Commit Graph

22 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Thomas Gleixner 2874c5fd28 treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):

  this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
  it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by
  the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at
  your option any later version

extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier

  GPL-2.0-or-later

has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s).

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-05-30 11:26:32 -07:00
Vitaly Chikunov c7381b0128 crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms
Previous akcipher .verify() just `decrypts' (using RSA encrypt which is
using public key) signature to uncover message hash, which was then
compared in upper level public_key_verify_signature() with the expected
hash value, which itself was never passed into verify().

This approach was incompatible with EC-DSA family of algorithms,
because, to verify a signature EC-DSA algorithm also needs a hash value
as input; then it's used (together with a signature divided into halves
`r||s') to produce a witness value, which is then compared with `r' to
determine if the signature is correct. Thus, for EC-DSA, nor
requirements of .verify() itself, nor its output expectations in
public_key_verify_signature() wasn't sufficient.

Make improved .verify() call which gets hash value as input and produce
complete signature check without any output besides status.

Now for the top level verification only crypto_akcipher_verify() needs
to be called and its return value inspected.

Make sure that `digest' is in kmalloc'd memory (in place of `output`) in
{public,tpm}_key_verify_signature() as insisted by Herbert Xu, and will
be changed in the following commit.

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-18 22:15:02 +08:00
Vitaly Chikunov 3ecc972599 crypto: rsa - unimplement sign/verify for raw RSA backends
In preparation for new akcipher verify call remove sign/verify callbacks
from RSA backends and make PKCS1 driver call encrypt/decrypt instead.

This also complies with the well-known idea that raw RSA should never be
used for sign/verify. It only should be used with proper padding scheme
such as PKCS1 driver provides.

Cc: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
Cc: qat-linux@intel.com
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Gary Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Cc: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Cc: Aymen Sghaier <aymen.sghaier@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Gary R Hook <gary.hook@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-04-18 22:15:02 +08:00
Eric Biggers a1180cffea crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - include <crypto/internal/rsa.h>
Include internal/rsa.h in rsa-pkcs1pad.c to get the declaration of
rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl.  This fixes the following sparse warning:

    crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c:698:24: warning: symbol 'rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl' was not declared. Should it be static?

Cc: Andrzej Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2019-01-18 18:43:42 +08:00
Denis Kenzior b3a8c8a5eb crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be optional [ver #2]
The original pkcs1pad implementation allowed to pad/unpad raw RSA
output.  However, this has been taken out in commit:
commit c0d20d22e0 ("crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Require hash to be present")

This patch restored this ability as it is needed by the asymmetric key
implementation.

Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
Dan Aloni 3944f139d5 crypto: fix a memory leak in rsa-kcs1pad's encryption mode
The encryption mode of pkcs1pad never uses out_sg and out_buf, so
there's no need to allocate the buffer, which presently is not even
being freed.

CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CC: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Dan Aloni <dan@kernelim.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-09-28 12:46:06 +08:00
Jia-Ju Bai 1ca2809897 crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Replace GFP_ATOMIC with GFP_KERNEL in pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete
After checking all possible call chains to kzalloc here,
my tool finds that this kzalloc is never called in atomic context.
Thus GFP_ATOMIC is not necessary, and it can be replaced with GFP_KERNEL.

This is found by a static analysis tool named DCNS written by myself.

Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2018-02-15 23:26:47 +08:00
Gilad Ben-Yossef 4e5b0ad582 crypto: remove redundant backlog checks on EBUSY
Now that -EBUSY return code only indicates backlog queueing
we can safely remove the now redundant check for the
CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG flag when -EBUSY is returned.

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-11-03 22:11:17 +08:00
Jason A. Donenfeld fec17cb223 crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - use constant time memory comparison for MACs
Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack.

Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Suggested-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-06-20 11:21:19 +08:00
Tudor-Dan Ambarus 543de102e3 crypto: pkcs1pad - comply with crypto_akcipher_maxsize()
crypto_akcipher_maxsize() asks for the output buffer size without
caring for errors. It allways assume that will be called after
a valid setkey. Comply with it and return what he wants.

crypto_akcipher_maxsize() now returns an unsigned int.
Remove the unnecessary check.

Signed-off-by: Tudor Ambarus <tudor.ambarus@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2017-06-10 12:04:31 +08:00
Herbert Xu 0cf43f509f crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Handle leading zero for decryption
As the software RSA implementation now produces fixed-length
output, we need to eliminate leading zeros in the calling code
instead.

This patch does just that for pkcs1pad decryption while signature
verification was fixed in an earlier patch.

Fixes: 9b45b7bba3 ("crypto: rsa - Generate fixed-length output")
Reported-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-09-22 17:42:08 +08:00
Tadeusz Struk a6d7bfd0ff crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix rsa-pkcs1pad request struct
To allow for child request context the struct akcipher_request child_req
needs to be at the end of the structure.

Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-19 12:01:47 +08:00
Herbert Xu 27710b8ea3 crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Fix regression from leading zeros
As the software RSA implementation now produces fixed-length
output, we need to eliminate leading zeros in the calling code
instead.

This patch does just that for pkcs1pad signature verification.

Fixes: 9b45b7bba3 ("crypto: rsa - Generate fixed-length output")
Reported-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-03 15:44:56 +08:00
Herbert Xu d858b07138 crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Avoid copying output when possible
In the vast majority of cases (2^-32 on 32-bit and 2^-64 on 64-bit)
cases, the result from encryption/signing will require no padding.

This patch makes these two operations write their output directly
to the final destination.  Only in the exceedingly rare cases where
fixup is needed to we copy it out and back to add the leading zeroes.

This patch also makes use of the crypto_akcipher_set_crypt API
instead of writing the akcipher request directly.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-01 23:45:20 +08:00
Herbert Xu 73f7918960 crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Move key size check to setkey
Rather than repeatedly checking the key size on each operation,
we should be checking it once when the key is set.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-01 23:45:20 +08:00
Herbert Xu 3a32ce507a crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Always use GFP_KERNEL
We don't currently support using akcipher in atomic contexts,
so GFP_KERNEL should always be used.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-01 23:45:19 +08:00
Herbert Xu 0f2c83190b crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Remove bogus page splitting
The helper pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf tries to split a buffer that crosses
a page boundary into two SG entries.  This is unnecessary.  This
patch removes that.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-01 23:45:19 +08:00
Herbert Xu c0d20d22e0 crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Require hash to be present
The only user of rsa-pkcs1pad always uses the hash so there is
no reason to support the case of not having a hash.

This patch also changes the digest info lookup so that it is
only done once during template instantiation rather than on each
operation.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-07-01 23:45:19 +08:00
Tadeusz Struk 6f0904ada4 crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix dst len
The output buffer length has to be at least as big as the key_size.
It is then updated to the actual output size by the implementation.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-04-15 22:13:55 +08:00
Tadeusz Struk a49de377e0 crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad
This adds hash param to pkcs1pad.
The pkcs1pad template can work with or without the hash.
When hash param is provided then the verify operation will
also verify the output against the known digest.

Signed-off-by: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2016-03-03 21:49:26 +00:00
Andrzej Zaborowski 5319216dcf crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - don't allocate buffer on stack
Avoid the s390 compile "warning: 'pkcs1pad_encrypt_sign_complete'
uses dynamic stack allocation" reported by kbuild test robot.  Don't
use a flat zero-filled buffer, instead zero the contents of the SGL.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-12-22 20:43:24 +08:00
Andrzej Zaborowski 3d5b1ecdea crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm
This patch adds PKCS#1 v1.5 standard RSA padding as a separate template.
This way an RSA cipher with padding can be obtained by instantiating
"pkcs1pad(rsa)".  The reason for adding this is that RSA is almost
never used without this padding (or OAEP) so it will be needed for
either certificate work in the kernel or the userspace, and I also hear
that it is likely implemented by hardware RSA in which case hardware
implementations of the whole of pkcs1pad(rsa) can be provided.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Zaborowski <andrew.zaborowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2015-12-09 20:03:57 +08:00