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https://github.com/brain-hackers/u-boot-brain
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609 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext
609 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext
![]() |
Verified Boot on the Beaglebone Black
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=====================================
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Introduction
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------------
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Before reading this, please read verified-boot.txt and signature.txt. These
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instructions are for mainline U-Boot from v2014.07 onwards.
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There is quite a bit of documentation in this directory describing how
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verified boot works in U-Boot. There is also a test which runs through the
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entire process of signing an image and running U-Boot (sandbox) to check it.
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However, it might be useful to also have an example on a real board.
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Beaglebone Black is a fairly common board so seems to be a reasonable choice
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for an example of how to enable verified boot using U-Boot.
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First a note that may to help avoid confusion. U-Boot and Linux both use
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device tree. They may use the same device tree source, but it is seldom useful
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for them to use the exact same binary from the same place. More typically,
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U-Boot has its device tree packaged wtih it, and the kernel's device tree is
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packaged with the kernel. In particular this is important with verified boot,
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since U-Boot's device tree must be immutable. If it can be changed then the
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public keys can be changed and verified boot is useless. An attacker can
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simply generate a new key and put his public key into U-Boot so that
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everything verifies. On the other hand the kernel's device tree typically
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changes when the kernel changes, so it is useful to package an updated device
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tree with the kernel binary. U-Boot supports the latter with its flexible FIT
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format (Flat Image Tree).
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Overview
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--------
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The steps are roughly as follows:
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1. Build U-Boot for the board, with the verified boot options enabled.
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2. Obtain a suitable Linux kernel
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3. Create a Image Tree Source file (ITS) file describing how you want the
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kernel to be packaged, compressed and signed.
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4. Create a key pair
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5. Sign the kernel
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6. Put the public key into U-Boot's image
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7. Put U-Boot and the kernel onto the board
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8. Try it
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Step 1: Build U-Boot
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--------------------
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a. Set up the environment variable to point to your toolchain. You will need
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this for U-Boot and also for the kernel if you build it. For example if you
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installed a Linaro version manually it might be something like:
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export CROSS_COMPILE=/opt/linaro/gcc-linaro-arm-linux-gnueabihf-4.8-2013.08_linux/bin/arm-linux-gnueabihf-
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or if you just installed gcc-arm-linux-gnueabi then it might be
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export CROSS_COMPILE=arm-linux-gnueabi-
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b. Configure and build U-Boot with verified boot enabled:
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export ARCH=arm
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export UBOOT=/path/to/u-boot
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cd $UBOOT
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# You can add -j10 if you have 10 CPUs to make it faster
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make O=b/am335x_boneblack_vboot am335x_boneblack_vboot_config all
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export UOUT=$UBOOT/b/am335x_boneblack_vboot
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c. You will now have a U-Boot image:
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file b/am335x_boneblack_vboot/u-boot-dtb.img
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b/am335x_boneblack_vboot/u-boot-dtb.img: u-boot legacy uImage, U-Boot 2014.07-rc2-00065-g2f69f8, Firmware/ARM, Firmware Image (Not compressed), 395375 bytes, Sat May 31 16:19:04 2014, Load Address: 0x80800000, Entry Point: 0x00000000, Header CRC: 0x0ABD6ACA, Data CRC: 0x36DEF7E4
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Step 2: Build Linux
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--------------------
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a. Find the kernel image ('Image') and device tree (.dtb) file you plan to
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use. In our case it is am335x-boneblack.dtb and it is built with the kernel.
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At the time of writing an SD Boot image can be obtained from here:
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http://www.elinux.org/Beagleboard:Updating_The_Software#Image_For_Booting_From_microSD
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You can write this to an SD card and then mount it to extract the kernel and
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device tree files.
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You can also build a kernel. Instructions for this are are here:
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http://elinux.org/Building_BBB_Kernel
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or you can use your favourite search engine. Following these instructions
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produces a kernel Image and device tree files. For the record the steps were:
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export KERNEL=/path/to/kernel
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cd $KERNEL
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git clone git://github.com/beagleboard/kernel.git .
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git checkout v3.14
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./patch.sh
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cp configs/beaglebone kernel/arch/arm/configs/beaglebone_defconfig
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cd kernel
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make beaglebone_defconfig
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make uImage dtbs # -j10 if you have 10 CPUs
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export OKERNEL=$KERNEL/kernel/arch/arm/boot
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c. You now have the 'Image' and 'am335x-boneblack.dtb' files needed to boot.
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Step 3: Create the ITS
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----------------------
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Set up a directory for your work.
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export WORK=/path/to/dir
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cd $WORK
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Put this into a file in that directory called sign.its:
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/dts-v1/;
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/ {
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description = "Beaglebone black";
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#address-cells = <1>;
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images {
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kernel@1 {
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data = /incbin/("Image.lzo");
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type = "kernel";
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arch = "arm";
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os = "linux";
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compression = "lzo";
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load = <0x80008000>;
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entry = <0x80008000>;
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hash@1 {
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algo = "sha1";
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};
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};
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fdt@1 {
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description = "beaglebone-black";
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data = /incbin/("am335x-boneblack.dtb");
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type = "flat_dt";
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arch = "arm";
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compression = "none";
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hash@1 {
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algo = "sha1";
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};
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};
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};
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configurations {
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default = "conf@1";
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conf@1 {
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kernel = "kernel@1";
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fdt = "fdt@1";
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signature@1 {
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algo = "sha1,rsa2048";
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key-name-hint = "dev";
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sign-images = "fdt", "kernel";
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};
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};
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};
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};
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The explanation for this is all in the documentation you have already read.
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But briefly it packages a kernel and device tree, and provides a single
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configuration to be signed with a key named 'dev'. The kernel is compressed
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with LZO to make it smaller.
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Step 4: Create a key pair
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-------------------------
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See signature.txt for details on this step.
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cd $WORK
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mkdir keys
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openssl genrsa -F4 -out keys/dev.key 2048
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openssl req -batch -new -x509 -key keys/dev.key -out keys/dev.crt
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Note: keys/dev.key contains your private key and is very secret. If anyone
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gets access to that file they can sign kernels with it. Keep it secure.
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Step 5: Sign the kernel
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-----------------------
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We need to use mkimage (which was built when you built U-Boot) to package the
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Linux kernel into a FIT (Flat Image Tree, a flexible file format that U-Boot
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can load) using the ITS file you just created.
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At the same time we must put the public key into U-Boot device tree, with the
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'required' property, which tells U-Boot that this key must be verified for the
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image to be valid. You will make this key available to U-Boot for booting in
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step 6.
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ln -s $OKERNEL/dts/am335x-boneblack.dtb
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ln -s $OKERNEL/Image
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ln -s $UOUT/u-boot-dtb.img
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cp $UOUT/arch/arm/dts/am335x-boneblack.dtb am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb
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lzop Image
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$UOUT/tools/mkimage -f sign.its -K am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb -k keys -r image.fit
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You should see something like this:
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FIT description: Beaglebone black
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Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014
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Image 0 (kernel@1)
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Description: unavailable
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Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014
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Type: Kernel Image
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Compression: lzo compressed
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Data Size: 7790938 Bytes = 7608.34 kB = 7.43 MB
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Architecture: ARM
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OS: Linux
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Load Address: 0x80008000
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Entry Point: 0x80008000
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Hash algo: sha1
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Hash value: c94364646427e10f423837e559898ef02c97b988
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Image 1 (fdt@1)
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Description: beaglebone-black
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Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014
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Type: Flat Device Tree
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Compression: uncompressed
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Data Size: 31547 Bytes = 30.81 kB = 0.03 MB
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Architecture: ARM
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Hash algo: sha1
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Hash value: cb09202f889d824f23b8e4404b781be5ad38a68d
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Default Configuration: 'conf@1'
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Configuration 0 (conf@1)
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Description: unavailable
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Kernel: kernel@1
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FDT: fdt@1
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Now am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb contains the public key and image.fit contains
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the signed kernel. Jump to step 6 if you like, or continue reading to increase
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your understanding.
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You can also run fit_check_sign to check it:
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$UOUT/tools/fit_check_sign -f image.fit -k am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb
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which results in:
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Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1,rsa2048:dev+
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## Loading kernel from FIT Image at 7fc6ee469000 ...
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Using 'conf@1' configuration
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Verifying Hash Integrity ...
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sha1,rsa2048:dev+
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OK
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Trying 'kernel@1' kernel subimage
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Description: unavailable
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Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014
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Type: Kernel Image
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Compression: lzo compressed
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Data Size: 7790938 Bytes = 7608.34 kB = 7.43 MB
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Architecture: ARM
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OS: Linux
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Load Address: 0x80008000
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Entry Point: 0x80008000
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Hash algo: sha1
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Hash value: c94364646427e10f423837e559898ef02c97b988
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Verifying Hash Integrity ...
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sha1+
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OK
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Unimplemented compression type 4
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## Loading fdt from FIT Image at 7fc6ee469000 ...
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Using 'conf@1' configuration
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Trying 'fdt@1' fdt subimage
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Description: beaglebone-black
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Created: Sun Jun 1 12:50:30 2014
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Type: Flat Device Tree
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Compression: uncompressed
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Data Size: 31547 Bytes = 30.81 kB = 0.03 MB
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Architecture: ARM
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Hash algo: sha1
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Hash value: cb09202f889d824f23b8e4404b781be5ad38a68d
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Verifying Hash Integrity ...
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sha1+
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OK
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Loading Flat Device Tree ... OK
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## Loading ramdisk from FIT Image at 7fc6ee469000 ...
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Using 'conf@1' configuration
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Could not find subimage node
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Signature check OK
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At the top, you see "sha1,rsa2048:dev+". This means that it checked an RSA key
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of size 2048 bits using SHA1 as the hash algorithm. The key name checked was
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'dev' and the '+' means that it verified. If it showed '-' that would be bad.
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Once the configuration is verified it is then possible to rely on the hashes
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in each image referenced by that configuration. So fit_check_sign goes on to
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load each of the images. We have a kernel and an FDT but no ramkdisk. In each
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case fit_check_sign checks the hash and prints sha1+ meaning that the SHA1
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hash verified. This means that none of the images has been tampered with.
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There is a test in test/vboot which uses U-Boot's sandbox build to verify that
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the above flow works.
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But it is fun to do this by hand, so you can load image.fit into a hex editor
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like ghex, and change a byte in the kernel:
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$UOUT/tools/fit_info -f image.fit -n /images/kernel@1 -p data
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NAME: kernel@1
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LEN: 7790938
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OFF: 168
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This tells us that the kernel starts at byte offset 168 (decimal) in image.fit
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and extends for about 7MB. Try changing a byte at 0x2000 (say) and run
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fit_check_sign again. You should see something like:
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Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1,rsa2048:dev+
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## Loading kernel from FIT Image at 7f5a39571000 ...
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Using 'conf@1' configuration
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Verifying Hash Integrity ...
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sha1,rsa2048:dev+
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OK
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Trying 'kernel@1' kernel subimage
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Description: unavailable
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Created: Sun Jun 1 13:09:21 2014
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Type: Kernel Image
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Compression: lzo compressed
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Data Size: 7790938 Bytes = 7608.34 kB = 7.43 MB
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Architecture: ARM
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OS: Linux
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Load Address: 0x80008000
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Entry Point: 0x80008000
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Hash algo: sha1
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Hash value: c94364646427e10f423837e559898ef02c97b988
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Verifying Hash Integrity ...
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sha1 error
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Bad hash value for 'hash@1' hash node in 'kernel@1' image node
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Bad Data Hash
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## Loading fdt from FIT Image at 7f5a39571000 ...
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Using 'conf@1' configuration
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Trying 'fdt@1' fdt subimage
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Description: beaglebone-black
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Created: Sun Jun 1 13:09:21 2014
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Type: Flat Device Tree
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Compression: uncompressed
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Data Size: 31547 Bytes = 30.81 kB = 0.03 MB
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Architecture: ARM
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Hash algo: sha1
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Hash value: cb09202f889d824f23b8e4404b781be5ad38a68d
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Verifying Hash Integrity ...
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sha1+
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OK
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Loading Flat Device Tree ... OK
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## Loading ramdisk from FIT Image at 7f5a39571000 ...
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Using 'conf@1' configuration
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Could not find subimage node
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Signature check Bad (error 1)
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It has detected the change in the kernel.
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You can also be sneaky and try to switch images, using the libfdt utilities
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that come with dtc (package name is device-tree-compiler but you will need a
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recent version like 1.4:
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dtc -v
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Version: DTC 1.4.0
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First we can check which nodes are actually hashed by the configuration:
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fdtget -l image.fit /
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images
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configurations
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fdtget -l image.fit /configurations
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conf@1
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fdtget -l image.fit /configurations/conf@1
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signature@1
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fdtget -p image.fit /configurations/conf@1/signature@1
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hashed-strings
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hashed-nodes
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timestamp
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signer-version
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signer-name
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value
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algo
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key-name-hint
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sign-images
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fdtget image.fit /configurations/conf@1/signature@1 hashed-nodes
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/ /configurations/conf@1 /images/fdt@1 /images/fdt@1/hash@1 /images/kernel@1 /images/kernel@1/hash@1
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This gives us a bit of a look into the signature that mkimage added. Note you
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can also use fdtdump to list the entire device tree.
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Say we want to change the kernel that this configuration uses
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(/images/kernel@1). We could just put a new kernel in the image, but we will
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need to change the hash to match. Let's simulate that by changing a byte of
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the hash:
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fdtget -tx image.fit /images/kernel@1/hash@1 value
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c9436464 6427e10f 423837e5 59898ef0 2c97b988
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fdtput -tx image.fit /images/kernel@1/hash@1 value c9436464 6427e10f 423837e5 59898ef0 2c97b981
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Now check it again:
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$UOUT/tools/fit_check_sign -f image.fit -k am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb
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Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1,rsa2048:devrsa_verify_with_keynode: RSA failed to verify: -13
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rsa_verify_with_keynode: RSA failed to verify: -13
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-
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Failed to verify required signature 'key-dev'
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Signature check Bad (error 1)
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|
This time we don't even get as far as checking the images, since the
|
||
|
configuration signature doesn't match. We can't change any hashes without the
|
||
|
signature check noticing. The configuration is essentially locked. U-Boot has
|
||
|
a public key for which it requires a match, and will not permit the use of any
|
||
|
configuration that does not match that public key. The only way the
|
||
|
configuration will match is if it was signed by the matching private key.
|
||
|
|
||
|
It would also be possible to add a new signature node that does match your new
|
||
|
configuration. But that won't work since you are not allowed to change the
|
||
|
configuration in any way. Try it with a fresh (valid) image if you like by
|
||
|
running the mkimage link again. Then:
|
||
|
|
||
|
fdtput -p image.fit /configurations/conf@1/signature@2 value fred
|
||
|
$UOUT/tools/fit_check_sign -f image.fit -k am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb
|
||
|
Verifying Hash Integrity ... -
|
||
|
sha1,rsa2048:devrsa_verify_with_keynode: RSA failed to verify: -13
|
||
|
rsa_verify_with_keynode: RSA failed to verify: -13
|
||
|
-
|
||
|
Failed to verify required signature 'key-dev'
|
||
|
Signature check Bad (error 1)
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Of course it would be possible to add an entirely new configuration and boot
|
||
|
with that, but it still needs to be signed, so it won't help.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
6. Put the public key into U-Boot's image
|
||
|
-----------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Having confirmed that the signature is doing its job, let's try it out in
|
||
|
U-Boot on the board. U-Boot needs access to the public key corresponding to
|
||
|
the private key that you signed with so that it can verify any kernels that
|
||
|
you sign.
|
||
|
|
||
|
cd $UBOOT
|
||
|
make O=b/am335x_boneblack_vboot EXT_DTB=${WORK}/am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb
|
||
|
|
||
|
Here we are overrriding the normal device tree file with our one, which
|
||
|
contains the public key.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Now you have a special U-Boot image with the public key. It can verify can
|
||
|
kernel that you sign with the private key as in step 5.
|
||
|
|
||
|
If you like you can take a look at the public key information that mkimage
|
||
|
added to U-Boot's device tree:
|
||
|
|
||
|
fdtget -p am335x-boneblack-pubkey.dtb /signature/key-dev
|
||
|
required
|
||
|
algo
|
||
|
rsa,r-squared
|
||
|
rsa,modulus
|
||
|
rsa,n0-inverse
|
||
|
rsa,num-bits
|
||
|
key-name-hint
|
||
|
|
||
|
This has information about the key and some pre-processed values which U-Boot
|
||
|
can use to verify against it. These values are obtained from the public key
|
||
|
certificate by mkimage, but require quite a bit of code to generate. To save
|
||
|
code space in U-Boot, the information is extracted and written in raw form for
|
||
|
U-Boot to easily use. The same mechanism is used in Google's Chrome OS.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Notice the 'required' property. This marks the key as required - U-Boot will
|
||
|
not boot any image that does not verify against this key.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
7. Put U-Boot and the kernel onto the board
|
||
|
-------------------------------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
The method here varies depending on how you are booting. For this example we
|
||
|
are booting from an micro-SD card with two partitions, one for U-Boot and one
|
||
|
for Linux. Put it into your machine and write U-Boot and the kernel to it.
|
||
|
Here the card is /dev/sde:
|
||
|
|
||
|
cd $WORK
|
||
|
export UDEV=/dev/sde1 # Change thes two lines to the correct device
|
||
|
export KDEV=/dev/sde2
|
||
|
sudo mount $UDEV /mnt/tmp && sudo cp $UOUT/u-boot-dtb.img /mnt/tmp/u-boot.img && sleep 1 && sudo umount $UDEV
|
||
|
sudo mount $KDEV /mnt/tmp && sudo cp $WORK/image.fit /mnt/tmp/boot/image.fit && sleep 1 && sudo umount $KDEV
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
8. Try it
|
||
|
---------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Boot the board using the commands below:
|
||
|
|
||
|
setenv bootargs console=ttyO0,115200n8 quiet root=/dev/mmcblk0p2 ro rootfstype=ext4 rootwait
|
||
|
ext2load mmc 0:2 82000000 /boot/image.fit
|
||
|
bootm 82000000
|
||
|
|
||
|
You should then see something like this:
|
||
|
|
||
|
U-Boot# setenv bootargs console=ttyO0,115200n8 quiet root=/dev/mmcblk0p2 ro rootfstype=ext4 rootwait
|
||
|
U-Boot# ext2load mmc 0:2 82000000 /boot/image.fit
|
||
|
7824930 bytes read in 589 ms (12.7 MiB/s)
|
||
|
U-Boot# bootm 82000000
|
||
|
## Loading kernel from FIT Image at 82000000 ...
|
||
|
Using 'conf@1' configuration
|
||
|
Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1,rsa2048:dev+ OK
|
||
|
Trying 'kernel@1' kernel subimage
|
||
|
Description: unavailable
|
||
|
Created: 2014-06-01 19:32:54 UTC
|
||
|
Type: Kernel Image
|
||
|
Compression: lzo compressed
|
||
|
Data Start: 0x820000a8
|
||
|
Data Size: 7790938 Bytes = 7.4 MiB
|
||
|
Architecture: ARM
|
||
|
OS: Linux
|
||
|
Load Address: 0x80008000
|
||
|
Entry Point: 0x80008000
|
||
|
Hash algo: sha1
|
||
|
Hash value: c94364646427e10f423837e559898ef02c97b988
|
||
|
Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1+ OK
|
||
|
## Loading fdt from FIT Image at 82000000 ...
|
||
|
Using 'conf@1' configuration
|
||
|
Trying 'fdt@1' fdt subimage
|
||
|
Description: beaglebone-black
|
||
|
Created: 2014-06-01 19:32:54 UTC
|
||
|
Type: Flat Device Tree
|
||
|
Compression: uncompressed
|
||
|
Data Start: 0x8276e2ec
|
||
|
Data Size: 31547 Bytes = 30.8 KiB
|
||
|
Architecture: ARM
|
||
|
Hash algo: sha1
|
||
|
Hash value: cb09202f889d824f23b8e4404b781be5ad38a68d
|
||
|
Verifying Hash Integrity ... sha1+ OK
|
||
|
Booting using the fdt blob at 0x8276e2ec
|
||
|
Uncompressing Kernel Image ... OK
|
||
|
Loading Device Tree to 8fff5000, end 8ffffb3a ... OK
|
||
|
|
||
|
Starting kernel ...
|
||
|
|
||
|
[ 0.582377] omap_init_mbox: hwmod doesn't have valid attrs
|
||
|
[ 2.589651] musb-hdrc musb-hdrc.0.auto: Failed to request rx1.
|
||
|
[ 2.595830] musb-hdrc musb-hdrc.0.auto: musb_init_controller failed with status -517
|
||
|
[ 2.606470] musb-hdrc musb-hdrc.1.auto: Failed to request rx1.
|
||
|
[ 2.612723] musb-hdrc musb-hdrc.1.auto: musb_init_controller failed with status -517
|
||
|
[ 2.940808] drivers/rtc/hctosys.c: unable to open rtc device (rtc0)
|
||
|
[ 7.248889] libphy: PHY 4a101000.mdio:01 not found
|
||
|
[ 7.253995] net eth0: phy 4a101000.mdio:01 not found on slave 1
|
||
|
systemd-fsck[83]: Angstrom: clean, 50607/218160 files, 306348/872448 blocks
|
||
|
|
||
|
.---O---.
|
||
|
| | .-. o o
|
||
|
| | |-----.-----.-----.| | .----..-----.-----.
|
||
|
| | | __ | ---'| '--.| .-'| | |
|
||
|
| | | | | |--- || --'| | | ' | | | |
|
||
|
'---'---'--'--'--. |-----''----''--' '-----'-'-'-'
|
||
|
-' |
|
||
|
'---'
|
||
|
|
||
|
The Angstrom Distribution beaglebone ttyO0
|
||
|
|
||
|
Angstrom v2012.12 - Kernel 3.14.1+
|
||
|
|
||
|
beaglebone login:
|
||
|
|
||
|
At this point your kernel has been verified and you can be sure that it is one
|
||
|
that you signed. As an exercise, try changing image.fit as in step 5 and see
|
||
|
what happens.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Further Improvements
|
||
|
--------------------
|
||
|
|
||
|
Several of the steps here can be easily automated. In particular it would be
|
||
|
capital if signing and packaging a kernel were easy, perhaps a simple make
|
||
|
target in the kernel.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Some mention of how to use multiple .dtb files in a FIT might be useful.
|
||
|
|
||
|
U-Boot's verified boot mechanism has not had a robust and independent security
|
||
|
review. Such a review should look at the implementation and its resistance to
|
||
|
attacks.
|
||
|
|
||
|
Perhaps the verified boot feature could could be integrated into the Amstrom
|
||
|
distribution.
|
||
|
|
||
|
|
||
|
Simon Glass
|
||
|
sjg@chromium.org
|
||
|
2-June-14
|