linux-brain/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
David Howells 8c2f826dc3 rxrpc: Don't put crypto buffers on the stack
Don't put buffers of data to be handed to crypto on the stack as this may
cause an assertion failure in the kernel (see below).  Fix this by using an
kmalloc'd buffer instead.

kernel BUG at ./include/linux/scatterlist.h:147!
...
RIP: 0010:rxkad_encrypt_response.isra.6+0x191/0x1b0 [rxrpc]
RSP: 0018:ffffbe2fc06cfca8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff989277d59900 RCX: 0000000000000028
RDX: 0000259dc06cfd88 RSI: 0000000000000025 RDI: ffffbe30406cfd88
RBP: ffffbe2fc06cfd60 R08: ffffbe2fc06cfd08 R09: ffffbe2fc06cfd08
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff7c5f80d9f95
R13: ffffbe2fc06cfd88 R14: ffff98927a3f7aa0 R15: ffffbe2fc06cfd08
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff98927fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055b1ff28f0f8 CR3: 000000001b412003 CR4: 00000000003606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 rxkad_respond_to_challenge+0x297/0x330 [rxrpc]
 rxrpc_process_connection+0xd1/0x690 [rxrpc]
 ? process_one_work+0x1c3/0x680
 ? __lock_is_held+0x59/0xa0
 process_one_work+0x249/0x680
 worker_thread+0x3a/0x390
 ? process_one_work+0x680/0x680
 kthread+0x121/0x140
 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

Reported-by: Jonathan Billings <jsbillings@jsbillings.org>
Reported-by: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jonathan Billings <jsbillings@jsbillings.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-08 13:48:29 -05:00

1255 lines
31 KiB
C

/* Kerberos-based RxRPC security
*
* Copyright (C) 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/udp.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/af_rxrpc.h>
#include <keys/rxrpc-type.h>
#include "ar-internal.h"
#define RXKAD_VERSION 2
#define MAXKRB5TICKETLEN 1024
#define RXKAD_TKT_TYPE_KERBEROS_V5 256
#define ANAME_SZ 40 /* size of authentication name */
#define INST_SZ 40 /* size of principal's instance */
#define REALM_SZ 40 /* size of principal's auth domain */
#define SNAME_SZ 40 /* size of service name */
struct rxkad_level1_hdr {
__be32 data_size; /* true data size (excluding padding) */
};
struct rxkad_level2_hdr {
__be32 data_size; /* true data size (excluding padding) */
__be32 checksum; /* decrypted data checksum */
};
/*
* this holds a pinned cipher so that keventd doesn't get called by the cipher
* alloc routine, but since we have it to hand, we use it to decrypt RESPONSE
* packets
*/
static struct crypto_skcipher *rxkad_ci;
static DEFINE_MUTEX(rxkad_ci_mutex);
/*
* initialise connection security
*/
static int rxkad_init_connection_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *ci;
struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
int ret;
_enter("{%d},{%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->params.key));
token = conn->params.key->payload.data[0];
conn->security_ix = token->security_index;
ci = crypto_alloc_skcipher("pcbc(fcrypt)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(ci)) {
_debug("no cipher");
ret = PTR_ERR(ci);
goto error;
}
if (crypto_skcipher_setkey(ci, token->kad->session_key,
sizeof(token->kad->session_key)) < 0)
BUG();
switch (conn->params.security_level) {
case RXRPC_SECURITY_PLAIN:
break;
case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH:
conn->size_align = 8;
conn->security_size = sizeof(struct rxkad_level1_hdr);
break;
case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT:
conn->size_align = 8;
conn->security_size = sizeof(struct rxkad_level2_hdr);
break;
default:
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
goto error;
}
conn->cipher = ci;
ret = 0;
error:
_leave(" = %d", ret);
return ret;
}
/*
* prime the encryption state with the invariant parts of a connection's
* description
*/
static int rxkad_prime_packet_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
{
struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, conn->cipher);
struct scatterlist sg;
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
__be32 *tmpbuf;
size_t tmpsize = 4 * sizeof(__be32);
_enter("");
if (!conn->params.key)
return 0;
tmpbuf = kmalloc(tmpsize, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmpbuf)
return -ENOMEM;
token = conn->params.key->payload.data[0];
memcpy(&iv, token->kad->session_key, sizeof(iv));
tmpbuf[0] = htonl(conn->proto.epoch);
tmpbuf[1] = htonl(conn->proto.cid);
tmpbuf[2] = 0;
tmpbuf[3] = htonl(conn->security_ix);
sg_init_one(&sg, tmpbuf, tmpsize);
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, conn->cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, tmpsize, iv.x);
crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
memcpy(&conn->csum_iv, tmpbuf + 2, sizeof(conn->csum_iv));
kfree(tmpbuf);
_leave(" = 0");
return 0;
}
/*
* partially encrypt a packet (level 1 security)
*/
static int rxkad_secure_packet_auth(const struct rxrpc_call *call,
struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 data_size,
void *sechdr)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
struct rxkad_level1_hdr hdr;
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
struct scatterlist sg;
u16 check;
_enter("");
check = sp->hdr.seq ^ call->call_id;
data_size |= (u32)check << 16;
hdr.data_size = htonl(data_size);
memcpy(sechdr, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
/* start the encryption afresh */
memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
sg_init_one(&sg, sechdr, 8);
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, call->conn->cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, 8, iv.x);
crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
_leave(" = 0");
return 0;
}
/*
* wholly encrypt a packet (level 2 security)
*/
static int rxkad_secure_packet_encrypt(const struct rxrpc_call *call,
struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 data_size,
void *sechdr)
{
const struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
struct rxkad_level2_hdr rxkhdr;
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
struct scatterlist sg[16];
struct sk_buff *trailer;
unsigned int len;
u16 check;
int nsg;
int err;
sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
_enter("");
check = sp->hdr.seq ^ call->call_id;
rxkhdr.data_size = htonl(data_size | (u32)check << 16);
rxkhdr.checksum = 0;
memcpy(sechdr, &rxkhdr, sizeof(rxkhdr));
/* encrypt from the session key */
token = call->conn->params.key->payload.data[0];
memcpy(&iv, token->kad->session_key, sizeof(iv));
sg_init_one(&sg[0], sechdr, sizeof(rxkhdr));
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, call->conn->cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg[0], &sg[0], sizeof(rxkhdr), iv.x);
crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
/* we want to encrypt the skbuff in-place */
nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (nsg < 0 || nsg > 16)
goto out;
len = data_size + call->conn->size_align - 1;
len &= ~(call->conn->size_align - 1);
sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, len);
if (unlikely(err < 0))
goto out;
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len, iv.x);
crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
_leave(" = 0");
err = 0;
out:
skcipher_request_zero(req);
return err;
}
/*
* checksum an RxRPC packet header
*/
static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call,
struct sk_buff *skb,
size_t data_size,
void *sechdr)
{
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp;
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
struct scatterlist sg;
u32 x, y;
int ret;
sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
_enter("{%d{%x}},{#%u},%zu,",
call->debug_id, key_serial(call->conn->params.key),
sp->hdr.seq, data_size);
if (!call->conn->cipher)
return 0;
ret = key_validate(call->conn->params.key);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/* continue encrypting from where we left off */
memcpy(&iv, call->conn->csum_iv.x, sizeof(iv));
/* calculate the security checksum */
x = (call->cid & RXRPC_CHANNELMASK) << (32 - RXRPC_CIDSHIFT);
x |= sp->hdr.seq & 0x3fffffff;
call->crypto_buf[0] = htonl(call->call_id);
call->crypto_buf[1] = htonl(x);
sg_init_one(&sg, call->crypto_buf, 8);
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, call->conn->cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, 8, iv.x);
crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
y = ntohl(call->crypto_buf[1]);
y = (y >> 16) & 0xffff;
if (y == 0)
y = 1; /* zero checksums are not permitted */
sp->hdr.cksum = y;
switch (call->conn->params.security_level) {
case RXRPC_SECURITY_PLAIN:
ret = 0;
break;
case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH:
ret = rxkad_secure_packet_auth(call, skb, data_size, sechdr);
break;
case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT:
ret = rxkad_secure_packet_encrypt(call, skb, data_size,
sechdr);
break;
default:
ret = -EPERM;
break;
}
_leave(" = %d [set %hx]", ret, y);
return ret;
}
/*
* decrypt partial encryption on a packet (level 1 security)
*/
static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int offset, unsigned int len,
rxrpc_seq_t seq)
{
struct rxkad_level1_hdr sechdr;
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
struct scatterlist sg[16];
struct sk_buff *trailer;
bool aborted;
u32 data_size, buf;
u16 check;
int nsg, ret;
_enter("");
if (len < 8) {
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_1_hdr", "V1H",
RXKADSEALEDINCON);
goto protocol_error;
}
/* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt
* directly into the target buffer.
*/
nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
if (nsg < 0 || nsg > 16)
goto nomem;
sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, 8);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
return ret;
/* start the decryption afresh */
memset(&iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, call->conn->cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, 8, iv.x);
crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0) {
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_1_len", "XV1",
RXKADDATALEN);
goto protocol_error;
}
offset += sizeof(sechdr);
len -= sizeof(sechdr);
buf = ntohl(sechdr.data_size);
data_size = buf & 0xffff;
check = buf >> 16;
check ^= seq ^ call->call_id;
check &= 0xffff;
if (check != 0) {
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_1_check", "V1C",
RXKADSEALEDINCON);
goto protocol_error;
}
if (data_size > len) {
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_1_datalen", "V1L",
RXKADDATALEN);
goto protocol_error;
}
_leave(" = 0 [dlen=%x]", data_size);
return 0;
protocol_error:
if (aborted)
rxrpc_send_abort_packet(call);
return -EPROTO;
nomem:
_leave(" = -ENOMEM");
return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
* wholly decrypt a packet (level 2 security)
*/
static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int offset, unsigned int len,
rxrpc_seq_t seq)
{
const struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
struct rxkad_level2_hdr sechdr;
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
struct scatterlist _sg[4], *sg;
struct sk_buff *trailer;
bool aborted;
u32 data_size, buf;
u16 check;
int nsg, ret;
_enter(",{%d}", skb->len);
if (len < 8) {
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_2_hdr", "V2H",
RXKADSEALEDINCON);
goto protocol_error;
}
/* Decrypt the skbuff in-place. TODO: We really want to decrypt
* directly into the target buffer.
*/
nsg = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &trailer);
if (nsg < 0)
goto nomem;
sg = _sg;
if (unlikely(nsg > 4)) {
sg = kmalloc(sizeof(*sg) * nsg, GFP_NOIO);
if (!sg)
goto nomem;
}
sg_init_table(sg, nsg);
ret = skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, offset, len);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
if (sg != _sg)
kfree(sg);
return ret;
}
/* decrypt from the session key */
token = call->conn->params.key->payload.data[0];
memcpy(&iv, token->kad->session_key, sizeof(iv));
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, call->conn->cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, len, iv.x);
crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
if (sg != _sg)
kfree(sg);
/* Extract the decrypted packet length */
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0) {
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_2_len", "XV2",
RXKADDATALEN);
goto protocol_error;
}
offset += sizeof(sechdr);
len -= sizeof(sechdr);
buf = ntohl(sechdr.data_size);
data_size = buf & 0xffff;
check = buf >> 16;
check ^= seq ^ call->call_id;
check &= 0xffff;
if (check != 0) {
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_2_check", "V2C",
RXKADSEALEDINCON);
goto protocol_error;
}
if (data_size > len) {
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_2_datalen", "V2L",
RXKADDATALEN);
goto protocol_error;
}
_leave(" = 0 [dlen=%x]", data_size);
return 0;
protocol_error:
if (aborted)
rxrpc_send_abort_packet(call);
return -EPROTO;
nomem:
_leave(" = -ENOMEM");
return -ENOMEM;
}
/*
* Verify the security on a received packet or subpacket (if part of a
* jumbo packet).
*/
static int rxkad_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int offset, unsigned int len,
rxrpc_seq_t seq, u16 expected_cksum)
{
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, call->conn->cipher);
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
struct scatterlist sg;
bool aborted;
u16 cksum;
u32 x, y;
_enter("{%d{%x}},{#%u}",
call->debug_id, key_serial(call->conn->params.key), seq);
if (!call->conn->cipher)
return 0;
/* continue encrypting from where we left off */
memcpy(&iv, call->conn->csum_iv.x, sizeof(iv));
/* validate the security checksum */
x = (call->cid & RXRPC_CHANNELMASK) << (32 - RXRPC_CIDSHIFT);
x |= seq & 0x3fffffff;
call->crypto_buf[0] = htonl(call->call_id);
call->crypto_buf[1] = htonl(x);
sg_init_one(&sg, call->crypto_buf, 8);
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, call->conn->cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sg, &sg, 8, iv.x);
crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
y = ntohl(call->crypto_buf[1]);
cksum = (y >> 16) & 0xffff;
if (cksum == 0)
cksum = 1; /* zero checksums are not permitted */
if (cksum != expected_cksum) {
aborted = rxrpc_abort_eproto(call, skb, "rxkad_csum", "VCK",
RXKADSEALEDINCON);
goto protocol_error;
}
switch (call->conn->params.security_level) {
case RXRPC_SECURITY_PLAIN:
return 0;
case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH:
return rxkad_verify_packet_1(call, skb, offset, len, seq);
case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT:
return rxkad_verify_packet_2(call, skb, offset, len, seq);
default:
return -ENOANO;
}
protocol_error:
if (aborted)
rxrpc_send_abort_packet(call);
return -EPROTO;
}
/*
* Locate the data contained in a packet that was partially encrypted.
*/
static void rxkad_locate_data_1(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len)
{
struct rxkad_level1_hdr sechdr;
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, *_offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0)
BUG();
*_offset += sizeof(sechdr);
*_len = ntohl(sechdr.data_size) & 0xffff;
}
/*
* Locate the data contained in a packet that was completely encrypted.
*/
static void rxkad_locate_data_2(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len)
{
struct rxkad_level2_hdr sechdr;
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, *_offset, &sechdr, sizeof(sechdr)) < 0)
BUG();
*_offset += sizeof(sechdr);
*_len = ntohl(sechdr.data_size) & 0xffff;
}
/*
* Locate the data contained in an already decrypted packet.
*/
static void rxkad_locate_data(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb,
unsigned int *_offset, unsigned int *_len)
{
switch (call->conn->params.security_level) {
case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH:
rxkad_locate_data_1(call, skb, _offset, _len);
return;
case RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT:
rxkad_locate_data_2(call, skb, _offset, _len);
return;
default:
return;
}
}
/*
* issue a challenge
*/
static int rxkad_issue_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
{
struct rxkad_challenge challenge;
struct rxrpc_wire_header whdr;
struct msghdr msg;
struct kvec iov[2];
size_t len;
u32 serial;
int ret;
_enter("{%d,%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->params.key));
ret = key_validate(conn->params.key);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
get_random_bytes(&conn->security_nonce, sizeof(conn->security_nonce));
challenge.version = htonl(2);
challenge.nonce = htonl(conn->security_nonce);
challenge.min_level = htonl(0);
challenge.__padding = 0;
msg.msg_name = &conn->params.peer->srx.transport;
msg.msg_namelen = conn->params.peer->srx.transport_len;
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
whdr.epoch = htonl(conn->proto.epoch);
whdr.cid = htonl(conn->proto.cid);
whdr.callNumber = 0;
whdr.seq = 0;
whdr.type = RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_CHALLENGE;
whdr.flags = conn->out_clientflag;
whdr.userStatus = 0;
whdr.securityIndex = conn->security_ix;
whdr._rsvd = 0;
whdr.serviceId = htons(conn->service_id);
iov[0].iov_base = &whdr;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(whdr);
iov[1].iov_base = &challenge;
iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(challenge);
len = iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len;
serial = atomic_inc_return(&conn->serial);
whdr.serial = htonl(serial);
_proto("Tx CHALLENGE %%%u", serial);
ret = kernel_sendmsg(conn->params.local->socket, &msg, iov, 2, len);
if (ret < 0) {
_debug("sendmsg failed: %d", ret);
return -EAGAIN;
}
_leave(" = 0");
return 0;
}
/*
* send a Kerberos security response
*/
static int rxkad_send_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
struct rxrpc_host_header *hdr,
struct rxkad_response *resp,
const struct rxkad_key *s2)
{
struct rxrpc_wire_header whdr;
struct msghdr msg;
struct kvec iov[3];
size_t len;
u32 serial;
int ret;
_enter("");
msg.msg_name = &conn->params.peer->srx.transport;
msg.msg_namelen = conn->params.peer->srx.transport_len;
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_flags = 0;
memset(&whdr, 0, sizeof(whdr));
whdr.epoch = htonl(hdr->epoch);
whdr.cid = htonl(hdr->cid);
whdr.type = RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE;
whdr.flags = conn->out_clientflag;
whdr.securityIndex = hdr->securityIndex;
whdr.serviceId = htons(hdr->serviceId);
iov[0].iov_base = &whdr;
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(whdr);
iov[1].iov_base = resp;
iov[1].iov_len = sizeof(*resp);
iov[2].iov_base = (void *)s2->ticket;
iov[2].iov_len = s2->ticket_len;
len = iov[0].iov_len + iov[1].iov_len + iov[2].iov_len;
serial = atomic_inc_return(&conn->serial);
whdr.serial = htonl(serial);
_proto("Tx RESPONSE %%%u", serial);
ret = kernel_sendmsg(conn->params.local->socket, &msg, iov, 3, len);
if (ret < 0) {
_debug("sendmsg failed: %d", ret);
return -EAGAIN;
}
_leave(" = 0");
return 0;
}
/*
* calculate the response checksum
*/
static void rxkad_calc_response_checksum(struct rxkad_response *response)
{
u32 csum = 1000003;
int loop;
u8 *p = (u8 *) response;
for (loop = sizeof(*response); loop > 0; loop--)
csum = csum * 0x10204081 + *p++;
response->encrypted.checksum = htonl(csum);
}
/*
* encrypt the response packet
*/
static void rxkad_encrypt_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
struct rxkad_response *resp,
const struct rxkad_key *s2)
{
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, conn->cipher);
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
struct scatterlist sg[1];
/* continue encrypting from where we left off */
memcpy(&iv, s2->session_key, sizeof(iv));
sg_init_table(sg, 1);
sg_set_buf(sg, &resp->encrypted, sizeof(resp->encrypted));
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, conn->cipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, sizeof(resp->encrypted), iv.x);
crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
}
/*
* respond to a challenge packet
*/
static int rxkad_respond_to_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 *_abort_code)
{
const struct rxrpc_key_token *token;
struct rxkad_challenge challenge;
struct rxkad_response *resp;
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
const char *eproto;
u32 version, nonce, min_level, abort_code;
int ret;
_enter("{%d,%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->params.key));
eproto = tracepoint_string("chall_no_key");
abort_code = RX_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
if (!conn->params.key)
goto protocol_error;
abort_code = RXKADEXPIRED;
ret = key_validate(conn->params.key);
if (ret < 0)
goto other_error;
eproto = tracepoint_string("chall_short");
abort_code = RXKADPACKETSHORT;
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header),
&challenge, sizeof(challenge)) < 0)
goto protocol_error;
version = ntohl(challenge.version);
nonce = ntohl(challenge.nonce);
min_level = ntohl(challenge.min_level);
_proto("Rx CHALLENGE %%%u { v=%u n=%u ml=%u }",
sp->hdr.serial, version, nonce, min_level);
eproto = tracepoint_string("chall_ver");
abort_code = RXKADINCONSISTENCY;
if (version != RXKAD_VERSION)
goto protocol_error;
abort_code = RXKADLEVELFAIL;
ret = -EACCES;
if (conn->params.security_level < min_level)
goto other_error;
token = conn->params.key->payload.data[0];
/* build the response packet */
resp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rxkad_response), GFP_NOFS);
if (!resp)
return -ENOMEM;
resp->version = htonl(RXKAD_VERSION);
resp->encrypted.epoch = htonl(conn->proto.epoch);
resp->encrypted.cid = htonl(conn->proto.cid);
resp->encrypted.securityIndex = htonl(conn->security_ix);
resp->encrypted.inc_nonce = htonl(nonce + 1);
resp->encrypted.level = htonl(conn->params.security_level);
resp->kvno = htonl(token->kad->kvno);
resp->ticket_len = htonl(token->kad->ticket_len);
resp->encrypted.call_id[0] = htonl(conn->channels[0].call_counter);
resp->encrypted.call_id[1] = htonl(conn->channels[1].call_counter);
resp->encrypted.call_id[2] = htonl(conn->channels[2].call_counter);
resp->encrypted.call_id[3] = htonl(conn->channels[3].call_counter);
/* calculate the response checksum and then do the encryption */
rxkad_calc_response_checksum(resp);
rxkad_encrypt_response(conn, resp, token->kad);
ret = rxkad_send_response(conn, &sp->hdr, resp, token->kad);
kfree(resp);
return ret;
protocol_error:
trace_rxrpc_rx_eproto(NULL, sp->hdr.serial, eproto);
ret = -EPROTO;
other_error:
*_abort_code = abort_code;
return ret;
}
/*
* decrypt the kerberos IV ticket in the response
*/
static int rxkad_decrypt_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
struct sk_buff *skb,
void *ticket, size_t ticket_len,
struct rxrpc_crypt *_session_key,
time64_t *_expiry,
u32 *_abort_code)
{
struct skcipher_request *req;
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
struct rxrpc_crypt iv, key;
struct scatterlist sg[1];
struct in_addr addr;
unsigned int life;
const char *eproto;
time64_t issue, now;
bool little_endian;
int ret;
u32 abort_code;
u8 *p, *q, *name, *end;
_enter("{%d},{%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->server_key));
*_expiry = 0;
ret = key_validate(conn->server_key);
if (ret < 0) {
switch (ret) {
case -EKEYEXPIRED:
abort_code = RXKADEXPIRED;
goto other_error;
default:
abort_code = RXKADNOAUTH;
goto other_error;
}
}
ASSERT(conn->server_key->payload.data[0] != NULL);
ASSERTCMP((unsigned long) ticket & 7UL, ==, 0);
memcpy(&iv, &conn->server_key->payload.data[2], sizeof(iv));
ret = -ENOMEM;
req = skcipher_request_alloc(conn->server_key->payload.data[0],
GFP_NOFS);
if (!req)
goto temporary_error;
sg_init_one(&sg[0], ticket, ticket_len);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, ticket_len, iv.x);
crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_free(req);
p = ticket;
end = p + ticket_len;
#define Z(field) \
({ \
u8 *__str = p; \
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_bad_"#field); \
q = memchr(p, 0, end - p); \
if (!q || q - p > (field##_SZ)) \
goto bad_ticket; \
for (; p < q; p++) \
if (!isprint(*p)) \
goto bad_ticket; \
p++; \
__str; \
})
/* extract the ticket flags */
_debug("KIV FLAGS: %x", *p);
little_endian = *p & 1;
p++;
/* extract the authentication name */
name = Z(ANAME);
_debug("KIV ANAME: %s", name);
/* extract the principal's instance */
name = Z(INST);
_debug("KIV INST : %s", name);
/* extract the principal's authentication domain */
name = Z(REALM);
_debug("KIV REALM: %s", name);
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_bad_len");
if (end - p < 4 + 8 + 4 + 2)
goto bad_ticket;
/* get the IPv4 address of the entity that requested the ticket */
memcpy(&addr, p, sizeof(addr));
p += 4;
_debug("KIV ADDR : %pI4", &addr);
/* get the session key from the ticket */
memcpy(&key, p, sizeof(key));
p += 8;
_debug("KIV KEY : %08x %08x", ntohl(key.n[0]), ntohl(key.n[1]));
memcpy(_session_key, &key, sizeof(key));
/* get the ticket's lifetime */
life = *p++ * 5 * 60;
_debug("KIV LIFE : %u", life);
/* get the issue time of the ticket */
if (little_endian) {
__le32 stamp;
memcpy(&stamp, p, 4);
issue = rxrpc_u32_to_time64(le32_to_cpu(stamp));
} else {
__be32 stamp;
memcpy(&stamp, p, 4);
issue = rxrpc_u32_to_time64(be32_to_cpu(stamp));
}
p += 4;
now = ktime_get_real_seconds();
_debug("KIV ISSUE: %llx [%llx]", issue, now);
/* check the ticket is in date */
if (issue > now) {
abort_code = RXKADNOAUTH;
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
goto other_error;
}
if (issue < now - life) {
abort_code = RXKADEXPIRED;
ret = -EKEYEXPIRED;
goto other_error;
}
*_expiry = issue + life;
/* get the service name */
name = Z(SNAME);
_debug("KIV SNAME: %s", name);
/* get the service instance name */
name = Z(INST);
_debug("KIV SINST: %s", name);
return 0;
bad_ticket:
trace_rxrpc_rx_eproto(NULL, sp->hdr.serial, eproto);
abort_code = RXKADBADTICKET;
ret = -EPROTO;
other_error:
*_abort_code = abort_code;
return ret;
temporary_error:
return ret;
}
/*
* decrypt the response packet
*/
static void rxkad_decrypt_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
struct rxkad_response *resp,
const struct rxrpc_crypt *session_key)
{
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, rxkad_ci);
struct scatterlist sg[1];
struct rxrpc_crypt iv;
_enter(",,%08x%08x",
ntohl(session_key->n[0]), ntohl(session_key->n[1]));
ASSERT(rxkad_ci != NULL);
mutex_lock(&rxkad_ci_mutex);
if (crypto_skcipher_setkey(rxkad_ci, session_key->x,
sizeof(*session_key)) < 0)
BUG();
memcpy(&iv, session_key, sizeof(iv));
sg_init_table(sg, 1);
sg_set_buf(sg, &resp->encrypted, sizeof(resp->encrypted));
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, rxkad_ci);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, sizeof(resp->encrypted), iv.x);
crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
mutex_unlock(&rxkad_ci_mutex);
_leave("");
}
/*
* verify a response
*/
static int rxkad_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 *_abort_code)
{
struct rxkad_response *response;
struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp = rxrpc_skb(skb);
struct rxrpc_crypt session_key;
const char *eproto;
time64_t expiry;
void *ticket;
u32 abort_code, version, kvno, ticket_len, level;
__be32 csum;
int ret, i;
_enter("{%d,%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->server_key));
ret = -ENOMEM;
response = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rxkad_response), GFP_NOFS);
if (!response)
goto temporary_error;
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_short");
abort_code = RXKADPACKETSHORT;
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header),
response, sizeof(*response)) < 0)
goto protocol_error;
if (!pskb_pull(skb, sizeof(*response)))
BUG();
version = ntohl(response->version);
ticket_len = ntohl(response->ticket_len);
kvno = ntohl(response->kvno);
_proto("Rx RESPONSE %%%u { v=%u kv=%u tl=%u }",
sp->hdr.serial, version, kvno, ticket_len);
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_ver");
abort_code = RXKADINCONSISTENCY;
if (version != RXKAD_VERSION)
goto protocol_error;
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_tktlen");
abort_code = RXKADTICKETLEN;
if (ticket_len < 4 || ticket_len > MAXKRB5TICKETLEN)
goto protocol_error;
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_unkkey");
abort_code = RXKADUNKNOWNKEY;
if (kvno >= RXKAD_TKT_TYPE_KERBEROS_V5)
goto protocol_error;
/* extract the kerberos ticket and decrypt and decode it */
ret = -ENOMEM;
ticket = kmalloc(ticket_len, GFP_NOFS);
if (!ticket)
goto temporary_error;
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_tkt_short");
abort_code = RXKADPACKETSHORT;
if (skb_copy_bits(skb, sizeof(struct rxrpc_wire_header),
ticket, ticket_len) < 0)
goto protocol_error_free;
ret = rxkad_decrypt_ticket(conn, skb, ticket, ticket_len, &session_key,
&expiry, _abort_code);
if (ret < 0)
goto temporary_error_free_resp;
/* use the session key from inside the ticket to decrypt the
* response */
rxkad_decrypt_response(conn, response, &session_key);
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_param");
abort_code = RXKADSEALEDINCON;
if (ntohl(response->encrypted.epoch) != conn->proto.epoch)
goto protocol_error_free;
if (ntohl(response->encrypted.cid) != conn->proto.cid)
goto protocol_error_free;
if (ntohl(response->encrypted.securityIndex) != conn->security_ix)
goto protocol_error_free;
csum = response->encrypted.checksum;
response->encrypted.checksum = 0;
rxkad_calc_response_checksum(response);
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_csum");
if (response->encrypted.checksum != csum)
goto protocol_error_free;
spin_lock(&conn->channel_lock);
for (i = 0; i < RXRPC_MAXCALLS; i++) {
struct rxrpc_call *call;
u32 call_id = ntohl(response->encrypted.call_id[i]);
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_callid");
if (call_id > INT_MAX)
goto protocol_error_unlock;
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_callctr");
if (call_id < conn->channels[i].call_counter)
goto protocol_error_unlock;
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_callst");
if (call_id > conn->channels[i].call_counter) {
call = rcu_dereference_protected(
conn->channels[i].call,
lockdep_is_held(&conn->channel_lock));
if (call && call->state < RXRPC_CALL_COMPLETE)
goto protocol_error_unlock;
conn->channels[i].call_counter = call_id;
}
}
spin_unlock(&conn->channel_lock);
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_seq");
abort_code = RXKADOUTOFSEQUENCE;
if (ntohl(response->encrypted.inc_nonce) != conn->security_nonce + 1)
goto protocol_error_free;
eproto = tracepoint_string("rxkad_rsp_level");
abort_code = RXKADLEVELFAIL;
level = ntohl(response->encrypted.level);
if (level > RXRPC_SECURITY_ENCRYPT)
goto protocol_error_free;
conn->params.security_level = level;
/* create a key to hold the security data and expiration time - after
* this the connection security can be handled in exactly the same way
* as for a client connection */
ret = rxrpc_get_server_data_key(conn, &session_key, expiry, kvno);
if (ret < 0)
goto temporary_error_free_ticket;
kfree(ticket);
kfree(response);
_leave(" = 0");
return 0;
protocol_error_unlock:
spin_unlock(&conn->channel_lock);
protocol_error_free:
kfree(ticket);
protocol_error:
kfree(response);
trace_rxrpc_rx_eproto(NULL, sp->hdr.serial, eproto);
*_abort_code = abort_code;
return -EPROTO;
temporary_error_free_ticket:
kfree(ticket);
temporary_error_free_resp:
kfree(response);
temporary_error:
/* Ignore the response packet if we got a temporary error such as
* ENOMEM. We just want to send the challenge again. Note that we
* also come out this way if the ticket decryption fails.
*/
return ret;
}
/*
* clear the connection security
*/
static void rxkad_clear(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
{
_enter("");
if (conn->cipher)
crypto_free_skcipher(conn->cipher);
}
/*
* Initialise the rxkad security service.
*/
static int rxkad_init(void)
{
/* pin the cipher we need so that the crypto layer doesn't invoke
* keventd to go get it */
rxkad_ci = crypto_alloc_skcipher("pcbc(fcrypt)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(rxkad_ci);
}
/*
* Clean up the rxkad security service.
*/
static void rxkad_exit(void)
{
if (rxkad_ci)
crypto_free_skcipher(rxkad_ci);
}
/*
* RxRPC Kerberos-based security
*/
const struct rxrpc_security rxkad = {
.name = "rxkad",
.security_index = RXRPC_SECURITY_RXKAD,
.init = rxkad_init,
.exit = rxkad_exit,
.init_connection_security = rxkad_init_connection_security,
.prime_packet_security = rxkad_prime_packet_security,
.secure_packet = rxkad_secure_packet,
.verify_packet = rxkad_verify_packet,
.locate_data = rxkad_locate_data,
.issue_challenge = rxkad_issue_challenge,
.respond_to_challenge = rxkad_respond_to_challenge,
.verify_response = rxkad_verify_response,
.clear = rxkad_clear,
};