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arm: mach-k3: Add secure device support 

K3 devices have High Security (HS) variants along with the non-HS already
supported. Like the previous generation devices (OMAP/Keystone2) K3
supports boot chain-of-trust by authenticating and optionally decrypting
images as they are unpacked from FIT images. Add support for this here.

Signed-off-by: Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Rini <trini@konsulko.com>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dannenberg <dannenberg@ti.com>
This commit is contained in:
Andrew F. Davis 2019-04-12 12:54:45 -04:00 committed by Tom Rini
parent ff6043a5fd
commit 3a543a8084
4 changed files with 66 additions and 1 deletions
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1
MAINTAINERS
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@ -733,6 +733,7 @@ S: Supported
F: arch/arm/mach-omap2/omap5/sec_entry_cpu1.S
F: arch/arm/mach-omap2/sec-common.c
F: arch/arm/mach-omap2/config_secure.mk
F: arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c
F: configs/am335x_hs_evm_defconfig
F: configs/am335x_hs_evm_uart_defconfig
F: configs/am43xx_hs_evm_defconfig

2
arch/arm/Kconfig
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@ -1464,7 +1464,7 @@ endchoice
config TI_SECURE_DEVICE
bool "HS Device Type Support"
depends on ARCH_KEYSTONE || ARCH_OMAP2PLUS
depends on ARCH_KEYSTONE || ARCH_OMAP2PLUS || ARCH_K3
help
If a high secure (HS) device type is being used, this config
must be set. This option impacts various aspects of the

1
arch/arm/mach-k3/Makefile
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@ -6,4 +6,5 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SOC_K3_AM6) += am6_init.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ARM64) += arm64-mmu.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_V7R) += r5_mpu.o lowlevel_init.o
obj-$(CONFIG_TI_SECURE_DEVICE) += security.o
obj-y += common.o

63
arch/arm/mach-k3/security.c Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* K3: Security functions
*
* Copyright (C) 2018 Texas Instruments Incorporated - http://www.ti.com/
* Andrew F. Davis <afd@ti.com>
*/
#include <common.h>
#include <dm.h>
#include <linux/soc/ti/ti_sci_protocol.h>
#include <mach/spl.h>
#include <spl.h>
void board_fit_image_post_process(void **p_image, size_t *p_size)
{
struct udevice *dev;
struct ti_sci_handle *ti_sci;
struct ti_sci_proc_ops *proc_ops;
u64 image_addr;
u32 image_size;
int ret;
/* Get handle to Device Management and Security Controller (SYSFW) */
ret = uclass_get_device_by_name(UCLASS_FIRMWARE, "dmsc", &dev);
if (ret) {
printf("Failed to get handle to SYSFW (%d)\n", ret);
hang();
}
ti_sci = (struct ti_sci_handle *)(ti_sci_get_handle_from_sysfw(dev));
proc_ops = &ti_sci->ops.proc_ops;
image_addr = (uintptr_t)*p_image;
debug("Authenticating image at address 0x%016llx\n", image_addr);
/* Authenticate image */
ret = proc_ops->proc_auth_boot_image(ti_sci, &image_addr, &image_size);
if (ret) {
printf("Authentication failed!\n");
hang();
}
/*
* The image_size returned may be 0 when the authentication process has
* moved the image. When this happens no further processing on the
* image is needed or often even possible as it may have also been
* placed behind a firewall when moved.
*/
*p_size = image_size;
/*
* Output notification of successful authentication to re-assure the
* user that the secure code is being processed as expected. However
* suppress any such log output in case of building for SPL and booting
* via YMODEM. This is done to avoid disturbing the YMODEM serial
* protocol transactions.
*/
if (!(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_BUILD) &&
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SPL_YMODEM_SUPPORT) &&
spl_boot_device() == BOOT_DEVICE_UART))
printf("Authentication passed\n");
}