linux-brain/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 23:07:57 +09:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
#ifndef _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H
#define _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H
#include <linux/bits.h>
/*
* CPU model specific register (MSR) numbers.
*
* Do not add new entries to this file unless the definitions are shared
* between multiple compilation units.
*/
/* x86-64 specific MSRs */
#define MSR_EFER 0xc0000080 /* extended feature register */
#define MSR_STAR 0xc0000081 /* legacy mode SYSCALL target */
#define MSR_LSTAR 0xc0000082 /* long mode SYSCALL target */
#define MSR_CSTAR 0xc0000083 /* compat mode SYSCALL target */
#define MSR_SYSCALL_MASK 0xc0000084 /* EFLAGS mask for syscall */
#define MSR_FS_BASE 0xc0000100 /* 64bit FS base */
#define MSR_GS_BASE 0xc0000101 /* 64bit GS base */
#define MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE 0xc0000102 /* SwapGS GS shadow */
#define MSR_TSC_AUX 0xc0000103 /* Auxiliary TSC */
/* EFER bits: */
#define _EFER_SCE 0 /* SYSCALL/SYSRET */
#define _EFER_LME 8 /* Long mode enable */
#define _EFER_LMA 10 /* Long mode active (read-only) */
#define _EFER_NX 11 /* No execute enable */
#define _EFER_SVME 12 /* Enable virtualization */
#define _EFER_LMSLE 13 /* Long Mode Segment Limit Enable */
#define _EFER_FFXSR 14 /* Enable Fast FXSAVE/FXRSTOR */
#define EFER_SCE (1<<_EFER_SCE)
#define EFER_LME (1<<_EFER_LME)
#define EFER_LMA (1<<_EFER_LMA)
#define EFER_NX (1<<_EFER_NX)
#define EFER_SVME (1<<_EFER_SVME)
#define EFER_LMSLE (1<<_EFER_LMSLE)
#define EFER_FFXSR (1<<_EFER_FFXSR)
/* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
#define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL 0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
x86/speculation: Prepare for per task indirect branch speculation control To avoid the overhead of STIBP always on, it's necessary to allow per task control of STIBP. Add a new task flag TIF_SPEC_IB and evaluate it during context switch if SMT is active and flag evaluation is enabled by the speculation control code. Add the conditional evaluation to x86_virt_spec_ctrl() as well so the guest/host switch works properly. This has no effect because TIF_SPEC_IB cannot be set yet and the static key which controls evaluation is off. Preparatory patch for adding the control code. [ tglx: Simplify the context switch logic and make the TIF evaluation depend on SMP=y and on the static key controlling the conditional update. Rename it to TIF_SPEC_IB because it controls both STIBP and IBPB ] Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.176917199@linutronix.de
2018-11-26 03:33:46 +09:00
#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT 1 /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictor (STIBP) bit */
#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT) /* STIBP mask */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT 2 /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD 0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
#define PRED_CMD_IBPB BIT(0) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
#define MSR_PPIN_CTL 0x0000004e
#define MSR_PPIN 0x0000004f
#define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1
#define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR1 0x000000c2
#define MSR_FSB_FREQ 0x000000cd
#define MSR_PLATFORM_INFO 0x000000ce
x86/cpufeature: Detect CPUID faulting support Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge. When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID instruction with CPL>0. This will allow a ptracer to emulate the CPUID instruction. Bit 31 of MSR_PLATFORM_INFO advertises support for this feature. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991 Detect support for this feature and expose it as X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULT. Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-8-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-20 17:16:25 +09:00
#define MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT_BIT 31
#define MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT BIT_ULL(MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT_BIT)
x86/umwait: Initialize umwait control values umwait or tpause allows the processor to enter a light-weight power/performance optimized state (C0.1 state) or an improved power/performance optimized state (C0.2 state) for a period specified by the instruction or until the system time limit or until a store to the monitored address range in umwait. IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR register allows the OS to enable/disable C0.2 on the processor and to set the maximum time the processor can reside in C0.1 or C0.2. By default C0.2 is enabled so the user wait instructions can enter the C0.2 state to save more power with slower wakeup time. Andy Lutomirski proposed to set the maximum umwait time to 100000 cycles by default. A quote from Andy: "What I want to avoid is the case where it works dramatically differently on NO_HZ_FULL systems as compared to everything else. Also, UMWAIT may behave a bit differently if the max timeout is hit, and I'd like that path to get exercised widely by making it happen even on default configs." A sysfs interface to adjust the time and the C0.2 enablement is provided in a follow up change. [ tglx: Renamed MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_MAX_TIME to MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_TIME_MASK because the constant is used as mask throughout the code. Massaged comments and changelog ] Signed-off-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: "Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de> Cc: "H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: "Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: "Tony Luck" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: "Ravi V Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1560994438-235698-3-git-send-email-fenghua.yu@intel.com
2019-06-20 10:33:55 +09:00
#define MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL 0xe1
#define MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_C02_DISABLE BIT(0)
#define MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_RESERVED BIT(1)
/*
* The time field is bit[31:2], but representing a 32bit value with
* bit[1:0] zero.
*/
#define MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_TIME_MASK (~0x03U)
#define MSR_PKG_CST_CONFIG_CONTROL 0x000000e2
#define NHM_C3_AUTO_DEMOTE (1UL << 25)
#define NHM_C1_AUTO_DEMOTE (1UL << 26)
#define ATM_LNC_C6_AUTO_DEMOTE (1UL << 25)
#define SNB_C3_AUTO_UNDEMOTE (1UL << 27)
#define SNB_C1_AUTO_UNDEMOTE (1UL << 28)
#define MSR_MTRRcap 0x000000fe
#define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES 0x0000010a
#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO BIT(0) /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL BIT(1) /* Enhanced IBRS support */
#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH BIT(3) /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO BIT(4) /*
* Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
* attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
* control required.
*/
x86/speculation/mds: Add basic bug infrastructure for MDS Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS), is a class of side channel attacks on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are: - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126) - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130) - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127) MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other. MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible. MLDPS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible. All variants have the same mitigation for single CPU thread case (SMT off), so the kernel can treat them as one MDS issue. Add the basic infrastructure to detect if the current CPU is affected by MDS. [ tglx: Rewrote changelog ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
2019-01-19 09:50:16 +09:00
#define ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO BIT(5) /*
* Not susceptible to
* Microarchitectural Data
* Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
*/
#define ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO BIT(6) /*
* The processor is not susceptible to a
* machine check error due to modifying the
* code page size along with either the
* physical address or cache type
* without TLB invalidation.
*/
x86/msr: Add the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may be used on certain processors as part of a speculative side channel attack. A microcode update for existing processors that are vulnerable to this attack will add a new MSR - IA32_TSX_CTRL to allow the system administrator the option to disable TSX as one of the possible mitigations. The CPUs which get this new MSR after a microcode upgrade are the ones which do not set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO (bit 5) because those CPUs have CPUID.MD_CLEAR, i.e., the VERW implementation which clears all CPU buffers takes care of the TAA case as well. [ Note that future processors that are not vulnerable will also support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. ] Add defines for the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR and its bits. TSX has two sub-features: 1. Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) is an explicitly-used feature where new instructions begin and end TSX transactions. 2. Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) is implicitly used when certain kinds of "old" style locks are used by software. Bit 7 of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicates the presence of the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR: Bit 0: When set, it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the XBEGIN instruction). Bit 1: When set, it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0). The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally disabled by the new microcode but still enumerated as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}, unless disabled by IA32_TSX_CTRL_MSR[1] - TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2019-10-23 17:45:50 +09:00
#define ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR BIT(7) /* MSR for TSX control is available. */
x86/speculation/taa: Add mitigation for TSX Async Abort TSX Async Abort (TAA) is a side channel vulnerability to the internal buffers in some Intel processors similar to Microachitectural Data Sampling (MDS). In this case, certain loads may speculatively pass invalid data to dependent operations when an asynchronous abort condition is pending in a TSX transaction. This includes loads with no fault or assist condition. Such loads may speculatively expose stale data from the uarch data structures as in MDS. Scope of exposure is within the same-thread and cross-thread. This issue affects all current processors that support TSX, but do not have ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO (bit 8) set in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. On CPUs which have their IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR bit MDS_NO=0, CPUID.MD_CLEAR=1 and the MDS mitigation is clearing the CPU buffers using VERW or L1D_FLUSH, there is no additional mitigation needed for TAA. On affected CPUs with MDS_NO=1 this issue can be mitigated by disabling the Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) feature. A new MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL in future and current processors after a microcode update can be used to control the TSX feature. There are two bits in that MSR: * TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE disables the TSX sub-feature Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM). * TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR clears the RTM enumeration in CPUID. The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally disabled with updated microcode but still enumerated as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}. The second mitigation approach is similar to MDS which is clearing the affected CPU buffers on return to user space and when entering a guest. Relevant microcode update is required for the mitigation to work. More details on this approach can be found here: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html The TSX feature can be controlled by the "tsx" command line parameter. If it is force-enabled then "Clear CPU buffers" (MDS mitigation) is deployed. The effective mitigation state can be read from sysfs. [ bp: - massage + comments cleanup - s/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLE/TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED/g - Josh. - remove partial TAA mitigation in update_mds_branch_idle() - Josh. - s/tsx_async_abort_cmdline/tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline/g ] Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2019-10-23 18:30:45 +09:00
#define ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO BIT(8) /*
* Not susceptible to
* TSX Async Abort (TAA) vulnerabilities.
*/
#define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b
#define L1D_FLUSH BIT(0) /*
* Writeback and invalidate the
* L1 data cache.
*/
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL 0x00000119
#define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3 0x0000011e
x86/msr: Add the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) may be used on certain processors as part of a speculative side channel attack. A microcode update for existing processors that are vulnerable to this attack will add a new MSR - IA32_TSX_CTRL to allow the system administrator the option to disable TSX as one of the possible mitigations. The CPUs which get this new MSR after a microcode upgrade are the ones which do not set MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO (bit 5) because those CPUs have CPUID.MD_CLEAR, i.e., the VERW implementation which clears all CPU buffers takes care of the TAA case as well. [ Note that future processors that are not vulnerable will also support the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. ] Add defines for the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR and its bits. TSX has two sub-features: 1. Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) is an explicitly-used feature where new instructions begin and end TSX transactions. 2. Hardware Lock Elision (HLE) is implicitly used when certain kinds of "old" style locks are used by software. Bit 7 of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES indicates the presence of the IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR. There are two control bits in IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR: Bit 0: When set, it disables the Restricted Transactional Memory (RTM) sub-feature of TSX (will force all transactions to abort on the XBEGIN instruction). Bit 1: When set, it disables the enumeration of the RTM and HLE feature (i.e. it will make CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4} and CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit11} read as 0). The other TSX sub-feature, Hardware Lock Elision (HLE), is unconditionally disabled by the new microcode but still enumerated as present by CPUID(EAX=7).EBX{bit4}, unless disabled by IA32_TSX_CTRL_MSR[1] - TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
2019-10-23 17:45:50 +09:00
#define MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL 0x00000122
#define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE BIT(0) /* Disable RTM feature */
#define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR BIT(1) /* Disable TSX enumeration */
x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for reuse. While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL. The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom. * Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using either mitigations=off or srbds=off. * Export vulnerability status via sysfs * Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations. [ bp: Massage, - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g, - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in, - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level, - reflow comments. jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-04-17 00:54:04 +09:00
/* SRBDS support */
#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123
#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0)
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175
#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP 0x00000176
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP 0x00000179
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS 0x0000017a
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL 0x0000017b
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL 0x000004d0
perf: Add support for supplementary event registers Change logs against Andi's original version: - Extends perf_event_attr:config to config{,1,2} (Peter Zijlstra) - Fixed a major event scheduling issue. There cannot be a ref++ on an event that has already done ref++ once and without calling put_constraint() in between. (Stephane Eranian) - Use thread_cpumask for percore allocation. (Lin Ming) - Use MSR names in the extra reg lists. (Lin Ming) - Remove redundant "c = NULL" in intel_percore_constraints - Fix comment of perf_event_attr::config1 Intel Nehalem/Westmere have a special OFFCORE_RESPONSE event that can be used to monitor any offcore accesses from a core. This is a very useful event for various tunings, and it's also needed to implement the generic LLC-* events correctly. Unfortunately this event requires programming a mask in a separate register. And worse this separate register is per core, not per CPU thread. This patch: - Teaches perf_events that OFFCORE_RESPONSE needs extra parameters. The extra parameters are passed by user space in the perf_event_attr::config1 field. - Adds support to the Intel perf_event core to schedule per core resources. This adds fairly generic infrastructure that can be also used for other per core resources. The basic code has is patterned after the similar AMD northbridge constraints code. Thanks to Stephane Eranian who pointed out some problems in the original version and suggested improvements. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Lin Ming <ming.m.lin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> LKML-Reference: <1299119690-13991-2-git-send-email-ming.m.lin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-03-03 11:34:47 +09:00
#define MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_0 0x000001a6
#define MSR_OFFCORE_RSP_1 0x000001a7
#define MSR_TURBO_RATIO_LIMIT 0x000001ad
#define MSR_TURBO_RATIO_LIMIT1 0x000001ae
#define MSR_TURBO_RATIO_LIMIT2 0x000001af
perf: Add support for supplementary event registers Change logs against Andi's original version: - Extends perf_event_attr:config to config{,1,2} (Peter Zijlstra) - Fixed a major event scheduling issue. There cannot be a ref++ on an event that has already done ref++ once and without calling put_constraint() in between. (Stephane Eranian) - Use thread_cpumask for percore allocation. (Lin Ming) - Use MSR names in the extra reg lists. (Lin Ming) - Remove redundant "c = NULL" in intel_percore_constraints - Fix comment of perf_event_attr::config1 Intel Nehalem/Westmere have a special OFFCORE_RESPONSE event that can be used to monitor any offcore accesses from a core. This is a very useful event for various tunings, and it's also needed to implement the generic LLC-* events correctly. Unfortunately this event requires programming a mask in a separate register. And worse this separate register is per core, not per CPU thread. This patch: - Teaches perf_events that OFFCORE_RESPONSE needs extra parameters. The extra parameters are passed by user space in the perf_event_attr::config1 field. - Adds support to the Intel perf_event core to schedule per core resources. This adds fairly generic infrastructure that can be also used for other per core resources. The basic code has is patterned after the similar AMD northbridge constraints code. Thanks to Stephane Eranian who pointed out some problems in the original version and suggested improvements. Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Lin Ming <ming.m.lin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> LKML-Reference: <1299119690-13991-2-git-send-email-ming.m.lin@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-03-03 11:34:47 +09:00
#define MSR_LBR_SELECT 0x000001c8
#define MSR_LBR_TOS 0x000001c9
#define MSR_LBR_NHM_FROM 0x00000680
#define MSR_LBR_NHM_TO 0x000006c0
#define MSR_LBR_CORE_FROM 0x00000040
#define MSR_LBR_CORE_TO 0x00000060
#define MSR_LBR_INFO_0 0x00000dc0 /* ... 0xddf for _31 */
#define LBR_INFO_MISPRED BIT_ULL(63)
#define LBR_INFO_IN_TX BIT_ULL(62)
#define LBR_INFO_ABORT BIT_ULL(61)
#define LBR_INFO_CYCLES 0xffff
#define MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE 0x000003f1
perf/x86/intel: Support adaptive PEBS v4 Adaptive PEBS is a new way to report PEBS sampling information. Instead of a fixed size record for all PEBS events it allows to configure the PEBS record to only include the information needed. Events can then opt in to use such an extended record, or stay with a basic record which only contains the IP. The major new feature is to support LBRs in PEBS record. Besides normal LBR, this allows (much faster) large PEBS, while still supporting callstacks through callstack LBR. So essentially a lot of profiling can now be done without frequent interrupts, dropping the overhead significantly. The main requirement still is to use a period, and not use frequency mode, because frequency mode requires reevaluating the frequency on each overflow. The floating point state (XMM) is also supported, which allows efficient profiling of FP function arguments. Introduce specific drain function to handle variable length records. Use a new callback to parse the new record format, and also handle the STATUS field now being at a different offset. Add code to set up the configuration register. Since there is only a single register, all events either get the full super set of all events, or only the basic record. Originally-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: acme@kernel.org Cc: jolsa@kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190402194509.2832-6-kan.liang@linux.intel.com [ Renamed GPRS => GP. ] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2019-04-03 04:45:02 +09:00
#define MSR_PEBS_DATA_CFG 0x000003f2
#define MSR_IA32_DS_AREA 0x00000600
#define MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES 0x00000345
#define MSR_PEBS_LD_LAT_THRESHOLD 0x000003f6
#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL 0x00000570
#define RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN BIT(0)
#define RTIT_CTL_CYCLEACC BIT(1)
#define RTIT_CTL_OS BIT(2)
#define RTIT_CTL_USR BIT(3)
#define RTIT_CTL_PWR_EVT_EN BIT(4)
#define RTIT_CTL_FUP_ON_PTW BIT(5)
#define RTIT_CTL_FABRIC_EN BIT(6)
#define RTIT_CTL_CR3EN BIT(7)
#define RTIT_CTL_TOPA BIT(8)
#define RTIT_CTL_MTC_EN BIT(9)
#define RTIT_CTL_TSC_EN BIT(10)
#define RTIT_CTL_DISRETC BIT(11)
#define RTIT_CTL_PTW_EN BIT(12)
#define RTIT_CTL_BRANCH_EN BIT(13)
#define RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE_OFFSET 14
#define RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE (0x0full << RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE_OFFSET)
#define RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH_OFFSET 19
#define RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH (0x0full << RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH_OFFSET)
#define RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ_OFFSET 24
#define RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ (0x0full << RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ_OFFSET)
#define RTIT_CTL_ADDR0_OFFSET 32
#define RTIT_CTL_ADDR0 (0x0full << RTIT_CTL_ADDR0_OFFSET)
#define RTIT_CTL_ADDR1_OFFSET 36
#define RTIT_CTL_ADDR1 (0x0full << RTIT_CTL_ADDR1_OFFSET)
#define RTIT_CTL_ADDR2_OFFSET 40
#define RTIT_CTL_ADDR2 (0x0full << RTIT_CTL_ADDR2_OFFSET)
#define RTIT_CTL_ADDR3_OFFSET 44
#define RTIT_CTL_ADDR3 (0x0full << RTIT_CTL_ADDR3_OFFSET)
#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS 0x00000571
#define RTIT_STATUS_FILTEREN BIT(0)
#define RTIT_STATUS_CONTEXTEN BIT(1)
#define RTIT_STATUS_TRIGGEREN BIT(2)
#define RTIT_STATUS_BUFFOVF BIT(3)
#define RTIT_STATUS_ERROR BIT(4)
#define RTIT_STATUS_STOPPED BIT(5)
#define RTIT_STATUS_BYTECNT_OFFSET 32
#define RTIT_STATUS_BYTECNT (0x1ffffull << RTIT_STATUS_BYTECNT_OFFSET)
#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A 0x00000580
#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B 0x00000581
#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR1_A 0x00000582
#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR1_B 0x00000583
#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR2_A 0x00000584
#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR2_B 0x00000585
#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_A 0x00000586
#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B 0x00000587
#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH 0x00000572
#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE 0x00000560
#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK 0x00000561
#define MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000 0x00000250
#define MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000 0x00000258
#define MSR_MTRRfix16K_A0000 0x00000259
#define MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000 0x00000268
#define MSR_MTRRfix4K_C8000 0x00000269
#define MSR_MTRRfix4K_D0000 0x0000026a
#define MSR_MTRRfix4K_D8000 0x0000026b
#define MSR_MTRRfix4K_E0000 0x0000026c
#define MSR_MTRRfix4K_E8000 0x0000026d
#define MSR_MTRRfix4K_F0000 0x0000026e
#define MSR_MTRRfix4K_F8000 0x0000026f
#define MSR_MTRRdefType 0x000002ff
#define MSR_IA32_CR_PAT 0x00000277
#define MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR 0x000001d9
#define MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP 0x000001db
#define MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP 0x000001dc
#define MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP 0x000001dd
#define MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP 0x000001de
/* DEBUGCTLMSR bits (others vary by model): */
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_LBR (1UL << 0) /* last branch recording */
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF_SHIFT 1
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF (1UL << 1) /* single-step on branches */
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_TR (1UL << 6)
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS (1UL << 7)
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTINT (1UL << 8)
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS_OFF_OS (1UL << 9)
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_BTS_OFF_USR (1UL << 10)
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_LBRS_ON_PMI (1UL << 11)
perf/x86/intel: Add a separate Arch Perfmon v4 PMI handler Implements counter freezing for Arch Perfmon v4 (Skylake and newer). This allows to speed up the PMI handler by avoiding unnecessary MSR writes and make it more accurate. The Arch Perfmon v4 PMI handler is substantially different than the older PMI handler. Differences to the old handler: - It relies on counter freezing, which eliminates several MSR writes from the PMI handler and lowers the overhead significantly. It makes the PMI handler more accurate, as all counters get frozen atomically as soon as any counter overflows. So there is much less counting of the PMI handler itself. With the freezing we don't need to disable or enable counters or PEBS. Only BTS which does not support auto-freezing still needs to be explicitly managed. - The PMU acking is done at the end, not the beginning. This makes it possible to avoid manual enabling/disabling of the PMU, instead we just rely on the freezing/acking. - The APIC is acked before reenabling the PMU, which avoids problems with LBRs occasionally not getting unfreezed on Skylake. - Looping is only needed to workaround a corner case which several PMIs are very close to each other. For common cases, the counters are freezed during PMI handler. It doesn't need to do re-check. This patch: - Adds code to enable v4 counter freezing - Fork <=v3 and >=v4 PMI handlers into separate functions. - Add kernel parameter to disable counter freezing. It took some time to debug counter freezing, so in case there are new problems we added an option to turn it off. Would not expect this to be used until there are new bugs. - Only for big core. The patch for small core will be posted later separately. Performance: When profiling a kernel build on Kabylake with different perf options, measuring the length of all NMI handlers using the nmi handler trace point: V3 is without counter freezing. V4 is with counter freezing. The value is the average cost of the PMI handler. (lower is better) perf options ` V3(ns) V4(ns) delta -c 100000 1088 894 -18% -g -c 100000 1862 1646 -12% --call-graph lbr -c 100000 3649 3367 -8% --c.g. dwarf -c 100000 2248 1982 -12% Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: acme@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1533712328-2834-2-git-send-email-kan.liang@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2018-08-08 16:12:07 +09:00
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_PERFMON_ON_PMI (1UL << 12)
perf/x86: Add sysfs entry to freeze counters on SMI Currently, the SMIs are visible to all performance counters, because many users want to measure everything including SMIs. But in some cases, the SMI cycles should not be counted - for example, to calculate the cost of an SMI itself. So a knob is needed. When setting FREEZE_WHILE_SMM bit in IA32_DEBUGCTL, all performance counters will be effected. There is no way to do per-counter freeze on SMI. So it should not use the per-event interface (e.g. ioctl or event attribute) to set FREEZE_WHILE_SMM bit. Adds sysfs entry /sys/device/cpu/freeze_on_smi to set FREEZE_WHILE_SMM bit in IA32_DEBUGCTL. When set, freezes perfmon and trace messages while in SMM. Value has to be 0 or 1. It will be applied to all processors. Also serialize the entire setting so we don't get multiple concurrent threads trying to update to different values. Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <Kan.liang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: acme@kernel.org Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: jolsa@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1494600673-244667-1-git-send-email-kan.liang@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-05-12 23:51:13 +09:00
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM_BIT 14
#define DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM (1UL << DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM_BIT)
#define MSR_PEBS_FRONTEND 0x000003f7
#define MSR_IA32_POWER_CTL 0x000001fc
#define MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL 0x00000400
#define MSR_IA32_MC0_STATUS 0x00000401
#define MSR_IA32_MC0_ADDR 0x00000402
#define MSR_IA32_MC0_MISC 0x00000403
/* C-state Residency Counters */
#define MSR_PKG_C3_RESIDENCY 0x000003f8
#define MSR_PKG_C6_RESIDENCY 0x000003f9
#define MSR_ATOM_PKG_C6_RESIDENCY 0x000003fa
#define MSR_PKG_C7_RESIDENCY 0x000003fa
#define MSR_CORE_C3_RESIDENCY 0x000003fc
#define MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY 0x000003fd
#define MSR_CORE_C7_RESIDENCY 0x000003fe
#define MSR_KNL_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY 0x000003ff
#define MSR_PKG_C2_RESIDENCY 0x0000060d
#define MSR_PKG_C8_RESIDENCY 0x00000630
#define MSR_PKG_C9_RESIDENCY 0x00000631
#define MSR_PKG_C10_RESIDENCY 0x00000632
/* Interrupt Response Limit */
#define MSR_PKGC3_IRTL 0x0000060a
#define MSR_PKGC6_IRTL 0x0000060b
#define MSR_PKGC7_IRTL 0x0000060c
#define MSR_PKGC8_IRTL 0x00000633
#define MSR_PKGC9_IRTL 0x00000634
#define MSR_PKGC10_IRTL 0x00000635
/* Run Time Average Power Limiting (RAPL) Interface */
#define MSR_RAPL_POWER_UNIT 0x00000606
#define MSR_PKG_POWER_LIMIT 0x00000610
#define MSR_PKG_ENERGY_STATUS 0x00000611
#define MSR_PKG_PERF_STATUS 0x00000613
#define MSR_PKG_POWER_INFO 0x00000614
#define MSR_DRAM_POWER_LIMIT 0x00000618
#define MSR_DRAM_ENERGY_STATUS 0x00000619
#define MSR_DRAM_PERF_STATUS 0x0000061b
#define MSR_DRAM_POWER_INFO 0x0000061c
#define MSR_PP0_POWER_LIMIT 0x00000638
#define MSR_PP0_ENERGY_STATUS 0x00000639
#define MSR_PP0_POLICY 0x0000063a
#define MSR_PP0_PERF_STATUS 0x0000063b
#define MSR_PP1_POWER_LIMIT 0x00000640
#define MSR_PP1_ENERGY_STATUS 0x00000641
#define MSR_PP1_POLICY 0x00000642
/* Config TDP MSRs */
#define MSR_CONFIG_TDP_NOMINAL 0x00000648
#define MSR_CONFIG_TDP_LEVEL_1 0x00000649
#define MSR_CONFIG_TDP_LEVEL_2 0x0000064A
#define MSR_CONFIG_TDP_CONTROL 0x0000064B
#define MSR_TURBO_ACTIVATION_RATIO 0x0000064C
#define MSR_PLATFORM_ENERGY_STATUS 0x0000064D
#define MSR_PKG_WEIGHTED_CORE_C0_RES 0x00000658
#define MSR_PKG_ANY_CORE_C0_RES 0x00000659
#define MSR_PKG_ANY_GFXE_C0_RES 0x0000065A
#define MSR_PKG_BOTH_CORE_GFXE_C0_RES 0x0000065B
#define MSR_CORE_C1_RES 0x00000660
#define MSR_MODULE_C6_RES_MS 0x00000664
#define MSR_CC6_DEMOTION_POLICY_CONFIG 0x00000668
#define MSR_MC6_DEMOTION_POLICY_CONFIG 0x00000669
#define MSR_ATOM_CORE_RATIOS 0x0000066a
#define MSR_ATOM_CORE_VIDS 0x0000066b
#define MSR_ATOM_CORE_TURBO_RATIOS 0x0000066c
#define MSR_ATOM_CORE_TURBO_VIDS 0x0000066d
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_LIMIT_REASONS 0x00000690
#define MSR_GFX_PERF_LIMIT_REASONS 0x000006B0
#define MSR_RING_PERF_LIMIT_REASONS 0x000006B1
/* Hardware P state interface */
#define MSR_PPERF 0x0000064e
#define MSR_PERF_LIMIT_REASONS 0x0000064f
#define MSR_PM_ENABLE 0x00000770
#define MSR_HWP_CAPABILITIES 0x00000771
#define MSR_HWP_REQUEST_PKG 0x00000772
#define MSR_HWP_INTERRUPT 0x00000773
#define MSR_HWP_REQUEST 0x00000774
#define MSR_HWP_STATUS 0x00000777
/* CPUID.6.EAX */
#define HWP_BASE_BIT (1<<7)
#define HWP_NOTIFICATIONS_BIT (1<<8)
#define HWP_ACTIVITY_WINDOW_BIT (1<<9)
#define HWP_ENERGY_PERF_PREFERENCE_BIT (1<<10)
#define HWP_PACKAGE_LEVEL_REQUEST_BIT (1<<11)
/* IA32_HWP_CAPABILITIES */
#define HWP_HIGHEST_PERF(x) (((x) >> 0) & 0xff)
#define HWP_GUARANTEED_PERF(x) (((x) >> 8) & 0xff)
#define HWP_MOSTEFFICIENT_PERF(x) (((x) >> 16) & 0xff)
#define HWP_LOWEST_PERF(x) (((x) >> 24) & 0xff)
/* IA32_HWP_REQUEST */
#define HWP_MIN_PERF(x) (x & 0xff)
#define HWP_MAX_PERF(x) ((x & 0xff) << 8)
#define HWP_DESIRED_PERF(x) ((x & 0xff) << 16)
#define HWP_ENERGY_PERF_PREFERENCE(x) (((unsigned long long) x & 0xff) << 24)
#define HWP_EPP_PERFORMANCE 0x00
#define HWP_EPP_BALANCE_PERFORMANCE 0x80
#define HWP_EPP_BALANCE_POWERSAVE 0xC0
#define HWP_EPP_POWERSAVE 0xFF
#define HWP_ACTIVITY_WINDOW(x) ((unsigned long long)(x & 0xff3) << 32)
#define HWP_PACKAGE_CONTROL(x) ((unsigned long long)(x & 0x1) << 42)
/* IA32_HWP_STATUS */
#define HWP_GUARANTEED_CHANGE(x) (x & 0x1)
#define HWP_EXCURSION_TO_MINIMUM(x) (x & 0x4)
/* IA32_HWP_INTERRUPT */
#define HWP_CHANGE_TO_GUARANTEED_INT(x) (x & 0x1)
#define HWP_EXCURSION_TO_MINIMUM_INT(x) (x & 0x2)
#define MSR_AMD64_MC0_MASK 0xc0010044
#define MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(x) (MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL + 4*(x))
#define MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(x) (MSR_IA32_MC0_STATUS + 4*(x))
#define MSR_IA32_MCx_ADDR(x) (MSR_IA32_MC0_ADDR + 4*(x))
#define MSR_IA32_MCx_MISC(x) (MSR_IA32_MC0_MISC + 4*(x))
#define MSR_AMD64_MCx_MASK(x) (MSR_AMD64_MC0_MASK + (x))
/* These are consecutive and not in the normal 4er MCE bank block */
#define MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 0x00000280
#define MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(x) (MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL2 + (x))
#define MSR_P6_PERFCTR0 0x000000c1
#define MSR_P6_PERFCTR1 0x000000c2
#define MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0 0x00000186
#define MSR_P6_EVNTSEL1 0x00000187
#define MSR_KNC_PERFCTR0 0x00000020
#define MSR_KNC_PERFCTR1 0x00000021
#define MSR_KNC_EVNTSEL0 0x00000028
#define MSR_KNC_EVNTSEL1 0x00000029
/* Alternative perfctr range with full access. */
#define MSR_IA32_PMC0 0x000004c1
/* Auto-reload via MSR instead of DS area */
#define MSR_RELOAD_PMC0 0x000014c1
#define MSR_RELOAD_FIXED_CTR0 0x00001309
/*
* AMD64 MSRs. Not complete. See the architecture manual for a more
* complete list.
*/
#define MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL 0x0000008b
#define MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO 0xc0000104
#define MSR_AMD64_NB_CFG 0xc001001f
x86/CPU/AMD: Clear RDRAND CPUID bit on AMD family 15h/16h There have been reports of RDRAND issues after resuming from suspend on some AMD family 15h and family 16h systems. This issue stems from a BIOS not performing the proper steps during resume to ensure RDRAND continues to function properly. RDRAND support is indicated by CPUID Fn00000001_ECX[30]. This bit can be reset by clearing MSR C001_1004[62]. Any software that checks for RDRAND support using CPUID, including the kernel, will believe that RDRAND is not supported. Update the CPU initialization to clear the RDRAND CPUID bit for any family 15h and 16h processor that supports RDRAND. If it is known that the family 15h or family 16h system does not have an RDRAND resume issue or that the system will not be placed in suspend, the "rdrand=force" kernel parameter can be used to stop the clearing of the RDRAND CPUID bit. Additionally, update the suspend and resume path to save and restore the MSR C001_1004 value to ensure that the RDRAND CPUID setting remains in place after resuming from suspend. Note, that clearing the RDRAND CPUID bit does not prevent a processor that normally supports the RDRAND instruction from executing it. So any code that determined the support based on family and model won't #UD. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org> Cc: "linux-pm@vger.kernel.org" <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7543af91666f491547bd86cebb1e17c66824ab9f.1566229943.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
2019-08-20 00:52:35 +09:00
#define MSR_AMD64_CPUID_FN_1 0xc0011004
#define MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER 0xc0010020
#define MSR_AMD_PERF_CTL 0xc0010062
#define MSR_AMD_PERF_STATUS 0xc0010063
#define MSR_AMD_PSTATE_DEF_BASE 0xc0010064
#define MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH 0xc0010140
#define MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS 0xc0010141
#define MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG 0xc0011020
#define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG 0xc0011022
#define MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2 0xc001102a
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHCTL 0xc0011030
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHLINAD 0xc0011031
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCHPHYSAD 0xc0011032
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCH_REG_COUNT 3
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCH_REG_MASK ((1UL<<MSR_AMD64_IBSFETCH_REG_COUNT)-1)
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOPCTL 0xc0011033
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOPRIP 0xc0011034
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA 0xc0011035
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA2 0xc0011036
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA3 0xc0011037
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSDCLINAD 0xc0011038
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSDCPHYSAD 0xc0011039
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOP_REG_COUNT 7
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOP_REG_MASK ((1UL<<MSR_AMD64_IBSOP_REG_COUNT)-1)
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSCTL 0xc001103a
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET 0xc001103b
#define MSR_AMD64_ICIBSEXTDCTL 0xc001103c
#define MSR_AMD64_IBSOPDATA4 0xc001103d
#define MSR_AMD64_IBS_REG_COUNT_MAX 8 /* includes MSR_AMD64_IBSBRTARGET */
x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active Early in the boot process, add checks to determine if the kernel is running with Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) active. Checking for SEV requires checking that the kernel is running under a hypervisor (CPUID 0x00000001, bit 31), that the SEV feature is available (CPUID 0x8000001f, bit 1) and then checking a non-interceptable SEV MSR (0xc0010131, bit 0). This check is required so that during early compressed kernel booting the pagetables (both the boot pagetables and KASLR pagetables (if enabled) are updated to include the encryption mask so that when the kernel is decompressed into encrypted memory, it can boot properly. After the kernel is decompressed and continues booting the same logic is used to check if SEV is active and set a flag indicating so. This allows to distinguish between SME and SEV, each of which have unique differences in how certain things are handled: e.g. DMA (always bounce buffered with SEV) or EFI tables (always access decrypted with SME). Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com
2017-10-20 23:30:54 +09:00
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV 0xc0010131
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT 0
#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT)
#define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f
/* Fam 17h MSRs */
#define MSR_F17H_IRPERF 0xc00000e9
/* Fam 16h MSRs */
#define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTL 0xc0010230
#define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTR 0xc0010231
#define MSR_F16H_DR1_ADDR_MASK 0xc0011019
#define MSR_F16H_DR2_ADDR_MASK 0xc001101a
#define MSR_F16H_DR3_ADDR_MASK 0xc001101b
#define MSR_F16H_DR0_ADDR_MASK 0xc0011027
/* Fam 15h MSRs */
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL 0xc0010200
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL0 MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL1 (MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL + 2)
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL2 (MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL + 4)
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL3 (MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL + 6)
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL4 (MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL + 8)
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL5 (MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL + 10)
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR 0xc0010201
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR0 MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR1 (MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR + 2)
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR2 (MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR + 4)
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR3 (MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR + 6)
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR4 (MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR + 8)
#define MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR5 (MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR + 10)
#define MSR_F15H_NB_PERF_CTL 0xc0010240
#define MSR_F15H_NB_PERF_CTR 0xc0010241
#define MSR_F15H_PTSC 0xc0010280
#define MSR_F15H_IC_CFG 0xc0011021
#define MSR_F15H_EX_CFG 0xc001102c
/* Fam 10h MSRs */
#define MSR_FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE 0xc0010058
#define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_ENABLE (1<<0)
#define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BUSRANGE_MASK 0xf
#define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BUSRANGE_SHIFT 2
#define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_MASK 0xfffffffULL
#define FAM10H_MMIO_CONF_BASE_SHIFT 20
#define MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID 0xc001100c
#define MSR_F10H_DECFG 0xc0011029
#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT 1
#define MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE BIT_ULL(MSR_F10H_DECFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT)
/* K8 MSRs */
#define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM1 0xc001001a
#define MSR_K8_TOP_MEM2 0xc001001d
#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG 0xc0010010
x86/cpu/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature Update the CPU features to include identifying and reporting on the Secure Memory Encryption (SME) feature. SME is identified by CPUID 0x8000001f, but requires BIOS support to enable it (set bit 23 of MSR_K8_SYSCFG). Only show the SME feature as available if reported by CPUID, enabled by BIOS and not configured as CONFIG_X86_32=y. Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Toshimitsu Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: kasan-dev@googlegroups.com Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/85c17ff450721abccddc95e611ae8df3f4d9718b.1500319216.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-07-18 06:10:01 +09:00
#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT 23
#define MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT BIT_ULL(MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT_BIT)
#define MSR_K8_INT_PENDING_MSG 0xc0010055
/* C1E active bits in int pending message */
#define K8_INTP_C1E_ACTIVE_MASK 0x18000000
x86: split large page mapping for AMD TSEG On AMD SMM protected memory is part of the address map, but handled internally like an MTRR. That leads to large pages getting split internally which has some performance implications. Check for the AMD TSEG MSR and split the large page mapping on that area explicitely if it is part of the direct mapping. There is also SMM ASEG, but it is in the first 1MB and already covered by the earlier split first page patch. Idea for this came from an earlier patch by Andreas Herrmann On a RevF dual Socket Opteron system kernbench shows a clear improvement from this: (together with the earlier patches in this series, especially the split first 2MB patch) [lower is better] no split stddev split stddev delta Elapsed Time 87.146 (0.727516) 84.296 (1.09098) -3.2% User Time 274.537 (4.05226) 273.692 (3.34344) -0.3% System Time 34.907 (0.42492) 34.508 (0.26832) -1.1% Percent CPU 322.5 (38.3007) 326.5 (44.5128) +1.2% => About 3.2% improvement in elapsed time for kernbench. With GB pages on AMD Fam1h the impact of splitting is much higher of course, since it would split two full GB pages (together with the first 1MB split patch) instead of two 2MB pages. I could not benchmark a clear difference in kernbench on gbpages, so I kept it disabled for that case That was only limited benchmarking of course, so if someone was interested in running more tests for the gbpages case that could be revisited (contributions welcome) I didn't bother implementing this for 32bit because it is very unlikely the 32bit lowmem mapping overlaps into the TSEG near 4GB and the 2MB low split is already handled for both. [ mingo@elte.hu: do it on gbpages kernels too, there's no clear reason why it shouldnt help there. ] Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> Acked-by: andreas.herrmann3@amd.com Cc: mingo@elte.hu Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-03-12 11:53:32 +09:00
#define MSR_K8_TSEG_ADDR 0xc0010112
#define MSR_K8_TSEG_MASK 0xc0010113
#define K8_MTRRFIXRANGE_DRAM_ENABLE 0x00040000 /* MtrrFixDramEn bit */
#define K8_MTRRFIXRANGE_DRAM_MODIFY 0x00080000 /* MtrrFixDramModEn bit */
#define K8_MTRR_RDMEM_WRMEM_MASK 0x18181818 /* Mask: RdMem|WrMem */
/* K7 MSRs */
#define MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0 0xc0010000
#define MSR_K7_PERFCTR0 0xc0010004
#define MSR_K7_EVNTSEL1 0xc0010001
#define MSR_K7_PERFCTR1 0xc0010005
#define MSR_K7_EVNTSEL2 0xc0010002
#define MSR_K7_PERFCTR2 0xc0010006
#define MSR_K7_EVNTSEL3 0xc0010003
#define MSR_K7_PERFCTR3 0xc0010007
#define MSR_K7_CLK_CTL 0xc001001b
#define MSR_K7_HWCR 0xc0010015
#define MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK_BIT 0
#define MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK BIT_ULL(MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK_BIT)
x86/cpu/amd: Enable the fixed Instructions Retired counter IRPERF commit 21b5ee59ef18e27d85810584caf1f7ddc705ea83 upstream. Commit aaf248848db50 ("perf/x86/msr: Add AMD IRPERF (Instructions Retired) performance counter") added support for access to the free-running counter via 'perf -e msr/irperf/', but when exercised, it always returns a 0 count: BEFORE: $ perf stat -e instructions,msr/irperf/ true Performance counter stats for 'true': 624,833 instructions 0 msr/irperf/ Simply set its enable bit - HWCR bit 30 - to make it start counting. Enablement is restricted to all machines advertising IRPERF capability, except those susceptible to an erratum that makes the IRPERF return bad values. That erratum occurs in Family 17h models 00-1fh [1], but not in F17h models 20h and above [2]. AFTER (on a family 17h model 31h machine): $ perf stat -e instructions,msr/irperf/ true Performance counter stats for 'true': 621,690 instructions 622,490 msr/irperf/ [1] Revision Guide for AMD Family 17h Models 00h-0Fh Processors [2] Revision Guide for AMD Family 17h Models 30h-3Fh Processors The revision guides are available from the bugzilla Link below. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Fixes: aaf248848db50 ("perf/x86/msr: Add AMD IRPERF (Instructions Retired) performance counter") Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206537 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200214201805.13830-1-kim.phillips@amd.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2020-02-20 02:52:43 +09:00
#define MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT 30
#define MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN BIT_ULL(MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT)
#define MSR_K7_FID_VID_CTL 0xc0010041
#define MSR_K7_FID_VID_STATUS 0xc0010042
/* K6 MSRs */
#define MSR_K6_WHCR 0xc0000082
#define MSR_K6_UWCCR 0xc0000085
#define MSR_K6_EPMR 0xc0000086
#define MSR_K6_PSOR 0xc0000087
#define MSR_K6_PFIR 0xc0000088
/* Centaur-Hauls/IDT defined MSRs. */
#define MSR_IDT_FCR1 0x00000107
#define MSR_IDT_FCR2 0x00000108
#define MSR_IDT_FCR3 0x00000109
#define MSR_IDT_FCR4 0x0000010a
#define MSR_IDT_MCR0 0x00000110
#define MSR_IDT_MCR1 0x00000111
#define MSR_IDT_MCR2 0x00000112
#define MSR_IDT_MCR3 0x00000113
#define MSR_IDT_MCR4 0x00000114
#define MSR_IDT_MCR5 0x00000115
#define MSR_IDT_MCR6 0x00000116
#define MSR_IDT_MCR7 0x00000117
#define MSR_IDT_MCR_CTRL 0x00000120
/* VIA Cyrix defined MSRs*/
#define MSR_VIA_FCR 0x00001107
#define MSR_VIA_LONGHAUL 0x0000110a
#define MSR_VIA_RNG 0x0000110b
#define MSR_VIA_BCR2 0x00001147
/* Transmeta defined MSRs */
#define MSR_TMTA_LONGRUN_CTRL 0x80868010
#define MSR_TMTA_LONGRUN_FLAGS 0x80868011
#define MSR_TMTA_LRTI_READOUT 0x80868018
#define MSR_TMTA_LRTI_VOLT_MHZ 0x8086801a
/* Intel defined MSRs. */
#define MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR 0x00000000
#define MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE 0x00000001
#define MSR_IA32_TSC 0x00000010
#define MSR_IA32_PLATFORM_ID 0x00000017
#define MSR_IA32_EBL_CR_POWERON 0x0000002a
#define MSR_EBC_FREQUENCY_ID 0x0000002c
#define MSR_SMI_COUNT 0x00000034
#define MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL 0x0000003a
KVM: x86: Emulate IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR CPUID.7.0.EBX[1]=1 indicates IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR 0x3b is supported Basic design is to emulate the MSR by allowing reads and writes to a guest vcpu specific location to store the value of the emulated MSR while adding the value to the vmcs tsc_offset. In this way the IA32_TSC_ADJUST value will be included in all reads to the TSC MSR whether through rdmsr or rdtsc. This is of course as long as the "use TSC counter offsetting" VM-execution control is enabled as well as the IA32_TSC_ADJUST control. However, because hardware will only return the TSC + IA32_TSC_ADJUST + vmsc tsc_offset for a guest process when it does and rdtsc (with the correct settings) the value of our virtualized IA32_TSC_ADJUST must be stored in one of these three locations. The argument against storing it in the actual MSR is performance. This is likely to be seldom used while the save/restore is required on every transition. IA32_TSC_ADJUST was created as a way to solve some issues with writing TSC itself so that is not an option either. The remaining option, defined above as our solution has the problem of returning incorrect vmcs tsc_offset values (unless we intercept and fix, not done here) as mentioned above. However, more problematic is that storing the data in vmcs tsc_offset will have a different semantic effect on the system than does using the actual MSR. This is illustrated in the following example: The hypervisor set the IA32_TSC_ADJUST, then the guest sets it and a guest process performs a rdtsc. In this case the guest process will get TSC + IA32_TSC_ADJUST_hyperviser + vmsc tsc_offset including IA32_TSC_ADJUST_guest. While the total system semantics changed the semantics as seen by the guest do not and hence this will not cause a problem. Signed-off-by: Will Auld <will.auld@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
2012-11-30 05:42:50 +09:00
#define MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST 0x0000003b
#define MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS 0x00000d90
#define MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD 0x00000ffc
#define MSR_IA32_XSS 0x00000da0
#define FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED (1<<0)
#define FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX (1<<1)
#define FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX (1<<2)
#define FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE (1<<20)
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE 0x0000001b
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP (1<<8)
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE (1<<11)
#define MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BASE (0xfffff<<12)
#define MSR_IA32_TSCDEADLINE 0x000006e0
#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE 0x00000079
#define MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV 0x0000008b
#define MSR_IA32_SMM_MONITOR_CTL 0x0000009b
#define MSR_IA32_SMBASE 0x0000009e
#define MSR_IA32_PERF_STATUS 0x00000198
#define MSR_IA32_PERF_CTL 0x00000199
#define INTEL_PERF_CTL_MASK 0xffff
#define MSR_IA32_MPERF 0x000000e7
#define MSR_IA32_APERF 0x000000e8
#define MSR_IA32_THERM_CONTROL 0x0000019a
#define MSR_IA32_THERM_INTERRUPT 0x0000019b
#define THERM_INT_HIGH_ENABLE (1 << 0)
#define THERM_INT_LOW_ENABLE (1 << 1)
#define THERM_INT_PLN_ENABLE (1 << 24)
#define MSR_IA32_THERM_STATUS 0x0000019c
#define THERM_STATUS_PROCHOT (1 << 0)
#define THERM_STATUS_POWER_LIMIT (1 << 10)
#define MSR_THERM2_CTL 0x0000019d
#define MSR_THERM2_CTL_TM_SELECT (1ULL << 16)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE 0x000001a0
#define MSR_IA32_TEMPERATURE_TARGET 0x000001a2
#define MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL 0x000001a4
#define MSR_MISC_PWR_MGMT 0x000001aa
#define MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS 0x000001b0
#define ENERGY_PERF_BIAS_PERFORMANCE 0
#define ENERGY_PERF_BIAS_BALANCE_PERFORMANCE 4
#define ENERGY_PERF_BIAS_NORMAL 6
#define ENERGY_PERF_BIAS_BALANCE_POWERSAVE 8
#define ENERGY_PERF_BIAS_POWERSAVE 15
#define MSR_IA32_PACKAGE_THERM_STATUS 0x000001b1
#define PACKAGE_THERM_STATUS_PROCHOT (1 << 0)
#define PACKAGE_THERM_STATUS_POWER_LIMIT (1 << 10)
#define MSR_IA32_PACKAGE_THERM_INTERRUPT 0x000001b2
#define PACKAGE_THERM_INT_HIGH_ENABLE (1 << 0)
#define PACKAGE_THERM_INT_LOW_ENABLE (1 << 1)
#define PACKAGE_THERM_INT_PLN_ENABLE (1 << 24)
/* Thermal Thresholds Support */
#define THERM_INT_THRESHOLD0_ENABLE (1 << 15)
#define THERM_SHIFT_THRESHOLD0 8
#define THERM_MASK_THRESHOLD0 (0x7f << THERM_SHIFT_THRESHOLD0)
#define THERM_INT_THRESHOLD1_ENABLE (1 << 23)
#define THERM_SHIFT_THRESHOLD1 16
#define THERM_MASK_THRESHOLD1 (0x7f << THERM_SHIFT_THRESHOLD1)
#define THERM_STATUS_THRESHOLD0 (1 << 6)
#define THERM_LOG_THRESHOLD0 (1 << 7)
#define THERM_STATUS_THRESHOLD1 (1 << 8)
#define THERM_LOG_THRESHOLD1 (1 << 9)
/* MISC_ENABLE bits: architectural */
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FAST_STRING_BIT 0
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FAST_STRING (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FAST_STRING_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_TCC_BIT 1
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_TCC (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_TCC_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_EMON_BIT 7
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_EMON (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_EMON_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_BTS_UNAVAIL_BIT 11
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_BTS_UNAVAIL (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_BTS_UNAVAIL_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PEBS_UNAVAIL_BIT 12
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PEBS_UNAVAIL (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PEBS_UNAVAIL_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_ENHANCED_SPEEDSTEP_BIT 16
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_ENHANCED_SPEEDSTEP (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_ENHANCED_SPEEDSTEP_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_MWAIT_BIT 18
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_MWAIT (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_MWAIT_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID_BIT 22
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XTPR_DISABLE_BIT 23
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XTPR_DISABLE (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XTPR_DISABLE_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE_BIT 34
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE_BIT)
/* MISC_ENABLE bits: model-specific, meaning may vary from core to core */
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_X87_COMPAT_BIT 2
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_X87_COMPAT (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_X87_COMPAT_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_TM1_BIT 3
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_TM1 (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_TM1_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_SPLIT_LOCK_DISABLE_BIT 4
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_SPLIT_LOCK_DISABLE (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_SPLIT_LOCK_DISABLE_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_L3CACHE_DISABLE_BIT 6
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_L3CACHE_DISABLE (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_L3CACHE_DISABLE_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_SUPPRESS_LOCK_BIT 8
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_SUPPRESS_LOCK (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_SUPPRESS_LOCK_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PREFETCH_DISABLE_BIT 9
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PREFETCH_DISABLE (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PREFETCH_DISABLE_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FERR_BIT 10
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FERR (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FERR_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FERR_MULTIPLEX_BIT 10
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FERR_MULTIPLEX (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FERR_MULTIPLEX_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_TM2_BIT 13
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_TM2 (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_TM2_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_ADJ_PREF_DISABLE_BIT 19
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_ADJ_PREF_DISABLE (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_ADJ_PREF_DISABLE_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_SPEEDSTEP_LOCK_BIT 20
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_SPEEDSTEP_LOCK (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_SPEEDSTEP_LOCK_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_L1D_CONTEXT_BIT 24
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_L1D_CONTEXT (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_L1D_CONTEXT_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_DCU_PREF_DISABLE_BIT 37
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_DCU_PREF_DISABLE (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_DCU_PREF_DISABLE_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_TURBO_DISABLE_BIT 38
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_TURBO_DISABLE (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_TURBO_DISABLE_BIT)
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_IP_PREF_DISABLE_BIT 39
#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_IP_PREF_DISABLE (1ULL << MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_IP_PREF_DISABLE_BIT)
/* MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES non-architectural features */
#define MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES 0x00000140
x86/arch_prctl: Add ARCH_[GET|SET]_CPUID Intel supports faulting on the CPUID instruction beginning with Ivy Bridge. When enabled, the processor will fault on attempts to execute the CPUID instruction with CPL>0. Exposing this feature to userspace will allow a ptracer to trap and emulate the CPUID instruction. When supported, this feature is controlled by toggling bit 0 of MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES. It is documented in detail in Section 2.3.2 of https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=243991 Implement a new pair of arch_prctls, available on both x86-32 and x86-64. ARCH_GET_CPUID: Returns the current CPUID state, either 0 if CPUID faulting is enabled (and thus the CPUID instruction is not available) or 1 if CPUID faulting is not enabled. ARCH_SET_CPUID: Set the CPUID state to the second argument. If cpuid_enabled is 0 CPUID faulting will be activated, otherwise it will be deactivated. Returns ENODEV if CPUID faulting is not supported on this system. The state of the CPUID faulting flag is propagated across forks, but reset upon exec. Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Cc: Grzegorz Andrejczuk <grzegorz.andrejczuk@intel.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Cc: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Cc: user-mode-linux-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: user-mode-linux-user@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@virtuozzo.com> Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320081628.18952-9-khuey@kylehuey.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
2017-03-20 17:16:26 +09:00
#define MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_CPUID_FAULT_BIT 0
#define MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_CPUID_FAULT BIT_ULL(MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_CPUID_FAULT_BIT)
#define MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_RING3MWAIT_BIT 1
#define MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE 0x000006E0
#define MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT 0x0000010F
#define MSR_TFA_RTM_FORCE_ABORT_BIT 0
#define MSR_TFA_RTM_FORCE_ABORT BIT_ULL(MSR_TFA_RTM_FORCE_ABORT_BIT)
/* P4/Xeon+ specific */
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_EAX 0x00000180
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_EBX 0x00000181
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_ECX 0x00000182
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_EDX 0x00000183
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_ESI 0x00000184
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_EDI 0x00000185
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_EBP 0x00000186
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_ESP 0x00000187
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_EFLAGS 0x00000188
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_EIP 0x00000189
#define MSR_IA32_MCG_RESERVED 0x0000018a
/* Pentium IV performance counter MSRs */
#define MSR_P4_BPU_PERFCTR0 0x00000300
#define MSR_P4_BPU_PERFCTR1 0x00000301
#define MSR_P4_BPU_PERFCTR2 0x00000302
#define MSR_P4_BPU_PERFCTR3 0x00000303
#define MSR_P4_MS_PERFCTR0 0x00000304
#define MSR_P4_MS_PERFCTR1 0x00000305
#define MSR_P4_MS_PERFCTR2 0x00000306
#define MSR_P4_MS_PERFCTR3 0x00000307
#define MSR_P4_FLAME_PERFCTR0 0x00000308
#define MSR_P4_FLAME_PERFCTR1 0x00000309
#define MSR_P4_FLAME_PERFCTR2 0x0000030a
#define MSR_P4_FLAME_PERFCTR3 0x0000030b
#define MSR_P4_IQ_PERFCTR0 0x0000030c
#define MSR_P4_IQ_PERFCTR1 0x0000030d
#define MSR_P4_IQ_PERFCTR2 0x0000030e
#define MSR_P4_IQ_PERFCTR3 0x0000030f
#define MSR_P4_IQ_PERFCTR4 0x00000310
#define MSR_P4_IQ_PERFCTR5 0x00000311
#define MSR_P4_BPU_CCCR0 0x00000360
#define MSR_P4_BPU_CCCR1 0x00000361
#define MSR_P4_BPU_CCCR2 0x00000362
#define MSR_P4_BPU_CCCR3 0x00000363
#define MSR_P4_MS_CCCR0 0x00000364
#define MSR_P4_MS_CCCR1 0x00000365
#define MSR_P4_MS_CCCR2 0x00000366
#define MSR_P4_MS_CCCR3 0x00000367
#define MSR_P4_FLAME_CCCR0 0x00000368
#define MSR_P4_FLAME_CCCR1 0x00000369
#define MSR_P4_FLAME_CCCR2 0x0000036a
#define MSR_P4_FLAME_CCCR3 0x0000036b
#define MSR_P4_IQ_CCCR0 0x0000036c
#define MSR_P4_IQ_CCCR1 0x0000036d
#define MSR_P4_IQ_CCCR2 0x0000036e
#define MSR_P4_IQ_CCCR3 0x0000036f
#define MSR_P4_IQ_CCCR4 0x00000370
#define MSR_P4_IQ_CCCR5 0x00000371
#define MSR_P4_ALF_ESCR0 0x000003ca
#define MSR_P4_ALF_ESCR1 0x000003cb
#define MSR_P4_BPU_ESCR0 0x000003b2
#define MSR_P4_BPU_ESCR1 0x000003b3
#define MSR_P4_BSU_ESCR0 0x000003a0
#define MSR_P4_BSU_ESCR1 0x000003a1
#define MSR_P4_CRU_ESCR0 0x000003b8
#define MSR_P4_CRU_ESCR1 0x000003b9
#define MSR_P4_CRU_ESCR2 0x000003cc
#define MSR_P4_CRU_ESCR3 0x000003cd
#define MSR_P4_CRU_ESCR4 0x000003e0
#define MSR_P4_CRU_ESCR5 0x000003e1
#define MSR_P4_DAC_ESCR0 0x000003a8
#define MSR_P4_DAC_ESCR1 0x000003a9
#define MSR_P4_FIRM_ESCR0 0x000003a4
#define MSR_P4_FIRM_ESCR1 0x000003a5
#define MSR_P4_FLAME_ESCR0 0x000003a6
#define MSR_P4_FLAME_ESCR1 0x000003a7
#define MSR_P4_FSB_ESCR0 0x000003a2
#define MSR_P4_FSB_ESCR1 0x000003a3
#define MSR_P4_IQ_ESCR0 0x000003ba
#define MSR_P4_IQ_ESCR1 0x000003bb
#define MSR_P4_IS_ESCR0 0x000003b4
#define MSR_P4_IS_ESCR1 0x000003b5
#define MSR_P4_ITLB_ESCR0 0x000003b6
#define MSR_P4_ITLB_ESCR1 0x000003b7
#define MSR_P4_IX_ESCR0 0x000003c8
#define MSR_P4_IX_ESCR1 0x000003c9
#define MSR_P4_MOB_ESCR0 0x000003aa
#define MSR_P4_MOB_ESCR1 0x000003ab
#define MSR_P4_MS_ESCR0 0x000003c0
#define MSR_P4_MS_ESCR1 0x000003c1
#define MSR_P4_PMH_ESCR0 0x000003ac
#define MSR_P4_PMH_ESCR1 0x000003ad
#define MSR_P4_RAT_ESCR0 0x000003bc
#define MSR_P4_RAT_ESCR1 0x000003bd
#define MSR_P4_SAAT_ESCR0 0x000003ae
#define MSR_P4_SAAT_ESCR1 0x000003af
#define MSR_P4_SSU_ESCR0 0x000003be
#define MSR_P4_SSU_ESCR1 0x000003bf /* guess: not in manual */
#define MSR_P4_TBPU_ESCR0 0x000003c2
#define MSR_P4_TBPU_ESCR1 0x000003c3
#define MSR_P4_TC_ESCR0 0x000003c4
#define MSR_P4_TC_ESCR1 0x000003c5
#define MSR_P4_U2L_ESCR0 0x000003b0
#define MSR_P4_U2L_ESCR1 0x000003b1
#define MSR_P4_PEBS_MATRIX_VERT 0x000003f2
/* Intel Core-based CPU performance counters */
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR0 0x00000309
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR1 0x0000030a
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR2 0x0000030b
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR_CTRL 0x0000038d
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_STATUS 0x0000038e
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL 0x0000038f
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL 0x00000390
/* PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTL bits */
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_TRACE_TOPA_PMI_BIT 55
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_TRACE_TOPA_PMI (1ULL << MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_TRACE_TOPA_PMI_BIT)
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_OVF_BUF_BIT 62
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_OVF_BUF (1ULL << MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_OVF_BUF_BIT)
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_COND_CHGD_BIT 63
#define MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_COND_CHGD (1ULL << MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL_COND_CHGD_BIT)
/* Geode defined MSRs */
#define MSR_GEODE_BUSCONT_CONF0 0x00001900
/* Intel VT MSRs */
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC 0x00000480
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS 0x00000481
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS 0x00000482
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS 0x00000483
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS 0x00000484
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC 0x00000485
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED0 0x00000486
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_CR0_FIXED1 0x00000487
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED0 0x00000488
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_CR4_FIXED1 0x00000489
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_VMCS_ENUM 0x0000048a
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2 0x0000048b
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP 0x0000048c
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PINBASED_CTLS 0x0000048d
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_PROCBASED_CTLS 0x0000048e
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS 0x0000048f
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS 0x00000490
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC 0x00000491
/* VMX_BASIC bits and bitmasks */
#define VMX_BASIC_VMCS_SIZE_SHIFT 32
#define VMX_BASIC_TRUE_CTLS (1ULL << 55)
#define VMX_BASIC_64 0x0001000000000000LLU
#define VMX_BASIC_MEM_TYPE_SHIFT 50
#define VMX_BASIC_MEM_TYPE_MASK 0x003c000000000000LLU
#define VMX_BASIC_MEM_TYPE_WB 6LLU
#define VMX_BASIC_INOUT 0x0040000000000000LLU
/* MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC bits */
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC_INTEL_PT (1ULL << 14)
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC_VMWRITE_SHADOW_RO_FIELDS (1ULL << 29)
#define MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC_PREEMPTION_TIMER_SCALE 0x1F
/* AMD-V MSRs */
#define MSR_VM_CR 0xc0010114
#define MSR_VM_IGNNE 0xc0010115
#define MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA 0xc0010117
#endif /* _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H */