Revert "apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation"

This reverts commit 651e28c553.

This caused a regression:
 "The specific problem is that dnsmasq refuses to start on openSUSE Leap
  42.2.  The specific cause is that and attempt to open a PF_LOCAL socket
  gets EACCES.  This means that networking doesn't function on a system
  with a 4.14-rc2 system."

Sadly, the developers involved seemed to be in denial for several weeks
about this, delaying the revert.  This has not been a good release for
the security subsystem, and this area needs to change development
practices.

Reported-and-bisected-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Tracked-by: Thorsten Leemhuis <regressions@leemhuis.info>
Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds 2017-10-26 19:35:35 +02:00
parent 5678255027
commit 80c094a47d
12 changed files with 16 additions and 840 deletions

View File

@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
#
# Generated include files
#
net_names.h
capability_names.h
rlim_names.h

View File

@ -4,44 +4,11 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o net.o
resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o
apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
# Build a lower case string table of address family names
# Transform lines from
# #define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */
# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
# to
# [1] = "local",
# [2] = "inet",
#
# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
# Transforms lines from
# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
# to
# #define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "local inet"
quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@
cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
echo "};" >> $@ ;\
printf '%s' '\#define AA_SFS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
sed -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
$< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
# Transform lines from
# SOCK_STREAM = 1,
# to
# [1] = "stream",
quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN $@
cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
-e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
echo "};" >> $@
# Build a lower case string table of capability names
# Transforms lines from
@ -94,7 +61,6 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
$(src)/Makefile
@ -102,8 +68,3 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
$(src)/Makefile
$(call cmd,make-rlim)
$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
$(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
$(src)/Makefile
$(call cmd,make-af)
$(call cmd,make-sock)

View File

@ -2202,7 +2202,6 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = {
AA_SFS_DIR("policy", aa_sfs_entry_policy),
AA_SFS_DIR("domain", aa_sfs_entry_domain),
AA_SFS_DIR("file", aa_sfs_entry_file),
AA_SFS_DIR("network", aa_sfs_entry_network),
AA_SFS_DIR("mount", aa_sfs_entry_mount),
AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces", aa_sfs_entry_ns),
AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),

View File

@ -21,7 +21,6 @@
#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/file.h"
#include "include/match.h"
#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/label.h"
@ -567,32 +566,6 @@ static int __file_path_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
return error;
}
static int __file_sock_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label,
struct aa_label *flabel, struct file *file,
u32 request, u32 denied)
{
struct socket *sock = (struct socket *) file->private_data;
int error;
AA_BUG(!sock);
/* revalidation due to label out of date. No revocation at this time */
if (!denied && aa_label_is_subset(flabel, label))
return 0;
/* TODO: improve to skip profiles cached in flabel */
error = aa_sock_file_perm(label, op, request, sock);
if (denied) {
/* TODO: improve to skip profiles checked above */
/* check every profile in file label to is cached */
last_error(error, aa_sock_file_perm(flabel, op, request, sock));
}
if (!error)
update_file_ctx(file_ctx(file), label, request);
return error;
}
/**
* aa_file_perm - do permission revalidation check & audit for @file
* @op: operation being checked
@ -637,9 +610,6 @@ int aa_file_perm(const char *op, struct aa_label *label, struct file *file,
error = __file_path_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
denied);
else if (S_ISSOCK(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
error = __file_sock_perm(op, label, flabel, file, request,
denied);
done:
rcu_read_unlock();

View File

@ -121,29 +121,21 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
/* these entries require a custom callback fn */
struct {
struct aa_label *peer;
union {
struct {
kuid_t ouid;
const char *target;
} fs;
struct {
int type, protocol;
struct sock *peer_sk;
void *addr;
int addrlen;
} net;
int signal;
struct {
int rlim;
unsigned long max;
} rlim;
};
struct {
const char *target;
kuid_t ouid;
} fs;
};
struct {
struct aa_profile *profile;
const char *ns;
long pos;
} iface;
int signal;
struct {
int rlim;
unsigned long max;
} rlim;
struct {
const char *src_name;
const char *type;

View File

@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
/*
* AppArmor security module
*
* This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
* Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
* License.
*/
#ifndef __AA_NET_H
#define __AA_NET_H
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <linux/path.h>
#include "apparmorfs.h"
#include "label.h"
#include "perms.h"
#include "policy.h"
#define AA_MAY_SEND AA_MAY_WRITE
#define AA_MAY_RECEIVE AA_MAY_READ
#define AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN AA_MAY_DELETE
#define AA_MAY_CONNECT AA_MAY_OPEN
#define AA_MAY_ACCEPT 0x00100000
#define AA_MAY_BIND 0x00200000
#define AA_MAY_LISTEN 0x00400000
#define AA_MAY_SETOPT 0x01000000
#define AA_MAY_GETOPT 0x02000000
#define NET_PERMS_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \
AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_BIND | AA_MAY_LISTEN | \
AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_ACCEPT | AA_MAY_SETATTR | \
AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_SETOPT | AA_MAY_GETOPT)
#define NET_FS_PERMS (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CREATE | \
AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN | AA_MAY_CONNECT | AA_MAY_RENAME |\
AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_GETATTR | AA_MAY_CHMOD | \
AA_MAY_CHOWN | AA_MAY_CHGRP | AA_MAY_LOCK | \
AA_MAY_MPROT)
#define NET_PEER_MASK (AA_MAY_SEND | AA_MAY_RECEIVE | AA_MAY_CONNECT | \
AA_MAY_ACCEPT)
struct aa_sk_ctx {
struct aa_label *label;
struct aa_label *peer;
struct path path;
};
#define SK_CTX(X) ((X)->sk_security)
#define SOCK_ctx(X) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, F, T, P) \
struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
.family = (F)}; \
DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(NAME, \
((SK) && (F) != AF_UNIX) ? LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET : \
LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, \
OP); \
NAME.u.net = &(NAME ## _net); \
aad(&NAME)->net.type = (T); \
aad(&NAME)->net.protocol = (P)
#define DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(NAME, OP, SK) \
DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(NAME, OP, SK, (SK)->sk_family, (SK)->sk_type, \
(SK)->sk_protocol)
/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
* @allow: basic network families permissions
* @audit: which network permissions to force audit
* @quiet: which network permissions to quiet rejects
*/
struct aa_net {
u16 allow[AF_MAX];
u16 audit[AF_MAX];
u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
};
extern struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[];
void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va);
int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
u32 request, u16 family, int type);
int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
int type, int protocol);
static inline int aa_profile_af_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
struct common_audit_data *sa,
u32 request,
struct sock *sk)
{
return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, sa, request, sk->sk_family,
sk->sk_type);
}
int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk);
int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
struct socket *sock);
static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
{
/* NOP */
}
#endif /* __AA_NET_H */

View File

@ -135,10 +135,9 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms;
void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask);
void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
u32 mask);
void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask);
void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask);
u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask);
void aa_apply_modes_to_perms(struct aa_profile *profile,
struct aa_perms *perms);
void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,

View File

@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
#include "file.h"
#include "lib.h"
#include "label.h"
#include "net.h"
#include "perms.h"
#include "resource.h"
@ -112,7 +111,6 @@ struct aa_data {
* @policy: general match rules governing policy
* @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
* @caps: capabilities for the profile
* @net: network controls for the profile
* @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
*
* @dents: dentries for the profiles file entries in apparmorfs
@ -150,7 +148,6 @@ struct aa_profile {
struct aa_policydb policy;
struct aa_file_rules file;
struct aa_caps caps;
struct aa_net net;
struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
struct aa_loaddata *rawdata;
@ -223,16 +220,6 @@ static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(struct aa_profile *profile,
return 0;
}
static inline unsigned int PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(struct aa_profile *profile,
u16 AF) {
unsigned int state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
u16 be_af = cpu_to_be16(AF);
if (!state)
return 0;
return aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &be_af, 2);
}
/**
* aa_get_profile - increment refcount on profile @p
* @p: profile (MAYBE NULL)

View File

@ -211,8 +211,7 @@ void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask)
*str = '\0';
}
void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
u32 mask)
void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask)
{
const char *fmt = "%s";
unsigned int i, perm = 1;
@ -230,7 +229,7 @@ void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char * const *names,
}
void aa_audit_perm_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask, const char *chrs,
u32 chrsmask, const char * const *names, u32 namesmask)
u32 chrsmask, const char **names, u32 namesmask)
{
char str[33];

View File

@ -33,7 +33,6 @@
#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/file.h"
#include "include/ipc.h"
#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/label.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
@ -737,368 +736,6 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
return error;
}
/**
* apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
*/
static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
if (!ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
SK_CTX(sk) = ctx;
return 0;
}
/**
* apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
*/
static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
SK_CTX(sk) = NULL;
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
path_put(&ctx->path);
kfree(ctx);
}
/**
* apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
*/
static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
struct sock *newsk)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
new->path = ctx->path;
path_get(&new->path);
}
static int aa_sock_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
int protocol)
{
AA_BUG(!label);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type,
protocol);
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket
*/
static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error = 0;
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
error = aa_sock_create_perm(label, family, type, protocol);
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
*
* Note:
* - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to
* move to a special kernel label
* - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
* sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
* sock_graft.
*/
static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
struct aa_label *label;
if (kern) {
struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns();
label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns));
aa_put_ns(ns);
} else
label = aa_get_current_label();
if (sock->sk) {
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
aa_put_label(ctx->label);
ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
}
aa_put_label(label);
return 0;
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
*/
static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(!address);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk);
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address
*/
static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(!address);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk);
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen
*/
static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk);
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection.
*
* Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
* has not been done.
*/
static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(!newsock);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk);
}
static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(!msg);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message
*/
static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
{
return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
}
/* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address
*/
static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
{
return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address
*/
static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
{
return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
}
/* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
int level, int optname)
{
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
}
/**
* apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
*/
static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
int optname)
{
return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
level, optname);
}
/**
* apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
*/
static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
int optname)
{
return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
level, optname);
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn
*/
static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
{
return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
*
* Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
*
* dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
* to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb()
*/
static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return 0;
}
static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
if (ctx->peer)
return ctx->peer;
return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
*
* Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
*/
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen,
unsigned int len)
{
char *name;
int slen, error = 0;
struct aa_label *label;
struct aa_label *peer;
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk);
if (IS_ERR(peer)) {
error = PTR_ERR(peer);
goto done;
}
slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
/* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
if (slen < 0) {
error = -ENOMEM;
} else {
if (slen > len) {
error = -ERANGE;
} else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
error = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
if (put_user(slen, optlen))
error = -EFAULT;
out:
kfree(name);
}
done:
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
/**
* apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
* @sock: the peer socket
* @skb: packet data
* @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
*
* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
*/
static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
{
/* TODO: requires secid support */
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
/**
* apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
* @sk: child sock
* @parent: parent socket
*
* Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
* just set sk security information off of current creating process label
* Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
* instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
* socket is shared by different tasks.
*/
static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
if (!ctx->label)
ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
}
static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@ -1133,30 +770,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),

View File

@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
/*
* AppArmor security module
*
* This file contains AppArmor network mediation
*
* Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
* Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
* published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
* License.
*/
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/label.h"
#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "net_names.h"
struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
{ }
};
static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
"unknown",
"send",
"receive",
"unknown",
"create",
"shutdown",
"connect",
"unknown",
"setattr",
"getattr",
"setcred",
"getcred",
"chmod",
"chown",
"chgrp",
"lock",
"mmap",
"mprot",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"accept",
"bind",
"listen",
"unknown",
"setopt",
"getopt",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"unknown",
"unknown",
};
/* audit callback for net specific fields */
void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
{
struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
else
audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type])
audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
else
audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", aad(sa)->net.type);
audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0,
net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0,
net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
}
}
if (aad(sa)->peer) {
audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
}
/* Generic af perm */
int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
u32 request, u16 family, int type)
{
struct aa_perms perms = { };
AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
if (profile_unconfined(profile))
return 0;
perms.allow = (profile->net.allow[family] & (1 << type)) ?
ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0;
perms.audit = (profile->net.audit[family] & (1 << type)) ?
ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0;
perms.quiet = (profile->net.quiet[family] & (1 << type)) ?
ALL_PERMS_MASK : 0;
aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
}
int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
int type, int protocol)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family,
type));
}
static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
struct sock *sk)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
AA_BUG(!label);
AA_BUG(!sk);
if (unconfined(label))
return 0;
return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
}
int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
{
struct aa_label *label;
int error;
AA_BUG(!sk);
AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
/* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
end_current_label_crit_section(label);
return error;
}
int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
struct socket *sock)
{
AA_BUG(!label);
AA_BUG(!sock);
AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
}

View File

@ -275,19 +275,6 @@ fail:
return 0;
}
static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
{
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
return 0;
if (data)
*data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((__le16 *) e->pos));
e->pos += sizeof(u16);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
{
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
@ -597,7 +584,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL;
const char *info = "failed to unpack profile";
size_t size = 0, ns_len;
size_t ns_len;
struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 };
char *key = NULL;
struct aa_data *data;
@ -730,38 +717,6 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name)
goto fail;
}
size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
if (size) {
for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
/* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
* never request
*/
if (i >= AF_MAX) {
u16 tmp;
if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
goto fail;
continue;
}
if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
goto fail;
if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
goto fail;
if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
goto fail;
}
if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
goto fail;
}
if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v7)) {
/* pre v7 policy always allowed these */
profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
}
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
info = "failed to unpack policydb";