The optee_copy_fdt_nodes is only used to copy op-tee nodes
of U-Boot device tree (from gd->fdt_blob when OF_LIVE is not activated)
to external device tree but it is not compatible with OF_LIVE.
This patch migrates all used function fdt_ functions to read node on
old_blob to ofnode functions, compatible with OF_LIVE and remove this
parameter "old_blob".
The generated "device tree" is checked on stm32mp platform with OF_LIVE
activated.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Delaunay <patrick.delaunay@foss.st.com>
This Trusted Application allows enabling SCP03 as well as provisioning
the keys on TEE controlled secure element (ie, NXP SE050).
All the information flowing on buses (ie I2C) between the processor
and the secure element must be encrypted. Secure elements are
pre-provisioned with a set of keys known to the user so that the
secure channel protocol (encryption) can be enforced on the first
boot. This situation is however unsafe since the keys are publically
available.
For example, in the case of the NXP SE050, these keys would be
available in the OP-TEE source tree [2] and of course in the
documentation corresponding to the part.
To address that, users are required to rotate/provision those keys
(ie, generate new keys and write them in the secure element's
persistent memory).
For information on SCP03, check the Global Platform HomePage and
google for that term [1]
[1] globalplatform.org
[2] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/
check:
core/drivers/crypto/se050/adaptors/utils/scp_config.c
Signed-off-by: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <jorge@foundries.io>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
This adds support for RPC test trusted application emulation, which
permits to test reverse RPC calls to TEE supplicant. Currently it covers
requests to the I2C bus from TEE.
Signed-off-by: Igor Opaniuk <igor.opaniuk@foundries.io>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>
The loading convention for optee or any other tee on arm64 is as bl32
parameter to the trusted-firmware. So TF-A gets invoked with the TEE as
bl32 and main u-boot as bl33. Once it has done its startup TF-A jumps
into the bl32 for the TEE startup, returns to TF-A and then jumps to bl33.
All of them get passed a devicetree as parameter and all components often
get loaded from a FIT image.
OP-TEE will create additional nodes in that devicetree namely a firmware
node and possibly multiple reserved-memory nodes.
While this devicetree is used in main u-boot, in most cases it won't be
the one passed to the actual kernel. Instead most boot commands will load
a new devicetree from somewhere like mass storage of the network, so if
that happens u-boot should transfer the optee nodes to that new devicetree.
To make that happen introduce optee_copy_fdt_nodes() called from the dt
setup function in image-fdt which after checking for the optee presence
in the u-boot dt will make sure a optee node is present in the kernel dt
and transfer any reserved-memory regions it can find.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko.stuebner@theobroma-systems.com>
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
AVB 2.0 spec. revision 1.1 introduces support for named persistent values
that must be tamper evident and allows AVB to store arbitrary key-value
pairs [1].
Introduce implementation of two additional AVB operations
read_persistent_value()/write_persistent_value() for retrieving/storing
named persistent values.
Correspondent pull request in the OP-TEE OS project repo [2].
[1]: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/android-9.0.0_r22
[2]: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/2699
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sam Protsenko <semen.protsenko@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Igor Opaniuk <igor.opaniuk@gmail.com>
Adds configuration option OPTEE_TA_AVB and a header file describing the
interface to the Android Verified Boot 2.0 (AVB) trusted application
provided by OP-TEE.
Tested-by: Igor Opaniuk <igor.opaniuk@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Igor Opaniuk <igor.opaniuk@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
When U-Boot started using SPDX tags we were among the early adopters and
there weren't a lot of other examples to borrow from. So we picked the
area of the file that usually had a full license text and replaced it
with an appropriate SPDX-License-Identifier: entry. Since then, the
Linux Kernel has adopted SPDX tags and they place it as the very first
line in a file (except where shebangs are used, then it's second line)
and with slightly different comment styles than us.
In part due to community overlap, in part due to better tag visibility
and in part for other minor reasons, switch over to that style.
This commit changes all instances where we have a single declared
license in the tag as both the before and after are identical in tag
contents. There's also a few places where I found we did not have a tag
and have introduced one.
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
This patch adds optee_verify_bootm_image() which will be subsequently used
to verify the parameters encoded in the OPTEE header match the memory
allocated to the OPTEE region, OPTEE header magic and version prior to
handing off control to the OPTEE image.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Harinarayan Bhatta <harinarayan@ti.com>
Cc: Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com>
Cc: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Cc: Kever Yang <kever.yang@rock-chips.com>
Cc: Philipp Tomsich <philipp.tomsich@theobroma-systems.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
This patch adds optee_image_get_load_addr() a helper function used to
calculate the load-address of an OPTEE image based on the lower
entry-point address given in the OPTEE header.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Harinarayan Bhatta <harinarayan@ti.com>
Cc: Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com>
Cc: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Cc: Kever Yang <kever.yang@rock-chips.com>
Cc: Philipp Tomsich <philipp.tomsich@theobroma-systems.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Add a helper function for extracting the least significant 32 bits from the
OPTEE entry point address, which will be good enough to load OPTEE binaries
up to (2^32)-1 bytes.
We may need to extend this out later on but for now (2^32)-1 should be
fine.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Harinarayan Bhatta <harinarayan@ti.com>
Cc: Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com>
Cc: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Cc: Kever Yang <kever.yang@rock-chips.com>
Cc: Philipp Tomsich <philipp.tomsich@theobroma-systems.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
This patch adds code to lib to enable sharing of useful OPTEE code between
board-ports and architectures. The code on lib/optee/optee.c comes from the
TI omap2 port. Eventually the OMAP2 code will be patched to include the
shared code. The intention here is to add more useful OPTEE specific code
as more functionality gets added.
Signed-off-by: Bryan O'Donoghue <bryan.odonoghue@linaro.org>
Cc: Harinarayan Bhatta <harinarayan@ti.com>
Cc: Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com>
Cc: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Cc: Kever Yang <kever.yang@rock-chips.com>
Cc: Philipp Tomsich <philipp.tomsich@theobroma-systems.com>
Cc: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
secure_tee_install is used to install and initialize a secure TEE OS such as
Linaro OP-TEE into the secure world. This function takes in the address
where the signed TEE image is loaded as an argument. The signed TEE image
consists of a header (struct tee_header), TEE code+data followed by the
signature generated using image signing tool from TI security development
package (SECDEV). Refer to README.ti-secure for more information.
This function uses 2 new secure APIs.
1. PPA_SERV_HAL_TEE_LOAD_MASTER - Must be called on CPU Core 0. Protected
memory for TEE must be reserved before calling this function. This API
needs arguments filled into struct ppa_tee_load_info. The TEE image is
authenticated and if there are no errors, the control passes to the TEE
entry point.
2. PPA_SERV_HAL_TEE_LOAD_SLAVE - Called on other CPU cores only after
a TEE_LOAD_MASTER call. Takes no arguments. Checks if TEE was
successfully loaded (on core 0) and transfers control to the same TEE
entry point.
The code at TEE entry point is expected perform OS initialization steps
and return back to non-secure world (U-Boot).
Signed-off-by: Harinarayan Bhatta <harinarayan@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Patrick Delaunay