linux-brain/arch/s390/include/asm/processor.h

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License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2017-11-01 23:07:57 +09:00
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* S390 version
* Copyright IBM Corp. 1999
* Author(s): Hartmut Penner (hp@de.ibm.com),
* Martin Schwidefsky (schwidefsky@de.ibm.com)
*
* Derived from "include/asm-i386/processor.h"
* Copyright (C) 1994, Linus Torvalds
*/
#ifndef __ASM_S390_PROCESSOR_H
#define __ASM_S390_PROCESSOR_H
#include <linux/bits.h>
#define CIF_MCCK_PENDING 0 /* machine check handling is pending */
#define CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY 1 /* primary asce needs fixup / uaccess */
#define CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY 2 /* secondary asce needs fixup / uaccess */
#define CIF_NOHZ_DELAY 3 /* delay HZ disable for a tick */
#define CIF_FPU 4 /* restore FPU registers */
#define CIF_IGNORE_IRQ 5 /* ignore interrupt (for udelay) */
#define CIF_ENABLED_WAIT 6 /* in enabled wait state */
#define CIF_MCCK_GUEST 7 /* machine check happening in guest */
#define CIF_DEDICATED_CPU 8 /* this CPU is dedicated */
#define _CIF_MCCK_PENDING BIT(CIF_MCCK_PENDING)
#define _CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY BIT(CIF_ASCE_PRIMARY)
#define _CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY BIT(CIF_ASCE_SECONDARY)
#define _CIF_NOHZ_DELAY BIT(CIF_NOHZ_DELAY)
#define _CIF_FPU BIT(CIF_FPU)
#define _CIF_IGNORE_IRQ BIT(CIF_IGNORE_IRQ)
#define _CIF_ENABLED_WAIT BIT(CIF_ENABLED_WAIT)
#define _CIF_MCCK_GUEST BIT(CIF_MCCK_GUEST)
#define _CIF_DEDICATED_CPU BIT(CIF_DEDICATED_CPU)
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/linkage.h>
#include <linux/irqflags.h>
#include <asm/cpu.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
#include <asm/runtime_instr.h>
#include <asm/fpu/types.h>
#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
static inline void set_cpu_flag(int flag)
{
S390_lowcore.cpu_flags |= (1UL << flag);
}
static inline void clear_cpu_flag(int flag)
{
S390_lowcore.cpu_flags &= ~(1UL << flag);
}
static inline int test_cpu_flag(int flag)
{
return !!(S390_lowcore.cpu_flags & (1UL << flag));
}
/*
* Test CIF flag of another CPU. The caller needs to ensure that
* CPU hotplug can not happen, e.g. by disabling preemption.
*/
static inline int test_cpu_flag_of(int flag, int cpu)
{
struct lowcore *lc = lowcore_ptr[cpu];
return !!(lc->cpu_flags & (1UL << flag));
}
#define arch_needs_cpu() test_cpu_flag(CIF_NOHZ_DELAY)
static inline void get_cpu_id(struct cpuid *ptr)
{
asm volatile("stidp %0" : "=Q" (*ptr));
}
void s390_adjust_jiffies(void);
void s390_update_cpu_mhz(void);
void cpu_detect_mhz_feature(void);
extern const struct seq_operations cpuinfo_op;
extern int sysctl_ieee_emulation_warnings;
extern void execve_tail(void);
extern void __bpon(void);
/*
* User space process size: 2GB for 31 bit, 4TB or 8PT for 64 bit.
*/
#define TASK_SIZE_OF(tsk) (test_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_31BIT) ? \
(1UL << 31) : -PAGE_SIZE)
#define TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE (test_thread_flag(TIF_31BIT) ? \
(1UL << 30) : (1UL << 41))
#define TASK_SIZE TASK_SIZE_OF(current)
#define TASK_SIZE_MAX (-PAGE_SIZE)
#define STACK_TOP (test_thread_flag(TIF_31BIT) ? \
(1UL << 31) : (1UL << 42))
#define STACK_TOP_MAX (1UL << 42)
#define HAVE_ARCH_PICK_MMAP_LAYOUT
s390: remove all code using the access register mode The vdso code for the getcpu() and the clock_gettime() call use the access register mode to access the per-CPU vdso data page with the current code. An alternative to the complicated AR mode is to use the secondary space mode. This makes the vdso faster and quite a bit simpler. The downside is that the uaccess code has to be changed quite a bit. Which instructions are used depends on the machine and what kind of uaccess operation is requested. The instruction dictates which ASCE value needs to be loaded into %cr1 and %cr7. The different cases: * User copy with MVCOS for z10 and newer machines The MVCOS instruction can copy between the primary space (aka user) and the home space (aka kernel) directly. For set_fs(KERNEL_DS) the kernel ASCE is loaded into %cr1. For set_fs(USER_DS) the user space is already loaded in %cr1. * User copy with MVCP/MVCS for older machines To be able to execute the MVCP/MVCS instructions the kernel needs to switch to primary mode. The control register %cr1 has to be set to the kernel ASCE and %cr7 to either the kernel ASCE or the user ASCE dependent on set_fs(KERNEL_DS) vs set_fs(USER_DS). * Data access in the user address space for strnlen / futex To use "normal" instruction with data from the user address space the secondary space mode is used. The kernel needs to switch to primary mode, %cr1 has to contain the kernel ASCE and %cr7 either the user ASCE or the kernel ASCE, dependent on set_fs. To load a new value into %cr1 or %cr7 is an expensive operation, the kernel tries to be lazy about it. E.g. for multiple user copies in a row with MVCP/MVCS the replacement of the vdso ASCE in %cr7 with the user ASCE is done only once. On return to user space a CPU bit is checked that loads the vdso ASCE again. To enable and disable the data access via the secondary space two new functions are added, enable_sacf_uaccess and disable_sacf_uaccess. The fact that a context is in secondary space uaccess mode is stored in the mm_segment_t value for the task. The code of an interrupt may use set_fs as long as it returns to the previous state it got with get_fs with another call to set_fs. The code in finish_arch_post_lock_switch simply has to do a set_fs with the current mm_segment_t value for the task. For CPUs with MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode, lazy | user | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | For CPUs without MVCOS: CPU running in | %cr1 ASCE | %cr7 ASCE | --------------------------------------|-----------|-----------| user space | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode | user | vdso | kernel, USER_DS, normal-mode lazy | kernel | user | kernel, USER_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | user | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode | kernel | vdso | kernel, KERNEL_DS, normal-mode, lazy | kernel | kernel | kernel, KERNEL_DS, sacf-mode | kernel | kernel | The lines with "lazy" refer to the state after a copy via the secondary space with a delayed reload of %cr1 and %cr7. There are three hardware address spaces that can cause a DAT exception, primary, secondary and home space. The exception can be related to four different fault types: user space fault, vdso fault, kernel fault, and the gmap faults. Dependent on the set_fs state and normal vs. sacf mode there are a number of fault combinations: 1) user address space fault via the primary ASCE 2) gmap address space fault via the primary ASCE 3) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for machines with MVCOS and set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 4) vdso address space faults via the secondary ASCE with an invalid address while running in secondary space in problem state 5) user address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy based on the secondary space mode, e.g. futex_ops or strnlen_user 6) kernel address space fault via the secondary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(KERNEL_DS) 7) kernel address space fault via the primary ASCE for user-copy with secondary space mode with set_fs(USER_DS) on machines without MVCOS. 8) kernel address space fault via the home space ASCE Replace user_space_fault() with a new function get_fault_type() that can distinguish all four different fault types. With these changes the futex atomic ops from the kernel and the strnlen_user will get a little bit slower, as well as the old style uaccess with MVCP/MVCS. All user accesses based on MVCOS will be as fast as before. On the positive side, the user space vdso code is a lot faster and Linux ceases to use the complicated AR mode. Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
2017-08-22 19:08:22 +09:00
typedef unsigned int mm_segment_t;
/*
* Thread structure
*/
struct thread_struct {
unsigned int acrs[NUM_ACRS];
unsigned long ksp; /* kernel stack pointer */
unsigned long user_timer; /* task cputime in user space */
2017-01-06 02:11:49 +09:00
unsigned long guest_timer; /* task cputime in kvm guest */
unsigned long system_timer; /* task cputime in kernel space */
2017-01-06 02:11:49 +09:00
unsigned long hardirq_timer; /* task cputime in hardirq context */
unsigned long softirq_timer; /* task cputime in softirq context */
unsigned long sys_call_table; /* system call table address */
mm_segment_t mm_segment;
unsigned long gmap_addr; /* address of last gmap fault. */
s390/mm: add shadow gmap support For a nested KVM guest the outer KVM host needs to create shadow page tables for the nested guest. This patch adds the basic support to the guest address space (gmap) code. For each guest address space the inner KVM host creates, the first outer KVM host needs to create shadow page tables. The address space is identified by the ASCE loaded into the control register 1 at the time the inner SIE instruction for the second nested KVM guest is executed. The outer KVM host creates the shadow tables starting with the table identified by the ASCE on a on-demand basis. The outer KVM host will get repeated faults for all the shadow tables needed to run the second KVM guest. While a shadow page table for the second KVM guest is active the access to the origin region, segment and page tables needs to be restricted for the first KVM guest. For region and segment and page tables the first KVM guest may read the memory, but write attempt has to lead to an unshadow. This is done using the page invalid and read-only bits in the page table of the first KVM guest. If the first guest re-accesses one of the origin pages of a shadow, it gets a fault and the affected parts of the shadow page table hierarchy needs to be removed again. PGSTE tables don't have to be shadowed, as all interpretation assist can't deal with the invalid bits in the shadow pte being set differently than the original ones provided by the first KVM guest. Many bug fixes and improvements by David Hildenbrand. Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
2016-03-08 20:12:18 +09:00
unsigned int gmap_write_flag; /* gmap fault write indication */
unsigned int gmap_int_code; /* int code of last gmap fault */
unsigned int gmap_pfault; /* signal of a pending guest pfault */
/* Per-thread information related to debugging */
struct per_regs per_user; /* User specified PER registers */
struct per_event per_event; /* Cause of the last PER trap */
unsigned long per_flags; /* Flags to control debug behavior */
unsigned int system_call; /* system call number in signal */
unsigned long last_break; /* last breaking-event-address. */
/* pfault_wait is used to block the process on a pfault event */
unsigned long pfault_wait;
struct list_head list;
/* cpu runtime instrumentation */
struct runtime_instr_cb *ri_cb;
s390: add a system call for guarded storage This adds a new system call to enable the use of guarded storage for user space processes. The system call takes two arguments, a command and pointer to a guarded storage control block: s390_guarded_storage(int command, struct gs_cb *gs_cb); The second argument is relevant only for the GS_SET_BC_CB command. The commands in detail: 0 - GS_ENABLE Enable the guarded storage facility for the current task. The initial content of the guarded storage control block will be all zeros. After the enablement the user space code can use load-guarded-storage-controls instruction (LGSC) to load an arbitrary control block. While a task is enabled the kernel will save and restore the current content of the guarded storage registers on context switch. 1 - GS_DISABLE Disables the use of the guarded storage facility for the current task. The kernel will cease to save and restore the content of the guarded storage registers, the task specific content of these registers is lost. 2 - GS_SET_BC_CB Set a broadcast guarded storage control block. This is called per thread and stores a specific guarded storage control block in the task struct of the current task. This control block will be used for the broadcast event GS_BROADCAST. 3 - GS_CLEAR_BC_CB Clears the broadcast guarded storage control block. The guarded- storage control block is removed from the task struct that was established by GS_SET_BC_CB. 4 - GS_BROADCAST Sends a broadcast to all thread siblings of the current task. Every sibling that has established a broadcast guarded storage control block will load this control block and will be enabled for guarded storage. The broadcast guarded storage control block is used up, a second broadcast without a refresh of the stored control block with GS_SET_BC_CB will not have any effect. Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2016-01-26 22:10:34 +09:00
struct gs_cb *gs_cb; /* Current guarded storage cb */
struct gs_cb *gs_bc_cb; /* Broadcast guarded storage cb */
unsigned char trap_tdb[256]; /* Transaction abort diagnose block */
/*
* Warning: 'fpu' is dynamically-sized. It *MUST* be at
* the end.
*/
struct fpu fpu; /* FP and VX register save area */
};
/* Flag to disable transactions. */
#define PER_FLAG_NO_TE 1UL
/* Flag to enable random transaction aborts. */
#define PER_FLAG_TE_ABORT_RAND 2UL
/* Flag to specify random transaction abort mode:
* - abort each transaction at a random instruction before TEND if set.
* - abort random transactions at a random instruction if cleared.
*/
#define PER_FLAG_TE_ABORT_RAND_TEND 4UL
typedef struct thread_struct thread_struct;
#define ARCH_MIN_TASKALIGN 8
#define INIT_THREAD { \
.ksp = sizeof(init_stack) + (unsigned long) &init_stack, \
.fpu.regs = (void *) init_task.thread.fpu.fprs, \
.last_break = 1, \
}
/*
* Do necessary setup to start up a new thread.
*/
#define start_thread(regs, new_psw, new_stackp) do { \
regs->psw.mask = PSW_USER_BITS | PSW_MASK_EA | PSW_MASK_BA; \
regs->psw.addr = new_psw; \
regs->gprs[15] = new_stackp; \
execve_tail(); \
} while (0)
#define start_thread31(regs, new_psw, new_stackp) do { \
regs->psw.mask = PSW_USER_BITS | PSW_MASK_BA; \
regs->psw.addr = new_psw; \
regs->gprs[15] = new_stackp; \
s390/mm: fix asce_bits handling with dynamic pagetable levels There is a race with multi-threaded applications between context switch and pagetable upgrade. In switch_mm() a new user_asce is built from mm->pgd and mm->context.asce_bits, w/o holding any locks. A concurrent mmap with a pagetable upgrade on another thread in crst_table_upgrade() could already have set new asce_bits, but not yet the new mm->pgd. This would result in a corrupt user_asce in switch_mm(), and eventually in a kernel panic from a translation exception. Fix this by storing the complete asce instead of just the asce_bits, which can then be read atomically from switch_mm(), so that it either sees the old value or the new value, but no mixture. Both cases are OK. Having the old value would result in a page fault on access to the higher level memory, but the fault handler would see the new mm->pgd, if it was a valid access after the mmap on the other thread has completed. So as worst-case scenario we would have a page fault loop for the racing thread until the next time slice. Also remove dead code and simplify the upgrade/downgrade path, there are no upgrades from 2 levels, and only downgrades from 3 levels for compat tasks. There are also no concurrent upgrades, because the mmap_sem is held with down_write() in do_mmap, so the flush and table checks during upgrade can be removed. Reported-by: Michael Munday <munday@ca.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Gerald Schaefer <gerald.schaefer@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2016-04-15 23:38:40 +09:00
crst_table_downgrade(current->mm); \
execve_tail(); \
} while (0)
/* Forward declaration, a strange C thing */
struct task_struct;
struct mm_struct;
struct seq_file;
struct pt_regs;
void show_registers(struct pt_regs *regs);
void show_cacheinfo(struct seq_file *m);
/* Free all resources held by a thread. */
static inline void release_thread(struct task_struct *tsk) { }
/* Free guarded storage control block */
void guarded_storage_release(struct task_struct *tsk);
s390: add a system call for guarded storage This adds a new system call to enable the use of guarded storage for user space processes. The system call takes two arguments, a command and pointer to a guarded storage control block: s390_guarded_storage(int command, struct gs_cb *gs_cb); The second argument is relevant only for the GS_SET_BC_CB command. The commands in detail: 0 - GS_ENABLE Enable the guarded storage facility for the current task. The initial content of the guarded storage control block will be all zeros. After the enablement the user space code can use load-guarded-storage-controls instruction (LGSC) to load an arbitrary control block. While a task is enabled the kernel will save and restore the current content of the guarded storage registers on context switch. 1 - GS_DISABLE Disables the use of the guarded storage facility for the current task. The kernel will cease to save and restore the content of the guarded storage registers, the task specific content of these registers is lost. 2 - GS_SET_BC_CB Set a broadcast guarded storage control block. This is called per thread and stores a specific guarded storage control block in the task struct of the current task. This control block will be used for the broadcast event GS_BROADCAST. 3 - GS_CLEAR_BC_CB Clears the broadcast guarded storage control block. The guarded- storage control block is removed from the task struct that was established by GS_SET_BC_CB. 4 - GS_BROADCAST Sends a broadcast to all thread siblings of the current task. Every sibling that has established a broadcast guarded storage control block will load this control block and will be enabled for guarded storage. The broadcast guarded storage control block is used up, a second broadcast without a refresh of the stored control block with GS_SET_BC_CB will not have any effect. Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
2016-01-26 22:10:34 +09:00
unsigned long get_wchan(struct task_struct *p);
#define task_pt_regs(tsk) ((struct pt_regs *) \
(task_stack_page(tsk) + THREAD_SIZE) - 1)
#define KSTK_EIP(tsk) (task_pt_regs(tsk)->psw.addr)
#define KSTK_ESP(tsk) (task_pt_regs(tsk)->gprs[15])
/* Has task runtime instrumentation enabled ? */
#define is_ri_task(tsk) (!!(tsk)->thread.ri_cb)
static inline unsigned long current_stack_pointer(void)
{
unsigned long sp;
asm volatile("la %0,0(15)" : "=a" (sp));
return sp;
}
static __always_inline unsigned short stap(void)
{
unsigned short cpu_address;
asm volatile("stap %0" : "=Q" (cpu_address));
return cpu_address;
}
#define cpu_relax() barrier()
#define ECAG_CACHE_ATTRIBUTE 0
#define ECAG_CPU_ATTRIBUTE 1
static inline unsigned long __ecag(unsigned int asi, unsigned char parm)
{
unsigned long val;
asm volatile(".insn rsy,0xeb000000004c,%0,0,0(%1)" /* ecag */
: "=d" (val) : "a" (asi << 8 | parm));
return val;
}
static inline void psw_set_key(unsigned int key)
{
asm volatile("spka 0(%0)" : : "d" (key));
}
/*
* Set PSW to specified value.
*/
static inline void __load_psw(psw_t psw)
{
asm volatile("lpswe %0" : : "Q" (psw) : "cc");
}
/*
* Set PSW mask to specified value, while leaving the
* PSW addr pointing to the next instruction.
*/
static __always_inline void __load_psw_mask(unsigned long mask)
{
unsigned long addr;
psw_t psw;
psw.mask = mask;
asm volatile(
" larl %0,1f\n"
" stg %0,%1\n"
" lpswe %2\n"
"1:"
: "=&d" (addr), "=Q" (psw.addr) : "Q" (psw) : "memory", "cc");
}
/*
* Extract current PSW mask
*/
static inline unsigned long __extract_psw(void)
{
unsigned int reg1, reg2;
asm volatile("epsw %0,%1" : "=d" (reg1), "=a" (reg2));
return (((unsigned long) reg1) << 32) | ((unsigned long) reg2);
}
static inline void local_mcck_enable(void)
{
__load_psw_mask(__extract_psw() | PSW_MASK_MCHECK);
}
static inline void local_mcck_disable(void)
{
__load_psw_mask(__extract_psw() & ~PSW_MASK_MCHECK);
}
/*
* Rewind PSW instruction address by specified number of bytes.
*/
static inline unsigned long __rewind_psw(psw_t psw, unsigned long ilc)
{
unsigned long mask;
mask = (psw.mask & PSW_MASK_EA) ? -1UL :
(psw.mask & PSW_MASK_BA) ? (1UL << 31) - 1 :
(1UL << 24) - 1;
return (psw.addr - ilc) & mask;
}
/*
* Function to stop a processor until the next interrupt occurs
*/
void enabled_wait(void);
/*
* Function to drop a processor into disabled wait state
*/
static inline void __noreturn disabled_wait(void)
{
psw_t psw;
psw.mask = PSW_MASK_BASE | PSW_MASK_WAIT | PSW_MASK_BA | PSW_MASK_EA;
psw.addr = _THIS_IP_;
__load_psw(psw);
while (1);
}
/*
* Basic Machine Check/Program Check Handler.
*/
extern void s390_base_pgm_handler(void);
extern void s390_base_ext_handler(void);
extern void (*s390_base_pgm_handler_fn)(void);
extern void (*s390_base_ext_handler_fn)(void);
#define ARCH_LOW_ADDRESS_LIMIT 0x7fffffffUL
extern int memcpy_real(void *, void *, size_t);
extern void memcpy_absolute(void *, void *, size_t);
#define mem_assign_absolute(dest, val) do { \
__typeof__(dest) __tmp = (val); \
\
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(__tmp) != sizeof(val)); \
memcpy_absolute(&(dest), &__tmp, sizeof(__tmp)); \
} while (0)
extern int s390_isolate_bp(void);
extern int s390_isolate_bp_guest(void);
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#endif /* __ASM_S390_PROCESSOR_H */