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99d5cadfde
This is a preparatory patch for kexec_file_load() lockdown. A locked down kernel needs to prevent unsigned kernel images from being loaded with kexec_file_load(). Currently, the only way to force the signature verification is compiling with KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG. This prevents loading usigned images even when the kernel is not locked down at runtime. This patch splits KEXEC_VERIFY_SIG into KEXEC_SIG and KEXEC_SIG_FORCE. Analogous to the MODULE_SIG and MODULE_SIG_FORCE for modules, KEXEC_SIG turns on the signature verification but allows unsigned images to be loaded. KEXEC_SIG_FORCE disallows images without a valid signature. Signed-off-by: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
66 lines
1.6 KiB
C
66 lines
1.6 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Image loader for kexec_file_load system call.
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*
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* Copyright IBM Corp. 2018
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*
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* Author(s): Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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*/
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#include <linux/errno.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/kexec.h>
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#include <asm/ipl.h>
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#include <asm/setup.h>
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static int kexec_file_add_kernel_image(struct kimage *image,
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struct s390_load_data *data)
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{
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struct kexec_buf buf;
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buf.image = image;
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buf.buffer = image->kernel_buf;
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buf.bufsz = image->kernel_buf_len;
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buf.mem = 0;
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if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH)
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buf.mem += crashk_res.start;
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buf.memsz = buf.bufsz;
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data->kernel_buf = image->kernel_buf;
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data->kernel_mem = buf.mem;
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data->parm = image->kernel_buf + PARMAREA;
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data->memsz += buf.memsz;
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ipl_report_add_component(data->report, &buf,
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IPL_RB_COMPONENT_FLAG_SIGNED |
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IPL_RB_COMPONENT_FLAG_VERIFIED,
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IPL_RB_CERT_UNKNOWN);
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return kexec_add_buffer(&buf);
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}
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static void *s390_image_load(struct kimage *image,
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char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len,
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char *initrd, unsigned long initrd_len,
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char *cmdline, unsigned long cmdline_len)
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{
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return kexec_file_add_components(image, kexec_file_add_kernel_image);
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}
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static int s390_image_probe(const char *buf, unsigned long len)
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{
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/* Can't reliably tell if an image is valid. Therefore give the
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* user whatever he wants.
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*/
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return 0;
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}
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const struct kexec_file_ops s390_kexec_image_ops = {
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.probe = s390_image_probe,
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.load = s390_image_load,
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#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
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.verify_sig = s390_verify_sig,
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#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
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};
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