triggered sporadically by some test cases from fstests
such as generic/269 for example, which tries to fill a filesystem and then
kills fsstress processes running in the background.
When this issue happens, we get a warning in syslog/dmesg when unmounting
the filesystem, like the following:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 13240 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:3186 btrfs_free_block_groups+0x314/0x470 [btrfs]
(...)
CPU: 0 PID: 13240 Comm: umount Tainted: G W L 5.3.0-rc8-btrfs-next-48+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-0-ga698c8995f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:btrfs_free_block_groups+0x314/0x470 [btrfs]
(...)
RSP: 0018:ffff9910c14cfdb8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000024 RBX: ffff89cd8a4d55f0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff89cdf6a178a8 RDI: ffff89cdf6a178a8
RBP: ffff9910c14cfde8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffff89cd4d618040 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff89cd8a4d5508
R13: ffff89cde7c4a600 R14: dead000000000122 R15: dead000000000100
FS: 00007f42754432c0(0000) GS:ffff89cdf6a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fd25a47f730 CR3: 000000021f8d6006 CR4: 00000000003606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
close_ctree+0x1ad/0x390 [btrfs]
generic_shutdown_super+0x6c/0x110
kill_anon_super+0xe/0x30
btrfs_kill_super+0x12/0xa0 [btrfs]
deactivate_locked_super+0x3a/0x70
cleanup_mnt+0xb4/0x160
task_work_run+0x7e/0xc0
exit_to_usermode_loop+0xfa/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x1cb/0x220
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7f4274d2cb37
(...)
RSP: 002b:00007ffcff701d38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000557ebde2f060 RCX: 00007f4274d2cb37
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000557ebde2f240
RBP: 0000557ebde2f240 R08: 0000557ebde2f270 R09: 0000000000000015
R10: 00000000000006b4 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f427522ee64
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffcff701fc0
irq event stamp: 0
hardirqs last enabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
hardirqs last disabled at (0): [<ffffffffb12b561e>] copy_process+0x75e/0x1fd0
softirqs last enabled at (0): [<ffffffffb12b561e>] copy_process+0x75e/0x1fd0
softirqs last disabled at (0): [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
---[ end trace bcf4b235461b26f6 ]---
BTRFS info (device sdb): space_info 4 has 19116032 free, is full
BTRFS info (device sdb): space_info total=33554432, used=14176256, pinned=0, reserved=0, may_use=196608, readonly=65536
BTRFS info (device sdb): global_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
BTRFS info (device sdb): trans_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
BTRFS info (device sdb): chunk_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
BTRFS info (device sdb): delayed_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
BTRFS info (device sdb): delayed_refs_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
Fixes:
|
||
Qu Wenruo
|
8bb177d18f |
btrfs: tree-checker: Fix wrong check on max devid
[BUG]
The following script will cause false alert on devid check.
#!/bin/bash
dev1=/dev/test/test
dev2=/dev/test/scratch1
mnt=/mnt/btrfs
umount $dev1 &> /dev/null
umount $dev2 &> /dev/null
umount $mnt &> /dev/null
mkfs.btrfs -f $dev1
mount $dev1 $mnt
_fail()
{
echo "!!! FAILED !!!"
exit 1
}
for ((i = 0; i < 4096; i++)); do
btrfs dev add -f $dev2 $mnt || _fail
btrfs dev del $dev1 $mnt || _fail
dev_tmp=$dev1
dev1=$dev2
dev2=$dev_tmp
done
[CAUSE]
Tree-checker uses BTRFS_MAX_DEVS() and BTRFS_MAX_DEVS_SYS_CHUNK() as
upper limit for devid. But we can have devid holes just like above
script.
So the check for devid is incorrect and could cause false alert.
[FIX]
Just remove the whole devid check. We don't have any hard requirement
for devid assignment.
Furthermore, even devid could get corrupted by a bitflip, we still have
dev extents verification at mount time, so corrupted data won't sneak
in.
This fixes fstests btrfs/194.
Reported-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Fixes:
|
||
Qu Wenruo
|
c17add7a1c |
btrfs: Consider system chunk array size for new SYSTEM chunks
For SYSTEM chunks, despite the regular chunk item size limit, there is
another limit due to system chunk array size.
The extra limit was removed in a refactoring, so add it back.
Fixes:
|
||
Linus Torvalds
|
54955e3bfd |
for-5.4-rc4-tag
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||
Filipe Manana
|
ba0b084ac3 |
Btrfs: check for the full sync flag while holding the inode lock during fsync
We were checking for the full fsync flag in the inode before locking the inode, which is racy, since at that that time it might not be set but after we acquire the inode lock some other task set it. One case where this can happen is on a system low on memory and some concurrent task failed to allocate an extent map and therefore set the full sync flag on the inode, to force the next fsync to work in full mode. A consequence of missing the full fsync flag set is hitting the problems fixed by commit |
||
Filipe Manana
|
c7967fc149 |
Btrfs: fix qgroup double free after failure to reserve metadata for delalloc
If we fail to reserve metadata for delalloc operations we end up releasing
the previously reserved qgroup amount twice, once explicitly under the
'out_qgroup' label by calling btrfs_qgroup_free_meta_prealloc() and once
again, under label 'out_fail', by calling btrfs_inode_rsv_release() with a
value of 'true' for its 'qgroup_free' argument, which results in
btrfs_qgroup_free_meta_prealloc() being called again, so we end up having
a double free.
Also if we fail to reserve the necessary qgroup amount, we jump to the
label 'out_fail', which calls btrfs_inode_rsv_release() and that in turns
calls btrfs_qgroup_free_meta_prealloc(), even though we weren't able to
reserve any qgroup amount. So we freed some amount we never reserved.
So fix this by removing the call to btrfs_inode_rsv_release() in the
failure path, since it's not necessary at all as we haven't changed the
inode's block reserve in any way at this point.
Fixes:
|
||
Qu Wenruo
|
fd2b007eae |
btrfs: tracepoints: Fix wrong parameter order for qgroup events
[BUG]
For btrfs:qgroup_meta_reserve event, the trace event can output garbage:
qgroup_meta_reserve: 9c7f6acc-b342-4037-bc47-7f6e4d2232d7: refroot=5(FS_TREE) type=DATA diff=2
The diff should always be alinged to sector size (4k), so there is
definitely something wrong.
[CAUSE]
For the wrong @diff, it's caused by wrong parameter order.
The correct parameters are:
struct btrfs_root, s64 diff, int type.
However the parameters used are:
struct btrfs_root, int type, s64 diff.
Fixes:
|
||
Qu Wenruo
|
8702ba9396 |
btrfs: qgroup: Always free PREALLOC META reserve in btrfs_delalloc_release_extents()
[Background] Btrfs qgroup uses two types of reserved space for METADATA space, PERTRANS and PREALLOC. PERTRANS is metadata space reserved for each transaction started by btrfs_start_transaction(). While PREALLOC is for delalloc, where we reserve space before joining a transaction, and finally it will be converted to PERTRANS after the writeback is done. [Inconsistency] However there is inconsistency in how we handle PREALLOC metadata space. The most obvious one is: In btrfs_buffered_write(): btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(BTRFS_I(inode), reserve_bytes, true); We always free qgroup PREALLOC meta space. While in btrfs_truncate_block(): btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(BTRFS_I(inode), blocksize, (ret != 0)); We only free qgroup PREALLOC meta space when something went wrong. [The Correct Behavior] The correct behavior should be the one in btrfs_buffered_write(), we should always free PREALLOC metadata space. The reason is, the btrfs_delalloc_* mechanism works by: - Reserve metadata first, even it's not necessary In btrfs_delalloc_reserve_metadata() - Free the unused metadata space Normally in: btrfs_delalloc_release_extents() |- btrfs_inode_rsv_release() Here we do calculation on whether we should release or not. E.g. for 64K buffered write, the metadata rsv works like: /* The first page */ reserve_meta: num_bytes=calc_inode_reservations() free_meta: num_bytes=0 total: num_bytes=calc_inode_reservations() /* The first page caused one outstanding extent, thus needs metadata rsv */ /* The 2nd page */ reserve_meta: num_bytes=calc_inode_reservations() free_meta: num_bytes=calc_inode_reservations() total: not changed /* The 2nd page doesn't cause new outstanding extent, needs no new meta rsv, so we free what we have reserved */ /* The 3rd~16th pages */ reserve_meta: num_bytes=calc_inode_reservations() free_meta: num_bytes=calc_inode_reservations() total: not changed (still space for one outstanding extent) This means, if btrfs_delalloc_release_extents() determines to free some space, then those space should be freed NOW. So for qgroup, we should call btrfs_qgroup_free_meta_prealloc() other than btrfs_qgroup_convert_reserved_meta(). The good news is: - The callers are not that hot The hottest caller is in btrfs_buffered_write(), which is already fixed by commit |
||
David Sterba
|
80ed4548d0 |
btrfs: don't needlessly create extent-refs kernel thread
The patch |
||
Qu Wenruo
|
4b654acdae |
btrfs: block-group: Fix a memory leak due to missing btrfs_put_block_group()
In btrfs_read_block_groups(), if we have an invalid block group which
has mixed type (DATA|METADATA) while the fs doesn't have MIXED_GROUPS
feature, we error out without freeing the block group cache.
This patch will add the missing btrfs_put_block_group() to prevent
memory leak.
Note for stable backports: the file to patch in versions <= 5.3 is
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c
Fixes:
|
||
Filipe Manana
|
44db1216ef |
Btrfs: add missing extents release on file extent cluster relocation error
If we error out when finding a page at relocate_file_extent_cluster(), we
need to release the outstanding extents counter on the relocation inode,
set by the previous call to btrfs_delalloc_reserve_metadata(), otherwise
the inode's block reserve size can never decrease to zero and metadata
space is leaked. Therefore add a call to btrfs_delalloc_release_extents()
in case we can't find the target page.
Fixes:
|
||
Linus Torvalds
|
f8779876d4 |
for-5.4-rc2-tag
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||
Austin Kim
|
431d39887d |
btrfs: silence maybe-uninitialized warning in clone_range
GCC throws warning message as below: ‘clone_src_i_size’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized] #define IS_ALIGNED(x, a) (((x) & ((typeof(x))(a) - 1)) == 0) ^ fs/btrfs/send.c:5088:6: note: ‘clone_src_i_size’ was declared here u64 clone_src_i_size; ^ The clone_src_i_size is only used as call-by-reference in a call to get_inode_info(). Silence the warning by initializing clone_src_i_size to 0. Note that the warning is a false positive and reported by older versions of GCC (eg. 7.x) but not eg 9.x. As there have been numerous people, the patch is applied. Setting clone_src_i_size to 0 does not otherwise make sense and would not do any action in case the code changes in the future. Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austindh.kim@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ add note ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
c5f4987e86 |
btrfs: fix uninitialized ret in ref-verify
Coverity caught a case where we could return with a uninitialized value
in ret in process_leaf. This is actually pretty likely because we could
very easily run into a block group item key and have a garbage value in
ret and think there was an errror. Fix this by initializing ret to 0.
Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Fixes:
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
11a19a9087 |
btrfs: allocate new inode in NOFS context
A user reported a lockdep splat
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.2.11-gentoo #2 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kswapd0/711 is trying to acquire lock:
000000007777a663 (sb_internal){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500
but task is already holding lock:
000000000ba86300 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x0/0x30
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}:
kmem_cache_alloc+0x1f/0x1c0
btrfs_alloc_inode+0x1f/0x260
alloc_inode+0x16/0xa0
new_inode+0xe/0xb0
btrfs_new_inode+0x70/0x610
btrfs_symlink+0xd0/0x420
vfs_symlink+0x9c/0x100
do_symlinkat+0x66/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
-> #0 (sb_internal){.+.+}:
__sb_start_write+0xf6/0x150
start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500
btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x59/0x110
btrfs_evict_inode+0x19e/0x4c0
evict+0xbc/0x1f0
inode_lru_isolate+0x113/0x190
__list_lru_walk_one.isra.4+0x5c/0x100
list_lru_walk_one+0x32/0x50
prune_icache_sb+0x36/0x80
super_cache_scan+0x14a/0x1d0
do_shrink_slab+0x131/0x320
shrink_node+0xf7/0x380
balance_pgdat+0x2d5/0x640
kswapd+0x2ba/0x5e0
kthread+0x147/0x160
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(fs_reclaim);
lock(sb_internal);
lock(fs_reclaim);
lock(sb_internal);
*** DEADLOCK ***
3 locks held by kswapd0/711:
#0: 000000000ba86300 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x0/0x30
#1: 000000004a5100f8 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}, at: shrink_node+0x9a/0x380
#2: 00000000f956fa46 (&type->s_umount_key#30){++++}, at: super_cache_scan+0x35/0x1d0
stack backtrace:
CPU: 7 PID: 711 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.2.11-gentoo #2
Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision Tower 3620/0MWYPT, BIOS 2.4.2 09/29/2017
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x85/0xc7
print_circular_bug.cold.40+0x1d9/0x235
__lock_acquire+0x18b1/0x1f00
lock_acquire+0xa6/0x170
? start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500
__sb_start_write+0xf6/0x150
? start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500
start_transaction+0x3a8/0x500
btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x59/0x110
btrfs_evict_inode+0x19e/0x4c0
? var_wake_function+0x20/0x20
evict+0xbc/0x1f0
inode_lru_isolate+0x113/0x190
? discard_new_inode+0xc0/0xc0
__list_lru_walk_one.isra.4+0x5c/0x100
? discard_new_inode+0xc0/0xc0
list_lru_walk_one+0x32/0x50
prune_icache_sb+0x36/0x80
super_cache_scan+0x14a/0x1d0
do_shrink_slab+0x131/0x320
shrink_node+0xf7/0x380
balance_pgdat+0x2d5/0x640
kswapd+0x2ba/0x5e0
? __wake_up_common_lock+0x90/0x90
kthread+0x147/0x160
? balance_pgdat+0x640/0x640
? __kthread_create_on_node+0x160/0x160
ret_from_fork+0x24/0x30
This is because btrfs_new_inode() calls new_inode() under the
transaction. We could probably move the new_inode() outside of this but
for now just wrap it in memalloc_nofs_save().
Reported-by: Zdenek Sojka <zsojka@seznam.cz>
Fixes:
|
||
Zygo Blaxell
|
7a54789074 |
btrfs: fix balance convert to single on 32-bit host CPUs
Currently, the command:
btrfs balance start -dconvert=single,soft .
on a Raspberry Pi produces the following kernel message:
BTRFS error (device mmcblk0p2): balance: invalid convert data profile single
This fails because we use is_power_of_2(unsigned long) to validate
the new data profile, the constant for 'single' profile uses bit 48,
and there are only 32 bits in a long on ARM.
Fix by open-coding the check using u64 variables.
Tested by completing the original balance command on several Raspberry
Pis.
Fixes:
|
||
Josef Bacik
|
4203e96894 |
btrfs: fix incorrect updating of log root tree
We've historically had reports of being unable to mount file systems because the tree log root couldn't be read. Usually this is the "parent transid failure", but could be any of the related errors, including "fsid mismatch" or "bad tree block", depending on which block got allocated. The modification of the individual log root items are serialized on the per-log root root_mutex. This means that any modification to the per-subvol log root_item is completely protected. However we update the root item in the log root tree outside of the log root tree log_mutex. We do this in order to allow multiple subvolumes to be updated in each log transaction. This is problematic however because when we are writing the log root tree out we update the super block with the _current_ log root node information. Since these two operations happen independently of each other, you can end up updating the log root tree in between writing out the dirty blocks and setting the super block to point at the current root. This means we'll point at the new root node that hasn't been written out, instead of the one we should be pointing at. Thus whatever garbage or old block we end up pointing at complains when we mount the file system later and try to replay the log. Fix this by copying the log's root item into a local root item copy. Then once we're safely under the log_root_tree->log_mutex we update the root item in the log_root_tree. This way we do not modify the log_root_tree while we're committing it, fixing the problem. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Filipe Manana
|
c67d970f0e |
Btrfs: fix memory leak due to concurrent append writes with fiemap
When we have a buffered write that starts at an offset greater than or equals to the file's size happening concurrently with a full ranged fiemap, we can end up leaking an extent state structure. Suppose we have a file with a size of 1Mb, and before the buffered write and fiemap are performed, it has a single extent state in its io tree representing the range from 0 to 1Mb, with the EXTENT_DELALLOC bit set. The following sequence diagram shows how the memory leak happens if a fiemap a buffered write, starting at offset 1Mb and with a length of 4Kb, are performed concurrently. CPU 1 CPU 2 extent_fiemap() --> it's a full ranged fiemap range from 0 to LLONG_MAX - 1 (9223372036854775807) --> locks range in the inode's io tree --> after this we have 2 extent states in the io tree: --> 1 for range [0, 1Mb[ with the bits EXTENT_LOCKED and EXTENT_DELALLOC_BITS set --> 1 for the range [1Mb, LLONG_MAX[ with the EXTENT_LOCKED bit set --> start buffered write at offset 1Mb with a length of 4Kb btrfs_file_write_iter() btrfs_buffered_write() --> cached_state is NULL lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() --> returns 0 and does not lock range because it starts at current i_size / eof --> cached_state remains NULL btrfs_dirty_pages() btrfs_set_extent_delalloc() (...) __set_extent_bit() --> splits extent state for range [1Mb, LLONG_MAX[ and now we have 2 extent states: --> one for the range [1Mb, 1Mb + 4Kb[ with EXTENT_LOCKED set --> another one for the range [1Mb + 4Kb, LLONG_MAX[ with EXTENT_LOCKED set as well --> sets EXTENT_DELALLOC on the extent state for the range [1Mb, 1Mb + 4Kb[ --> caches extent state [1Mb, 1Mb + 4Kb[ into @cached_state because it has the bit EXTENT_LOCKED set --> btrfs_buffered_write() ends up with a non-NULL cached_state and never calls anything to release its reference on it, resulting in a memory leak Fix this by calling free_extent_state() on cached_state if the range was not locked by lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need(). The same issue can happen if anything else other than fiemap locks a range that covers eof and beyond. This could be triggered, sporadically, by test case generic/561 from the fstests suite, which makes duperemove run concurrently with fsstress, and duperemove does plenty of calls to fiemap. When CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG is set the leak is reported in dmesg/syslog when removing the btrfs module with a message like the following: [77100.039461] BTRFS: state leak: start 6574080 end 6582271 state 16402 in tree 0 refs 1 Otherwise (CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG not set) detectable with kmemleak. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.16+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Linus Torvalds
|
bb48a59135 |
for-5.4-rc1-tag
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE8rQSAMVO+zA4DBdWxWXV+ddtWDsFAl2SDbMACgkQxWXV+ddt WDsUhw/9HcRsT6SlrwA2R5leHxCR5UMwT2Zmbxpfft37ANF0SC1UINHBfnmquM97 xX6fdRSR9RUjF9DrdLPfLBnJDQ/MnHl1ruIVBFhJm6cJ9TJwf9E0TiJBQt+08JWg vy5hZBWvsPWWRBJ94XPMe4LtakK/isW4Cz5W9AdrC2Siqw69j6eZzms2AnIjyBjA BoKg4se2Ay2rMxLZWXIOj9374PU+N1cnRnqgh77ZxLku5WdCzrDfB5safE7UmoTG /MWJuuIgzOk0iQpQORRtEZDS1dNe5KT9m4xXkUbrZbQROwqnXrT1SVIsuqNAvlPk uaymR1W8nshepzpMlSxVydLv/mKWZNUGnDxOJ23ooow8Yd7ndppXEtFuGwCYqIFc xQqxuTLREvJ9+jpSv11bmDpk/ULRqpV+2PjUqGaWlGwFArJ+qFRLVGYx31eXmDPj t2mrPOcXGzY0pKtIpbkuUGleY/jeI+BNsvD4+QPs+jnp0nmfvH0/Rmp7grGqx2FI rQM8Gn4a5i3nuEDWLp8nN2wcKC3ePwy96Vp2tqfsl6TVTPx4EFzGLkWogHR2yiqI 0LAj8YWFmWuChSv71wYOjX79CppjcbNwOakSwtDjV30jkwoh2f/0D3OwOpua2xe8 75KQMaSB0kesGZz7ZkL1kMqA5m5w7MGZom6XZoBJ+bq2HPLB2jo= =2UM7 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'for-5.4-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux Pull btrfs fixes from David Sterba: "A bunch of fixes that accumulated in recent weeks, mostly material for stable. Summary: - fix for regression from 5.3 that prevents to use balance convert with single profile - qgroup fixes: rescan race, accounting leak with multiple writers, potential leak after io failure recovery - fix for use after free in relocation (reported by KASAN) - other error handling fixups" * tag 'for-5.4-rc1-tag' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kdave/linux: btrfs: qgroup: Fix reserved data space leak if we have multiple reserve calls btrfs: qgroup: Fix the wrong target io_tree when freeing reserved data space btrfs: Fix a regression which we can't convert to SINGLE profile btrfs: relocation: fix use-after-free on dead relocation roots Btrfs: fix race setting up and completing qgroup rescan workers Btrfs: fix missing error return if writeback for extent buffer never started btrfs: adjust dirty_metadata_bytes after writeback failure of extent buffer Btrfs: fix selftests failure due to uninitialized i_mode in test inodes |
||
Qu Wenruo
|
d4e204948f |
btrfs: qgroup: Fix reserved data space leak if we have multiple reserve calls
[BUG]
The following script can cause btrfs qgroup data space leak:
mkfs.btrfs -f $dev
mount $dev -o nospace_cache $mnt
btrfs subv create $mnt/subv
btrfs quota en $mnt
btrfs quota rescan -w $mnt
btrfs qgroup limit 128m $mnt/subv
for (( i = 0; i < 3; i++)); do
# Create 3 64M holes for latter fallocate to fail
truncate -s 192m $mnt/subv/file
xfs_io -c "pwrite 64m 4k" $mnt/subv/file > /dev/null
xfs_io -c "pwrite 128m 4k" $mnt/subv/file > /dev/null
sync
# it's supposed to fail, and each failure will leak at least 64M
# data space
xfs_io -f -c "falloc 0 192m" $mnt/subv/file &> /dev/null
rm $mnt/subv/file
sync
done
# Shouldn't fail after we removed the file
xfs_io -f -c "falloc 0 64m" $mnt/subv/file
[CAUSE]
Btrfs qgroup data reserve code allow multiple reservations to happen on
a single extent_changeset:
E.g:
btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data(inode, &data_reserved, 0, SZ_1M);
btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data(inode, &data_reserved, SZ_1M, SZ_2M);
btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data(inode, &data_reserved, 0, SZ_4M);
Btrfs qgroup code has its internal tracking to make sure we don't
double-reserve in above example.
The only pattern utilizing this feature is in the main while loop of
btrfs_fallocate() function.
However btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data()'s error handling has a bug in that
on error it clears all ranges in the io_tree with EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED
flag but doesn't free previously reserved bytes.
This bug has a two fold effect:
- Clearing EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED ranges
This is the correct behavior, but it prevents
btrfs_qgroup_check_reserved_leak() to catch the leakage as the
detector is purely EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED flag based.
- Leak the previously reserved data bytes.
The bug manifests when N calls to btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data are made and
the last one fails, leaking space reserved in the previous ones.
[FIX]
Also free previously reserved data bytes when btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data
fails.
Fixes:
|
||
Qu Wenruo
|
bab32fc069 |
btrfs: qgroup: Fix the wrong target io_tree when freeing reserved data space
[BUG]
Under the following case with qgroup enabled, if some error happened
after we have reserved delalloc space, then in error handling path, we
could cause qgroup data space leakage:
From btrfs_truncate_block() in inode.c:
ret = btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space(inode, &data_reserved,
block_start, blocksize);
if (ret)
goto out;
again:
page = find_or_create_page(mapping, index, mask);
if (!page) {
btrfs_delalloc_release_space(inode, data_reserved,
block_start, blocksize, true);
btrfs_delalloc_release_extents(BTRFS_I(inode), blocksize, true);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
[CAUSE]
In the above case, btrfs_delalloc_reserve_space() will call
btrfs_qgroup_reserve_data() and mark the io_tree range with
EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED flag.
In the error handling path, we have the following call stack:
btrfs_delalloc_release_space()
|- btrfs_free_reserved_data_space()
|- btrsf_qgroup_free_data()
|- __btrfs_qgroup_release_data(reserved=@reserved, free=1)
|- qgroup_free_reserved_data(reserved=@reserved)
|- clear_record_extent_bits();
|- freed += changeset.bytes_changed;
However due to a completion bug, qgroup_free_reserved_data() will clear
EXTENT_QGROUP_RESERVED flag in BTRFS_I(inode)->io_failure_tree, other
than the correct BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree.
Since io_failure_tree is never marked with that flag,
btrfs_qgroup_free_data() will not free any data reserved space at all,
causing a leakage.
This type of error handling can only be triggered by errors outside of
qgroup code. So EDQUOT error from qgroup can't trigger it.
[FIX]
Fix the wrong target io_tree.
Reported-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Fixes:
|
||
Qu Wenruo
|
fab2735955 |
btrfs: Fix a regression which we can't convert to SINGLE profile
[BUG] With v5.3 kernel, we can't convert to SINGLE profile: # btrfs balance start -f -dconvert=single $mnt ERROR: error during balancing '/mnt/btrfs': Invalid argument # dmesg -t | tail validate_convert_profile: data profile=0x1000000000000 allowed=0x20 is_valid=1 final=0x1000000000000 ret=1 BTRFS error (device dm-3): balance: invalid convert data profile single [CAUSE] With the extra debug output added, it shows that the @allowed bit is lacking the special in-memory only SINGLE profile bit. Thus we fail at that (profile & ~allowed) check. This regression is caused by commit |
||
Qu Wenruo
|
1fac4a5437 |
btrfs: relocation: fix use-after-free on dead relocation roots
[BUG]
One user reported a reproducible KASAN report about use-after-free:
BTRFS info (device sdi1): balance: start -dvrange=1256811659264..1256811659265
BTRFS info (device sdi1): relocating block group 1256811659264 flags data|raid0
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs]
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88856f671710 by task kworker/u24:10/261579
CPU: 2 PID: 261579 Comm: kworker/u24:10 Tainted: P OE 5.2.11-arch1-1-kasan #4
Hardware name: To Be Filled By O.E.M. To Be Filled By O.E.M./X99 Extreme4, BIOS P3.80 04/06/2018
Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_endio_write_helper [btrfs]
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x7b/0xba
print_address_description+0x6c/0x22e
? btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs]
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x3b
? btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs]
kasan_report+0x12/0x17
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x17/0x20
btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2cd/0x340 [btrfs]
record_root_in_trans+0x2a0/0x370 [btrfs]
btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0xf4/0x140 [btrfs]
start_transaction+0x1ab/0xe90 [btrfs]
btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x7bf/0x18a0 [btrfs]
? lock_repin_lock+0x400/0x400
? __kmem_cache_shutdown.cold+0x140/0x1ad
? btrfs_unlink_subvol+0x9b0/0x9b0 [btrfs]
finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20 [btrfs]
normal_work_helper+0x1bd/0xca0 [btrfs]
? process_one_work+0x819/0x1720
? kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
btrfs_endio_write_helper+0x12/0x20 [btrfs]
process_one_work+0x8c9/0x1720
? pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x2f0/0x2f0
? worker_thread+0x1d9/0x1030
worker_thread+0x98/0x1030
kthread+0x2bb/0x3b0
? process_one_work+0x1720/0x1720
? kthread_park+0x120/0x120
ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
Allocated by task 369692:
__kasan_kmalloc.part.0+0x44/0xc0
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xba/0xc0
kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x138/0x260
btrfs_read_tree_root+0x92/0x360 [btrfs]
btrfs_read_fs_root+0x10/0xb0 [btrfs]
create_reloc_root+0x47d/0xa10 [btrfs]
btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x1e2/0x340 [btrfs]
record_root_in_trans+0x2a0/0x370 [btrfs]
btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0xf4/0x140 [btrfs]
start_transaction+0x1ab/0xe90 [btrfs]
btrfs_start_transaction+0x1e/0x20 [btrfs]
__btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x1c2/0xa00 [btrfs]
btrfs_prealloc_file_range+0x13/0x20 [btrfs]
prealloc_file_extent_cluster+0x29f/0x570 [btrfs]
relocate_file_extent_cluster+0x193/0xc30 [btrfs]
relocate_data_extent+0x1f8/0x490 [btrfs]
relocate_block_group+0x600/0x1060 [btrfs]
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x3a0/0xa00 [btrfs]
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x9e/0x180 [btrfs]
btrfs_balance+0x14e4/0x2fc0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x47f/0x640 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x119d/0x8380 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x9f5/0x1060
ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x370
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Freed by task 369692:
__kasan_slab_free+0x14f/0x210
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10
kfree+0xd8/0x270
btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x154c/0x1eb0 [btrfs]
clean_dirty_subvols+0x227/0x340 [btrfs]
relocate_block_group+0x972/0x1060 [btrfs]
btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x3a0/0xa00 [btrfs]
btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x9e/0x180 [btrfs]
btrfs_balance+0x14e4/0x2fc0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x47f/0x640 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x119d/0x8380 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x9f5/0x1060
ksys_ioctl+0x67/0x90
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0
do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x370
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88856f671100
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
The buggy address is located 1552 bytes inside of
4096-byte region [ffff88856f671100, ffff88856f672100)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0015bd9c00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88864400e600 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x2ffff0000010200(slab|head)
raw: 02ffff0000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff88864400e600
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88856f671600: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88856f671680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff88856f671700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff88856f671780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88856f671800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
BTRFS info (device sdi1): 1 enospc errors during balance
BTRFS info (device sdi1): balance: ended with status: -28
[CAUSE]
The problem happens when finish_ordered_io() get called with balance
still running, while the reloc root of that subvolume is already dead.
(Tree is swap already done, but tree not yet deleted for possible qgroup
usage.)
That means root->reloc_root still exists, but that reloc_root can be
under btrfs_drop_snapshot(), thus we shouldn't access it.
The following race could cause the use-after-free problem:
CPU1 | CPU2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| relocate_block_group()
| |- unset_reloc_control(rc)
| |- btrfs_commit_transaction()
btrfs_finish_ordered_io() | |- clean_dirty_subvols()
|- btrfs_join_transaction() | |
|- record_root_in_trans() | |
|- btrfs_init_reloc_root() | |
|- if (root->reloc_root) | |
| | |- root->reloc_root = NULL
| | |- btrfs_drop_snapshot(reloc_root);
|- reloc_root->last_trans|
= trans->transid |
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Use after free
[FIX]
Fix it by the following modifications:
- Test if the root has dead reloc tree before accessing root->reloc_root
If the root has BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE, then we don't need to
create or update root->reloc_tree
- Clear the BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE flag until we have fully dropped
reloc tree
To co-operate with above modification, so as long as
BTRFS_ROOT_DEAD_RELOC_TREE is still set, we won't try to re-create
reloc tree at record_root_in_trans().
Reported-by: Cebtenzzre <cebtenzzre@gmail.com>
Fixes:
|
||
Filipe Manana
|
13fc1d271a |
Btrfs: fix race setting up and completing qgroup rescan workers
There is a race between setting up a qgroup rescan worker and completing a qgroup rescan worker that can lead to callers of the qgroup rescan wait ioctl to either not wait for the rescan worker to complete or to hang forever due to missing wake ups. The following diagram shows a sequence of steps that illustrates the race. CPU 1 CPU 2 CPU 3 btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan() btrfs_qgroup_rescan() qgroup_rescan_init() mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) spin_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock) fs_info->qgroup_flags |= BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN init_completion( &fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion) fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running = true mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) spin_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock) btrfs_init_work() --> starts the worker btrfs_qgroup_rescan_worker() mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) fs_info->qgroup_flags &= ~BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) starts transaction, updates qgroup status item, etc btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan() btrfs_qgroup_rescan() qgroup_rescan_init() mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) spin_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock) fs_info->qgroup_flags |= BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN init_completion( &fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion) fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running = true mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) spin_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_lock) btrfs_init_work() --> starts another worker mutex_lock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running = false mutex_unlock(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock) complete_all(&fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion) Before the rescan worker started by the task at CPU 3 completes, if another task calls btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan(), it will get -EINPROGRESS because the flag BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN is set at fs_info->qgroup_flags, which is expected and correct behaviour. However if other task calls btrfs_ioctl_quota_rescan_wait() before the rescan worker started by the task at CPU 3 completes, it will return immediately without waiting for the new rescan worker to complete, because fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running is set to false by CPU 2. This race is making test case btrfs/171 (from fstests) to fail often: btrfs/171 9s ... - output mismatch (see /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/171.out.bad) --- tests/btrfs/171.out 2018-09-16 21:30:48.505104287 +0100 +++ /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/171.out.bad 2019-09-19 02:01:36.938486039 +0100 @@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ QA output created by 171 +ERROR: quota rescan failed: Operation now in progress Silence is golden ... (Run 'diff -u /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/tests/btrfs/171.out /home/fdmanana/git/hub/xfstests/results//btrfs/171.out.bad' to see the entire diff) That is because the test calls the btrfs-progs commands "qgroup quota rescan -w", "qgroup assign" and "qgroup remove" in a sequence that makes calls to the rescan start ioctl fail with -EINPROGRESS (note the "btrfs" commands 'qgroup assign' and 'qgroup remove' often call the rescan start ioctl after calling the qgroup assign ioctl, btrfs_ioctl_qgroup_assign()), since previous waits didn't actually wait for a rescan worker to complete. Another problem the race can cause is missing wake ups for waiters, since the call to complete_all() happens outside a critical section and after clearing the flag BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN. In the sequence diagram above, if we have a waiter for the first rescan task (executed by CPU 2), then fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion.wait is not empty, and if after the rescan worker clears BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN and before it calls complete_all() against fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion, the task at CPU 3 calls init_completion() against fs_info->qgroup_rescan_completion which re-initilizes its wait queue to an empty queue, therefore causing the rescan worker at CPU 2 to call complete_all() against an empty queue, never waking up the task waiting for that rescan worker. Fix this by clearing BTRFS_QGROUP_STATUS_FLAG_RESCAN and setting fs_info->qgroup_rescan_running to false in the same critical section, delimited by the mutex fs_info->qgroup_rescan_lock, as well as doing the call to complete_all() in that same critical section. This gives the protection needed to avoid rescan wait ioctl callers not waiting for a running rescan worker and the lost wake ups problem, since setting that rescan flag and boolean as well as initializing the wait queue is done already in a critical section delimited by that mutex (at qgroup_rescan_init()). Fixes: |
||
Filipe Manana
|
0607eb1d45 |
Btrfs: fix missing error return if writeback for extent buffer never started
If lock_extent_buffer_for_io() fails, it returns a negative value, but its caller btree_write_cache_pages() ignores such error. This means that a call to flush_write_bio(), from lock_extent_buffer_for_io(), might have failed. We should make btree_write_cache_pages() notice such error values and stop immediatelly, making sure filemap_fdatawrite_range() returns an error to the transaction commit path. A failure from flush_write_bio() should also result in the endio callback end_bio_extent_buffer_writepage() being invoked, which sets the BTRFS_FS_*_ERR bits appropriately, so that there's no risk a transaction or log commit doesn't catch a writeback failure. Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Dennis Zhou
|
eb5b64f142 |
btrfs: adjust dirty_metadata_bytes after writeback failure of extent buffer
Before, if a eb failed to write out, we would end up triggering a BUG_ON(). As of |
||
Filipe Manana
|
9f7fec0ba8 |
Btrfs: fix selftests failure due to uninitialized i_mode in test inodes
Some of the self tests create a test inode, setup some extents and then do
calls to btrfs_get_extent() to test that the corresponding extent maps
exist and are correct. However btrfs_get_extent(), since the 5.2 merge
window, now errors out when it finds a regular or prealloc extent for an
inode that does not correspond to a regular file (its ->i_mode is not
S_IFREG). This causes the self tests to fail sometimes, specially when
KASAN, slub_debug and page poisoning are enabled:
$ modprobe btrfs
modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'btrfs': Invalid argument
$ dmesg
[ 9414.691648] Btrfs loaded, crc32c=crc32c-intel, debug=on, assert=on, integrity-checker=on, ref-verify=on
[ 9414.692655] BTRFS: selftest: sectorsize: 4096 nodesize: 4096
[ 9414.692658] BTRFS: selftest: running btrfs free space cache tests
[ 9414.692918] BTRFS: selftest: running extent only tests
[ 9414.693061] BTRFS: selftest: running bitmap only tests
[ 9414.693366] BTRFS: selftest: running bitmap and extent tests
[ 9414.696455] BTRFS: selftest: running space stealing from bitmap to extent tests
[ 9414.697131] BTRFS: selftest: running extent buffer operation tests
[ 9414.697133] BTRFS: selftest: running btrfs_split_item tests
[ 9414.697564] BTRFS: selftest: running extent I/O tests
[ 9414.697583] BTRFS: selftest: running find delalloc tests
[ 9415.081125] BTRFS: selftest: running find_first_clear_extent_bit test
[ 9415.081278] BTRFS: selftest: running extent buffer bitmap tests
[ 9415.124192] BTRFS: selftest: running inode tests
[ 9415.124195] BTRFS: selftest: running btrfs_get_extent tests
[ 9415.127909] BTRFS: selftest: running hole first btrfs_get_extent test
[ 9415.128343] BTRFS critical (device (efault)): regular/prealloc extent found for non-regular inode 256
[ 9415.131428] BTRFS: selftest: fs/btrfs/tests/inode-tests.c:904 expected a real extent, got 0
This happens because the test inodes are created without ever initializing
the i_mode field of the inode, and neither VFS's new_inode() nor the btrfs
callback btrfs_alloc_inode() initialize the i_mode. Initialization of the
i_mode is done through the various callbacks used by the VFS to create
new inodes (regular files, directories, symlinks, tmpfiles, etc), which
all call btrfs_new_inode() which in turn calls inode_init_owner(), which
sets the inode's i_mode. Since the tests only uses new_inode() to create
the test inodes, the i_mode was never initialized.
This always happens on a VM I used with kasan, slub_debug and many other
debug facilities enabled. It also happened to someone who reported this
on bugzilla (on a 5.3-rc).
Fix this by setting i_mode to S_IFREG at btrfs_new_test_inode().
Fixes:
|
||
Linus Torvalds
|
7d14df2d28 |
for-5.4-tag
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||
Linus Torvalds
|
1b304a1ae4 |
for-5.3-rc8-tag
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||
Filipe Manana
|
18dfa7117a |
Btrfs: fix unwritten extent buffers and hangs on future writeback attempts
The lock_extent_buffer_io() returns 1 to the caller to tell it everything went fine and the callers needs to start writeback for the extent buffer (submit a bio, etc), 0 to tell the caller everything went fine but it does not need to start writeback for the extent buffer, and a negative value if some error happened. When it's about to return 1 it tries to lock all pages, and if a try lock on a page fails, and we didn't flush any existing bio in our "epd", it calls flush_write_bio(epd) and overwrites the return value of 1 to 0 or an error. The page might have been locked elsewhere, not with the goal of starting writeback of the extent buffer, and even by some code other than btrfs, like page migration for example, so it does not mean the writeback of the extent buffer was already started by some other task, so returning a 0 tells the caller (btree_write_cache_pages()) to not start writeback for the extent buffer. Note that epd might currently have either no bio, so flush_write_bio() returns 0 (success) or it might have a bio for another extent buffer with a lower index (logical address). Since we return 0 with the EXTENT_BUFFER_WRITEBACK bit set on the extent buffer and writeback is never started for the extent buffer, future attempts to writeback the extent buffer will hang forever waiting on that bit to be cleared, since it can only be cleared after writeback completes. Such hang is reported with a trace like the following: [49887.347053] INFO: task btrfs-transacti:1752 blocked for more than 122 seconds. [49887.347059] Not tainted 5.2.13-gentoo #2 [49887.347060] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. [49887.347062] btrfs-transacti D 0 1752 2 0x80004000 [49887.347064] Call Trace: [49887.347069] ? __schedule+0x265/0x830 [49887.347071] ? bit_wait+0x50/0x50 [49887.347072] ? bit_wait+0x50/0x50 [49887.347074] schedule+0x24/0x90 [49887.347075] io_schedule+0x3c/0x60 [49887.347077] bit_wait_io+0x8/0x50 [49887.347079] __wait_on_bit+0x6c/0x80 [49887.347081] ? __lock_release.isra.29+0x155/0x2d0 [49887.347083] out_of_line_wait_on_bit+0x7b/0x80 [49887.347084] ? var_wake_function+0x20/0x20 [49887.347087] lock_extent_buffer_for_io+0x28c/0x390 [49887.347089] btree_write_cache_pages+0x18e/0x340 [49887.347091] do_writepages+0x29/0xb0 [49887.347093] ? kmem_cache_free+0x132/0x160 [49887.347095] ? convert_extent_bit+0x544/0x680 [49887.347097] filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x70/0x90 [49887.347099] btrfs_write_marked_extents+0x53/0x120 [49887.347100] btrfs_write_and_wait_transaction.isra.4+0x38/0xa0 [49887.347102] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x6bb/0x990 [49887.347103] ? start_transaction+0x33e/0x500 [49887.347105] transaction_kthread+0x139/0x15c So fix this by not overwriting the return value (ret) with the result from flush_write_bio(). We also need to clear the EXTENT_BUFFER_WRITEBACK bit in case flush_write_bio() returns an error, otherwise it will hang any future attempts to writeback the extent buffer, and undo all work done before (set back EXTENT_BUFFER_DIRTY, etc). This is a regression introduced in the 5.2 kernel. Fixes: |
||
Filipe Manana
|
410f954cb1 |
Btrfs: fix assertion failure during fsync and use of stale transaction
Sometimes when fsync'ing a file we need to log that other inodes exist and when we need to do that we acquire a reference on the inodes and then drop that reference using iput() after logging them. That generally is not a problem except if we end up doing the final iput() (dropping the last reference) on the inode and that inode has a link count of 0, which can happen in a very short time window if the logging path gets a reference on the inode while it's being unlinked. In that case we end up getting the eviction callback, btrfs_evict_inode(), invoked through the iput() call chain which needs to drop all of the inode's items from its subvolume btree, and in order to do that, it needs to join a transaction at the helper function evict_refill_and_join(). However because the task previously started a transaction at the fsync handler, btrfs_sync_file(), it has current->journal_info already pointing to a transaction handle and therefore evict_refill_and_join() will get that transaction handle from btrfs_join_transaction(). From this point on, two different problems can happen: 1) evict_refill_and_join() will often change the transaction handle's block reserve (->block_rsv) and set its ->bytes_reserved field to a value greater than 0. If evict_refill_and_join() never commits the transaction, the eviction handler ends up decreasing the reference count (->use_count) of the transaction handle through the call to btrfs_end_transaction(), and after that point we have a transaction handle with a NULL ->block_rsv (which is the value prior to the transaction join from evict_refill_and_join()) and a ->bytes_reserved value greater than 0. If after the eviction/iput completes the inode logging path hits an error or it decides that it must fallback to a transaction commit, the btrfs fsync handle, btrfs_sync_file(), gets a non-zero value from btrfs_log_dentry_safe(), and because of that non-zero value it tries to commit the transaction using a handle with a NULL ->block_rsv and a non-zero ->bytes_reserved value. This makes the transaction commit hit an assertion failure at btrfs_trans_release_metadata() because ->bytes_reserved is not zero but the ->block_rsv is NULL. The produced stack trace for that is like the following: [192922.917158] assertion failed: !trans->bytes_reserved, file: fs/btrfs/transaction.c, line: 816 [192922.917553] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [192922.917922] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.h:3532! [192922.918310] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI [192922.918666] CPU: 2 PID: 883 Comm: fsstress Tainted: G W 5.1.4-btrfs-next-47 #1 [192922.919035] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.2-0-gf9626ccb91-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [192922.919801] RIP: 0010:assfail.constprop.25+0x18/0x1a [btrfs] (...) [192922.920925] RSP: 0018:ffffaebdc8a27da8 EFLAGS: 00010286 [192922.921315] RAX: 0000000000000051 RBX: ffff95c9c16a41c0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [192922.921692] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff95cab6b16838 RDI: ffff95cab6b16838 [192922.922066] RBP: ffff95c9c16a41c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [192922.922442] R10: ffffaebdc8a27e70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff95ca731a0980 [192922.922820] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff95ca84c73338 R15: ffff95ca731a0ea8 [192922.923200] FS: 00007f337eda4e80(0000) GS:ffff95cab6b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [192922.923579] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [192922.923948] CR2: 00007f337edad000 CR3: 00000001e00f6002 CR4: 00000000003606e0 [192922.924329] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [192922.924711] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [192922.925105] Call Trace: [192922.925505] btrfs_trans_release_metadata+0x10c/0x170 [btrfs] [192922.925911] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x3e/0xaf0 [btrfs] [192922.926324] btrfs_sync_file+0x44c/0x490 [btrfs] [192922.926731] do_fsync+0x38/0x60 [192922.927138] __x64_sys_fdatasync+0x13/0x20 [192922.927543] do_syscall_64+0x60/0x1c0 [192922.927939] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe (...) [192922.934077] ---[ end trace f00808b12068168f ]--- 2) If evict_refill_and_join() decides to commit the transaction, it will be able to do it, since the nested transaction join only increments the transaction handle's ->use_count reference counter and it does not prevent the transaction from getting committed. This means that after eviction completes, the fsync logging path will be using a transaction handle that refers to an already committed transaction. What happens when using such a stale transaction can be unpredictable, we are at least having a use-after-free on the transaction handle itself, since the transaction commit will call kmem_cache_free() against the handle regardless of its ->use_count value, or we can end up silently losing all the updates to the log tree after that iput() in the logging path, or using a transaction handle that in the meanwhile was allocated to another task for a new transaction, etc, pretty much unpredictable what can happen. In order to fix both of them, instead of using iput() during logging, use btrfs_add_delayed_iput(), so that the logging path of fsync never drops the last reference on an inode, that step is offloaded to a safe context (usually the cleaner kthread). The assertion failure issue was sporadically triggered by the test case generic/475 from fstests, which loads the dm error target while fsstress is running, which lead to fsync failing while logging inodes with -EIO errors and then trying later to commit the transaction, triggering the assertion failure. CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+ Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Nikolay Borisov
|
6af112b11a |
btrfs: Relinquish CPUs in btrfs_compare_trees
When doing any form of incremental send the parent and the child trees
need to be compared via btrfs_compare_trees. This can result in long
loop chains without ever relinquishing the CPU. This causes softlockup
detector to trigger when comparing trees with a lot of items. Example
report:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 24s! [snapperd:16153]
CPU: 0 PID: 16153 Comm: snapperd Not tainted 5.2.9-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased)
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 40000005 (nZcv daif -PAN -UAO)
pc : __ll_sc_arch_atomic_sub_return+0x14/0x20
lr : btrfs_release_extent_buffer_pages+0xe0/0x1e8 [btrfs]
sp : ffff00001273b7e0
Call trace:
__ll_sc_arch_atomic_sub_return+0x14/0x20
release_extent_buffer+0xdc/0x120 [btrfs]
free_extent_buffer.part.0+0xb0/0x118 [btrfs]
free_extent_buffer+0x24/0x30 [btrfs]
btrfs_release_path+0x4c/0xa0 [btrfs]
btrfs_free_path.part.0+0x20/0x40 [btrfs]
btrfs_free_path+0x24/0x30 [btrfs]
get_inode_info+0xa8/0xf8 [btrfs]
finish_inode_if_needed+0xe0/0x6d8 [btrfs]
changed_cb+0x9c/0x410 [btrfs]
btrfs_compare_trees+0x284/0x648 [btrfs]
send_subvol+0x33c/0x520 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl_send+0x8a0/0xaf0 [btrfs]
btrfs_ioctl+0x199c/0x2288 [btrfs]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x4b0/0x820
ksys_ioctl+0x84/0xb8
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x28/0x38
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x7c/0x188
el0_svc_handler+0x34/0x90
el0_svc+0x8/0xc
Fix this by adding a call to cond_resched at the beginning of the main
loop in btrfs_compare_trees.
Fixes:
|
||
Nikolay Borisov
|
65e99c43e9 |
btrfs: Don't assign retval of btrfs_try_tree_write_lock/btrfs_tree_read_lock_atomic
Those function are simple boolean predicates there is no need to assign their return values to interim variables. Use them directly as predicates. No functional changes. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Johannes Thumshirn
|
af024ed2e0 |
btrfs: create structure to encode checksum type and length
Create a structure to encode the type and length for the known on-disk checksums. This makes it easier to add new checksums later. The structure and helpers are moved from ctree.h so they don't occupy space in all headers including ctree.h. This save some space in the final object. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
84fe47a4be |
btrfs: add enospc debug messages for ticket failure
When debugging weird enospc problems it's handy to be able to dump the space info when we wake up all tickets, and see what the ticket values are. This helped me figure out cases where we were enospc'ing when we shouldn't have been. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
0096420adb |
btrfs: do not account global reserve in can_overcommit
We ran into a problem in production where a box with plenty of space was getting wedged doing ENOSPC flushing. These boxes only had 20% of the disk allocated, but their metadata space + global reserve was right at the size of their metadata chunk. In this case can_overcommit should be allowing allocations without problem, but there's logic in can_overcommit that doesn't allow us to overcommit if there's not enough real space to satisfy the global reserve. This is for historical reasons. Before there were only certain places we could allocate chunks. We could go to commit the transaction and not have enough space for our pending delayed refs and such and be unable to allocate a new chunk. This would result in a abort because of ENOSPC. This code was added to solve this problem. However since then we've gained the ability to always be able to allocate a chunk. So we can easily overcommit in these cases without risking a transaction abort because of ENOSPC. Also prior to now the global reserve really would be used because that's the space we relied on for delayed refs. With delayed refs being tracked separately we no longer have to worry about running out of delayed refs space while committing. We are much less likely to exhaust our global reserve space during transaction commit. Fix the can_overcommit code to simply see if our current usage + what we want is less than our current free space plus whatever slack space we have in the disk is. This solves the problem we were seeing in production and keeps us from flushing as aggressively as we approach our actual metadata size usage. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
426551f686 |
btrfs: use btrfs_try_granting_tickets in update_global_rsv
We have some annoying xfstests tests that will create a very small fs, fill it up, delete it, and repeat to make sure everything works right. This trips btrfs up sometimes because we may commit a transaction to free space, but most of the free metadata space was being reserved by the global reserve. So we commit and update the global reserve, but the space is simply added to bytes_may_use directly, instead of trying to add it to existing tickets. This results in ENOSPC when we really did have space. Fix this by calling btrfs_try_granting_tickets once we add back our excess space to wake any pending tickets. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
d792b0f197 |
btrfs: always reserve our entire size for the global reserve
While messing with the overcommit logic I noticed that sometimes we'd ENOSPC out when really we should have run out of space much earlier. It turns out it's because we'll only reserve up to the free amount left in the space info for the global reserve, but that doesn't make sense with overcommit because we could be well above our actual size. This results in the global reserve not carving out it's entire reservation, and thus not putting enough pressure on the rest of the infrastructure to do the right thing and ENOSPC out at a convenient time. Fix this by always taking our full reservation amount for the global reserve. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
3593ce30b5 |
btrfs: change the minimum global reserve size
It made sense to have the global reserve set at 16M in the past, but since it is used less nowadays set the minimum size to the number of items we'll need to update the main trees we update during a transaction commit, plus some slop area so we can do unlinks if we need to. In practice this doesn't affect normal file systems, but for xfstests where we do things like fill up a fs and then rm * it can fall over in weird ways. This enables us for more sane behavior at extremely small file system sizes. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
d05e46497f |
btrfs: rename btrfs_space_info_add_old_bytes
This name doesn't really fit with how the space reservation stuff works now, rename it to btrfs_space_info_free_bytes_may_use so it's clear what the function is doing. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
def936e535 |
btrfs: remove orig_bytes from reserve_ticket
Now that we do not do partial filling of tickets simply remove orig_bytes, it is no longer needed. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
00c0135eb8 |
btrfs: fix may_commit_transaction to deal with no partial filling
Now that we aren't partially filling tickets we may have some slack space left in the space_info. We need to account for this in may_commit_transaction, otherwise we may choose to not commit the transaction despite it actually having enough space to satisfy our ticket. Calculate the free space we have in the space_info, if any, and subtract this from the ticket we have and use that amount to determine if we will need to commit to reclaim enough space. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
2341ccd1bf |
btrfs: rework wake_all_tickets
Now that we no longer partially fill tickets we need to rework wake_all_tickets to call btrfs_try_to_wakeup_tickets() in order to see if any subsequent tickets are able to be satisfied. If our tickets_id changes we know something happened and we can keep flushing. Also if we find a ticket that is smaller than the first ticket in our queue then we want to retry the flushing loop again in case may_commit_transaction() decides we could satisfy the ticket by committing the transaction. Rename this to maybe_fail_all_tickets() while we're at it, to better reflect what the function is actually doing. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
18fa2284aa |
btrfs: refactor the ticket wakeup code
Now that btrfs_space_info_add_old_bytes simply checks if we can make the reservation and updates bytes_may_use, there's no reason to have both helpers in place. Factor out the ticket wakeup logic into it's own helper, make btrfs_space_info_add_old_bytes() update bytes_may_use and then call the wakeup helper, and replace all calls to btrfs_space_info_add_new_bytes() with the wakeup helper. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
9118264507 |
btrfs: stop partially refilling tickets when releasing space
btrfs_space_info_add_old_bytes is used when adding the extra space from an existing reservation back into the space_info to be used by any waiting tickets. In order to keep us from overcommitting we check to make sure that we can still use this space for our reserve ticket, and if we cannot we'll simply subtract it from space_info->bytes_may_use. However this is problematic, because it assumes that only changes to bytes_may_use would affect our ability to make reservations. Any changes to bytes_reserved would be missed. If we were unable to make a reservation prior because of reserved space, but that reserved space was free'd due to unlink or truncate and we were allowed to immediately reclaim that metadata space we would still ENOSPC. Consider the example where we create a file with a bunch of extents, using up 2MiB of actual space for the new tree blocks. Then we try to make a reservation of 2MiB but we do not have enough space to make this reservation. The iput() occurs in another thread and we remove this space, and since we did not write the blocks we simply do space_info->bytes_reserved -= 2MiB. We would never see this because we do not check our space info used, we just try to re-use the freed reservations. To fix this problem, and to greatly simplify the wakeup code, do away with this partial refilling nonsense. Use btrfs_space_info_add_old_bytes to subtract the reservation from space_info->bytes_may_use, and then check the ticket against the total used of the space_info the same way we do with the initial reservation attempt. This keeps the reservation logic consistent and solves the problem of early ENOSPC in the case that we free up space in places other than bytes_may_use and bytes_pinned. Thanks, Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
a43c383574 |
btrfs: add space reservation tracepoint for reserved bytes
I noticed when folding the trace_btrfs_space_reservation() tracepoint into the btrfs_space_info_update_* helpers that we didn't emit a tracepoint when doing btrfs_add_reserved_bytes(). I know this is because we were swapping bytes_may_use for bytes_reserved, so in my mind there was no reason to have the tracepoint there. But now there is because we always emit the unreserve for the bytes_may_use side, and this would have broken if compression was on anyway. Add a tracepoint to cover the bytes_reserved counter so the math still comes out right. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
f3e75e3805 |
btrfs: roll tracepoint into btrfs_space_info_update helper
We duplicate this tracepoint everywhere we call these helpers, so update the helper to have the tracepoint as well. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Josef Bacik
|
ef1317a1b9 |
btrfs: do not allow reservations if we have pending tickets
If we already have tickets on the list we don't want to steal their reservations. This is a preparation patch for upcoming changes, technically this shouldn't happen today because of the way we add bytes to tickets before adding them to the space_info in most cases. This does not change the FIFO nature of reserve tickets, it simply allows us to enforce it in a different way. Previously it was enforced because any new space would be added to the first ticket on the list, which would result in new reservations getting a reserve ticket. This replaces that mechanism by simply checking to see if we have outstanding reserve tickets and skipping straight to adding a ticket for our reservation. Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Omar Sandoval
|
e182163d9c |
btrfs: stop clearing EXTENT_DIRTY in inode I/O tree
Since commit
|
||
Omar Sandoval
|
f50cb7aff9 |
btrfs: treat RWF_{,D}SYNC writes as sync for CRCs
The VFS indicates a synchronous write to ->write_iter() via iocb->ki_flags. The IOCB_{,D}SYNC flags may be set based on the file (see iocb_flags()) or the RWF_* flags passed to a syscall like pwritev2() (see kiocb_set_rw_flags()). However, in btrfs_file_write_iter(), we're checking if a write is synchronous based only on the file; we use this to decide when to bump the sync_writers counter and thus do CRCs synchronously. Make sure we do this for all synchronous writes as determined by the VFS. Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> [ add const ] Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Omar Sandoval
|
c09767a896 |
btrfs: use correct count in btrfs_file_write_iter()
generic_write_checks() may modify iov_iter_count(), so we must get the
count after the call, not before. Using the wrong one has a couple of
consequences:
1. We check a longer range in check_can_nocow() for nowait than we're
actually writing.
2. We create extra hole extent maps in btrfs_cont_expand(). As far as I
can tell, this is harmless, but I might be missing something.
These issues are pretty minor, but let's fix it before something more
important trips on it.
Fixes:
|
||
David Sterba
|
c82f823c9b |
btrfs: tie extent buffer and it's token together
Further simplifaction of the get/set helpers is possible when the token is uniquely tied to an extent buffer. A condition and an assignment can be avoided. The initializations are moved closer to the first use when the extent buffer is valid. There's one exception in __push_leaf_left where the token is reused. Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
David Sterba
|
48bc39501a |
btrfs: assume valid token for btrfs_set/get_token helpers
Now that we can safely assume that the token is always a valid pointer, remove the branches that check that. Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
David Sterba
|
cb49511328 |
btrfs: define separate btrfs_set/get_XX helpers
There are helpers for all type widths defined via macro and optionally can use a token which is a cached pointer to avoid repeated mapping of the extent buffer. The token value is known at compile time, when it's valid it's always address of a local variable, otherwise it's NULL passed by the token-less helpers. This can be utilized to remove some branching as the helpers are used frequenlty. Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Nikolay Borisov
|
6ff49c6ad2 |
btrfs: Make btrfs_find_name_in_ext_backref return struct btrfs_inode_extref
btrfs_find_name_in_ext_backref returns either 0/1 depending on whether it found a backref for the given name. If it returns true then the actual inode_ref struct is returned in one of its parameters. That's pointless, instead refactor the function such that it returns either a pointer to the btrfs_inode_extref or NULL it it didn't find anything. This streamlines the function calling convention. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Nikolay Borisov
|
9bb8407f54 |
btrfs: Make btrfs_find_name_in_backref return btrfs_inode_ref struct
btrfs_find_name_in_backref returns either 0/1 depending on whether it found a backref for the given name. If it returns true then the actual inode_ref struct is returned in one of its parameters. That's pointless, instead refactor the function such that it returns either a pointer to the btrfs_inode_ref or NULL it it didn't find anything. This streamlines the function calling convention. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
David Sterba
|
1dc990dfd3 |
btrfs: move dev_stats helpers to volumes.c
The other dev stats functions are already there and the helpers are not used by anything else. Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
David Sterba
|
67b61aefce |
btrfs: move struct io_ctl to free-space-cache.h
The io_ctl structure is used for free space management, and used only by the v1 space cache code, but unfortunatlly the full definition is required by block-group.h so it can't be moved to free-space-cache.c without additional changes. Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
David Sterba
|
18d0f5c6e1 |
btrfs: move functions for tree compare to send.c
Send is the only user of tree_compare, we can move it there along with the other helpers and definitions. Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
David Sterba
|
4b231ae474 |
btrfs: rename and export read_node_slot
Preparatory work for code that will be moved out of ctree and uses this function. Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
David Sterba
|
8a953348af |
btrfs: move private raid56 definitions from ctree.h
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
David Sterba
|
784352fe0b |
btrfs: move math functions to misc.h
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
David Sterba
|
602cbe91fb |
btrfs: move cond_wake_up functions out of ctree
The file ctree.h serves as a header for everything and has become quite bloated. Split some helpers that are generic and create a new file that should be the catch-all for code that's not btrfs-specific. Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |
||
Anand Jain
|
d2979aa25f |
btrfs: use proper error values on allocation failure in clone_fs_devices
Fix the fake ENOMEM return error code to the actual error in clone_fs_devices(). Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com> |