linux-brain/arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h
Nicholas Piggin 09495b5f7a powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses
commit 9a32a7e78bd0cd9a9b6332cbdc345ee5ffd0c5de upstream.

IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache
before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It
is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible
memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of
hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where
protected data could be leaked.

However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces
the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that
the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass
"kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony
Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself,
but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with
side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an
attack.

This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege
boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.

This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-11-22 10:14:10 +01:00

85 lines
2.4 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_SETUP_H
#define _ASM_POWERPC_SETUP_H
#include <uapi/asm/setup.h>
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
extern void ppc_printk_progress(char *s, unsigned short hex);
extern unsigned int rtas_data;
extern unsigned long long memory_limit;
extern bool init_mem_is_free;
extern unsigned long klimit;
extern void *zalloc_maybe_bootmem(size_t size, gfp_t mask);
struct device_node;
extern void note_scsi_host(struct device_node *, void *);
/* Used in very early kernel initialization. */
extern unsigned long reloc_offset(void);
extern unsigned long add_reloc_offset(unsigned long);
extern void reloc_got2(unsigned long);
#define PTRRELOC(x) ((typeof(x)) add_reloc_offset((unsigned long)(x)))
void check_for_initrd(void);
void mem_topology_setup(void);
void initmem_init(void);
void setup_panic(void);
#define ARCH_PANIC_TIMEOUT 180
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES
extern void pseries_enable_reloc_on_exc(void);
extern void pseries_disable_reloc_on_exc(void);
extern void pseries_big_endian_exceptions(void);
extern void pseries_little_endian_exceptions(void);
#else
static inline void pseries_enable_reloc_on_exc(void) {}
static inline void pseries_disable_reloc_on_exc(void) {}
static inline void pseries_big_endian_exceptions(void) {}
static inline void pseries_little_endian_exceptions(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_PSERIES */
void rfi_flush_enable(bool enable);
/* These are bit flags */
enum l1d_flush_type {
L1D_FLUSH_NONE = 0x1,
L1D_FLUSH_FALLBACK = 0x2,
L1D_FLUSH_ORI = 0x4,
L1D_FLUSH_MTTRIG = 0x8,
};
void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type, bool enable);
void setup_entry_flush(bool enable);
void setup_uaccess_flush(bool enable);
void do_rfi_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types);
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC
void setup_barrier_nospec(void);
#else
static inline void setup_barrier_nospec(void) { };
#endif
void do_uaccess_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types);
void do_entry_flush_fixups(enum l1d_flush_type types);
void do_barrier_nospec_fixups(bool enable);
extern bool barrier_nospec_enabled;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC
void do_barrier_nospec_fixups_range(bool enable, void *start, void *end);
#else
static inline void do_barrier_nospec_fixups_range(bool enable, void *start, void *end) { };
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E
void setup_spectre_v2(void);
#else
static inline void setup_spectre_v2(void) {};
#endif
void do_btb_flush_fixups(void);
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SETUP_H */