brain-hackers_pepepper-mirror
/
linux-brain
mirror of https://github.com/brain-hackers/linux-brain.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity

mm/hugetlb: fix F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE 

commit 22247efd822e6d263f3c8bd327f3f769aea9b1d9 upstream.

Patch series "mm/hugetlb: Fix issues on file sealing and fork", v2.

Hugh reported issue with F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE not applied correctly to
hugetlbfs, which I can easily verify using the memfd_test program, which
seems that the program is hardly run with hugetlbfs pages (as by default
shmem).

Meanwhile I found another probably even more severe issue on that hugetlb
fork won't wr-protect child cow pages, so child can potentially write to
parent private pages.  Patch 2 addresses that.

After this series applied, "memfd_test hugetlbfs" should start to pass.

This patch (of 2):

F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE is missing for hugetlb starting from the first day.
There is a test program for that and it fails constantly.

$ ./memfd_test hugetlbfs
memfd-hugetlb: CREATE
memfd-hugetlb: BASIC
memfd-hugetlb: SEAL-WRITE
memfd-hugetlb: SEAL-FUTURE-WRITE
mmap() didn't fail as expected
Aborted (core dumped)

I think it's probably because no one is really running the hugetlbfs test.

Fix it by checking FUTURE_WRITE also in hugetlbfs_file_mmap() as what we
do in shmem_mmap().  Generalize a helper for that.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210503234356.9097-1-peterx@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210503234356.9097-2-peterx@redhat.com
Fixes: ab3948f58f ("mm/memfd: add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfd")
Signed-off-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Xu 2021-05-14 17:27:04 -07:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent b3f1731c6d
commit f77aa56ad9
3 changed files with 41 additions and 18 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

5
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
View File

@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ static void huge_pagevec_release(struct pagevec *pvec)
static int hugetlbfs_file_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct hugetlbfs_inode_info *info = HUGETLBFS_I(inode);
loff_t len, vma_len;
int ret;
struct hstate *h = hstate_file(file);
@ -150,6 +151,10 @@ static int hugetlbfs_file_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
vma->vm_flags |= VM_HUGETLB | VM_DONTEXPAND;
vma->vm_ops = &hugetlb_vm_ops;
ret = seal_check_future_write(info->seals, vma);
if (ret)
return ret;
/*
* page based offset in vm_pgoff could be sufficiently large to
* overflow a loff_t when converted to byte offset. This can

32
include/linux/mm.h
View File

@ -2925,5 +2925,37 @@ static inline int pages_identical(struct page *page1, struct page *page2)
return !memcmp_pages(page1, page2);
}
/**
* seal_check_future_write - Check for F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE flag and handle it
* @seals: the seals to check
* @vma: the vma to operate on
*
* Check whether F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE is set; if so, do proper check/handling on
* the vma flags. Return 0 if check pass, or <0 for errors.
*/
static inline int seal_check_future_write(int seals, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
if (seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) {
/*
* New PROT_WRITE and MAP_SHARED mmaps are not allowed when
* "future write" seal active.
*/
if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
return -EPERM;
/*
* Since an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed memfd can be mapped as
* MAP_SHARED and read-only, take care to not allow mprotect to
* revert protections on such mappings. Do this only for shared
* mappings. For private mappings, don't need to mask
* VM_MAYWRITE as we still want them to be COW-writable.
*/
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)
vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE);
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _LINUX_MM_H */

22
mm/shmem.c
View File

@ -2208,25 +2208,11 @@ out_nomem:
static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(file_inode(file));
int ret;
if (info->seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) {
/*
* New PROT_WRITE and MAP_SHARED mmaps are not allowed when
* "future write" seal active.
*/
if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))
return -EPERM;
/*
* Since an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE sealed memfd can be mapped as
* MAP_SHARED and read-only, take care to not allow mprotect to
* revert protections on such mappings. Do this only for shared
* mappings. For private mappings, don't need to mask
* VM_MAYWRITE as we still want them to be COW-writable.
*/
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)
vma->vm_flags &= ~(VM_MAYWRITE);
}
ret = seal_check_future_write(info->seals, vma);
if (ret)
return ret;
file_accessed(file);
vma->vm_ops = &shmem_vm_ops;