rsa-checksum.c sontains the hash_calculate() implementations. Despite
the "rsa-" file prefix, this function is useful for other algorithms.
To prevent confusion, move this file to lib/, and rename it to
hash-checksum.c, to give it a more "generic" feel.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
When searching for a node called 'fred', any unit address appended to the
name is ignored by libfdt, meaning that 'fred' can match 'fred@1'. This
means that we cannot be sure that the node originally intended is the one
that is used.
Disallow use of nodes with unit addresses.
Update the forge test also, since it uses @ addresses.
CVE-2021-27138
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Bruce Monroe <bruce.monroe@intel.com>
Reported-by: Arie Haenel <arie.haenel@intel.com>
Reported-by: Julien Lenoir <julien.lenoir@intel.com>
Move this out of the common header and include it only where needed. In
a number of cases this requires adding "struct udevice;" to avoid adding
another large header or in other cases replacing / adding missing header
files that had been pulled in, very indirectly. Finally, we have a few
cases where we did not need to include <asm/global_data.h> at all, so
remove that include.
Signed-off-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
In fit_config_verify_sig(), when no 'signature*' subnode exists in
the configuration node, the fdt_for_each_subnode() loop is a no-op.
Therefore, no error flags are set, and 'err_,sg' is not populated
with an error string. This is incorrect behavior.
Populate err_msg to indicate that no 'signature' is found, before
entering the loop. The first call to fit_image_verify_sig() will
override clear err_msg, or set it to a more specific message.
Signed-off-by: Alexandru Gagniuc <mr.nuke.me@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
When CONFIG_FIT_CIPHER=y and CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE=n is there is no
implementation of image_get_host_blob for mkimage/dumpimage:
/usr/bin/ld: tools/common/image-cipher.o: in function `fit_image_decrypt_data':
image-cipher.c:(.text+0x9a): undefined reference to `image_get_host_blob'
Move the implementation to a common file so it can be shaed between
image-cipher.c and image-fit-sig.c.
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
Currently FIT image must be signed by all required conf keys. This means
Verified Boot fails if there is a signature verification failure
using any required key in U-Boot DTB.
This patch introduces a new policy in DTB that can be set to any required
conf key. This means if verified boot passes with one of the required
keys, U-Boot will continue the OS hand off.
There were prior attempts to address this:
https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2019-April/366047.html
The above patch was failing "make tests".
https://lists.denx.de/pipermail/u-boot/2020-January/396629.html
Signed-off-by: Thirupathaiah Annapureddy <thiruan@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
The signature check on config node is broken on fit with padding.
To compute the signature for config node, U-Boot compute the
signature on all properties of requested node for this config,
except for the property "data". But, when padding is used for
binary in a fit, there isn't a property "data" but two properties:
"data-offset" and "data-size". So to fix the check of signature,
we also don't use the properties "data-offset" and "data-size"
when checking the signature on config node.
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Philippe Reynes <philippe.reynes@softathome.com>
fdt_region APIs are not part of libfdt. They are U-Boot extension
for the verified boot. Split the declarations related to fdt_region
out of <fdt_region.h>. This allows <linux/libfdt.h> to become a
simple wrapper file, like Linux does.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Introduce new configuration, CONFIG_RSA_VERIFY which will decouple building
RSA functions from FIT verification and allow for adding a RSA-based
signature verification for other file formats, in particular PE file
for UEFI secure boot.
Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org>
Alexandru Gagniuc