[ Upstream commit 45add3cc99feaaf57d4b6f01d52d532c16a1caee ]
UEFI spec 2.9, p.108, table 4-1 lists the scenario that both attributes
are cleared with the description "No memory access protection is
possible for Entry". So we can have valid entries where both attributes
are cleared, so remove the check.
Signed-off-by: Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>
Fixes: 10f0d2f577 ("efi: Implement generic support for the Memory Attributes table")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Replace all GPL license blurbs with an equivalent SPDX header (most
files are GPLv2, some are GPLv2+). While at it, drop some outdated
header changelogs as well.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeffrey Hugo <jhugo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190202094119.13230-7-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
The EFI memory attributes code cross-references the EFI memory map with
the more granular EFI memory attributes table to ensure that they are in
sync before applying the strict permissions to the regions it describes.
Since we always install virtual mappings for the EFI runtime regions to
which these strict permissions apply, we currently perform a sanity check
on the EFI memory descriptor, and ensure that the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME bit
is set, and that the virtual address has been assigned.
However, in cases where a runtime region exists at physical address 0x0,
and the virtual mapping equals the physical mapping, e.g., when running
in mixed mode on x86, we encounter a memory descriptor with the runtime
attribute and virtual address 0x0, and incorrectly draw the conclusion
that a runtime region exists for which no virtual mapping was installed,
and give up altogether. The consequence of this is that firmware mappings
retain their read-write-execute permissions, making the system more
vulnerable to attacks.
So let's only bail if the virtual address of 0x0 has been assigned to a
physical region that does not reside at address 0x0.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Cc: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
Cc: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Cc: Jeffrey Hugo <jhugo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 10f0d2f577 ("efi: Implement generic support for the Memory ...")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190202094119.13230-4-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
UEFI v2.6 introduces EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE which describes memory
protections that may be applied to the EFI Runtime code and data regions by
the kernel. This enables the kernel to map these regions more strictly thereby
increasing security.
Presently, the only valid bits for the attribute field of a memory descriptor
are EFI_MEMORY_RO and EFI_MEMORY_XP, hence use these bits to update the
mappings in efi_pgd.
The UEFI specification recommends to use this feature instead of
EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE and hence while updating EFI mappings we first
check for EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE and if it's present we update
the mappings according to this table and hence disregarding
EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE even if it's published by the firmware. We consider
EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE only when EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE is absent.
Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485868902-20401-6-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
UEFI v2.6 introduces a configuration table called
EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE which provides additional information about
EFI runtime regions. Currently this table describes memory protections
that may be applied to the EFI Runtime code and data regions by the kernel.
Allocate a EFI_XXX bit to keep track of whether this feature is
published by firmware or not.
Signed-off-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485868902-20401-5-git-send-email-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
This implements shared support for discovering the presence of the
Memory Attributes table, and for parsing and validating its contents.
The table is validated against the construction rules in the UEFI spec.
Since this is a new table, it makes sense to complain if we encounter
a table that does not follow those rules.
The parsing and validation routine takes a callback that can be specified
per architecture, that gets passed each unique validated region, with the
virtual address retrieved from the ordinary memory map.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
[ Trim pr_*() strings to 80 cols and use EFI consistently. ]
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1461614832-17633-14-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Heiner Kallweit